Employment Rights Bill

Debate between Baroness Jones of Whitchurch and Lord Garnier
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade and Department for Science, Information and Technology (Baroness Jones of Whitchurch) (Lab)
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The words that the noble Lord just said come from the Opposition Benches and do not reflect what we are intending by the Bill, or indeed these particular clauses.

I will first speak to government Amendments 156 to 158 in my name, which are minor but important technical amendments to Schedule 10. Amendment 156 makes a small correction to paragraph 36(6), replacing the phrase “that subsection” with a reference instead to “subsection (3)” of Section 15 of the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004. Amendment 157 ensures that Schedule 1 to the Immigration Act 2016 is repealed following the abolition of the Director of Labour Market Enforcement, and Amendment 158 removes specific reference to paragraphs 9 and 11 of Schedule 3 to the Immigration Act 2016. The purpose of these changes is to ensure that the provision functions as intended and provides legal clarity. They do not alter the policy or substance of the Bill in any way but ensure that the schedule functions as intended.

On Amendment 154 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Carter, the Government were elected on a manifesto pledge to deliver the plan to make work pay in full. This sets out that the new employment rights enforcement agency would have the power to bring civil proceedings to uphold compliance with employment law. This clause delivers that pledge.

The noble Lord, Lord Carter, referred to the precedent, and yes, the precedent that we are citing is the example of the Equality Act 2006, Sections 28 to 30 of which are the precedent for Clauses 113 to 115. Section 28 of the Equality Act enables the Equality and Human Rights Commission to assist an individual who is or may become party to legal proceedings. Section 30 of the Equality Act, which is the precedent for Clause 113, affords the EHRC the capacity to institute and intervene in legal proceedings, including for breach of EHRC rights, even though it is not a victim.

The noble Lord, Lord Carter, said there was not an example of where the EHRC had taken over a case. However, in the case of MS (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, the EHRC in fact substituted itself once the original appellant withdrew from the proceedings. This was a substitution, with the consent of the Supreme Court, by the EHRC in the same way that the fair work agency could substitute itself in place of a worker without their consent.

The EHRC uses Section 30 strategically to clarify the law and act where there are egregious breaches. We envisage that the fair work agency, rather than the Secretary of State as such, will use this power in Clause 113 similarly. Noble Lords have misrepresented what is intended by this clause. It is intended to address some of the worst employment practices that current regulations do not adequately cover. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that there are of course cases where individuals or groups of workers are unable or reluctant to take a case, but that does not necessarily mean that the case should not be taken, because there are wider issues at stake. For example, the fair work agency could use the power to clarify entitlement to holiday pay where enforcement officers do not have enough information to confidently issue a notice of underpayment, or the fair work agency could exercise the power to clarify the employment status of a group of individuals. Currently, employers may misclassify workers as self-employed to get out of giving them the rights that they are entitled to. Without this power, the fair work agency has no ability to challenge such claims.

To give a specific example on the possible application of Clause 113, the Director of Labour Market Enforcement has flagged endemic bad practice in the hand car wash sector. A particular challenge in this sector is misclassification of workers, which stymies HMRC’s efforts to enforce the minimum wage. Currently, if a hand car wash claims that its workers are self-employed, HMRC has no means to test this in the courts. It must go through the full notice of underpayment process and wait for the employer to appeal against the notice of underpayment. This can lead to nugatory work if the appeal is upheld and otherwise delay workers getting their due rights. This is a gap in the existing system of state enforcement, which this power will go some way to remedy.

Just as the current system works, the fair work agency will take a whole-employer approach to enforcement. This has the advantages of a resolution for more workers than individual cases against the employer. But in such circumstances, where the fair work agency may be taking action for hundreds or thousands of workers, it is simply not practical to get consent from every individual concerned. As a strategic approach, this power will be used when acting in workers’ best interests to clarify the law. As with the EHRC’s powers under the Equality Act, the fair work agency will not need the consent of each individual concerned to take on cases. The fair work agency will therefore be able to decide when to seek clear, neutral and authoritative guidance from a tribunal on the application of employment legislation.

As we know, in the worst cases of serious exploitation, workers may be reluctant to give their consent due to fear of retribution from the employer. The noble Lord, Lord Goddard, was quite right to say that there are circumstances in which we have the responsibility to look after the individuals who are suffering at the hands of rogue employers and feel powerless in those circumstances. We know that many migrant workers with legal rights to work in the UK, particularly low- paid workers, are reluctant or unable to enforce their employment rights. These workers have understandable concerns, including fear of retaliation, lack of awareness or language barriers. For legal migrants, employment is their prerogative and, for those workers, there are wider implications in challenging an employer that could bring about repercussions for their employment or potentially impact on their visa. We believe that requiring consent from workers would make it easier for employers to attribute blame to individual employees, and they would suffer as a result.

Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
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I am going to carry on. When exercising this power—

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Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
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My Lords, we have had advice already about what the Companion says on this. The noble Lord has spoken once.

Lord Garnier Portrait Lord Garnier (Con)
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That is what the Government say, not the Companion.

Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Portrait Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
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I think that the Companion overrides anything that I have to say.

When exercising this power, the fair work agency will of course act in accordance with the rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, including Article 8, and comply with data protection legislation. In doing so, it must act in accordance with the law and for a legitimate purpose.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, raised the issue of anonymity. In appropriate cases, the fair work agency will consider applying under Rule 49 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024. Rule 49 allows the tribunal to restrict public disclosure of aspects of the proceedings. That means that workers’ names can be kept from the public domain—