Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Cameron of Lochiel

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, we have Amendments 51 and 51B in this group. Amendment 51 would add mobile phones and chargers to the list of relevant articles. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, is just leaving; he may be coming back. There are innocent examples of the use of mobile phones in the JCHR’s report. Mobile phones are very common, and we are looking for proportionality in all this. Some years ago, I quite often heard opponents of asylum seekers and refugees, who were outraged, say, “They even have mobile phones”, as if that was some sort of great luxury and that having them meant they would be perfectly capable of getting, possibly not first-class seats, but certainly seats on a plane, because they were clearly very civilised, well-equipped and moneyed. I have not actually heard that for some time. Mobile phones are not a luxury these days; they enable asylum seekers to keep in touch with their family. I think that is hugely important, not for any sinister reason but because they are a lifeline for mental health, quite apart from more practical examples.

Amendment 51B speaks to the regulations which I mentioned in the last group. The Secretary of State can, by regulations, alter the list of relevant articles, and my amendment would provide for consultation with organisations that aim, without charge, to assist asylum seekers. I think that that point was made by one of those organisations in its briefings to noble Lords. After all, if there is to be a change, it is perfectly reasonable and proper that the people who know what happens on the ground—I am not suggesting that the Government do not—and who have that particular take on it should be consulted.

I have signed Amendment 56, to which the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, has spoken. People travel in groups—not everybody, but some people—and it seems natural, to me anyway, that a husband would perhaps carry documents for his wife and children, or a mother would carry documents for her children. I think that it would be right to make that change.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

Once again, I am grateful to noble Lords for their contributions to this group of amendments around the safeguards to the offences. As I have already said on previous groups, it is the position of His Majesty’s Opposition Benches that the new criminal offences in the Bill must be as watertight as possible. We know that people-smuggling criminal gangs are incredibly innovative in their efforts to continue running their illegal operations, concocting ever more ingenious methods to circumvent the law. We must do all we can to frustrate that. To do so, we need to ensure that there are no loopholes that could be used to evade legal repercussions.

I turn to the amendments. Amendment 46, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord German, seems, to us, with respect, to be unnecessary. As the Bill stands, the person in question already has a defence if they are able to show that they were carrying out a rescue, or if

“they were acting on behalf of an organisation which … aims to assist asylum-seekers, and … does not charge for its services”.

In my view, if someone has broken a law, as they will have done if they are charged under this clause, without being able to avail themselves of those two specific defences, then they have committed an offence for which they should be held liable. The amendment proposes that we, in effect, waive the law if the person shows that their actions were self-relating. That is a dangerous precedent to establish—that someone acting to benefit only themselves can get away with actions that are demonstrably illegal. If someone knowingly engages in criminal activity and is unable to have recourse to the defences set out in the Bill, we need to be clear that they have committed a crime and should still be liable as a result. In our view, the amendment would blow wide open the rigour and focus of the offences as currently drafted, which is the opposite of the strong message we need to send to those who—we cannot forget—are illegally violating our borders.

Amendments 50 and 62 would mean that, for the purposes of the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, any offence committed under the relevant clauses would not be regarded as a particularly serious crime. I listened to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, explain the rationale for the amendments, and I completely understand the concern that lies behind them. I think I am right in saying that the convention talks about constituting

“a danger to the community of that country”,

and I completely accept that that is very strong language, but I think it is important to consider this in context. Illegal migrants enter the UK without going through any checks whatever. It can be almost impossible to find out who such migrants are, where they have come from, what their history is, and, fundamentally, what sort of people they are. Safe and legal routes are safe and legal precisely because they answer these questions. Let us not forget the incident that happened in May, when five Iranian nationals were arrested for planning what the Home Secretary described as a major terror attack. They arrived in the United Kingdom by irregular means, including small boats and a lorry, before claiming asylum. One of those people was taken out of his taxpayer-funded accommodation when he was arrested. Is it not clear that those men constituted a danger to the community of our country? We need to appreciate the risks that we run when faced with this system and with the problem that we have no idea of who those people are or the potential risk they pose. The police and security services were successful in foiling that attack, but we cannot guarantee that that would happen indefinitely. This problem obviously and demonstrably risks the safety of our national community, and we need to engage with the law in a way that reflects this. For that reason, we oppose those amendments.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Cameron of Lochiel

Committee stage
Thursday 26th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 15 I will speak also to Amendment 17; both are in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower. I will also reflect briefly on Amendment 16, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

Amendment 15 is a matter of legal precision. Legal precision, especially in issues as sensitive and complex as immigration enforcement, is a necessity. This amendment would define illegal entry to the United Kingdom with direct reference to Section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971. That Act has long provided the statutory foundation for offences relating to unlawful entry and overstaying. If we are serious about creating a coherent framework for the commander to operate within, we must be clear about what we mean by “illegal entry”. Without this definition, the term is left open to interpretation and could result in confusion, inconsistency and perhaps even legal challenge. By tying a definition directly to the existing law, we would ensure that there is no ambiguity and no risk of the commander operating under uncertain or shifting interpretations. It is a simple, necessary fix and sets widely accepted parameters, not only for our discussion now but for the law once it comes into force.

Amendment 17 is likewise rooted in common sense. It defines sea crossings as

“journeys by water from another country for the purpose of reaching, and gaining entry into, the United Kingdom”.

That is important because it makes it clear that a sea crossing can be regarded as having occurred from any third country. It is vital that we draft this legislation now in a way that allows our enforcement authorities to take robust action to stop this threat. How we define these core terms is important to ensuring that we can do this successfully.

We note that the Government’s current intention is to include sea crossings that originate only in France, Belgium or the Netherlands, as is stated in the offence of endangering another during sea crossings in Clause 18. We have an amendment to address that in a later group, so I will not dwell on it now, but suffice it to say that we do not think we should be narrowing the scope of the definition only to crossings that begin in these three countries. They might be the countries that illegal migrants cross from now, but we must ensure that the legislation is future-proofed. Given that the strategy—indeed, much of the public discourse—centres on the dangers and deterrence of these crossings, it is only right that the Bill is clear in defining what it actually refers to. Our amendment would close that gap.

I turn briefly to Amendment 16 from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, which raises an interesting point about whether private bodies carrying out public functions are captured under the definition of “public authority”. I suggest some caution, though: although the intention is to probe and not prescribe, we must be wary of unintentionally expanding the net of liability obligation without fully understanding the operational and legal issues and consequences. If private contractors working at the border are to be brought within the scope of the commander’s influence, that should be considered through a fuller and more deliberative process, and not inserted without clear parameters.

So, although I appreciate the spirit of the amendment, I hope the Government can offer some clarification, perhaps in guidance or regulation rather than in primary legislation at this stage. The two amendments in our names are about clarity, consistency and good legislative practice, and they would support the effectiveness of the commander. I urge the Government to support them, and I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

We have Amendment 16 in this group. It is indeed a probing amendment. I am a little amused that the noble Lord has just criticised the expansionist tendencies of this amendment, given that that is what some of his earlier amendments have tended to suggest.

Clause 3(5) tells us that “public authority” means

“a person with functions of a public nature”.

Clause 3 makes public authorities “partner authorities” for the purpose of the chapter. Across the public sector—not just this one—private organisations are contracted to provide services, so I am probing whether such organisations are within the definition. Does the commander have authority over them—and, if so, how far?—or is it that, as I have been arguing for the whole of today, the responsibility lies with the Secretary of State for all this work? Of course, we know that the Home Office has contracted private sector organisations—to run asylum hotels, for instance—so my questioning is not totally theoretical.

I often worry that the Government are not always as good at procurement as one might like them to be—or, frankly, at enforcing contracts—so I hope that the private sector will not be put in an even stronger position in the sector. If it is, I for one would like to know. But this is a probing amendment, and I am not seeking to expand the territory.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Cameron of Lochiel

Report stage
Tuesday 4th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I was surprised at the last stage by the amendment requiring the tribunal to issue a determination within a reasonable time, as defined by the Secretary of State, because it seemed to me that that was an inappropriate combination or eliding of the roles of the judiciary and the Executive. That was not pressed, but this amendment seems to me to be on the same page.

Others will have experience of the courts staying an order—I mean professional experience—but I understand that to be part of proceedings in a lower court. As I read Amendment 19, it would require an extra stage in the proceedings, presumably a hearing on an application that the time before determining an appeal is unreasonable, and so a further addition to the tribunal’s load and further delay. We cannot support that amendment.

On Amendment 20, having to pay within 28 days does not seem to me to be excessive penalisation, which is the wording used in the Member’s explanatory statement. In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, talked of a grace period being aligned with similar penalties. The Minister disagreed and made the point that 28 days is a minimum.

The penalty will not come out of the blue in most cases, as I understand it. The SIA has to be satisfied that there has been, or will be, a contravention. Unless the responsible person has refused, or completely failed, to engage with the SIA, there will have been a dialogue.

With regard to volunteers, of course we are with the noble Lord on not disincentivising volunteers, but I do not think this is the first or only time that volunteers have been faced with or have had to think about the responsibilities laid on them as volunteers, particularly if they are trustees of charities. There are a lot of rules that have to be observed by them.

The Bill, in any event, is about taking precautions appropriate to the premises or to the event. The distinction between the operators—volunteers or paid—is surely irrelevant. I doubt terrorists would make that distinction. As we have been reminded today, the Conservative Government were proposing 100 as a threshold. That would have meant a greater problem, as the noble Lord defines it. We are, I am afraid, not able to support those amendments.

With regard to Amendment 23, Clause 20(2) allows for the SIA to consider “matters it considers relevant”, which presumably will include the local authority’s view. Having specifically to obtain the local authority’s view seems to be another bit of bureaucracy in certain cases. If it is relevant, it will be considered, and provision is made for that.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

I thank noble Lords for their contributions, particularly those of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and my noble friend Lord Murray.

I turn briefly to the amendments. My noble friend Lord Murray dealt with the treatment of volunteers and spoke eloquently about the principle that volunteers acting in good faith should not be subject to financial penalties, criminal liability or civil liability. He made the point that volunteers play a vital role in many public and community settings, often stepping forward to help in times of crisis. To penalise those who act voluntarily and in good faith would be both unfair and counterproductive. If the Bill is to encourage a culture of shared responsibility for public protection, it must also offer reasonable protections to those who contribute to that effort, and volunteers should not be deterred from assisting by fear of punitive measures. Those amendments strike the right balance by ensuring that only those who act negligently or with ill intent are held responsible.

On Amendment 19, respectfully, I do not accept the argument of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that this creates an additional court process. The Bill already contains a mechanism in Clause 16(6) and (7) for rendering a notice as having no effect, and Amendment 19 would simply add another scenario to that. Taken together, I suggest these amendments improve the Bill and I urge the Government to accept them.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Lord Cameron of Lochiel

Committee stage
Wednesday 5th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I suspect that the answer to quite a lot of the points that have been made lies in the term “reasonably practicable”, which is seen throughout the Bill. I asked some questions about that on the previous day of Committee, in particular whether reasonably practicable was limited to physical considerations or included financial ones and was a mix. Fair enough, my amendment was about the meaning of “immediate vicinity” and that is what the Minister answered, but I do not think he answered that question. If he is able to do so today, I think it might help us quite a lot. The financial implications are specifically referred to in Amendment 22.

I first heard the term “invacuation” about 20 years ago and I heard it from the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey. I am very doubtful about Amendment 20A. I do not think it can be dealt with by advice. Taking the example of Grenfell, it seems very harsh to say this, but bad cases make bad law. I really doubt that the example we have heard could be answered by the change in the Bill proposed by this amendment.

With Amendment 21A, I suppose the question is whether reasonably practicable encompasses proportionate. I think, in the context, it does. Conversely, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and I think he is right to question in Amendment 23A whether it is appropriate that a copy of the document dealing with procedures is provided to the SIA as soon as reasonably practicable after it is prepared. It would be helpful to have a specific time limit here to ensure that the documents are prepared quickly, in a timely manner. That may be something for the SIA to be able to indicate was required, but it would be right not to have an entirely open-ended arrangement that could mean that some people who should be preparing documents do not get on with them as quickly as they should.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak in support of my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower’s amendments in this group, specifically Amendments 21A and 23A, and I hope to do so very briefly. It strikes me that Amendment 21A is a crucial brake, as it were, on the power of the Executive. It introduces a test of reasonable proportionality to the creation by the Secretary of State of further procedures by regulation.

I know that there are some later amendments by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and others on the totality of the Henry VIII clauses in this clause and ensuing clauses. But, in the event that these specific provisions, namely subsections (4) and (5), remain in the Bill, Amendment 21A represents a crucial limit on the powers of the Government. In the age-old phrasing relating to proportionality, it is important not to use a sledgehammer to crack a nut. Insisting that “further procedures” meet an additional test of being reasonably proportionate imposes on the Secretary of State a duty to consider the question of proportionality in a measured and proper way.

Finally, Amendment 23A, as others have said, would provide an express and definitive timeframe for ensuring documentary compliance. The legislation would thus avoid uncertainty and vagueness by creating a specific time period. That strikes me as being in the interests of the person responsible for the enhanced duty premises or qualifying event and in the interests of the SIA. In short, everyone would know where they stand, and I suggest that that kind of awareness is to be commended. I look forward to hearing the Government’s clarification of all the points made.