Employment Rights Bill

Debate between Baroness Jones of Whitchurch and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Committee stage
Wednesday 21st May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Young of Acton for his expert introduction to the amendments in this group. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Monks, about common sense, but I fear that went out of the window of an employment tribunal some years ago. As my noble friend Lord Young laid out in an earlier group, this Bill threatens to restrict free expression in some cases with its provisions. It is for this reason that I support the amendments, which seek to safeguard political opinion and affiliation within our employment laws.

At the heart of any thriving democracy lies the freedom to hold and express political beliefs without fear of retribution. In a democratic society, freedom of speech and freedom of belief are not luxuries; they are fundamental rights that underpin our entire system of governance and civil life. The workplace, where so many of us spend a significant portion of our lives, must be a space where individuals can hold and express their political views without fear of unfair treatment or dismissal. As it stands, our existing laws provide only patchy protections for political beliefs, and they leave many workers vulnerable. My noble friend Lord Young’s examples are truly shocking, and I would like to take this opportunity to wish, in particular, Mr Poursaeedi well in his ongoing battles.

We should draw upon the timeless wisdom of John Stuart Mill, who was one of the great architects of liberalism. He argued in his seminal work On Liberty that the truth emerges only through free and open debate, and he warned against the suppression of any opinion, because no one person or group holds a monopoly on truth. Even opinions that we may find mistaken—perhaps such as democratic socialism—or indeed offensive, must be heard and challenged openly, for only through such dialogue can society discern truth from error. Voltaire was right on this. I must admit I find it a bit disappointing that the Liberal Democrat Benches are not more enthusiastic about these amendments.

By protecting employees from dismissal or discrimination based on their political opinions or affiliations, these amendments would ensure that the workplace remains a forum where diverse ideas can be expressed, scrutinised and debated. Suppressing political expression risks silencing valuable perspectives and preventing the emergence of truth through robust discussion.

We in this House pride ourselves on opening our minds to a broad range of political views. Obviously, that involves robust engagement, challenging each other and refining our positions through vigorous debate. If such diversity of opinion is essential to the functioning of this Chamber, why would it not apply beyond these walls, and particularly in other workplaces? Workers, like us, should be free to express their political beliefs without fear of losing their jobs or being discriminated against.

In conclusion, I urge the Government to accept my noble friend’s amendments. To go back to the great liberal John Stuart Mill, he also said:

“A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly accountable to them for the injury”.


This is not the time for inaction. These amendments not only would protect workers from unfair dismissal and discrimination but would uphold our fundamental democratic values. By embedding these protections into our laws, we would reaffirm our commitment to free expression. I am afraid saying just that they are not necessary is not good enough. They clearly are necessary, as we heard in the examples from my noble friend.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade and Department for Science, Information and Technology (Baroness Jones of Whitchurch) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. I think it would be helpful if I first clarify where the law stands on this.

On Amendment 101B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, let me make it clear that religious and philosophical beliefs are already protected by the Equality Act 2010, including in the workplace. However, political belief—in the sense of a party-political affiliation or opinion—was not included as a protected characteristic in the Equality Act 2010. The noble Lord referred to the Grainger case. That case and the definition that the noble Lord read out referred to the issue of philosophical belief, which is already protected by the Act.

In 2015-16, the Equality and Human Rights Commission reviewed whether Great Britain’s equality and human rights legal framework sufficiently protects individuals with a religion or belief and the distinction of a religion or belief organisation while balancing the rights of others protected under the Equality Act 2010. The review found that the definition of religion or belief in the Equality Act is sufficiently broad to ensure wide protection for many religions or beliefs. It recommended no change to the definition of religion or belief or to the approach that the court should take in deciding whether any particular belief is protected under the Act.

We are not convinced that a political opinion or affiliation should be specifically protected by amendment to the Equality Act 2010 in contrast to other religions or beliefs. The extent of protected beliefs has been developed in case law, and we have not been presented with strong evidence that any legislative amendment is necessary. The amendment the noble Lord is proposing would potentially cause legal uncertainty over its relationship to the protected characteristic of religion or belief in Section 10 of the Equality Act, which has a much wider application than just the workplace.

The Government frequently receive calls for new protected characteristics—there have been over 21 suggested to date. While some of these carry merit, it simply would not be practical to include these all in the legislation, which would quickly become unmanageable for employers and service providers to follow, and for courts and tribunals to process and judge.

The noble Lord referred to the European Convention on Human Rights. The courts and tribunals will always be required to balance competing rights on the facts of a particular case, including the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and freedom of expression under Articles 9 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as academic freedom.

Noble Lords have referred to a number of individual cases. They will appreciate that I cannot comment on individual cases. However, I can assure them that free speech is a cornerstone of British values. We are firmly committed to upholding the right of freedom of expression, which is protected by Article 10. I also absolutely agree with my noble friend Lord Monks that, in many cases—and preferably in all cases—it is ideal for these issues to be resolved by common sense at the workplace.

Turning to Amendment 141A, I seek to reassure the noble Lord that further legislative provision on this matter is not needed. Through the Bill, the Government are creating a day one right against unfair dismissal. As the noble Lord, Lord Young, acknowledged in his explanatory statement, additional protections for employees already exist under Section 108(4) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, which currently ensures that claims for unfair dismissal on the grounds of political opinion or affiliation are not subject to any qualification period. I can reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that, while dismissal on the grounds of political beliefs and affiliations is not automatically unfair, if brought to a tribunal, the tribunal could find that it was unfair based on the circumstances at hand.

As we have said, these issues will very often have to be decided by a tribunal, based on the facts of the case. This will obviously also have to apply to the noble Lord’s amendment as well. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that the delays in employment tribunals are a very real challenge that we are very conscious of, and we have already reported elsewhere in other debates on the Bill that we are taking steps to address this.

Relevant case law sets out the circumstances where political beliefs may constitute a philosophical belief for the purpose of the Equality Act 2010. In these cases, discrimination provisions could apply. Following a judgment from the European Court of Human Rights, the qualifying period for bringing a claim of unfair dismissal relating to political opinions or affiliation was removed, further strengthening employees’ access to justice in instances of unfair dismissal based on political views. The Bill ensures that claims for dismissal on this basis continue to be treated in the same way as claims for automatic unfair dismissal by carving them out in a new Section 108A from the requirement that any employee must have started work before a claim can be brought.

We regard this as the right approach. Making dismissal for political opinions automatically unfair, as this amendment seeks to do, would fundamentally change the way that free speech is considered in relation to dismissal for the holding of views or the expression of views that the employer regards as unacceptable. It could sweep up such a wide range of views as to be unworkable. As sufficient protection against dismissal for political beliefs already exists, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw Amendment 101B.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and my noble friends Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lord Lucas for their amendments and their thoughtful contributions in this group. It has been a most interesting debate. I will speak to my Amendments 103, 113 and 123.

I completely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, that it would be much better to get this right now rather than pursuing Amendment 103 in particular, which returns to the Government’s insufficient impact assessment. The assessment that has been produced states that this provision will have one of the highest impacts, yet, as we have mentioned before, the Regulatory Policy Committee has given the Government’s analysis in this section a red rating. The RPC’s critique is not a matter of minor technicalities because it identifies serious deficiencies in the Government’s case for intervention in the options that they have considered and in the justification for the policy that they propose. The Government’s impact assessment admits that it lacks robust data on dismissal rates for employees with under two years’ service. To answer the question from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, there is no evidence for that. It proceeds regardless, however, with only superficial reference to “asymmetric information” and without any substantive analysis of any market failure.

The RPC highlights the impact assessment’s failure to consider how long-serving employees might view the equalisation of rights for new joiners—an issue of fairness and workplace cohesion that the Government have ignored. The impact assessment itself mentions that options such as reducing the qualifying period to 18 months or one year were considered and rejected without detailed assessment. No real exploration of probation periods was provided. That is not a balanced appraisal of possible alternatives; it is a justification for a predetermined decision.

On the justification of the preferred option, the impact assessment is again found lacking. The RPC calls for clarity on the costs to businesses—the costs of managing performance, handling disputes and the increased settlements to avoid tribunal risks. It also questions whether the Government have considered evidence from existing unfair dismissal claims and how risks might vary across sectors or job types, particularly in roles where reputational damage from a claim might deter employers from hiring at all.

More significantly, the Government have not addressed indirect and dynamic labour impacts, such as whether day-one rights might lead to more cautious hiring, greater use of temporary contracts or weaker overall job security. These are not abstract concerns as they go to the heart of how this policy might reshape employment relationships across the country. Noble Lords might be interested in a real example. I was talking this morning to a senior executive at a FTSE 100 company. It is an exemplary employer in every way; for example, offering many day-one rights. But this year—partly as a result of the jobs tax but also in anticipation of the Bill—it has reduced its hiring by 84%. I repeat that for the record: 84%. This is not abstract or theoretical. This is real, this is now.

It is important to note that these likely labour market impacts are not accounted for in the £5 billion cost to businesses, so the real cost is likely to be significantly higher. The result is a policy with high ambition but little practical clarity, as the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, has just noted. How will unfair dismissal rights interact with a statutory probationary period? Will employers still have access to the same set of fair reasons for dismissal? Will there be a different threshold for acting reasonably during probation? Can probation be extended if needed? None of those questions has been clearly answered.

The noble Lord, Lord Leong, reminded us of the light-touch, nine-month proposal, but what does that mean in practice? My noble friend Lady Meyer asked that. At the same time, the Government’s own analysis predicts that granting day-one rights for unfair dismissal alone will result in a 15% increase in employment tribunal claims. Using the statistics given by the noble Lord, Lord Barber, that is an additional 750 claims per year, on top of the 50,000 backlog already waiting 18 months to two years. The noble Lord argued that this is, in effect, a statistical irrelevance, but it is not to the 750 business owners who are being dragged through courts. That is a substantial impact. It represents direct costs to businesses in terms of time, legal risk and, of course, the chilling effect on recruitment.

The tribunal system itself needs to be looked at. Without significant new investment it is hard to see how the system will cope with this 15% increase. The result could be longer delays, greater costs and justice deferred for all parties. In an earlier group we heard about a case that is going to take more than two years to come before a tribunal. Yet the Government intend to bring these changes into force in 2026. On what basis? There is nothing in the impact assessment that explains why 2026 has been chosen or how the system will be ready by then. Businesses will need time to revise contracts, restructure probation processes and train managers on the new rules. What assessment has been made of whether 2026 is realistic, with all those things in mind? What engagement has been carried out with employers, particularly SMEs, about what implementation will require?

It is not unreasonable to ask the Government to explain how the timeline was determined and whether it is genuinely achievable, given the lack of clarity in both the policy detail and the supporting evidence. We all agree that employees deserve fair treatment, particularly in the vulnerable early stages of employment, but employers must also have a reasonable opportunity to assess performance, capability and suitability without the immediate threat of litigation.

We have established that there is no evidence for any of this clause. In fact, when the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, was arguing his point, he said that it is very difficult anyway for employees to take a case to an employment tribunal. The noble Lord, Lord Barber, as I just mentioned, said it is, in effect, a statistical irrelevance. If there is no evidence, it is too difficult and it is a statistical irrelevance, why are we bothering at all?

I want to raise a final point that others, particularly my noble friends Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lady Noakes, have referred to. It is not just about the policy itself; it is a more troubling concern. The policy will create unintended incentives, but for whom? It is not just about employers scaling back hiring overall but about who they stop hiring. If we remove the qualifying period for unfair dismissal and provide no workable probationary mechanism, we tilt the hiring incentives away from risk-taking, as we have heard. It will, in effect, stop employers taking a punt.

Right now, a small business owner might be willing to take that chance on someone with no formal qualifications, or from a non-traditional background, or re-entering the workforce after a time away. That chance exists because the employer has a short window to assess their suitability—and vice versa, of course—before facing the full weight of employment litigation risk. If that safety net is removed and exposure begins from day one and the probationary period lacks clarity or legal protection, that same employer will think twice. They will play it safe.

Noble Lords opposite should pay attention to those of us who have employed people. It is a simple fact. Who is going to suffer? It is not the already advantaged candidate with a polished CV. It is the young person with gaps in education, the career switcher with no references, the working parent returning after years out of the labour market, or the person coming back to work after a long period of illness. Noble Lords opposite should reread the speech given by my noble friend Lord Elliott, with his experience of the Jobs Foundation. He explained this much more eloquently than I just have. Those are the people who benefit from flexibility and second chances and who may now find those doors quietly closed.

This goes to the heart of social mobility and genuine workplace diversity. I would like to ask the Government a rhetorical question: have they considered the incentives this policy creates? If they have not—both common-sense experience of real working life in the private sector and, indeed, the RPC suggest that they have not—we risk designing a policy that sounds progressive but, in practice, reduces opportunity for the very groups that we should be helping the most. We need a decent impact assessment, and my amendment would allow for it.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. As there have been a number of questions about our intentions with these clauses, I think it would be helpful to clarify them and put them on the record.

Clause 23 introduces Schedule 3 and repeals Section 108 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, thereby removing the two-year qualifying period for protection against unfair dismissal. Schedule 3 further amends the 1996 Act, including the introduction of a statutory probationary period in legislation. Schedule 3 also removes the two-year qualifying period for the right to request written reasons for dismissal. Any employee who has been dismissed after the statutory probationary period will have the right to written reasons for dismissal within 14 days upon request.

The legislation will introduce a statutory probationary period that will maintain an employer’s ability to assess any new hires. Schedule 3 allows the duration of a statutory probationary period to be set in regulations by the Secretary of State following consultation. The Government’s preference, as we know, is for this probationary period to be nine months in length. Schedule 3 also creates the power to modify the test for whether dismissal during the probationary period is fair for reasons of performance or suitability for the role.

The Government’s intention is to use this power to set light-touch standards for fair dismissal during probation. The power will be limited to the following reasons for dismissal, which, under Section 98 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, qualify as potentially fair reasons: capability, conduct, illegality or some other substantial reason relating to the employee. The Government will consult on the light-touch standards and proceed to set out in regulations what specific reasons relate to the employee and when.

Schedule 3 amends the delegated power to set the maximum compensatory award for unfair dismissal so that a different maximum can be set for dismissals during the probationary period and when the light-touch standards apply. It is our intention to consult before the introduction of any new cap on awards.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Again, we are being promised a blizzard of consultations, but can the Minister give me any idea when those consultations will take place? Can we also have some assurance that all the employer organisations will be consulted on this occasion? From our conversations with many of them, they do not feel particularly consulted up to now.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

First, on the issue of consultation, I assure the noble Lord that there have been a considerable number of consultations, not only with the main employer organisations but in terms of working parties working on particular aspects of the Bill, and those will continue. That consultation will continue—and I have now forgotten his other question.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Will the Government consult with employer organisations?

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

Yes, I can confirm that that is the case.

Employment Rights Bill

Debate between Baroness Jones of Whitchurch and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Committee stage
Monday 19th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friends Lord Young of Acton and Lady Noakes very much for their expert, valuable and important introductions to and insights into this group. I also thank my noble friends Lady Meyer, Lady Lawlor, Lady Cash, Lord Strathcarron, Lord Ashcombe and Lord Murray for their practical, legal and philosophical objections to Clause 20, which, as noble Lords will perhaps not be surprised to know, I do not regard as straw-man arguments. It was also wise of my noble friends to note that these amendments have the support of UKHospitality. They also have the support of the British Beer and Pub Association.

These amendments are vital in ensuring that we do not inadvertently restrict fundamental rights of free expression in the workplace and beyond. We all recognise the importance of protecting employees from harassment. It is not about not caring about their plight, as the noble Lord, Lord Fox, implied; it is about also ensuring that we are not creating a framework that stifles open and honest conversation. That is especially true in matters of political, moral, religious or social debate.

Clause 20 as it stands is, as my noble friend Lady Cash pointed out, poorly drafted and therefore risks leading to unintended consequences. In fact, I agree with the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, about the speech from the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry, who made a very persuasive case that Clause 20 is superfluous in its current form.

The inclusion of speech or conversation that simply expresses an opinion on a political, moral, religious or social issue would lead to significant restrictions on individuals’ freedom to speak openly. This could lead to employees feeling that they cannot express their thoughts and ideas or, perhaps worse, would be penalised for expressing an opinion that someone else may find uncomfortable or offensive. As my noble friend pointed out, we must be mindful of the unintended consequences that could arise from an overbroad definition of harassment. Both he and the noble Lord, Lord Londesborough, gave strong examples from the footballing world. If I may speak as a fellow West Ham United fan, I am very aware that being a supporter of that august club can be a very testing experience that can drive one to the occasional profanity.

It is not just in sports that these concerns arise. Think about public spaces such as pubs, about which we have been hearing. If an individual overhears a conversation that they find offensive or upsetting, where does the line lie? What happens if somebody misunderstands something that is said and it is taken to an employment tribunal as a case of harassment? In such situations, the burden placed on employers would become unreasonable. Would they be required to intervene every time someone overhears an opinion that they find discomforting or just dislike?

If I may ask a genuine question, how are people supposed to judge, to quote the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry, whether a conversation is obviously fake or not? As my noble friend Lord Young and the noble Lord, Lord Londesborough, argued, are we expecting publicans to make finely calibrated judgments on ECHR Article 10 in particular? We should remember that even senior police officers, who are trained in these matters, often struggle to make such judgments. Employers will inevitably err on the side of caution and that is chilling.

I believe that we must ensure that harassment in this context remains focused on behaviours that are truly indecent or grossly offensive, not on speech that is merely uncomfortable or challenging. People must have the right to engage in conversations, to express differing opinions and to debate issues of public importance without the fear of being accused of harassment. To allow an employer to be forced or encouraged into silencing this kind of expression would be a serious violation of freedom of speech, which is a cornerstone of our democracy and society.

The amendments before us offer balance. They ensure that employers are not required to protect their employees from hearing or overhearing expressions of opinion, provided that those opinions are not indecent or grossly offensive. This is a reasonable and sensible approach. It respects individuals’ rights to express their views without creating an environment where every opinion has the potential to be deemed harassment.

Moreover, these amendments recognise the specific context in which such protections should apply. By excluding certain sectors, such as the hospitality industry, sports venues and higher education, we acknowledge the diverse nature of these environments where debate, disagreement and the expression of differing opinions are often the fabric of daily life. To apply the same strict rules in these settings as we would in an office environment or a more controlled space would be misguided. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, may well say that this is not the purpose of Clause 20. However, as my noble friends Lady Cash and Lord Murray pointed out, the drafting means that that is unlikely to be the effect.

The requirement for repeated instances of harassment before an employer must take action, as outlined in Amendment 86, aligns with the principle of proportionality. We should not expect employers to become the arbiters of every comment or opinion expressed, especially when such comments are made in good faith. The amendment rightly recognises that harassment should be defined as something that occurs repeatedly, not something that might result from a single isolated incident of disagreement or discomfort. I agree with my noble friend Lord Young of Acton that this is a solution in search of a problem or, based on his statistics, a sledgehammer in search of a nut.

When the Minister responds, can she please answer my noble friend Lady Noakes’s point on territorial extent? These issues are clearly not going away, so I urge the Government to take them very seriously. As it stands, Clause 20 is garbled and needs rewriting.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. I hope I can reassure the Committee of the Government’s approach, as well as set straight some considerable misunderstandings on how the provisions will operate. I stress at the outset that the provisions in the Bill will protect employees while preserving existing human rights, such as freedom of speech, which I hope we can all agree are core British values. Also core to our identity is the belief that with rights come responsibilities.

I will first address the noble Lords, Lord Young of Acton and Lord Strathcarron, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, who oppose Clause 20. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, for meeting me to share his views. When we met, he pushed his position that our proposals are anti-banter, and he has reiterated that today. I make it clear that we are anti-harassment, not anti-banter, and this is what Clause 20 delivers.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Fox, that I feel that we have been subjected to a wave of synthetic rage by many on the other Benches this evening, who have given examples that simply would not be covered by the harassment provisions in Clause 20. Removing Clause 20 would not only go against the manifesto on which this Government were elected but deprive employees of protection from all types of harassment by third parties under the Equality Act 2010. This Government are committed to tackling all forms of harassment in the workplace. In order to make workplaces safe, we must require employers to create and maintain workplaces and working conditions free from harassment, including by third parties.

For example, if a woman is sexually harassed by a customer at work today, she has very few effective options by which to seek legal redress, even if her employer has made no effort whatever to address the issue. The only possible employment law action in this scenario at present is for the Equality and Human Rights Commission to exercise its unique enforcement powers against the employer. However, such powers can be used only very selectively and strategically by the commission, and would be unlikely to be used in anything other than an exceptional case.

Sexual harassment is, sadly, not the only type of harassment that is experienced in the workplace. Employees can experience racial harassment or harassment related to their disability or other protected characteristics. In the case of non-sexual harassment, not even the possibility of enforcement exists at present. As such, Clause 20 is required for employees to be able to seek legal redress where they have experienced third-party harassment, and to ensure that employers are clear about their responsibilities.

Employment Rights Bill

Debate between Baroness Jones of Whitchurch and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Committee stage
Monday 19th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I agree that this has been an extremely interesting debate. I thank all noble Baronesses—they are mostly Baronesses, with some noble Lords—for their contributions. In particular, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, deserves singling out for her very thought-provoking introduction to this group.

As my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral pointed out in the previous group, every individual should feel safe and supported in their working environment. We recognise that NDAs have deviated from their original purpose, which was to protect trade secrets and intellectual property, as the noble Baronesses, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws and Lady Goudie, pointed out. They have been abused in some circumstances, particularly where they are used to silence the victims of misconduct, which includes sexual harassment.

However, we must also acknowledge there are some cases where NDAs may serve a legitimate purpose. Some individuals may wish to resolve disputes privately, without the need for public disclosure. It is important, therefore, that we do not take a blanket approach but instead consider the context in which NDAs are being used. Many of the amendments acknowledge those simple facts. Having said that, we also need to consider the wider impact that NDAs might have—for example, in cases of medical malpractice. How can society and the medical profession learn from mistakes that are not made public?

It is clear that further scrutiny of NDAs is essential. The potential for abuse cannot be ignored, and we must ensure that any agreement entered into is fully informed and entirely voluntary. I will briefly speak as a non-lawyer, because I was particularly taken by Amendment 281, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. Like the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, I was rather shocked that such an NDA might exist even under the current regime. How can one sign a legally binding document that prevents the disclosure of a breach of the law? With apologies to my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, I say that only the legal profession could manage the perverse logic to invent such a thing.

As we have seen, particularly in the NHS, whistle-blowers are often the individuals who bravely speak out against wrongdoing, misconduct or unethical practices that might otherwise go unnoticed. Their courage in raising concerns is critical to maintaining trust and ensuring that the organisation remains committed to the highest ethical standards.

Both noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb, referred to the NHS. I looked into this earlier, and in one high-profile case, the NHS spent over £4 million on legal action against a single whistleblower, including a £3.2 million compensation settlement. This sparked criticism from Professor Phil Banfield, the chairman of the British Medical Association, who argued that whistleblowing is often not welcomed by NHS management. He emphasised that NHS trusts and senior managers are more focused on protecting their reputations than addressing the concerns of whistleblowers or prioritising patient safety. That is clearly a very unacceptable state of affairs, and that example alone suggests that the Government should take these amendments extremely seriously.

I am sure that the Minister is about to stand up and offer to have further discussions on this subject. We will pre-empt her and volunteer to take part in those discussions. There is clearly much more work to be done in this area. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s remarks.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade and Department for Science, Information and Technology (Baroness Jones of Whitchurch) (Lab)]

My Lords, I genuinely thank all noble Lords—they have mainly been noble Baronesses—who have taken part in this excellent debate, in which we have addressed some important, salient and highly concerning issues about the misuse of non-disclosure agreements. We have heard some very moving and completely unacceptable examples that have no place in the modern workplace.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and my noble friends Lady Kennedy of The Shaws and Lady Goudie, for their Amendments 98, 101 and 101C, which seek to restrict the use of non-disclosure agreements that prevent workers disclosing certain misconduct. My noble friend Lady Kennedy’s amendment looks to apply this to a broader category of misconduct, including harassment, retaliation and discrimination. I also acknowledge that the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and my noble friend Lady Kennedy make it clear that workers should still be able to request confidentiality protections in agreements between a worker and employer, if they so choose. A number of noble Lords have reiterated that that is an important principle.

I also thank my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti for her Amendment 281, which makes express provision for a court to void an NDA in the public interest if it seeks to prevent the disclosure of illegal conduct by the employer. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, that my noble friend made a very compelling case on that issue.

I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Morrissey, for Amendment 101A and her contribution today. Her amendment would void any provision in an NDA that prevents a worker making a disclosure about sexual harassment. However, it would allow NDAs in settlement agreements to stand where the victim of sexual harassment requests them and where they have received independent legal advice. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, for his comments in support of that amendment.

Today’s debate on NDAs demonstrates the best elements of your Lordships’ House. Points have been well made by all noble Lords, and we have listened carefully to their arguments. I was grateful to have the opportunity to meet with a number of noble Lords in recent weeks to reaffirm the Government’s position on the misuse of NDAs and to understand the intention behind these amendments. Let me be clear: NDAs should never be used to silence victims of sexual harassment and other forms of misconduct in the workplace.

My noble friend Lady O’Grady asked whether the proposals extend beyond sexual harassment. The whistleblowing measures in the Bill cover only sexual harassment. However, the whistleblowing framework already covers disclosures about criminal offences, breaches of legal obligations and endangerment of health and safety. In many cases, harassment and discrimination in the workplace will fall within those categories.

While the Government agree that NDAs should not be misused by employers to conceal misconduct in the workplace, any restrictions on their use must be carefully considered to avoid unintended consequences. For example, confidentiality can allow employers and workers to resolve a dispute and move on without publicity and expensive legal proceedings. It is vital that we take the time to consider any impacts on a worker’s ability to choose the right outcome for themselves, including the option of an NDA.

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[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, the answer to both noble Lords—and I think I said this during my response—is that the amendments are all raising really important issues. There is an issue about the breadth of the issues and the extent to which we need to legislate or perhaps amplify things that are already the law but are not understood to be the law. We have more work to do on this, but we are working at pace on it. We still have time before the Bill passes through your Lordship’s House, so I hope we can make some progress during that time.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am sorry to intervene on the noble Baroness once more. Does that mean she intends to talk to interested Peers before Report?

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I have already had one meeting and, as noble Lords will know, I seem to be in perpetual meeting mode. I certainly am very happy to carry on having those discussions.

Employment Rights Bill

Debate between Baroness Jones of Whitchurch and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Committee stage
Thursday 8th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Leong, for his letter explaining certain matters that were left over from the last day of Committee. The fact that the algebraic question required a three-page, detailed answer for one worked-up example rather illustrates our point that this adds a huge and possibly unnecessary level of complexity for small businesses in particular. But I will let that lie for now.

Amendments 18 and 19 standing in my name would remove the broad delegated power in new Section 27BD. This Bill continues the concerning trend of the steady transfer of legislative authority from Parliament to Ministers. As I noted at Second Reading, it contains no fewer than 173 delegated powers. The Government may, and probably will, argue that this is justified by ongoing consultation, but that is in effect an admission that this Bill is not yet complete or ready for full and proper scrutiny by this House.

Time and again, we have seen ill-defined powers handed to the Executive allowing for significant policy changes to be made by regulation without meaningful parliamentary oversight. Clause 1 exemplifies this problem. It inserts new sections into the Employment Rights Act 1996, establishing a framework for a new statutory right relating to guaranteed hours. However, through new Section 27BD(6), it grants the Secretary of State a remarkably wide power to make regulations specifying circumstances in which the duty to offer guaranteed hours does not apply or where an offer may be treated as withdrawn. There are no limitations, no criteria and no guiding principles. There is no requirement for a consultation or justification. In effect, the Secretary of State is given a blank cheque.

The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has been very clear that the power is “inappropriately broad” and should be

“restated with a greater degree of precision”.

While the Government’s memorandum refers to

“maintaining the original policy intent while allowing reasonable exemptions”,

the committee rightly points out that nothing in the Bill legally constrains the Secretary of State’s discretion in that regard. Moreover, as we raised on the first day of Committee, businesses need clarity on the operation of guaranteed hours. If there are to be sector-specific exemptions—and there may very well be a case for them—they should appear in the Bill, not be left to future ministerial discretion. Uncertainty benefits no one—not workers, not employers and not enforcement bodies. Allowing such fundamental aspects of the regime to be decided later by regulation undermines the transparency and stability of the framework that the Government are seeking to establish.

I remind the Minister that, during the passage of the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill, she rightly accepted similar concerns and tabled amendments which directly reflected the recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. At the time, she said:

“I hope the Minister is able to commit to taking on board the recommendations of the Delegated Powers Committee in this respect”.—[Official Report, 27/3/24; col. GC 198.]


Why should that principle not apply here? If it is truly the Government’s intention that this power will be used only in limited and specific cases, then the legislation should make that clear. As it stands, any future Secretary of State could by regulation significantly weaken or disapply this statutory regime without the involvement of Parliament.

Regardless of one’s views on the underlying policy, that is not an acceptable way to legislate. When Parliament creates new rights in statute, they should not be left vulnerable to being hollowed out at the stroke of a ministerial pen. This amendment removes that overly broad delegated power and ensures that any substantive changes to the scope of the duty must be brought back to Parliament through primary legislation. Will the Minister now commit, as she has done before, to taking seriously the recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and amending the Bill accordingly?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade and Department for Science, Information and Technology (Baroness Jones of Whitchurch) (Lab)]

My Lords, it is very good to return to the subject of zero-hours contracts as we start day 2 of Committee. As we debated last week, the Government are committed to ending one-sided flexibility and exploitative zero-hours contracts, ensuring that all jobs provide a baseline of security and predictability so that workers can better plan their lives and their finances.

Employers who already provide this security and predictability for their workers will benefit from a level playing field, but these measures will help drive up standards and eliminate undercutting across the board. Meanwhile, employees who enjoy the flexibility of their current zero-hours arrangements will not be pressurised into accepting a guaranteed-hour contract.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, for tabling Amendments 18 and 19, which would remove the power to make regulations specifying circumstances in which the duty to offer guaranteed hours does not apply, or an offer may be treated as withdrawn. This power would allow the Secretary of State to react dynamically to changing employment practices that may arise, allowing for updates to maintain the original policy intent of providing a baseline of security and predictability so workers can better plan their lives. It could provide the required economic flexibility that businesses have been asking for, to ensure that the policy is working as intended while adapting to changing circumstances.

This power is separate to the power in the Bill to exclude categories of workers. Regulations made under the excluded workers power would allow specified workers to be taken out of scope of the right to guaranteed hours. Since the right to guaranteed hours is a new, novel right, it could be necessary to exclude certain workers in order to respond to the changing employment environment.

The power at issue here relates to specified circumstances where the right to guaranteed hours would otherwise apply but limited and specified circumstances justified an exception to the duty to make a guaranteed-hour offer. We envisage that any exceptions to the duty to offer guaranteed hours will be narrow and be applied in specified circumstances; for instance, where the measures would otherwise have significant adverse impacts, even when the employers and the workers act with good intentions and there is no other accepted way to mitigate the risk. Examples could include unforeseen circumstances such as a pandemic or a state of emergency.

Consultation is required to further determine which specific circumstances may justify a potential exemption. I assure the Committee that we will give full consideration to any representations made in this House and by respondents to that consultation. Gathering the views from those who will be impacted by the policy via consultation remains of the utmost importance to this Government. By removing the power, we would become unable to make such exceptions and to provide flexibility in those specific circumstances. The power will also be subject to the affirmative procedure, meaning that both Houses will have the opportunity to debate this matter.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, I am, as ever, grateful to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee for its careful consideration of the Bill, including in relation to the power with which we are here concerned. The committee continues to serve your Lordships’ House well by providing a thoughtful analysis of the Government’s legislative programme, and I thank it for that.

As acknowledged by that committee, the need to respond to changing circumstances is an appropriate basis for such a power, but in the committee’s view, that power should be narrowed—whereas the amendment goes much further than what has been proposed by it. On that basis, I hope I have been able to set out more information on how the Government intend to use this power, and I of course look forward to responding more fully to the Delegated Powers Committee report in due course. I hope that reassures the noble Lord so that he feels able not to press his Amendments 18 and 19.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

Phew—I do not know whether I want to join in this philosophical debate because, clearly, we have heard strong views on both sides, and they have strayed way beyond the amendments we are trying to moderate today. But I would say that the Bill overall seeks to find the right balance between workers, unions and businesses, recognising that each has an important role to play. Our aim in the Bill is to modernise those arrangements for the 21st century so that we are not playing “Yah-boo, you did that back in 1953” but are actually looking to the future. We hope that is what the Bill will deliver.

These amendments aim to broaden the provisions in the Bill to allow employee representative bodies or staff associations to collectively agree to modify or opt out of the zero-hours measures. The Bill already allows these collective agreements to be made, but only by trade unions. As we are allowing for modification of statutory employment rights, it is vital that the appropriate safeguards are in place. This includes that only trade unions that have a certificate of independence, and are therefore free from employer control, can agree with employers to modify or opt out of rights, and that rights are guaranteed in exchange and incorporated into a worker’s contract.

I make it clear that staff associations and employee representative bodies, some of which we have heard described this afternoon, can do really good work, and we welcome engagement between employers and workers in all forms. However, we do not think it is appropriate for these associations and bodies to be able to modify statutory employment rights. This is not least because they may not have sufficient independence from the employers—a point well made by my noble friend Lady O’Grady—unlike independent trade unions, which do have that independence and which offer high levels of protection to workers. Furthermore, there is a well-established framework for trade unions, including recognition, independence and incorporation of terms, and the provisions build off these provisions.

I can see that the noble Lord’s amendments suggest a framework of requirements that staff associations and employee representative bodies would need to meet in order to modify or exclude zero-hours rights. These include requirements around independence, recognition, elections and record-keeping.

However, as my noble friends Lord Hendy and Lord Davies have said, the more you incorporate those requirements, the more you add to a staff association or employee representative body, the more similar it appears to be to an independent trade union. Given that the trade union framework is well established, historically and legally, it is not clear to me that it makes sense to establish a similar but different structure just for the purposes of the zero-hours measures. I am grateful to my noble friends Lord Davies, Lady O’Grady and others for reminding us of the hard-won rights that we have achieved through organisations within the trade union movement. Trade unions already serve to protect and advance the interests of workers.

I felt that the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, presented a caricature of the unions. For every criticism he has, we could come back with all the advantages that trade unions have delivered for working people over the years in pay and conditions and in some of the fantastic campaigns—for example, around the environment, women’s rights, and so on. They have already contributed enormously to modernising workplace rights, so I do not feel that it would be appropriate or proportionate to try to recreate them. The trade unions already provide the constructive dialogue with employers to which the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, refers, and membership of trade unions remains voluntary for employees.

I say, too, to the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, that there is a technical issue around all this. If his amendment was accepted as drafted, it would not achieve the aims that he intends. Collective agreements have a specific definition in the Employment Rights Act 1996, which the zero-hours provisions are being inserted into. The definition, referring to the definition in the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, provides that collective agreements are ones between independent and certified trade unions and employers’ or employees’ associations, so there would not be scope in the way that the noble Lord has worded his amendment for a wider definition of employee representatives.

We have had a debate which I have a feeling we are going to return to on some of the other trade union issues, but, for the time being, with this set of amendments in mind, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, will consider withdrawing his amendment.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

That was a short but most interesting debate, and I am grateful to all noble Lords who participated. I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, and the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady, for their comments. No one on this side is denying that trade unions often have a proud history. As my noble friend Lord Deben pointed out, they have a very strong history in securing workers’ rights which has been constructive for our country over many years—no one is denying that. However, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, pointed out, not all modern trade unions support that history. I am sure that noble Lords would accept that.

The fact is that the world has evolved, and these amendments simply respect that evolution. My noble friend Lord Moynihan points out that only 22% of workers are currently unionised. The latest figure that I can find for the private sector is 12.3%. The other 88% have not been prevented from joining a trade union; they have exercised a choice not to, a democratic choice, so trying to argue that this proposal is somehow undemocratic makes no sense in the context of the rest of the Bill. Why, for example, does the Bill later on scrap the 40% turnout requirement for statutory recognition? That seems profoundly undemocratic.

Having said all that, I am obviously very grateful to the Minister for her response, and I accept that there are probably technical issues with my amendment. With that helpful hint, I shall improve them for the next time that we debate these measures. However, on the first day in Committee, we heard the Government argue that, in relation to guaranteed hours:

“Unions can make these deals based on their knowledge of the industry and with a holistic view on what is best for their workers”.—[Official Report, 29/4/25; col. 1203.]


If the Government are willing to accept that logic for trade unions, surely the same reasoning must be extended to independent staff bodies and employment forums, many of which are embedded deeply within the day-to-day life of a company and have even greater practical knowledge of their specific industries and workplaces. In some cases, those bodies are closer to the operational realities of individual businesses than remote union structures, and they are more trusted by the employees themselves.

The debate should ultimately be about respecting individual workers and their choices. The Government’s stance suggests a lack of trust in individual workers and the belief that, unless a worker is represented through a traditional trade union, their voice is somehow less valid or less informed. Fundamentally, it appears that the Government do not believe in the individual and do not trust workers to know what works best in their own context; instead, they insist on a one-size-fits-all approach, even when that model may be entirely foreign to a smaller business or industries where union involvement has never been the norm.

What about the many employees who are content with their current representation? Will they now be told that their structures are not good enough and that they have to change, bring in new frameworks, hire experts and prepare for union-led negotiations, whether they want them or not? Will industries that have long enjoyed stable relations be pushed into more adversarial models, creating the very tensions that this Bill should be seeking to avoid? Can the Minister perhaps enlighten us as to how smaller businesses and those that have never operated within a unionised environment will adapt to rigid models such as this, which assume that union involvement is the only valid route to collective agreement?

These amendments do not challenge the value of trade unions—very far from it. They simply recognise that unions are not the only route to fair and effective representation. If the Government are truly serious about modernising employment rights, we must begin by acknowledging the diversity of how workers organise today. For now, I am of course content to withdraw the amendment.

Employment Rights Bill

Debate between Baroness Jones of Whitchurch and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Committee stage
Tuesday 29th April 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I take that point. I was attempting to explain in my description, which I obviously need to develop a little bit more, that we understood some of those issues and are trying to find a way through it.

Amendments 3, 4 and 6 seek to change the model for the right to guaranteed hours from a right to be offered to a right to request. We have debated this at some length. These amendments would mean that a qualifying worker experiencing one-sided flexibility would need to make a request to their employer to access their right to guaranteed hours. Noble Lords underestimate the imbalance of powers that employees in this circumstance face. The noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, mentioned young people, which is the group that is likely to be the most intimidated by having to request guaranteed hours. Therefore, we are attempting to make sure that these rights are balanced in a proper and more effective way.

I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Carberry for reminding us that the Low Pay Commission also looked at a right to request and, understandably, rejected it for exactly that reason. It understood that the people in those circumstances had the least power in the labour market and would therefore, quite rightly, feel intimidated about coming forward. She also raised the issue of what happens if the request is denied. I know the noble Lord, Lord Fox, attempted to address that, but I do not know that the amendments necessarily do so. The noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, says that employment has changed since those days. I would say that employment has become even more unpredictable and unreliable. Nothing that the Low Pay Commission said—or indeed that I said—addresses the potential exploitation which the commission identified. There is an imbalance, and it is very difficult for people to come forward and make that request; that is why we are insistent that it is done in the way that we have suggested.

After receiving an offer, the workers would then be able decide whether to accept it, based on its specific terms. That would empower the worker to decide for themselves, having seen the offer on the table. This addresses the point that some people do want to work flexible hours, and we understand that.

Amendment 15 would allow workers on limited-term contracts of four months or less to voluntarily waive their right to guaranteed hours. We believe that workers should be able to retain the flexibility of a zero-hours contract or arrangement if they wish, which is why those who are offered guaranteed hours will be able to turn them down and remain on their current contract or arrangement if they wish. This amendment would add an additional opt-out mechanism for workers that could create needless confusion for both employers and workers.

Amendment 17 would provide workers with the ability to opt out of receiving guaranteed-hours offers. We understand the importance of workers being able to retain the flexibility of zero-hours contracts or arrangements if they wish, which is why those receiving a guaranteed-hours offer will be able to turn it down. However, to ensure that all qualifying workers will benefit from the legislation, all workers should be able to receive a guaranteed-hours offer. We want to ensure that employers and workers are starting from a position of equal bargaining power. Therefore, through the Bill we have allowed for employers and unions to collectively agree to opt out of the zero-hours contract measure, if they agree. Unions can make these deals based on their knowledge of the industry and a holistic view of what is best for the workers. We feel it is more appropriate than individual workers opting out of receiving offers. After receiving an offer, qualifying workers would then be able to decide whether to accept, based on their individual circumstances.

Finally, Amendment 2 would remove from the Bill the right for qualifying workers to be offered guaranteed hours. We think that all employers should be required to offer their qualifying workers guaranteed hours, as this is the best way of addressing one-sided flexibility in the workplace and ensuring that jobs provide a baseline of security and predictability.

Without guaranteed hours, workers do not have any form of certainty as to their earnings, making it difficult to apply for credit or a mortgage, to rent a flat, to plan for major events, or even to manage their day-to-day life expenses. As I have previously iterated, those who are offered guaranteed hours will be able to turn them down and remain on a current contract or arrangement if they wish. We believe that this is the right balance. I therefore hope that I have persuaded noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The Minister is relying a great deal on the fabled consultation that we are going to have. Can we have some idea of when that consultation is likely to take place? Can I suggest that it perhaps takes place before we get to Report, because it will iron out a great many of these arguments? The Minister asserted that some businesses have supported the 12-week reference period. Can she say which ones?

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

The Bill sets out, in a number of ways, that there will be regulations that will be consulted upon. This goes back to the issue of when that consultation will take place, but there is a framework for that set out in the Bill which should cover that point.

Employment Rights Bill: Productivity

Debate between Baroness Jones of Whitchurch and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Monday 31st March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

The employment Bill that we have before us today is a very substantial piece of legislation. There will be further opportunities in the make work pay plan to come back to some of the wider issues and I look forward to debating those when the opportunity arises.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, at Second Reading last week, I asked the Minister to name one company—apart from the four that are routinely trotted out by the Government—that is supportive of this Bill. She did not answer the question, so I invite her to have another go, because we would really like to talk to them.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

The noble Lord will know that we have had extensive discussions with all the employment bodies that are engaged. Those stakeholder discussions are continuing. I am sure that we can provide further details, but the important thing is that those stakeholders have been engaged and listened to. We are continuing with that engagement and that will help the policies going forward.

US Steel and Aluminium Tariffs

Debate between Baroness Jones of Whitchurch and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Wednesday 12th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what steps they plan to take to mitigate the impact of US steel and aluminium tariffs on the UK manufacturing sector.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade and Department for Science, Information and Technology (Baroness Jones of Whitchurch) (Lab)]

My Lords, it is disappointing that the US has today imposed global tariffs on steel and aluminium. The UK will always be a champion of free and open trade, which is essential in delivering our Plan for Change. We are resolute in our support for the UK steel industry. This Government are working with affected companies today, and we back the industry’s application to the Trade Remedies Authority to investigate what further steps might be necessary to protect UK producers.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the Minister for her Answer, and I am pleased to hear about the steps she is taking. To move on slightly, I was pleased to hear that the Prime Minister acknowledged, during Prime Minister’s Questions today, the Brexit benefit of seeking a trade agreement with the United States to avoid tariffs. However, while the UK looks to negotiate with Washington, the EU has already retaliated against US tariffs, so the Government must now recognise that resetting relations with the EU at this moment risks dragging the UK into an escalating transatlantic trade war. Last month, a close ally of Donald Trump, Stephen Moore, made it clear that Britain will have to choose between its special relationship with the US and closer ties to the EU. The time for vague statements and talk of all options being open is surely over; we need clarity. Now that the US and the EU are openly in a trade war, do the Government not see the urgency of making their position clear? What will the UK prioritise—the special relationship or Brussels?

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, as the Prime Minister has made clear, when it comes to the national interest, he rejects having to make any false choice between allies. We are committed to continuing our work with both the US and the EU to remove barriers to trade and help UK businesses grow. Our number one priority will be the growth of the UK economy and free and open trade with our most economically important partners. We will only ever sign trade agreements which align with the UK’s national interests.

Tariffs: Canada and Mexico

Debate between Baroness Jones of Whitchurch and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Tuesday 4th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, as I said, we are committed to working with both the US and EU to remove barriers to trade and to help UK businesses grow. It is obviously very early days, and we will continue to take a cool-headed approach to any possible tariffs. We remain prepared to defend the UK’s national interest where it is right to do so.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, it is very welcome to hear the Minister talk about the national interest, because the importance of a trade deal with the US obviously cannot be overstated. Indeed, the British Chambers of Commerce estimates that if a deal could be reached it would provide business with a stable basis for up to £1.5 trillion of bilateral investment between the two countries. The Prime Minister has said, very wisely, that he is neither with the EU nor the USA, but the EU would seem to be taking a different view. A spokesman said that we need to make up our mind who we are with. Given the regulatory differences between the two entities, what steps are His Majesty’s Government taking to ensure that closer alignment with the EU does not hinder progress towards a comprehensive trade agreement with the US?

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, as I said, we are committed to working with both the US and the EU to remove barriers to trade and to help UK businesses grow. The noble Lord is quite right to draw attention to the fact that the US is one of our largest trading partners, with trade worth around £300 billion in September 2024, representing 18% of total UK trade. We have a long and deep relationship with the US, and we will obviously want to enhance that as the trade discussions continue.

Post Office: Capture System

Debate between Baroness Jones of Whitchurch and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Thursday 12th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness for that. There is a difference between Horizon and the Capture system. The Capture system was not networked to a central system like Horizon was, which meant the data in Capture could not be accessed or manipulated from elsewhere. However, notwithstanding that, we are looking at whether there have been miscarriages of justice. I am sorry to say this, but perhaps the noble Baroness should wait for the report we will produce next week. I feel frustrated saying this today, but I know noble Lords will understand how the machinery of government works. I hope to come back with clearer news next week.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

More broadly, can the Minister tell us what safeguards are being put in place to ensure that no authority, public or private, can act with unchecked power similar to that exercised by the Post Office during the Horizon case?

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

The noble Lord is absolutely right to raise this; it is an issue that relates not just to the Post Office and Horizon. We are very aware of that and are looking at whether other actions should be taken on a more general basis. It is at the top of our list of concerns, and I hope we will be able to come back with more information on that.