Trade Union Bill

Debate between Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town and Lord Stoneham of Droxford

Tuesday 3rd May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stoneham of Droxford]

I want to make just one brief point. We, too, welcome the amendment and the compromise which the Government are showing. However, having got rid of quite a lot of the powers, we are still left with a hell of a lot of bureaucracy—for no good purpose, as the noble Lord, Lord Kerslake, was suggesting. It is now a very complicated procedure and one wonders whether this will disappear into the long grass and be quietly forgotten. It would have been much better to have a one-off review to see what the problem is and deal with it through the management of the public sector, rather than setting up this ridiculous bureaucracy for no good purpose.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his clarity and brevity—after the previous debate—in introducing the amendment. I also thank him for taking the time to meet me and colleagues to discuss the possible introduction of a cap on facility time. He knows that we have serious concerns, which we retain, about the principle, and that we have even greater concerns about how it might work. How and when would a Minister decide that the amount of time taken needed to be restricted, and on what grounds? Would it be contrary to the desire of the relevant employer?

We raised the example of organisations going through contraction, restructuring, relocation or even growth, where more negotiating time with union reps is always needed. There is also the example of industries with particular safety issues or health issues—we discussed the health service—where safety reps might be needed more than average, thereby pushing up the overall amount of facility time recorded.

On the phrase,

“any other matters that the Minister thinks relevant”,

it would be helpful to hear from the Minister what sort of things he deems might be relevant. However, that is the only remaining issue, because the others we raised have been met by the safeguards he has just listed. They will spell out that particular instances can be given and that the employer will have time to give reasons.

The remaining issue is therefore one we discussed under the previous clause: whether charities might be caught by this provision. I acknowledge the discussions we have had and those that will now take place with the organisations likely to be affected, including with representatives of charities. We also recognise that we will be able to debate this further when the relevant regulations are brought forward.

These amendments show that the Government have clearly heard our original concerns. They have produced a schema which allows the relevant comparative data to be used and judged alongside similar industries and organisations, and which allows time for consultation with the employer, giving them the opportunity to explain the management practice that requires so much union reps’ time to do their work. We still concur with the view of the noble Lord, Lord Kerslake, that this is an unnecessary measure and would prefer the cap to be dead and buried. However, having recognised that we were not going to win that one, we acknowledge the change that the amendments have made and are happy to support them.

Enterprise Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town and Lord Stoneham of Droxford

Monday 30th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stoneham of Droxford]

My Lords, I have a specific point for the Minister. These two amendments raise important issues and I am broadly supportive of them. In Committee, the Minister said that, where a whistleblower successfully brings a case to an industrial tribunal, the cap will not apply to the award made. That relates to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Low, that if you have the cap lifted only for tribunal cases and awards, it will encourage that process rather than a settlement, which would be quicker, probably cheaper and simpler. I therefore again put to the Minister the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Low: can we have a mechanism that does not confine this only to employment tribunal awards? Will it apply to tribunal conciliation settlements? More importantly, it would be helpful if it could apply to general settlements in cases where whistleblowers are particularly vulnerable. As the noble Lord, Lord Wills, said, often in public cases these people do not work in the sectors in which they have made their sacrifice.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, the case for the amendments has been made by both my noble friend Lord Wills and the noble Lord, Lord Low. I merely re-emphasise that undermining everyone’s desire to outlaw discrimination or to encourage whistleblowing in the public interest—which is good for patients, consumers and fellow workers—by including any compensatory payment in the cap would be yet another unintended consequence of this clause.

The point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Stoneham—and, in a way, by Amendment 70A, although not formally moved—is the general worry that a court-approved or ordered settlement would be exempted. We support what the Government are trying to do elsewhere to get early settlements, including by ACAS, but we are worried that unless those sorts of settlements are excluded there will be a perverse incentive to go to tribunal or court because, otherwise, the settlement could disappear under the cap. This could be for unfair dismissal, harassment or victimisation in addition to discrimination and whistleblowing.

If the Minister agrees to discussions on this issue and how we can support what the Government are trying to do elsewhere—which is to achieve settlements before going to court and not at the court gate—it would be very helpful.

Deregulation Bill

Debate between Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town and Lord Stoneham of Droxford

Wednesday 4th March 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, I use this opportunity for a brief moment to pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Stevenson, who, from our side, has guided and marshalled our many Front Bench colleagues, including my noble friends Lady Thornton, Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord McKenzie, through what has been called a “Christmas tree Bill”. Of course, we do not think it is quite such a Bill because it is not full of goodies, but I thank my noble friend Lord Stevenson and, I have to say, our brilliant legislative adviser, Muna Abbas; this was her first such Bill. We think that it has ended up a little better than it arrived.

I thank the Minister and his sometimes expanding, sometimes reducing ministerial team. I also thank the other members of the Bill team who have helped negotiate, redraft, debate and discuss throughout the process, including the setting up of a large number of bilateral meetings, some of which have dealt with some very complex issues. They now deserve a very good holiday, so I suggest that before too long we have a general election so that they may have one.

[Lord Stoneham of Droxford (LD)]

My Lords, on behalf of these Benches, I thank my noble friend Lord Wallace for seeing us through this Bill. When we started, we thought that this would be a complete nightmare, but his skill, perseverance and patience have helped that not to be so. I thank also the opposition Benches for their part in seeing this legislation through, and our colleagues in our own office, Giles Derrington and Elizabeth Plummer, who supported us through the business of this Bill.

Financial Services Bill

Debate between Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town and Lord Stoneham of Droxford

Monday 12th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, financial services is perhaps less problematic than broadcasting at the moment. Amendment 25D stands in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Eatwell. This is perhaps the key amendment in all the ones that we will discuss today. We will simply not get this industry back on track and working in the interests of its savers and borrowers until firms put clients’ interests above their own bonus levels, remuneration or promotion prospects. Rather as doctors take care—above all else—of their patients, so must the banks, the insurance companies, those who lend us money and those who care for our savings put our interests centre stage.

These amendments seek to ensure that where consumers put trust in a firm’s discretion, and are vulnerable to the exercise of that discretion, the firm must act in their best interests. Trust is key to this industry. As John Kay wrote in his July review for the Government:

“Financial intermediation depends on trust and confidence: the trust and confidence that savers who invest funds have in those they choose to manage these funds”.

This goes to the heart of the behaviours, ethics and very thought patterns of this vital industry. Surely, as we have heard already today, we have enough evidence from LIBOR, precipice bonds, mortgage mis-selling and interest rate swaps that cultural change is needed in this industry. The costs of the PPI scandal, which has already been referred to, are now being picked up by those very offending banks. I believe that this amendment is in their interests. If they were stopped from doing these things beforehand, they would not then have to put things right afterwards.

The PPI scandal has sometimes been blamed on the lack of early intervention by the FSA, on the insufficiently rapid transmission of intelligence from the Financial Ombudsman, or on absolutely anything or anyone other than the mis-selling banks themselves. Had those banks had a duty of care towards clients, or been required to consider their best interests, there is no way that they could have continued to sell those products once they realised how few of their purchases would actually be covered by them.

Surely it is strange that where a saver puts their money into a trust-based pension scheme it is governed by trustees who have fiduciary duties to act in the best interests of beneficiaries, but that if that same saver puts their money in a contract-based pension scheme or similar scheme run by commercial providers, the FSA’s rules governing such contracts impose no duty on providers to put beneficiaries’ interests first. That cannot be right. It is not what savers expect of their provider.

The amendments would ensure, in an enforceable way, that authorised persons act in the best interests of their clients. As I argued in Committee, the Bill expects consumers to,

“take responsibility for their decisions”—[Official Report, 11/6/12; col. 1255]—

but without placing a corresponding requirement on firms to act in the best interests of their clients. This lacks balance. As the Kay review says:

“Stewardship is incompatible with conflict of interest”.

Kay calls for all those involved in the equity investment chain to observe fiduciary standards in their relationships with clients. Thus financial services should owe their customers the same duty of care as a lawyer or other professional by acting honestly, fairly and professionally in the best interests of their customers and in managing conflicts of interest. It is no good relying on rules to ensure this. Such requirements on firms have been in the FSA’s principles for business, yet consumers have still been shabbily treated.

We want there to be a duty of care in the Bill to ensure proper oversight and to emphasise its importance both to the regulators and the regulated. Such a duty of care will ensure that financial services can no longer profit unfairly at the expense of their customers. It is not enough—in case the Minister is going to say it—to leave this simply to the banking commission. It should be central to the Bill.

The Kay review calls for the application of fiduciary standards of care by all those who manage or advise on the investments of others. That is what we seek in these amendments and what I hope this House will now support. I beg to move.

[Lord Stoneham of Droxford]

My Lords, I support the amendment. The issue behind the amendments in this group is that the investment industry’s duties to savers appear to be poorly understood and observed. As the Law Commission has confirmed, where firms are managing other people’s money or giving them financial advice, they have strict fiduciary duties to act in those people’s interests. This includes both individual clients and institutions such as pension funds which represent large numbers of underlying savers.

Fiduciary duties are stricter than FSA rules, yet they are not universally accepted within the industry. There is anecdotal evidence that firms often seek to exclude or restrict their liability for breach of fiduciary duties through contractual terms which may not be read or understood by the lay trustees of pension funds. Even where they are accepted, it is very clear that they are not being applied. In the past week, the FSA has published a “Dear CEO” letter on conflicts of interests among asset managers which found that,

“many firms had failed to establish an adequate framework for identifying and managing conflicts of interests”,

and that,

“in most cases senior management failed to show us they understood and communicated this sense of duty to customers”.

In other words, firms are often not meeting even the FSA’s standards regarding conflicts of interest, which are lower than fiduciary standards.

As these are common law duties, they do not form part of the FSA’s regulatory approach. Indeed, there is confusion over whether it is appropriate for the FSA to enforce them, with some arguing that it is for beneficiaries to pursue court actions if duties are breached.

Where pension savings are concerned, this is unrealistic and unsatisfactory as a means of achieving high standards of care across the market. An explicit, best-interests principle in a Financial Services Bill would give the FCA a powerful tool to ensure that consumers’ interests were protected.

The concern is that the Bill’s new wording is significantly weaker than that proposed by the Joint Committee and may not provide a high enough level of protection for consumers. It lacks clarity in what might constitute an appropriate level of care, thereby leaving open the very question it was intended to resolve. Where those managing people’s long-term savings are concerned, the problem is precisely that there is confusion and misinformation about what is the appropriate level of care. Explicit confirmation that those managing other people’s money must act in their best interests would be a clear and effective way to help achieve the Joint Committee’s intention. Amendment 25D would provide that confirmation, since anyone managing somebody else’s money would meet the criteria of discretion and consumer vulnerability.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, drew attention to the fact that this issue has the potential to seriously undermine the aims of auto-enrolment. In trust-based pension schemes, it is clear that the trustees are there to act in beneficiaries’ best interests. Indeed, as the ABI pointed out in oral evidence to the Joint Committee, one positive feature of the National Employment Savings Trust—NEST—is that it has a trustee structure that looks to protect its members. However, many savers are likely to be auto-enrolled into contract-based pension products where, as things currently stand, no such protection exists. Since the House of Lords considered the Bill in Committee, we have had the Kay review of UK equity markets. It recommended that:

“Regulatory authorities … should apply fiduciary standards to all relationships in the investment chain which involve discretion over the investments of others, or advice on investment decisions. These obligations should be independent of the classification of the client, and should not be capable of being contractually overridden”.

This amendment seeks to address a number of objections to similar amendments raised in the Commons and in the Lords in Committee. First, it does not rely on the term “fiduciary duty” but rather seeks to enshrine the common sense principle that underpins these duties—that where consumers rely on a firm’s discretion, that discretion must be exercised in the consumers’ best interests. Secondly, it would not supersede or restrict the specific standards to be laid down in FCA rules but rather would provide an overarching principle that the FCA should bear in mind when setting those rules. Thirdly, it would not apply across the board but only where appropriate—that is, where consumers have a particular relationship with providers that justifies a best-interest standard.

When we looked at a similar amendment to Amendment 25D in Committee, my noble friend Lord Sassoon expressed sympathy with the intent but argued that it was a matter for the FCA to make detailed rules on, rather than to be included in the Bill. However, as I have already said, part of the problem is that the common law status of fiduciary duties makes it unclear whether it falls within the FCA’s remit to uphold them, hence the need for an explicit reference in the Bill. It has also been suggested that refusal to amend the Bill in this way indicates a lack of political support for robust action to challenge the interests of financial intermediaries. Indeed, this could make the FCA feel that it has limited room for manoeuvre. Therefore, I hope that my noble friend will be more prepared to consider accepting the amendment and, at the very least, that he will give some indication of the support that the Government will give to the full implementation of the Kay recommendations.

Financial Services Bill

Debate between Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town and Lord Stoneham of Droxford

Wednesday 18th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stoneham of Droxford]

My Lords, I am pleased to speak in support of Amendment 107, which was spoken to so well by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, and I also have sympathy with the other amendments in this group tabled by my noble friend Lord Sharkey.

My personal interest in the success of the coming revolution in pension policy through auto-enrolment makes me especially keen to support this group of amendments. We have to rebuild trust in the financial services sector, where culture is currently suspect, to encourage greater pension savings. An explicit “consumer’s best interest” principle in the Bill would be a powerful tool for the FCA to ensure consumer interests are protected. Fiduciary duty requires those entrusted with other people’s money to put those customers first and provide appropriate stewardship, not to exploit their position to make an unfair profit or to get involved in undue risk where it is inappropriate. If duties were properly observed and enforced, it would provide a sea change in the prevailing culture of the financial services industry and lead to a much better outcome for consumers.

The problem is to get the balance right between consumers and firms. Concern was expressed in pre-legislative scrutiny that the draft Bill was unbalanced, enshrining the principle that consumers are responsible for their decisions but not placing an equivalent responsibility on firms. The new principle, inserted by the Government, to which the FCA must have regard, is that,

“those providing regulated financial services should be expected to provide consumers with a level of care that is appropriate having regard to the … risk involved”,

and the consumers’ capabilities.

The question is whether we are prepared to leave this so vague and open to interpretation that it would provide very weak guidance. With respect, it leaves open the question that it was intended to resolve. For those managing long-term savings, the problem is precisely that there is confusion and misinformation about the appropriate level of care. Explicit confirmation that those managing other people’s money must act in their best interests would be a clear and effective way to get the balance right in the equivalent responsibility for consumers and firms.

When the Bill was considered in the other place, the Minister argued on this clause, as amendments were submitted for an explicit reference to fiduciary duty in the Bill, that:

“Customers should not have to dust down the old statute books and dig out their dictionaries … to identify what standards they can expect from providers”.

He said that it was better for the FCA to set out clear and specific standards via its rules. He also said that he was not convinced that fiduciary duty,

“is the right standard to impose across the board between providers and consumers”.—[Official Report, Commons, 1/3/12; cols. 271-72.]

Our Amendment 107 tries to address these objections. First, it does not rely on the term, “fiduciary duty”; it simply enshrines the common-sense principle that underpins these duties. Where consumers rely on a firm’s discretion, that discretion must be exercised in those consumers’ best interests. Secondly, it would not supersede or restrict the specific standards to be laid down in FCA rules, but rather provide an overreaching principle that the FCA should bear in mind when setting those rules. Thirdly, it would not apply across the board but only where appropriate, particularly where consumers have a relationship with providers that justifies a best-interests standard. I hope that the Minister will closely consider this matter and strengthen Clause 5 by accepting these amendments.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, this is perhaps the most important debate today—perhaps the most important of the whole clause—because these amendments are about requiring savings to be managed in the interest of savers, not financial intermediaries. As we have already heard, the Joint Committee recommended that the Bill,

“place a clear responsibility on firms to act honestly, fairly and professionally in the best interests of their customers”.

That should not be too much to ask. As my noble friend Lady Drake said, the Law Commission confirmed that where firms are managing other people’s money, or giving financial advice, they have fiduciary duties to act in those people’s interests, both individuals and institutions such as pensions that represent, after all, large numbers of individual savers. That fact is, sadly, not generally reflected within the industry. Because these are common-law duties, as we have heard, they do not form part of the FSA’s regulatory approach, hence they need to be repeated in the Bill, partly to comfort consumers that the Bill does not trump these common-law protections, partly to give the FSA a powerful tool to ensure that consumers’ interests are protected and partly to ensure that this duty of care is absolutely entwined in the industry’s DNA, where it has, until now, been lacking.