(2 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have Amendment 93A in this group. In the spirit of scrutiny, I wondered what “an abortion clinic” and “abortion services” actually meant. To me they include professional counselling which puts both sides of an issue and all the options. I say that because it seems as if we have got into a rather binary state where this is just about the abortion procedure.
I am convinced that there is a serious problem for women attending some clinics who are seeking an abortion. I am also aware of how activities can move around geographically. I understand that there is not a problem now with the activities that we have been talking about outside places where abortions do not take place but counselling does. However, as the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, said, activities have moved to new sites; she mentioned one that has been affected for the first time in many years. My amendment is to raise that issue, bothered that what is a problem now could be displaced and become a problem elsewhere. Obviously it is probing the position, but as we are seeking to tackle this, we should do so comprehensively.
My Lords, I am in general opposed to those of the amendments which are designed to reduce the impact of Clause 9. As I said at Second Reading, I support the concept of buffer zones around abortion clinics. Of course I accept the two propositions eloquently expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox: first, that the right to demonstrate and freely express views is of great importance in a democratic society; and secondly, that the provisions of Clause 9, as many of your Lordships have articulated, impose serious restrictions on such abilities. But again, as I said at Second Reading, these rights are not absolute. They have to be balanced with the rights of others, and the correct balance is often not easy to identify and can be the subject of legitimate disagreement—it usually is. However, in the context of abortion clinics, Clause 9 gets the balance about right.
I will identify occasions where the balance falls the other way: in favour of the demonstrator. Some of your Lordships will think that the examples are trivial. I have often hosted meets for our local hunts, both before the ban and after it; after the ban, our local hunt acts fully within the law. The saboteurs come and demonstrate, and they are often very tiresome. However, provided they operate within the law, I would not for one moment seek to ban them. There is another example. Pacifists sometimes demonstrate outside military recruitment offices. I disagree with that and think it is wrong in principle, but again it would never occur to me to seek to prohibit that activity.
The motives of those demonstrators and those who demonstrate outside abortion clinics have something in common. It is not that they are just expressing their own opinions, which of course they are absolutely entitled to do, but they are trying to induce a change of attitude on the part of others. It is when I come to those who protest outside abortion clinics that I am conscious of why the balance tips. Those who attend abortion clinics have come to a very painful and serious decision, and often an anguished one. I think it is very wrong to subject them to what is often intemperate bullying of an extremely nasty kind.
(4 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have put my name to Amendment 10. As the noble Viscount said, judicial review—the right to apply to the courts to review the decision of a public body—is hugely important. I do not share the view that the courts have acted inappropriately and entered the political arena when they should not have, but, as he says, that is not the point.
I was not trying to suggest that, for example, striking down the Prime Minister was in any way wrongful. I would have done so if I had been in the Supreme Court. What I am suggesting is that quite often courts do intervene on executive matters. I certainly do not include in that the decisions made by the Supreme Court at the back end of last year, which I profoundly supported.
I was not seeking to have a go at the noble Viscount. If judicial review has grown inappropriately, that is a separate matter. It is dangerous if the Executive are seeking through this provision to protect themselves from proper oversight by the courts.
In the Commons, a Member said on rights of redress for EU citizens that
“appeal rights and judicial review are enshrined”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/1/20; col. 330.]
The Minister endorsed that, at col. 336. But Clause 11(3) seems to “deshrine”—if that is a word—judicial review. I too am concerned that at the least we understand what we are doing, but, if it is as I understand it, that we do not do it.
My Lords, I very gratefully support the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter. I entirely agree with her; I think it is necessary to have a sunset clause, and if it is not necessary it behoves the Minister to tell us why. One of the central problems arising all the time is whether secondary legislation, whether affirmative or negative—I acknowledge that in this case it is very largely affirmative; I am aware of that—is unamendable. Statutory instruments are often published very close to the time when they are to be considered by both Houses, with the consequence that you do not get proper consideration by members of the public or people who have an interest in what is proposed. I hope that the Government will give serious consideration to a sunset clause. If we are told that two years is too short a time, let us have an argument about that. I am sure we could come to a date that would be acceptable to all parties. Could we please have a reason why a sunset clause is unacceptable in principle to the Government?
My Lords, my name is also put to the amendment. In the Commons, the Minister said that the clause enables the Government to
“maintain our statute book in accordance with the social security co-ordination provisions”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/1/20; col. 323.]
That puzzled me, because they do not need this to do that. Both noble Lords who have spoken pointed out the potential problems. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, reminded me that, so often when the House is asked to look at secondary legislation—or is given the opportunity to do so, having had to take positive steps to raise the issue—people who are affected and organisations that know about it make really valid and useful points. It does no good to the reputation of the House to be able to do no more than say, “Well, I’ll raise that in debate”, because we know that we cannot make any changes. I support what is proposed here; it is entirely sensible and in no way wrecking.
(6 years ago)
Lords ChamberIndeed they are, my Lords, and that was why I very deliberately mentioned security as well as liberty in my opening words. It would be wrong to give the noble Lord an assurance that we specifically discussed those rights in the same way or at the same length as other rights, but I have been in enough meetings of the committee to know that that is a backdrop to the other rights we address. I hope that reassures him. It may not, but I did say that we were not opposing this Bill in any wholesale way.
Amendment 3 would leave out paragraph (b) and instead insert a reference to intention,
“to encourage support for a proscribed organisation”.
Other noble Lords have referred to that at some length. I agree with the point about context made by the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza—whether this is the point at which to agree with her or not, I do not know. But I do think context assists one to understand what is in the mind of a person making a statement or undertaking an act.
Regarding Amendment 5, I am grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. His point about open discussion is an important one. I know that he balances the importance of transparency and free debate on these matters. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, about “support” and “supportive”. In debate and correspondence, the Government have relied on Section 4 of the 2000 Act as providing a route to apply to the Home Secretary for de-proscription. I do not challenge that, but do not think it is by any means a complete answer to this. The defence in the 2000 Act only protects statements of support related to a de-proscription application. It is not a defence for those taking part in debate outside those proceedings.
The clause creates a new offence, and the Minister in the Public Bill Committee in the Commons said:
“Dealing effectively with the power of inspiration or incitement is not new”.—[Official Report, Commons, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill Committee, 28/6/18; col. 71.]
I do not read this clause as being about incitement or inspiration. Recklessness is lesser than that.
I have a specific question for the Minister about new subsection 1A(b), which refers to a person to whom a statement, or whatever, is directed. I would like to understand the term “directed”. Are you directing something if it is not addressed to a named person or an identifiable/identified group? If you tweet or post something on Facebook, accessible to the world, are you directing that? The Minister in the Commons made a point similar to the one made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. He gave the example of walking down a high street swinging a baseball bat. Are the people who might see a tweet equivalent to the pedestrians in the high street?
Surely “directed at” is really equivalent to “published”, and the world at large is published, too.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak briefly to the three amendments in my name, Amendments 109, 134 and 188. These are intended as sunset clauses but, as I do not want them to be sunrise clauses, I intend to be extraordinarily brief.
Those of your Lordships who have been in Committee during debates on Clauses 7 to 9 will know that I am very unhappy about the process those clauses attract. For example, the powers within those clauses are very widely drawn, the scope is considerable, the regulations are made by secondary legislation with very limited scrutiny, both parliamentary and ministerial, and they are triggered by a test—the test of appropriateness—which I regard as wholly unsatisfactory. For all those reasons, my view is that the regulations made under the regulation-making powers should die two years after Brexit and should, if necessary, be replaced by primary legislation. That is my suggestion to the Committee, and I hope it commends itself to your Lordships. I beg to move.
My Lords, I have Amendments 111, 137 and 192 in this group and share the unhappiness that has just been described. Mine is a narrow but, I think, important point.
The thrust of most of the amendments in the group —not the noble Viscount’s—is about consultation and transparency. You do not have to spend long working in Parliament to realise that scrutiny very much depends on the input of stakeholders—I hate the term but I cannot think of a better one at this time of night. They assist us to understand how things work in practice, both with technicalities and wider issues. That is not to say that I do not have great admiration for parliamentary counsel and the lawyers working in the departments, who are most concerned with statutory instruments, but my amendments would require consultation on the regulations provided for by Clauses 7 to 9. This should all be a co-operative venture, with stakeholders contributing at an early stage, not least for the reason that the regulations are statutory instruments and not open to amendment, so you have to get it right from the very start.
I was a member for some time of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, which received a lot of very valuable representations—lobbying, if you like. I suspect we will not hear comments in support of Amendment 228 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, about the Cabinet Office code, but I support the application of the code to the regulations. We may well be told that of course the code will apply. I have to say that in my time on the committee, we undertook quite a lot of work on the application of the code in practice and were quite critical of the responses we received from the Cabinet Office. One of our criticisms was that when consultation was undertaken—which it was not always—on the statutory instruments we were considering, the Government did not publish the responses to the consultation before they published the statutory instrument, so the work was not as helpful as it should have been.
Other amendments in this group are more detailed. Mine is not very elegant. I am not proprietorial about it but I wanted to raise the subject because some provision is necessary and, if I may say so, appropriate. It is a step that is very easy to miss out and I hope we will not be told that all the regulations in question are simply about technicalities and that stakeholders would have nothing to add to the exercise. Practitioners in almost every area may see what is workable in proposals being put forward, as well as substantive points.
(8 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the amendment. From the point of view of the person detained the detention starts at the point described by my noble friend Lady Walmsley. It is not a question of that being some sort of limbo; that must be how it feels. If a person is on the way to a place of safety, they are being detained, held and controlled as much as they would be when they reached their destination.
My Lords, I have great sympathy with the points just made. The clock should start ticking when a person is taken into custody and not when he or she arrives at the place of safety.
(8 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the very fact that the noble Baroness raises this issue coming—and I do not say this at all disparagingly—rather fresher to this Bill than some of us underlines the need to get the answers to questions raised around the Committee on to the record and in such as a place as they can easily be found. It should not just be in a letter in the Library but in the Bill. That becomes all the more obvious. I am glad that the noble Baroness reinforced that. Other references have been made to the report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and to flexible licensing, so I will not take the time of the Committee now.
I have a number of amendments in this group. This may be the point at which I emulate the Government Front Bench as I am in danger of losing my place—I hope they will forgive me if I do. My Amendment 40A refers to the importance of resources by providing that the new functions conferred by regulation on the GLAA should be ones for which resources have been made available.
My amendments to Amendment 41 raise some similar points which I will refer to later, so I will deal with them in a rather more general fashion. The first is a probing amendment. Amendment 41 proposes new Section 114B for the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and says that,
“regulations may apply provisions of this Act with any modifications”.
Does that refer to modifications that are necessary simply in order to tweak references to legislation; for instance, so that the legislation being modified applies quite clearly directly or is it something wider? As it is written at the moment I fear it might be wider, which is why I have raised the issue.
I also suggest that regulations should,
“provide for labour abuse prevention officers to undertake specified training and achieve specified qualifications”.
The noble and learned Baroness referred earlier to the extension of PACE powers. One should not extend those significant powers to people who do not know how to use them. Training is needed and possibly qualifications for them to be able to use those powers. I picked that up at a number of points. I also suggest with my amendments that a statutory instrument amending or repealing a provision of the Act is significant.
In new Section 22A of the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004, to which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, referred, a relevant person for the purposes of requests for assistance going either way includes immigration officers. That again conflates immigration control and labour market regulation. I am aware that the GLA has experienced some frustrations when it might undertake what you might call hot pursuit when it has discovered a likely offence but does not have the power to deal with it. I have heard Paul Broadbent say that it is very frustrating when you have to wait for the police to arrive to deal with something and you cannot stop evidence being removed. I am not sure whether I am making that point at quite the right point in the Bill but I think it comes generally within this area.
My next group of amendments deals very much with training, qualifications and resources again so I will not repeat the arguments, but I think it was again the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, who referred to the relationship between the strategies. Under Amendment 77 the GLAA will have to carry out functions “in accordance with” the labour market enforcement strategy. Everybody else involved is left with the lighter obligation of having regard to it, so why the difference? That is my Amendment 77A.
Amendments 77B and 77C are about the relationship with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of State’s powers. At the moment, to take one instance, the GLA sets fees after consultation with the Secretary of State. What will the position be in the future? My Amendment 72 would enable the GLA to require information from supply chain. It would give it powers relating to an organisation that takes supplies of goods and services. That seems to have been a lacuna that could do with filling or closing. I am not sure what one does with a lacuna, but it is rather a different amendment from the others we have been debating. Again, it is something we could very usefully address during the course of this Bill.
My Lords, I apologise for making what I suspect will be regarded as a somewhat pedantic point but I should like to raise some specific questions about Amendment 41. At this point, I am referring to the amendments to the PACE powers.
First, as regards new subsection (1), I notice that the power is permissive and not mandatory. Perhaps the Minister would be so good as to explain why it is not a mandatory power but only a permissive one. Secondly and related to that, I am sure that your Lordships would like to know whether it is the Government’s intention to exercise this power. If so, when and to what extent?
My next point is also brief. In new subsection (7)(b) I find that the regulations may apply to “particular purposes”. I think that your Lordships will be reassured to know that this power is not going to be imposed with regard to particular investigations; rather, that it is more general in character.
My last point relates to new subsection (1)(8), which concerns a very wide power. It is contemplated giving the Secretary of State a power to amend substantive legislation. I have personally always been very cautious about using statutory instruments for such a purpose. Incidentally, I am very glad to see that the affirmative procedure is being used here for that very purpose, but, as I say, I am very cautious about using statutory instruments in this way. I suspect that the Committee would like to know the extent to which the Government are minded to use this power and, if so, for what purpose and when.