Policing and Crime Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 19th December 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

We take the view that the police should always act in a reasonable way.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I think that encompasses our arguments.

With regard to the pilots, I am grateful for the noble Baroness’s assurances, but had there been consultation on the choice of Hampshire, she might have had some useful input.

I do not know whether the noble Baroness is in a position to tell us whether there is a distinction between an immigration officer or constable “suspecting” under these clauses in the Bill and an officer having “reasonable grounds for believing”. Are these different tests? It seems to me that suspecting and having reasonable grounds for believing are not the same, but I think she is telling us that they are. Does she have anything that she is able to add?

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

I am slightly muddled by what the noble Baroness is saying. Could she explain that a bit more?

[Baroness Hamwee]

I take the point that different formulae are used in different parts of immigration law, but the Immigration Act to which I have referred provides for an officer to have “reasonable grounds for believing” something, while under this Bill, he simply has to “suspect” something. “Reasonable grounds for believing” seems to me to be a much tougher test than simply suspecting. The noble Baroness may have something she can share with the House on that.

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

Suspecting and believing are slightly different words, obviously. Perhaps I had better write to the noble Baroness with more clarification.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I wonder whether this is something that we can add to the discussion or consultation on the pilots. If one is going to pilot two provisions in the same place, carried out by the same officers and prompted no doubt by the same observations, it would be quite interesting to have them either able or not able to require documents from the same people, but not able to do so because in one case the ground applies and in the other it does not. I realise we are getting into very fine detail, but it will be very real detail in the application. It is not the noble Baroness’s fault, but I can see that we are not going to be able to make further progress on this today. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Policing and Crime Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen

Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 12th December 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

I will write to the noble Lord to clarify that point.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. When the noble Baroness writes, perhaps she can also explain this about what the Government did in the Immigration Act 2016. For this purpose, I simply refer to Section 43, which introduces a new paragraph in Schedule 2 to the 1971 Act providing for power to be exercised only if the authorised officer has “reasonable grounds” for believing that, in this case, the driving licence is on the premises. The very fact that that terminology is used in legislation which we passed a mere few months ago must raise the question of why it is not included in the comparable clause in this Bill. I know that the noble Baroness cannot answer this at the moment, but I hope that as well as writing, she might be able to discuss this with officials. It is an intrinsically important point, but also a technical one, as to why it should not be included in this Bill. Perhaps we can come back to this at Third Reading. I am not of course expecting her to do anything other than nod sympathetically, as she is doing.

The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee will no doubt consider the Government’s response, but I note that on the question of the affirmative procedure, the Minister said that she did not think that these regulations should be subject to parliamentary procedure. The committee also suggested, or would require, that the Secretary of State should consult interested parties before making the regulations. I am not sure—I might have missed it—whether she referred to the maximum duration of pilots. I accept that there will be post-legislative reviews, and that everything has to be kept under review, but it is the importance of the subject matter which led us to raise the point about requiring an ad hoc review.

I do not know whether the Minister has any information as to whether the pilots and guidance under the Immigration Act are going to be introduced in tandem with, and in the same areas as and so on, the pilots under this Bill. Does she have any information about that?

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

I think that is still under discussion at the moment with various authorities.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, we will see, but I am glad to note the Home Office’s acceptance of the importance of the issue, which I never had in doubt. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for raising this important issue. The Government take seriously their responsibilities to the very vulnerable group of people in society whom this amendment concerns. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for her deep knowledge of this issue, and for the words that she has spoken this evening.

Coroners in England and Wales play a critical role in investigating the deaths of persons where there is a suspicion that death may have resulted from violence or unnatural causes, or indeed where the cause of death is unknown. Coroners will continue to have this duty with regard to persons who have been deprived of their liberty as authorised under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. There is no restriction on when or by whom deaths can be reported to a coroner. Indeed, the registrar of deaths has a duty to report deaths to the coroner where he or she considers that the coroner’s duty to investigate may apply.

The Government recognise that there is a need to improve the scrutiny of deaths that are not investigated by a coroner. The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 contains provisions to introduce medical examiners who will contact the deceased’s family and those involved in the deceased person’s care to identify any concerns as part of a reformed death certification process.

We consulted on our proposals earlier this year and aim to publish our response to the consultation in the new year. This will of course be particularly relevant to vulnerable people in hospitals and care homes, regardless of whether they are being deprived of their liberty. Medical examiners will not just be responsible for scrutinising individual deaths not investigated by the coroner but will have a role in analysing data on deaths across their area. They will identify patterns and contribute to lessons that will reduce avoidable deaths. They will also have a duty to report to coroners deaths for which a coroner’s investigation may be required.

The effect of Clause 155 will be that the death of anyone subject to a deprivation of liberty safeguards authorisation, or an appropriate Court of Protection order, will no longer trigger an automatic coroner’s investigation. We supported this change in the law in the light of views expressed by the then chief coroner, his honour Peter Thornton QC, in his 2015-16 annual report. He called for immediate action to remove deprivation of liberty safeguards cases from the definition of “in state detention”—a point that, just prior to his recent retirement, he reiterated to the Minister for Victims, Youth and Family Justice.

The issue here is not simply one of the resources needed to undertake these inquests. The then chief coroner had addressed this to some extent through his 2014 guidance, revised in 2016, which set out a streamlined process. But, as he has said, these inquests “serve no good purpose”. It cannot be right that more than 20% of inquests undertaken each year are unnecessary, with all that that implies in terms of added anguish for bereaved families.

I thank the noble Baroness for raising the profile of this important issue, but I hope that she will accept that the Government’s recently completed consultation on reforming the death certification process will, when its proposals are implemented, complement and support the work of our coroners who investigate suspicious deaths.

I think that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked who we consulted in the consultation. The Ministry of Justice consulted the former and current chief coroner. Having said that, we consider that this removes any further need for further consultation on the coroner’s statutory duties, and I hope that the noble Baroness will therefore be content to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I thank the Minister, but I cannot restrain myself from observing that her answer has been that there has been a consultation and that the Government will publish their response to it next year. I say that as nicely as I can, because clearly a lot of work has gone on with regard to this—and I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, as well, for filling out the information that she gave pretty comprehensibly to the House on the last occasion. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I hope that my noble friend will understand that, given the further business to which the House has to attend tonight, I will confine myself to saying that we on these Benches enthusiastically support her amendments.

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for meeting with me, and for tabling these amendments again so that this House has a further opportunity to debate the important issue of victims’ rights.

Some of the amendments seek to place aspects of the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime on a statutory basis. This is a statutory code, provided for by the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, and as such all criminal justice agencies are required to provide the services victims are entitled to under it. Many of the entitlements for victims included in the proposed amendments are already in the code. Some are for all victims of crime, while others are enhanced entitlements for the most vulnerable victims of crimes such as stalking and domestic and sexual abuse. Placing them on a statutory footing separately will not ensure compliance, nor guarantee that those entitlements are delivered effectively. The effect would merely be symbolic, and make amendment and updating of entitlements more difficult.

As I said before, we recognise the importance of training for professionals who work with victims. Under the police educational framework and national curriculum, police officers and staff receive training on the code throughout their careers. Officers and staff can receive training on the code at various stages of their careers. This training is supported by a new online package launched by the College of Policing. All Crown Prosecution Service staff who attend court have been given face-to-face training on the new Speaking to Witnesses at Court guidance and on how to interact with victims and witnesses at court without undermining the fairness of the trial. This is supported by a comprehensive package of e-learning, which barristers who appear for the CPS in court are expected to complete.

We also appreciate that more can be done in relation to certain categories of crime. That is why, for example, the College of Policing, as part of reviewing its guidance on stalking and harassment investigations, is looking at whether police officers fully understand the offences and are receiving appropriate training. It is also why Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate are carrying out a joint inspection to assess the effectiveness of police forces and the CPS in dealing with cases involving stalking and harassment, and to examine the service received by victims. The CPS is developing a training package for its prosecutors to improve the quality of charging and review decisions in stalking and harassment cases.

There has also been a concerted effort to improve the response of the police in domestic abuse cases. In its most recent national thematic inspection of the police response to domestic abuse, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary found improvements in police attitudes towards victims and front-line officers’ understanding of the importance of dealing with victims in a supportive way. Since 2014, every police force has published a domestic abuse improvement plan, new guidance has been published by the College of Policing, new training has been successfully piloted and for the first time, police are now collecting data against a national standard on all domestic abuse recorded crimes. A joint police and CPS witness care review is looking to identify clear performance measures which would include timeliness of communication of information to witnesses as set out in the code. In addition, Her Majesty’s Courts & Tribunals Service is undergoing an audit by the Government Internal Audit Agency on the effectiveness of arrangements in place for victims and witnesses, against requirements in the victims’ code and the witness charter. Results are expected in the first quarter of 2017.

In order to determine what is required to strengthen further the rights of victims of crime, we are looking at available information about compliance with the victims’ code, and considering how it might be improved and monitored. We are also looking carefully at the range of proposals that have been made by the Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses and others. We are focused on making sure we get this work right, and ensuring that any future reform proposals are evidence-based, and an effective and proportionate approach.

Finally, in relation to Amendment 188, which seeks to provide a direct route of complaint for victims to the Parliamentary Ombudsman, I should add that on 5 December the Cabinet Office published a draft public service ombudsman Bill. The Bill will improve access to the ombudsman’s services by allowing for all complaints to be made with or without the help of a representative and in a variety of formats to meet the digital age. When the Bill is brought before your Lordships’ House, it will provide a further opportunity for noble Lords to test whether the measures I have set out are delivering the improvements to the experience of victims in their interaction with the criminal justice system that we all want to see.

I hope that, having further debated these issues and received greater detail of the work that is being undertaken both by the Government and by the criminal justice agencies, the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (Continuation) Order 2016

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen

Thursday 24th November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)]

My Lords, this statutory instrument will extend the Secretary of State’s powers within the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 for a further five years.

The first and foremost responsibility of the Home Secretary is to keep the people of this country safe. As noble Lords will be more than aware, the threat from terrorism is very much present. The events in France, Belgium and other parts of the world in recent years bring home to us the very real danger posed by terrorists who would seek to do us harm.

The Home Secretary is absolutely clear that the police and security services should have the powers they need to disrupt terrorists. We should, of course, always ensure that wherever possible we prosecute those individuals who would seek to harm the people of this country to ensure that they are brought to justice. In a very small number of cases, this is not possible, so the police and Security Service need alternative powers to disrupt terrorist-related activity.

This is why I am here today seeking parliamentary agreement to extend the powers available to the Secretary of State in the TPIM Act 2011 for a further five years. The Act first came into force on 14 December 2011. It introduced a new framework for placing restrictions on individuals where appropriate to do so. TPIMs are civil preventive measures intended for use only when the prosecution—or deportation in the case of foreign nationals—of individuals considered to be involved in terrorist-related activity is not possible.

The Act allows for the imposition of restrictive measures on an individual where the Secretary of State is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the person is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity. Available measures under the original Schedule 1 to the TPIM Act 2011 are: an overnight residence requirement; a ban on overseas travel and holding travel documents; exclusion from specific places; restrictions on the use of financial services; restrictions on ownership or transfer of properties; limits on the use of telephones and computers, including the internet; limits on association; restrictions on the individual’s ability to work and/or study; police reporting; a requirement to be photographed as required; and a requirement to wear an electronic tag. Under Part 2 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, a TPIM notice can also: require the individual to reside in a property up to 200 miles away from their residence without their consent; ban the individual from possessing certain weapons; and require the individual to attend appointments arranged by the Secretary of State.

A key objective of the Act was to introduce a more focused regime which protected the public from the risk of terrorism but increased the safeguards in place to protect the civil liberties of those subject to the measures. Built into the legislation is an automatic right of appeal which allows individuals subject to TPIM notices to challenge through the courts the decision of the Home Secretary to impose the TPIM. However, unlike the previous control order regime, no TPIMs have been quashed by the courts.

In accordance with Section 21 of the Act, the director-general of MI5, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and the Intelligence Services Commissioner have all been consulted, and they all recommended the continuation of the Secretary of State’s powers. I commend the order to the House.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, from these Benches we thank the noble Baroness for explaining the order, and we will not oppose the continuation of TPIMs. In the current climate, I am not surprised that they are to be extended, but it is a shame that the extension is for five years—I will come back to that.

I note the Government’s assessment for the Home Affairs Select Committee that the Act as amended in 2015 met its objectives and that the amendments incorporated most of the changes recommended at the time by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. The amendments that were not included were changes the Liberal Democrats called for, so I will mention them briefly again.

The first change is the proposal that the Home Secretary should be required on review to persuade a court—I stress, a court—that, on the balance of probabilities, a TPIM subject was involved in terrorism. The independent reviewer, commenting on this, said:

“Both the Home Secretary’s decision to impose a TPIM notice and the review by the court will be considered on the balance of probabilities that the individual is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity”.

That is intriguing in the light of the Government’s comment that the court will ask whether the Home Secretary has acted reasonably and proportionately.

The second change is a statutory bar to the use as evidence of information given during compulsory deradicalisation interviews—appointment measures. In 2015, the Government considered that the existing power of the criminal courts to exclude evidence where it would have an adverse effect on the fairness of proceedings was a sufficient safeguard. Now, as then—again, this point was raised by the independent reviewer—as soon as there is sufficient evidence to prosecute, the judicial process should take its course and the TPIM be ended.

I do not know whether the noble Baroness has in her briefing evidence that having TPIMs in place has led to more prosecutions. At the time of the creation of these measures, the Joint Committee on Human Rights commented that the “I” in TPIM—for “Investigation”—might be something of a misnomer. The debate around the Prevent strategy, in which many noble Lords have taken part, and will take part, has been rightly concerned about alienating communities. I have expressed the same concern about TPIMs: that they may increase the risk of the very thing they seek to avert. The measures have been changed and they are lesser measures than control orders—although they crept towards them. A considerable impact was noted in connection with control orders on both the subject and his family.

Policing and Crime Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 16th November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, we on these Benches support our noble friend Lady Brinton. I do not want to detain the Committee so will make just a couple of comments. When discussing matters such as trafficking and slavery, I often hear that these issues are where domestic violence was 20 years ago. It is very concerning to hear about the treatment of women—and men—who have suffered domestic violence in the way that my noble friend has described. That is not progress over the past 20 years.

There is another argument for my noble friend’s various amendments, which I do not think she mentioned; that is, obtaining the best evidence from victims who are also witnesses. These are very sensitive issues and one hears of very good practice by some police forces and some members of the judiciary. It is a question of spreading that good practice. There is an awful lot raised in these amendments, including the very delicate issue of ticketing for the judiciary dealing with certain cases. This is not the moment to go into that but the implications of the amendments need to be taken on board over a very wide area of practice. The Committee should be grateful to my noble friend and the noble Lord for ensuring that they are raised. It is a pity that, coming to the end of Committee, we are not able to do them the justice that we would all like to do them.

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and other noble Lords who have spoken, for raising the important issue of victims’ rights.

It is crucial that the needs of victims of crime are given proper consideration at every stage of the criminal justice process. We published a revised Code of Practice for Victims of Crime, which came into force in November 2015. As a result, victims of all criminal offences, not just victims of more serious offences, are entitled to support under the code. The code provides victims with a range of entitlements, including information about their case, interpretation and translation, and for them to be treated in a respectful and professional manner without discrimination of any kind. Furthermore, the code requires police and other service providers to have a complaints procedure. If victims are dissatisfied with the outcome, they are able to refer their complaints to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman via their Member of Parliament.

It is essential that victims receive the best possible support to help them cope with and recover from what they have been through. We have a raft of arrangements in place which ensure that victims have access to a wide range of emotional, practical and specialist support determined by and tailored to their needs; wherever possible, this support is accessible locally. We are committed to ensuring that victims get the support they need and have protected the overall level of funding for victims across the spending review period, with over £95 million being provided in 2016-17 to fund crucial support services, including £7 million for the provision of support for victims of child sexual abuse, in recognition of increasing demand. Of the £95 million, we allocated over £67 million in grant funding to police and crime commissioners, who are using that funding to commission local services. The Justice Secretary has recently agreed to extend grant funding to all the nationally funded organisations for 2017-18 while we consider the current mixed model of commissioning national and local services.

We recognise the importance of training for professionals who work with victims. Organisations are responsible for ensuring the highest-quality training for their staff to ensure that victims receive the best possible service and support. However, we also recognise that more can be done. That is why we are working to place victims and witnesses at the heart of a justice system that works for everyone. We recently announced the national rollout of pre-trial cross-examination in 2017 to improve the support available for vulnerable witnesses. We are also investing close to £1 billion to reform and digitise our courts and tribunals. This will improve the experience for all court and tribunal users, including vulnerable victims and witnesses. Furthermore, we have committed to introduce further measures to strengthen the rights of victims of crime. It is important that we take the time to get this right, and we will announce our plans in due course.

Finally, the proposal for homicide reviews is also unnecessary. If the family of a victim has concerns about a closed homicide case, this can be looked at again under the Crown Prosecution Service’s recent guidance, Reviewing Previously Finalised Cases, to determine whether or not a review should be conducted.

Having had this opportunity to debate these important issues, and in the knowledge that the Government will be bringing forward proposals to strengthen the rights of victims, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

Policing and Crime Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard - part two): House of Lords
Wednesday 9th November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

I cannot go further than I already have in saying that we will of course look very carefully at the findings of the committee before coming to any final conclusions. That is as far as I can go. Everything else is rather hypothetical at the moment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, perhaps the noble Baroness can assist this Committee with the timing. I imagine that the Select Committee will probably be required to report in February, but this Bill is likely to have concluded its passage before then. As a result, I am unclear how recommendations from the committee can affect the content of the Bill, but she may have information about the relative timings that could help this Committee.

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

We will not pre-empt what the committee is going to say, so we have to wait until we hear from it.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, Clause 140 provides for a requirement to produce a nationality document in the case where,

“an individual has been arrested on suspicion of the commission of an offence”,

and,

“an immigration officer or constable”,

gives,

“the individual a notice requiring the production of a nationality document”.

This amendment comes from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member. The committee regarded Article 14—the anti-discrimination article—as being engaged. The organisation Liberty has argued that if these powers,

“are to operate in a similar fashion to powers in the Immigration Bill”,

which a number of us will recall,

“immigration checks would become a routine aspect of every police engagement with a suspect. It is difficult to think how suspicion”,

which is required,

“will be generated if this is not the intended model, short of the police making assumptions about an individual’s status on the basis of appearance or accent”.

The committee noted the risk in this provision that requirements to confirm nationality could have a differential impact on BAME UK citizens. As our report says:

“We also questioned whether a person asked to produce a passport or other nationality document should instead be entitled to supply documentation sufficient to demonstrate an entitlement to such a document”,

since not everyone has a passport. We contacted the then Minister for the subject, who told the committee in the summer:

“Before deciding to issue a notice requiring a nationality document to be produced, as a matter of operational best practice, officers should check whether or not there is an immigration interest with Home Office Immigration Enforcement. If, having undertaken these checks, it is confirmed that the individual is not a UK national (or it is suspected the person may not be), it is a proportionate response to require the production of a document in order to properly establish identity. Should a UK national not possess a passport but are able to produce evidence (documentary or otherwise) that they are entitled to one under the terms of published guidance, it is reasonable that officers should take that into account. We”—

the Government—

“do not consider it necessary that such eventualities are set out on the face of the Bill, but will instead issue guidance to officers in that regard”.

The Joint Committee made the following point:

“If the Government accepts that alternative documentation may be required in circumstances where an individual does not possess a passport or driving licence, it is not clear why this fact should not be stated on the face of the Bill”.

This is a safeguard, after all, and something more than operational guidance would be appropriate. I beg to move.

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness and the other members of the Joint Committee on Human Rights for their consideration of the Bill. It is accepted that there may be situations where a UK national does not possess a passport and should be able to produce other documentary evidence to satisfy an officer that they are entitled to one under the terms of published government guidance.

The Government’s view is that this matter can properly be addressed through guidance, but in the light of the Joint Committee’s recommendation, I am content to take this amendment away and consider it further in advance of Report. I trust that, on that basis, the noble Baroness would be content to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, four minutes has achieved more than I might have expected. I realise that perhaps, in reading the content of the report fairly quickly, I might not have sufficiently stressed the risks of discrimination with which we were particularly concerned. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, we on these Benches very much support the noble Baroness’s amendment. She has obviously been working at this for some time—I see from her face that she has—and her explanation is clear and obviously based on the experiences of which she is aware. So we give her our support.

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Berridge for explaining the purpose of her amendment. The Government are mindful that forced religious marriage may be a deliberate attempt to avoid financial consequences in the event of the break-up of the marriage. The existing position is that the financial orders provided for in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 are available only where a marriage is capable of legal recognition in England and Wales and where it is being brought to an end—or where judicial separation is ordered. However, where a marriage is not capable of legal recognition, parties have the same recourse to the court as unmarried cohabiting couples on the breakdown of the relationship. This applies to the division of any property and to financial provision for any children the couple have.

For those in a marriage that has no legal validity, the pressure from families and communities to stay together is no less strong because of the fact that the marriage has no legal consequences. It does not make it any easier for an individual to escape an abusive relationship, and we share my noble friend’s concern that it leaves women in particular vulnerable to hardship when the relationship breaks up, since there is no recourse to the court for the financial orders available to divorcing couples. The Government take this issue very seriously, and it is central to the independent sharia law review launched by the current Prime Minister in May this year. The Government will wish to consider the issue further in light of the findings from the review.

None the less, the law governing marriage, divorce and matrimonial property is complex, nuanced and finely balanced, reflecting as it does the wide range of personal circumstances in which people find themselves. The amendment would introduce a disparity with unmarried cohabitants and with those who are in unregistered marriages that are not forced. There is no evidence at this stage that the amendment—

Policing and Crime Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard - part one): House of Lords
Wednesday 9th November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

My Lords, Amendment 209 provides for a new offence of possession of pyrotechnic articles at live musical events in England. The amendment is in response to one tabled by Nigel Adams on Report in the House of Commons. The misuse of fireworks, flares and smoke bombs at festivals and other live musical events by members of the public is an increasing and deeply concerning problem. Fireworks and other pyrotechnic articles covered by the amendment are dangerous when misused. Fireworks can burn at in excess of 2,200 degrees centigrade; flares can reach temperatures of 1,600 degrees centigrade and can burn for as long as an hour. Smoke bombs also burn at high temperatures, and in enclosed or crowded spaces the thick smoke that they release can cause breathing difficulties, particularly for asthma sufferers.

In the 1980s, it was recognised that the misuse of pyrotechnic articles in crowded football stadia posed a specific public order risk. As a result, the Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc.) Act 1985 provides for an offence of possession of fireworks and flares at a football match. However, current firework and explosives legislation does not provide the police or prosecutors with an appropriate offence to tackle the possession of pyrotechnic articles at music festivals. While the majority of festival organisers have their own rules banning festivalgoers from bringing fireworks and other pyrotechnic articles on to festival premises, no statutory regulation exists. There is no offence for the use of a firework, flare or smoke bomb in a crowd on private property unless it can be proved that it was used with the intent to cause injury or that its use was likely to endanger life or seriously damage property.

Amendment 209 therefore makes it an offence for a person to be in possession of a pyrotechnic article at a qualifying musical event in England. The offence has been so constructed as to apply also where a person is in possession of such articles at a point of entry into, or exit from, the place where a qualifying musical event is taking place, or at a campsite provided for those who are attending the event.

A qualifying musical event will be defined in regulations, subject to the negative procedure. The amendment itself provides that such musical events must involve live musical performances and, in defining a qualifying event, we will want to further target the offence at those events where there is evidence of harm being caused by the misuse of fireworks, flares or smoke bombs. The maximum penalty for the offence is three months’ imprisonment, which is the same as that applicable to the existing football-related offence.

The effect of Amendment 234 is that the offence extends to England and Wales. As I indicated, it applies to England only. However, we are considering further its territorial application in consultation with the Welsh Government. Amendment 245 makes a consequential amendment to the Long Title.

This offence will help prevent the harm that can come from the misuse of such dangerous articles and allow everyone to enjoy live music events safely. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am grateful to officials for explaining the origin of the amendment to me. They commented that the Government’s view is that we should not extend the criminal law unless there is a well-founded case for doing so. I agree with that, but I have instinctive concerns about this proposal. First, what consultation has there been with the entertainment industry? This must be a matter of widespread interest. I cannot say that I go to musical events usually held in the open air—I go to rather staider events—but a lot of people will feel that they are being targeted by the measure. What consideration has been given to, first, whether there should not be a focus on the venue organiser rather than the individual, as this seems to be a matter of crowd control? Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, is there no other way than creating a new specific offence? If fireworks and flares are dangerous—I accept that they are—is this not about the misuse of fireworks rather than the place or event where they may be misused? As for it being a musical event, which is to be determined by regulations, that seems to raise all sorts of problems.

I appreciate that this comes from legislation about football matches, although the 1985 Act cited by the Minister seems a little narrower, unless I have misunderstood it, because the places where the person is found to be in possession are very closely defined, including an area,

“from which the event may be directly viewed”.

When looking up that section, I came across a petition to Parliament to legalise the use of pyrotechnics at football grounds. I could not find its date, but it was rejected on the basis that it was,

“a matter for individual Local Authorities”.

That confused me even more, but I wonder what relation that point has to the amendment.

I am sorry to throw a number of questions at the Minister, but I am sure that the Government considered them before proposing the amendment.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

I did not express myself very well. I was not concerned about travel to the event. I was comparing the amendment with Section 2A of the Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc.) Act 1985, under which the offence applies when a person,

“is in any area of a designated sports ground from which the event may be directly viewed”.

I was comparing the two matters. That probably highlights the fact that musical events are different.

After hearing the response, I cannot help thinking that this is a matter of how people may use or misuse fireworks and flares in a much more general way. Does the noble Baroness know whether the regulations will address the definition of a qualifying musical event, or will they actually list particular events? She referred to the national policing lead for musical events; I had not realised there was such a post. By definition, that officer will not have given comments about events that are not musical events. If the noble Baroness has no further information—I appreciate that she may not, as we are becoming quite detailed—perhaps it is a matter for another day. But they are not invalid questions.

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

I might have inspiration from over my left shoulder. The offence will apply to a campsite adjacent to a festival and the regulation-making power will include a generic definition of a live musical event.

Policing and Crime Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - part one): House of Lords
Wednesday 26th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

We also have Amendment 148 in this group and the Government have Amendment 147. These are not such big issues but are the sort of thing that we try to cover in Committee. Clause 29 addresses the police barred list and the police advisory list. Clause 29(6) states:

“The Secretary of State may by regulations … make provision that … corresponds or is similar to that made by Part 4A of the Police Act 1996”.

We are not at this point querying the Police Act or Part 4A of it, but rather the words “similar to”. I understand the need to make regulations which will correspond with something. That seems to follow naturally, although sometimes the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee may comment on that. However, the power to make similar regulations seems potentially a wide provision and I am not sure what it means. I hope that the Minister will explain that in responding to Amendment 146, which is a probing amendment.

Government Amendment 147 seems one of the least contentious bits of today’s business. As regards Amendment 148, Schedule 8 contains a provision about the effect of including someone in the police barred list. Certain people are required to check the barred status of potential employees or appointees. The persons are listed as being,

“a chief officer of police; a local policing body; the chief inspector of constabulary; the Independent Police Complaints Commission”,

but also,

“a person specified in regulations”.

Again, there is rather wide scope in that latter provision which could have wide implications. Our Amendment 148 would provide for an affirmative resolution to be passed before the regulations were introduced. One is so pleased by little victories. I am delighted that the Minister has added her name to Amendment 148, which we will be very happy to move in due course. I beg to move Amendment 146.

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, explained, this group of amendments responds to two issues raised by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in its report on the Bill in respect of provisions in Clause 29 and Schedule 8, which provide for the creation of a new police barred list and a police advisory list to be held by the College of Policing.

The first issue raised by the Delegated Powers Committee related to the regulation-making power in Clause 29(6), which enables provision to be made which corresponds or is similar to that made by new Part 4A of the Police Act 1996 and which relates to a person who is or has been employed or appointed by a quasi-policing body. As the committee pointed out, certain aspects of the operation of the police barred and advisory lists will be determined by regulations made under new Part 4A of the 1996 Act and it will most likely be necessary, when exercising the power in Clause 29(6), also to make provision corresponding or similar to that contained in such regulations.

I am grateful to the Delegated Powers Committee for highlighting this gap in the regulation-making power in Clause 29(6), which Amendment 147 will address. The amendment will enable regulations made under Clause 29(6) to make provision that corresponds or is similar to that made by or under new Part 4A of the 1996 Act.

Policing and Crime Bill

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen

Wednesday 14th September 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

I thank noble Lords for taking part in this debate. I understand from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that these are probing amendments designed to tease out how collaboration may be varied. It is of course vital that collaboration agreements can be amended where appropriate to reflect local developments and to ensure the best outcomes for the public they serve. There may be a number of reasons to vary a collaboration agreement, perhaps to include a new partner to the agreement or to change participant roles and responsibilities. Clause 4(8) is simply intended to make it clear that such variations may be made. In locally agreeing to vary the terms in an existing collaboration agreement, the parties will in effect create a new or subsequent collaboration agreement. Such an agreement would be subject to all the provisions that pertain to collaboration agreements. I hope that clarification reassures the noble Baroness and that, accordingly, she will be content to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I think it may have become not a probing amendment.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

With great respect to the Minister, she did not address my point. One has a choice: either one varies an agreement or one replaces it with something else. The example given is a very good one of a variation, leaving the existing agreement in place. We are at a very early stage of this Bill and all I am suggesting is that the amendment might be taken away and looked at again. It is a question of the proper use of the English language, which is why I have taken the liberty of standing up and making my point.

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

Certainly. I feel I must bow before the noble and learned Lord’s incredible intelligence in these affairs. I cannot possibly completely disagree with what he says because he is way above my intellect. Of course we can go away and look at this.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, that is very helpful. The noble and learned Lord makes the argument far better than I did. I will attempt to rope him in on future amendments. As I said, it became not a probing amendment in the course of that exchange. I want to make it clear that we are not at all arguing against the variation of collaboration agreements—that would be intellectually incoherent. That is not the purpose of this. For the moment, at any rate, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has indicated that these are probing amendments, designed, in the cases of Amendments 14, 32 and 100, to provide some reassurance to those persons to whom a liability is owed that they will not be disadvantaged by a scheme transferring the liability. I appreciate that assurances on liabilities are important when considering arrangements for their transfer from an existing fire and rescue authority to a new PCC-style FRA or to a chief constable.

Statutory transfer schemes of this kind are well precedented. Indeed, I might add that the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 directly transferred all property, rights and liabilities of the old police authorities to the new police and crime commissioners or other local policing body. We have adopted the usual approach here of not requiring the consent of affected persons to the transfer of property, rights and liabilities. Once a Section 4A order is made, the existing fire and rescue authority will cease to exist and it is therefore right that all property, rights and liabilities held by the existing FRA should be transferred. If a person to whom a liability was owed was given an effective veto as to the transfer, that would arguably necessitate the preservation of the existing FRA alongside the new PCC-style FRA. This is a recipe for confusion and muddle.

However, I reassure the noble Baroness that the new PCC-style FRA, or the chief constable, to whom liabilities are transferred will take on the contractual obligations in respect of those liabilities, including, for example, the repayment of any debt. The person to whom the liability is owed will not be disadvantaged.

On Amendment 15, I hope I can reassure the noble Baroness that the approach taken in the Bill to the modification of a transfer scheme is the right one. The power to make modifications is designed principally to ensure that, should it be necessary, corrections may be made to a transfer scheme, particularly to address any errors made regarding the persons to whom rights or liabilities have transferred. As I am sure the noble Baroness appreciates, such transfer schemes can be complex and it is important to safeguard the ability to make revisions. These would need to be effective from the date at which the transfer came into being, rather than the date when the modification was made. To provide otherwise would risk disadvantaging a person, for example, to whom a liability was owed. I assure her that such modifications will be made only where there is agreement to do so between the affected parties.

On the basis of these reassurances, I trust that the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, that is very helpful, and I do indeed beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, we indeed have amendments at the various points at which there is reference to the application of an enactment with or without modifications. I apologise to the Committee that two of the amendments were published only this morning. They were tabled at the same time as the others and I do not know at what point they got lost—there is no particular significance in that.

I missed whether the noble Baroness in her reference to existing legislation was using the term “necessary modifications” as a quote from legislation or whether it was an assurance. If it is in other legislation, that makes my case; if not, I am not clear where the assurance will be in the Bill that the modifications will be “necessary” only for the purposes that she explained. On the face of it, to be able to apply an enactment with, by definition, unnecessary modifications, gives the Secretary of State a very wide power. I am sorry if I am being dim. It is entirely possible that I have lost the plot, but assurances not just from the Dispatch Box but in the Bill as to how the power will be used would be the most desirable way to go.

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for explaining her amendments. She explained that they are designed to seek further clarification of the scope of the order-making powers conferred on the Home Secretary to enable provisions of local policing and fire and rescue enactments to be applied to a PCC in relation to their fire and rescue functions, and to a combined authority mayor, where they are exercising the single-employer model.

The ability to apply provisions for such enactments with or without modifications is important to ensure that PCCs and combined authority mayors have the necessary powers and duties to exercise their functions effectively. This may include the ability to make consequential modifications as well as those that are necessary in the strictest sense to enact the arrangements contained within the PCC’s fire governance proposal.

I reassure the noble Baroness that the Home Secretary would need to exercise these powers reasonably and rationally and would do so only on the basis of applying provisions that are consequential on the implementation of either the governance or single-employer models. The Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments will also play an important role in scrutinising the use of the delegated powers and would make a report if in its view the Home Secretary had acted outside her powers or used them in an unusual or unexpected way. I should add that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee did not raise any concerns in respect of the existing order-making powers in the Bill relating to local policing enactments.

On the basis of these assurances, I hope that noble Lords will support the government amendments.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness. She seemed for most of her response to be making my case for me. I noted that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee had not commented on this—but, undeterred, I ploughed on. I will want to read precisely what she said, but I think that the important point is about the reasonableness of any modification made by the Secretary of State and how it relates to what she and I are both describing as “necessary”. I will not pursue the point this evening, but it is no reflection on her if I say that an assurance that the Secretary of State will do the right thing does not cut it for me with legislation.

Psychoactive Substances Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen

Tuesday 30th June 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)]

My Lords, I think we all agree that the key element of this Bill is the provision of civil sanctions. These are important because they offer an alternative, flexible mechanism to tackle the trade in new psychoactive substances. The amendments in this group relate to the list of prohibited activities in Clause 11. These activities essentially cover the offences in Clauses 4, 5 and 8— namely, the production, supply, importation and exportation of a psychoactive substance—along with the secondary offences of assisting and encouraging those offences.

Amendment 53 seeks to remove paragraph (f) from Clause 11(1) and so remove from the list of “prohibited activity” activities which assist or encourage the production, supply, offering to supply, importation or exportation of a psychoactive substance. In the normal way, the secondary offences of assisting or encouraging a crime apply to each of the main offences in the Bill, which is why the Government have specifically included such conduct in the list of prohibited activity.

If this amendment were to be made it would not, for example, be possible to serve a prohibition notice on someone providing precursor chemicals to another person knowing that the other person intended to use them to produce psychoactive substances. Were that the case, the relevant law enforcement agency might then have no option but to charge that person with the criminal offence of assisting the commission of an offence under Clause 4. Amendment 53 could therefore have the opposite effect to the outcome that the noble Lord is seeking to achieve, as it would force law enforcement agencies down the prosecution route rather than deploying a civil sanction.

The noble Baroness has asked how assisting or encouraging a crime differs from aiding or abetting a crime. This is a complex subject, which has excited much debate within the legal community ever since the Serious Crime Act 2007 created the offence of encouraging or assisting. Perhaps it is simplest to acknowledge that there is potential crossover between the two concepts—on occasion it will be possible both to aid and abet, and encourage or assist—but there will also be offences where, because of the circumstances, it will be possible to encourage or assist, even though there is no aiding or abetting.

Amendment 54 seeks to make clear in the Bill that the provision of harm reduction advice or information does not constitute a prohibited activity. Let me assure noble Lords that giving such harm reduction advice will not be a criminal offence under the Bill. The Government have no desire to hinder the giving of such advice—the opposite is in fact true—but if someone were to publish a manual on the production of psychoactive substances, we would wish to see that activity prohibited. The Bill allows for this. For instance, guidance published by a charity which identifies and highlights the dangers of these substances will be seeking to reduce the harms of these substances and will not fall foul of the Bill. I hope that having that assurance on the record will allay any concerns that the noble Lords and the noble Baroness may have in this regard.

The Government recognise that this legislation is not the silver bullet to tackle psychoactive substance misuse. The Bill must be seen in the context of our wider strategy to tackle the harms they cause. We are also driving forward another key recommendation of the expert panel, that of enhancing our efforts to reduce demand, including through effective prevention programmes and by providing the right health-related services to support individuals recovering from substance misuse. This is, of course incredibly important. On the basis of that explanation and the assurance that I have given on Amendment 54, I hope that the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I certainly will. I am grateful for that explanation. I can understand the structure of the clause and its thrust rather better than I did, which was pretty stupid of me. When I looked up “aid and abet” on the internet to see what that told me, I was pointed straight to the CPS guidance, which seemed to deal with pretty much everything other than aiding and abetting. It starts with “assisting and encouraging”, so it is hardly surprising that some of us are confused. I did not know that there was such a major debate going on in the legal community; they must speak of little else. I am grateful for the clear explanation; I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

I meant to say 1998.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I cannot say that I am comfortable about notices applying for an indefinite or unlimited period. There may be concerns about the detail of the notice. I obviously need to read the noble Baroness’s explanation. I should also wait to see what response we get to my later amendment, which is on appeals against notices. These issues all go together, and I would like then to consider where we have got to in the round. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

My Lords, the amendments in this group make a number of changes to the provisions in the Bill relating to notices and orders. The most significant amendments—Amendments 75, 76 and 77—insert three new clauses which make further provision in respect of access prohibitions.

Clause 21 enables a prohibition order or premises order to include an access prohibition, barring or restricting access to specified premises. Such a provision would, for example, enable the closure of a head shop selling psychoactive substances, initially for up to three months. This approach is based upon the provisions in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 relating to anti-social behaviour closure powers. Although a number of elements of that regime are already in the Bill, the Government feel that a number of additional elements of the 2014 Act should also be replicated.

For the civil sanctions in the Bill to be effective, they must be adhered to. Therefore, sanctions must be included to deter those who would otherwise choose to breach the terms of an access prohibition.

The other amendments are largely of a technical or drafting nature, and I would be happy to provide further details if necessary. I trust noble Lords will agree that these are all sensible refinements to the existing provisions in the Bill and on that basis I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I have one or two questions on the amendments in this group. Amendment 75 deals with reimbursement of costs. Would the person being asked to make the payment have the opportunity to make representations with regard to what is being claimed—both about the principle and the amount that has been calculated and ordered?

Amendment 76 inserts a new clause on exemption from liability and refers to,

“an act or omission shown to have been in bad faith”.

I note that that does not extend to negligence. I looked at the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act, and we do not have negligence in there either, but it does not seem to me that not having it in that Act makes this right.

It is not quite a read-across, but Amendment 77 again applies similar provisions to those in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act. Something struck me about this while reflecting on what happened during the last Government and the focus on the rehabilitation revolution and so on. I thought we were trying to avoid short-term prison sentences, and it felt uncomfortable to be providing for short-term prison sentences when we know that so often what happens is that the offender learns more about how to commit crime than he does about how not to commit crime.

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

My Lords, I reassure the noble Baroness that Amendment 75 makes provision to enable the relevant law enforcement agency to apply to the appropriate court for reimbursement of costs incurred in relation to the “clearing, securing or maintaining” of premises.

Amendment 76 makes provision to exempt the relevant law enforcement agency from civil liability for anything done or admitted to be done in the exercise of a power in relation to an access prohibition. The exemption does not apply when the act or omission was committed in bad faith or when the conduct was unlawful by virtue of Section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, acting incompatibly with the convention rights.

Amendment 77 creates an offence for a person, without reasonable excuse, to remain on or enter premises in contravention of an access prohibition or to obstruct an authorised person exercising powers under Clause 22(1). I understand the noble Baroness’s worries about the maximum penalty in England and Wales of six months’ imprisonment. I might need a little inspiration from my officials on that one, but perhaps we could write to the noble Baroness and make that a bit clearer.

[Baroness Hamwee]

This is really a broad matter of policy, and I appreciate that the provision on length of sentences replicates part of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, although there are also provisions in there for different periods. I should have given the Government an indication of these questions, but I am afraid that I did not think of them until very shortly before we came into the Chamber. This may not be consoling to the noble Baroness, but I was listening in on a rather high-powered legal discussion the other day, where someone referred to what the Minister thought at four in the morning when questioned—

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

I am sorry to interrupt the noble Baroness, but I have a bit of clarification about Amendment 77. Six months is the standard maximum in a magistrates’ court.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I shall not continue with the anecdote, because I was only giving the noble Baroness an opportunity for inspiration to fly to her. I might tell her later.

Psychoactive Substances Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Hamwee and Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen

Tuesday 30th June 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)]

My Lords, I believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser, have the same ambition as the Government—to ensure that lawful medical practice and patient care, as well as bona fide research, are untouched by the provisions of this Bill.

The purpose of Schedule 1 is to list psychoactive substances exempted from the scope of the Bill. It excludes certain substances which are not the target of this legislation, and are mostly already subject to regulatory controls. Importantly, under paragraph 2, it exempts medicinal products; this is the subject of Amendment 25, as proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher. This covers those products that have marketing authorisations issued in the UK, in the EU, or such authorisation issued by the licensing authority. The current definition for medicinal products was a starting point for the Bill’s introduction and is being reviewed again by the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency.

We continue to test whether our objective is achieved by the schedule as currently drafted. For example, we recognise that unlicensed medicines for human use need to be taken out of scope. These are lawfully manufactured, imported, distributed or supplied for the treatment of individual patients after being ordered by a range of healthcare professionals, not just doctors. It was always our intention to remove these medicines and this activity from the scope of the Bill. In this case, we see the advantages of making provision on the face of the Bill—in Schedule 1 to the Bill—rather than in regulations made by virtue of the power in Clause 10. I confirm to the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, that our intention is to bring forward appropriate amendments—if possible in time for Report—to ensure that the exemption for such products is properly aligned with existing medicines legislation.

Amendments 26, 28 and 49 all relate to safeguarding research into the medicinal and other legitimate uses of psychoactive substances. As I said, the Government attach a high priority to bona fide scientific research and to not putting in place unnecessary regulatory barriers that in any way impede research in the UK. We are actively ensuring, in accordance with our original intention, that any interaction between the provisions of the Bill and those conducting or supporting bona fide research into psychoactive substances is removed.

Along with the Department of Health, we are testing the need for greater latitude, over and above this exemption. As a priority, we are establishing how we best achieve this, perhaps through the drafting of further exemptions in the Bill. There could also be a case for making exceptions through regulations under Clause 10. We may well, therefore, bring forward government amendments on this issue on Report. I have listened to the concerns that have been expressed and all our further considerations will take account of the text and intent of noble Lords’ respective amendments.

Finally, the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, has also tabled Amendment 27 in this group, which would exempt low non-psychoactive doses of psychoactive substances. My understanding is that such materials are used by forensic and other laboratories, which hold these chemical reference samples for investigative procedures. I can assure the noble Baroness that, as these substances are not supplied for human consumption, they are already outside the scope of the Bill.

I hope I have demonstrated that I have sympathy for the intention behind Amendments 25, 26, 28 and 49. We are actively looking at whether the definition of medicinal products needs to be strengthened and whether further precision is needed to safeguard legitimate research. We will also make every effort to get together with the experts; that is an excellent idea. On the understanding that we will return to these issues on Report, I trust that the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, is there an issue around veterinary medicine as well as human medicine? I do not know the answer to that; it is a straight question. Is it something that needs to be looked at? The Minister is shaking her head, which suggests that one could go on producing veterinary medicines without offending under the Bill, which raises all sorts of other issues.

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

Veterinary medicines are not for human consumption, so they do not fall within the scope of the Bill.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My concern is that research in that area should not be impeded.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

My Lords, I understand that these are probing amendments which seek an explanation of some of the drafting in Schedule 1. Amendments 30 to 33 broadly deal with the same point, although Amendment 33 is in different terms to the others.

I am hesitant to say this following that which we have just heard but, taking alcohol as an example, Schedule 1 defines an alcoholic product as,

“any product which … contains alcohol, and … does not contain any psychoactive substance”.

The question is why the second limb of this definition does not refer to “any other psychoactive substance”. The answer is logical but, needless to say, not entirely straightforward. It hinges on the distinction between the natural meaning of the term “psychoactive substance” and the meaning given to that term by the Bill.

Under Clause 2, as we now all know, a psychoactive substance is a substance which,

“is capable of producing a psychoactive effect in a person who consumes it, and”—

importantly—

“is not an exempted substance”.

Alcohol is an exempted substance and so is not a psychoactive substance for the purposes of the Bill. It is therefore not necessary to refer in the definition of alcoholic product to “any other psychoactive substance” because we have already excluded alcohol from the definition of a psychoactive substance. I hope that makes sense.

Amendment 34 touches on a different issue—food additives and flavourings. These are already authorised under the EU legislation so the reference in paragraph 10 of Schedule 1 to an EU instrument—ugly though that may sound—is all that is required. My understanding is that this amendment would expand the paragraph referred to to read “an EU or other applicable instrument”. However, only EU instruments are relevant here and so the additional words are not required. I should perhaps add that we have discussed and agreed with the Food Standards Agency the approach taken in paragraph 10 in Schedule 1.

The noble Baroness suggested that the additional words might provide future-proofing. However, I remind her that there is a regulation-making power in Clause 3 designed with that in mind. In the light of this rather complicated explanation, I hope the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the Official Report will not record the facial expressions around the Chamber in response to the Minister. I think I follow what has been said, but whether it is a sensible way of writing legislation I rather doubt. Legislation should say what it really means and not leave us struggling to justify such really quite difficult wording. I am tempted to press this to a Division, but we have a lot to get through today so I will not take the time now, but who knows? I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.