Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(10 years, 7 months ago)
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Baroness Thornton (Lab)
My Lords, the first thing I need to say is happy birthday to the Minister. I am sure noble Lords will agree with me in wishing him all the very best. I am not sure that this is the best way I would choose to spend my birthday.
As I said at Second Reading, we on these Benches generally support the sexual harm prevention orders and the sexual risk orders as set out in Part 9 of the Bill. The two new orders will replace existing powers, and the threshold for risk will be lowered to cover any case of sexual harm, not just cases of serious sexual harm. These orders seek to improve the protection of vulnerable children at risk of sexual harm. On Report in the Commons, the Minister, Damian Green, provided details of the two new orders. He explained:
“The sexual harm prevention order may prohibit the person from doing anything described in it, including preventing travel overseas. Any prohibition must be necessary for protecting the public in the UK from sexual harm or, in relation to foreign travel, protecting children or vulnerable adults from sexual harm. It lasts a minimum of five years and has no maximum duration, with the exception of any foreign travel restrictions which, if applicable, lasts for a maximum of five years but can be renewed”.
The sexual risk order,
“will be available for those who have not been convicted of an offence but who none the less pose a risk of sexual harm to the public. It may be made by the magistrates court on application by the police or the new National Crime Agency where an individual has done an act of a sexual nature and poses a risk of harm to the public in the UK or adults or vulnerable children overseas”.
Of course, any prohibition in the sexual risk order must be necessary for protecting the public in the UK from sexual harm or for protecting vulnerable adults abroad. Such an order, as I have described it, will last for a minimum of two years. The police are very keen on these orders as their view is that they do not have the right measures at their disposal to intervene to prevent harm to children. We agree with them.
It is also welcome that these orders simplify the current system. In relation to non-conviction behaviour, they reduce the number of acts of harm required for an order to be used from two to one, which means that they can be obtained more easily. Extending the scope of sexual behaviour covered by the orders and lowering the threshold from serious sexual harm will also increase their use. This will help tackle behaviour that poses a risk of sexual abuse to children but which has not yet translated into a criminal offence.
In the Commons, my honourable friend Ann Coffey MP noted:
“The risk of sexual harm orders, which the new sexual risk orders would replace, can be given only to offenders aged 18 and over”.
She asked the Minister:
“Will the new sexual harm prevention orders also only apply to offenders over 18? If they will apply to offenders under 18, what consideration has he given to introducing accompanying rehabilitative provisions for child sex offenders?”.
That is at the heart of what this probing amendment is about. At the time, the Minister, Mr Green, said:
“The two new orders will apply to both over-18s and under-18s”.
He also clarified the situation in relation to the sex offenders register:
“In line with the old order, the new sexual harm prevention order will make the offender subject to the notification requirements for registered sex offenders—it will put them on the sex offenders register. For both new orders, in line with the existing position, breach is a criminal offence punishable by a maximum of five years’ imprisonment. Conviction for a breach of a sexual risk order would also make that individual subject to the sex offender notification requirements”.—[Official Report, Commons, 14/10/13; cols. 472-75.]
Extending the ability to use these orders to protect children under 18, including 16 and 17 year-olds, recognises that older children are still vulnerable and can be subject to child sexual exploitation and abuse. The inclusion of vulnerable adults to the SHPO and SRO is welcome. We know that young adults with learning difficulties or special educational needs are targeted by individuals looking to exploit them.
The amendment seeks to probe how the orders will work for young people under 18 subject to the orders and how they are supported. Some young people who are subject to the orders may also have been victims of sexual exploitation, or become involved as a means of self-preservation, as was the case for a young person quoted in one of the briefs that I received. We are seeking safeguards from the Government for young people under 18 who are subject to the orders, to ensure that they receive the support that they need,
“including an assessment of their emotional, welfare and behavioural needs, therapeutic or educational support”.
We are concerned that a breach of the child SHPO without conviction or the SRO can result in five years’ imprisonment when a child has not actually committed a criminal offence. We know that custody may not be the most effective way to tackle children’s criminal behaviour, and I am sure that we all agree that custody for under-18s should only be used as a very last resort in the most serious and violent offences, so we must question whether this is appropriate where children have not been convicted of an offence. We are very concerned about the use of custodial sentences for under-18s subject to SROs or SHPOs obtained without conviction. That is why we have put forward this amendment.
What measures do the Government propose for under-18s subject to these orders? Will the Government consider prescribing the use of therapeutic support and/or education and an assessment of needs in guidance when the orders are applied to under-18s? Will the Government review and evaluate the effectiveness of the orders, such as through rates of reoffending and the effectiveness of any assessment of needs, when they are applied to under-18s? It is important that we question the detail of how this will work for under-18s.
The Minister very kindly wrote to me on this matter and in his letter he mentioned that the Government will be,
“working closely with the Ministry of Justice on applications for orders relating to under-18s and will ensure that guidance is available to the courts and others to ensure that such cases are heard in the youth court as appropriate”.
Will that draft guidance be available before the Bill has completed its passage through your Lordships’ House? I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, the Government have moved forward a great deal, as have the police and the CPS, in understanding that in some cases, particularly in cases of trafficked people, those who may at first be seen as a perpetrator—often of relatively small crimes, but sometimes of bigger ones—are in fact victims and have done what they have done as a result of the way that they have been treated. It seems to me that what the noble Baroness proposes is absolutely in line with that thinking.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for her comments and join with her and the rest of the House in wishing my noble friend a very happy birthday. My appearance at the Dispatch Box may be one of the best presents that I can give my noble friend, who is doing a gallant job as my Whip today. This may well be part of the Conservative birthday present allocation.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, has explained, Amendment 1 would require a court making sexual harm prevention orders in relation to under-18s to have regard to,
“their emotional, welfare and behavioural needs, therapeutic or educational support”.
Schedule 5 makes provision to replace the current sexual offences prevention order, foreign travel order and risk of sexual harm order with sexual harm prevention orders and sexual risk orders. The new sexual harm prevention order can be applied where an individual has had a conviction for a specific sexual or violent offence and the court is satisfied that the prohibitions are necessary to protect the public in the UK or children or vulnerable adults abroad from sexual harm. The new sexual risk order can be applied to individuals without a conviction but who have committed an act of a sexual nature and, as a result, the court is satisfied that prohibitions are necessary to protect the public in the UK or children or vulnerable adults abroad from sexual harm.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
I hope that neither this amendment nor the two that I have in the next group will cause the Minister to run to and from the Dispatch Box. I see that he is already confident enough that that will not be the case. Amendment 2 takes us to violent offender orders, and my noble friend will, I hope, already know what my point is.
Clause 106, the new clause to be inserted in the 2008 Act, will allow the Secretary of State by an affirmative order to amend the list of specified offences, either by adding to or subtracting from the list—the specified offences being those which can trigger the order. It seems to me that this is a very wide power. As I said, it would require an affirmative resolution, and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has not chosen to share any concern about this because it is an affirmative power. However, I think that it would be helpful to understand how the Secretary of State will be expected to go about making such a change. Of course, we always have to remember that, although there may be a benign Secretary of State this month, next month or next year the Secretary of State may be less benign in the eyes of some Members of the House.
In order to probe this, my amendment would provide for consultation, before an order is made, with such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate. I cannot believe that any Secretary of State would undertake such an act without consultation, but you never know. It would be good to have confirmation on record as to the means that would be followed. I beg to move.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for raising this issue. Amendment 2 would, as she has outlined, require the Secretary of State to consult those deemed appropriate prior to making an order to amend the list of specified offences for a violent offender order.
Clause 106 gives the Secretary of State the power to amend the list of specified offences through secondary legislation, subject to the affirmative procedure. Models of offending change over time, and this change will help to ensure that the legislative powers for managing violent offenders can be updated to reflect changes with the appropriate parliamentary oversight.
My noble friend asked specifically about the consultation. I reassure her and the Committee that any changes to the list of specified offences will be considered in close consultation with the police, the National Offender Management Service and others to help to ensure that the police and NOMS are able to manage the risk posed by serious violent offenders. Specialist input will be sought as a matter of course. We do not consider that specific requirement to consult is required on the face of the Bill. I hope that this reassures my noble friend that appropriate consultation will take place and that she will be prepared to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, that is helpful. It has only just occurred to me that I should have asked whether any change is in mind at the moment. I do not know whether the Minister’s briefing allows him to answer that question.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
As I have highlighted, there is NOMS and the police will be involved. Additional experts will be sought as part of that process.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 4. This is a very low-key group of amendments as we start the part of the Bill on forced marriages. Many noble Lords will have far more to say on this issue than is appropriate to this little group. I will confine my remarks very narrowly to the points of which I have given the Government notice.
These are two probing amendments. Amendment 3 would take out new subsection (2). The intention is to probe the meaning of “aware” in it, where it says that,
“a person can be guilty of an offence … in respect of conduct engaged in at a time when the person was aware of the existence of the”,
forced marriage protection order. What is the burden of proof as to whether an individual is aware of an order? I assumed on first reading that this meant actually aware as distinct from having been served with an order, which is rather more particular. Is there scope for judicial discretion in dealing with this? As I said, this is just intended to understand what is meant by “aware” in this context. My noble friend Lord McNally accuses me of being too curious about this sort of terminology.
Amendment 4 probes the relationship between criminal proceedings following a forced marriage protection order and contempt of court if an order is not complied with. I agree with what I understand the Bill to provide—that it should be one or the other—but I hope that my noble friend can explain to the Committee how decisions will be taken about which enforcement route will be followed. What criteria will be used? I am not challenging the content; I simply wish to understand how the matter will be approached. I beg to move.
Baroness Thornton
I was not completely clear what these amendments concerned when I read them and I assumed they were probing. They are both legitimate questions and I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say about them.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am grateful for that and will of course withdraw my amendment. With regard to my first amendment, the clause refers to awareness,
“of the existence of the order”.
My noble friend said that one can be aware of the existence of the order without knowing what it prohibits, and so awareness of its existence is not the same as being aware of its content. I would like to think about whether “without reasonable excuse”, to which he referred, is an adequate protection in that situation. Obviously a range of circumstances could be covered by that.
On the two distinct remedies, if that is the right term for them, I believe the Minister is saying that the decision is very much in the hands of the victim. That, of course, is completely in line with what I have read about the Government’s approach to this and the rest of the Bill. This may perhaps be an issue for us later in today’s debates. On a later amendment, I will be looking to understand what guidance the police may have as to the advice they give. On paper, it looks easy for a potential victim—I would like to start calling them “survivors”—to take that decision, and it may look easy to us sitting in this Chamber, but when one is caught up in the situation, how does one assess the right course to take? That is a sort of trail for some of the points which may come up later. Unless the Minister wants to come in again, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I declare an interest as chairman of a forced marriage commission which is currently hearing evidence. An interesting aspect of that is that we went to visit the Karma Nirvana organisation just outside Leeds and the victims to whom we spoke were all very anxious that forced marriage should be criminalised. I have had my doubts about that. I took part, with the noble Lord, Lord Lester, in the original initiative on this issue, which led, I am very glad to say, to a government Bill being produced some years ago under the previous Government. I know that the noble Lord is very opposed to the criminalisation of forced marriage. However, there is no doubt that all the victims to whom members of the commission spoke considered that this was an essential next step, which I thought was very interesting.
I am very concerned about how the immigration authorities, or emigration authorities, can cope with this problem. I talked to an immigration official at Gatwick and asked him what he did about girls going out to Pakistan with their parents and those coming back, or a young man coming into this country, where a girl is waiting with her parents to welcome him as her intended husband. The official told me that he had spoken to these girls on many occasions. One such girl was waiting for an intended husband to come through the airport and the official took her aside and asked her whether she wanted to marry that man. She replied, “No, I do not”. When he asked her whether it was a forced marriage, she replied, “Yes, it is”. He said that he could stop the forced marriage by preventing the young man entering the country but that the girl would have to declare publicly that she was being forced into a marriage. The girl replied, “I cannot do so in front of my parents”. This is a major problem. We know that a lot of girls and some young men, many of whom are under 18, are being forced into marriage in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India and, indeed, other places. This is by no means only a Muslim problem. It is also a Sikh problem and occasionally a Jewish problem, but it is a problem across the world. One of the major problems in this regard I have been told about concerns disabled young people, particularly those with learning difficulties, as the parents think they are doing the young woman concerned a favour by marrying her off as she will be protected for the rest of her life. Nevertheless, she does not want the marriage and this is a very real problem.
I very much support Amendment 5, particularly because I think it is time that everyone, from the Government through to the Department for Education and schools in particular, should do as the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, suggests and treat this as a child protection issue. If you force a girl or boy to marry under the age of 18, particularly under 16, when they do not want to marry, this is a very real child protection issue. However, another extremely worrying issue arises. These girls—it affects particularly the girls—are being married in other parts of the world with an Islamic ceremony. That ceremony is not registered overseas and it is not registered in this country. Therefore, the girl is not married according to English law. The husband can divorce her under Islamic law and she can obtain no redress in this country for herself. She does not have to be married to get financial help for her children but she gets no financial help whatever for herself because she is not married according to English law. Interestingly, there is a law that gives the second wife in a polygamous marriage some financial assistance.
I have not tabled an amendment in relation to forced marriages that are not considered valid marriages, but I hope that the Government will look at that as there is no shortage of women in this country and abroad who are not considered married according to English law although their marriage ceremonies are considered perfectly adequate in some communities. I particularly underline what the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, said about child protection. I am not at all sure whether Amendments 5A and 6 are entirely necessary, although the Government should certainly look at them, but Amendment 5 is vital.
Baroness Hamwee
My noble friend Lady Berridge is not in her place at the moment, but I know, from a very short conversation I had with her yesterday, that her Amendment 11 is intended to address the second problem to which the noble and learned Baroness referred. When I first read it, I thought it was simply about annulment but she tells me that it is, in fact, about property.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and my noble friend Lady Hussein-Ece for tabling the amendment. The noble and learned Baroness made a point about forced marriages. As I said when we moved on to this part of the Bill, there is evidence to suggest that this is a reality and we have to deal with it. I can assure her that the Government take this very seriously. The issue of unregistered marriages which take place abroad or even on home soil, and which do not provide the protections afforded by the rule of law, is one that must be looked at and the Government are looking at how this can be done. An example of good practice within Muslim communities is where the nikah—one aspect of Islamic marriages—is not performed by the imam until a registration certificate is provided. Many Muslim communities adhere to that principle and we should be encouraging that kind of practice across the board.
I turn to the amendments which concern the publication of guidance for front-line professionals working in this area. We know how important guidance is if the new legislation is to work effectively. I join other noble Lords in saying that this must not just be issued but, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, said, adhered to as well. I align myself with the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, on the Forced Marriage Unit and pay tribute to the work done in this field, over many years, by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland.
First, I will explain the existing statutory provisions in relation to guidance. These are contained in Section 63Q of the Family Law Act 1996, which was inserted into the 1996 Act by the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007. I join noble friends in paying tribute to my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill whose Private Member’s Bill resulted in the 2007 Act and provided a widely used civil remedy for victims and potential victims of forced marriage. Subsection (1) of Section 63Q of the 1996 Act provides that the Secretary of State may, from time to time, prepare and publish guidance to such descriptions of persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate about, first, the effect of Part 4A of the Family Law Act 1996, and, secondly, about other matters relating to forced marriages.
Clause 107 amends Part 4A to make the breach of a forced marriage protection order a criminal offence, so the preparation of guidance about the new breach offence is already covered by the power to issue guidance provided for in Section 63Q. Clause 108 creates a new offence of forced marriage which is undoubtedly a matter relating to forced marriages, so the preparation of guidance about the offence in Clause 108 is also already covered by Section 63Q.
Baroness Hussein-Ece
I accept what the noble Baroness says. I have worked in the past with Southall Black Sisters on domestic violence issues in the Turkish and Kurdish communities when I was setting up a women’s refuge for them. Indeed, I worked very closely with them; I know the work the women do and I pay tribute to them. However, I think that we need some sanctions in order to prevent this. I am sure that the same arguments were deployed in the debates on the proposal to criminalise FGM. Perhaps that is not a good example because there have been no convictions, but it is illegal. Whatever we may think about it—which is obviously for another debate—that sends out the message that FGM is wrong. If something is wrong, it should be against the law. I have listened carefully to the debate and I have thought long and hard about the issue. I have not come to this view over the past few days. It is something that I have considered for many years, and of course there needs to be far more education.
Let us look at the facts. No religion supports forced marriage and it is not a religious requirement. It is also a barrier to integration. These girls, when they behave in what is perceived to be too pro-western a fashion and perhaps are friendly with members of the opposite sex, are considered to have lax morals. The barriers then come up and the pressure starts. I go into schools and talk to girls whose families do not want them to move on into further education. They do not want them to go into further education because they then start to lose control. They think, “Oh, they will have boyfriends and get into relationships where they have sex before marriage”. That is when the oppression starts. It is a barrier to integration and goes against the opportunity for girls to reach their full potential. That is something I feel very strongly about. Moreover, it is a form of slavery and rape. I will be clear on this because that is what happens in many cases. It is about being held against your will in a marriage, which is slavery and rape, and I have no other form of words to describe it.
At the moment, many families feel that their young girls, particularly those under the age of 18, are their property. They belong to the family and the honour of the family rests on them, so the family feels that it has the right to impose its will. I shall quote what I think I might have said, and what one young girl who is a survivor and very much in favour of this legislation said to me: “I wish I had been able to say to my parents at the age of 14, ‘You can’t do this to me because it is illegal’”.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am at the cautious end of the spectrum as well. Being cautious, I noticed in the fact sheet on this issue published by the Home Office the lines:
“Victims of forced marriage, their families, and society may feel better served by a specific criminal offence. There may also be a deterrent effect”.
I read into the second sentence that that might also cover a reluctance to approach the health and other authorities simply because they are authorities.
I share the concern that has been expressed about stigmatising one’s own family and the ostracism of not just the family, but of the whole community. However, as I have said already today, I am not yet convinced that this would be answered by there being a choice between civil and criminal proceedings. Indeed, the fact sheet also makes it clear that choice is a key message of engagement. That is because there is still the dilemma of how one’s family and community will react to either type of proceedings. I then asked myself whether, conversely, it could produce the reaction of, “Well, they are civil proceedings, not pursuing the criminal route, so it is not that serious”. That worries me as well. I have said to my noble friend that I am concerned about training in this issue for the police and prosecution authorities, although that probably goes to the guidance: how will they put to those who are victims in this situation the choice they have and yet not put pressure on them?
Finally—at this point at any rate—my noble friend said that female genital mutilation is not a good example. I think that it is a good example because the criminal route has not been chosen. I am not sure what we have learnt from that; I have not picked up that we have learnt anything.
Baroness Thornton
My Lords, this has been a remarkable debate and I thank my noble and learned friend Lady Scotland for introducing what is a very serious and important issue to our discussions. I want to make a point about the legislation on female genital mutilation. The reason we had to create an offence was because our law was silent on the matter of female genital mutilation at the time. We created an offence because it was the only thing we could do.
We should not be in any doubt at all that forced marriage is an offence. We need to be clear about that, and I do not think that my noble and learned friend’s—
Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Bill [HL]
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(13 years, 8 months ago)
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Lord Pannick
My Lords, to achieve its purpose this Bill needs to confer powers in relation both to persons and to assets within the jurisdiction. I understood the Minister to assure the House on Report that the Bill, as currently drafted, covers both categories of case. I do not understand that to involve extra-territorial effect, although the descriptive term may be less significant than the substance. My concern is where we find in the Bill a clear statement to the effect that a person may be the subject of a designation order because he has assets in this country even though he otherwise has no connection with this country. I hope the Government will give further thought to that matter as the Bill proceeds through the other place.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I cannot bring the same academic knowledge to this debate as the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but I start with the question of what this Bill aims to achieve and what it is directed at. As I understand it, it deals with assets that are in the UK. For me, other questions flow from that. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that if there is a query over the scope of the Bill, it should be clarified. One would hope not to have an argument such as this repeated either in the other place or, indeed, in court. However, having been involved with this Bill and its predecessor, I do not have the anxieties that have been expressed this afternoon.
Lord Davies of Oldham
My Lords, on behalf of the Opposition, I too would not dream of seeking to put myself in the same category of argument as the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord who have spoken on these issues. The Minister has an argument here that he will need to respond to effectively. We in the Opposition thought that most of these issues were covered effectively on Report by the Minister. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, who has expressed her reservations about other aspects of this Bill in the past, we see no argument for this amendment at present. Therefore, if we were to move to a Division, the Opposition would support the Government if, as I anticipate, they present an accurate and effective case for the rebuttal of this amendment.
Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Bill [HL]
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(13 years, 8 months ago)
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Lord Sassoon
My Lords, the Government’s intention behind this amendment is to clarify that the words “involved in” in the legal tests for interim and final designations do not mean something additional to the activities and conduct referred to in the definition of “terrorist activity”. In Committee, my noble friend Lady Hamwee indicated her concern that use of the term “involved in” could capture people whose conduct did not fall strictly within Clause 2(2) but who were simply associates of people whose conduct did fall within that clause or who were merely innocent bystanders. This was not the Government’s intention, nor do we think that it is the effect. However, by tabling this amendment to make it clear that “involvement in terrorist activity” means no more than the activities and conduct described in Clause 2(2), I hope to ensure that there can be no doubt or further confusion. I thank my noble friend for her intervention in Committee and hope that she and other noble Lords will be minded to support our amendment. I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the Minister for this amendment. The Bill creates a number of offences, so I felt that it was important to be crystal clear about the provisions. In my view, the amendment achieves that. I thank my noble friend.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, this amendment addresses the purpose of the interim designation. Noble Lords will be well aware that the Treasury has a power to make an interim designation for a period of up to 30 days if it reasonably suspects that the criteria for making a designation are satisfied. After the 30-day period, reasonable belief is required. I entirely accept that it is appropriate for the Treasury to have this power of interim designation on the basis of reasonable suspicion, but surely it is appropriate for the Treasury to have and to exercise such a power only in those cases where it has not had a proper opportunity to consider and to decide whether the stricter criterion of reasonable belief is satisfied. Amendment 10 would limit the interim designation power to those cases where the Treasury considers that it is necessary to act as a matter of urgency before proper consideration can be given to whether it has reasonable belief in the involvement in terrorism. I cannot see that it would be appropriate for the Treasury to exercise that power of interim designation in any other circumstances. I suggest to noble Lords that it would be highly desirable that the purpose of this interim designation power be specified in the Bill.
My Amendment 13 is grouped with Amendment 10. However, government Amendment 14 meets the concern which I expressed in Committee and explains Amendment 13, which deals with the need for improved safeguards against repeated interim designations of the same person. I thank the Minister for tabling Amendment 14. I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee
I have tabled Amendment 12 in this group. First, with regard to Amendment 10, I hope we will not hear from the Minister that it is not necessary to put the provision into the Bill because it is the practice—a point I may make later in a different context.
I might have said that my Amendment 12 was substantially the same as the amendments tabled by the noble Lord and the Minister. The point is the same—that the same or similar evidence should not be used to make more than one interim order. I could make the Government’s arguments against proposed new paragraph (b) in my Amendment 12, but I would like to hear them do so.
As regards the second limb of my amendment, it seemed to me that a time limit would be easier to deal with and could be more clearly analysed than relying on whether evidence is the same or substantially so. A time limit, although six months may not be the correct one, would make the matter absolutely clear—no one could argue with it or argue its nuances.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and with my noble friend. I am speaking partly as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, whose report was published on Friday last. We took the most unusual step of publishing our preliminary report before we had seen the Government’s response. I am therefore sure that once the committee, which meets tomorrow, has had a chance to look at this debate, it will be too late to influence what happens in this House, but I hope it may be looked at in the other place.
I shall not waste the time of the House by citing what is in our report as it can be read by anyone who is interested. However, one point at the end of it bears on all these amendments. At paragraph 1.47, we ask the Government to explain why the opportunity is not being taken in the Bill to provide a comprehensive and accessible legal regime for terrorist asset freezing, and therefore to provide Parliament with the opportunity to scrutinise those powers for human rights compatibility, the lack of which so troubled the Supreme Court. That is a general and important point, and it may have to be pursued if not here then in the other place.
Baroness Hamwee
“(4A) An application for a licence for the purposes set out in subsection (4B) shall be dealt with by the Treasury as a matter of urgency.”
Baroness Hamwee
I shall speak also to Amendments 20, 20A and 22. They all concern the licensing regime and I am keen to ensure that there is sufficient in the legislation, as distinct from current practice, to put a direct obligation on the Treasury to deal with licences in the way that we have come to understand it does, and that the obligations are direct and thus do not require what might be described as a slightly more complicated Human Rights Act route.
Amendment 20 would require of the Treasury, if requested by a designated person or another person—I have put that in as an olive branch to the Treasury—that,
“a licence shall, if requested, be granted to enable the designated person or any other affected person to have access to funds or economic resources sufficient for the reasonable living costs”,
both of the person concerned and of any dependants. Subsistence costs are not much to ask for, and they can be conditional. Clause 17(3)(a) provides that any licence can have conditions attached. Amendment 19 would require that an application,
“shall be dealt with by the Treasury as a matter of urgency”,
for the reasons that have already been touched on, and clearly this must be urgent. It almost goes without saying that if all of a person’s assets are frozen, enough should be released to allow for reasonable living expenses.
I understand that the Government say that the Human Rights Act in effect obliges the Treasury to issue licences so that convention rights are not infringed. No doubt the Minister will take this opportunity to spell out exactly what convention rights are in issue and give the Government’s view on the route taken through them to achieve the result I want.
Amendment 20A deals with the costs of legal representation or legal advice. We debated this in Committee and I hope that my amendment has taken the helpful points made in particular by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in order to address the possible use of such a provision to evade proper asset freezing controls—or, to put it more colloquially, giving money to dodgy lawyers who might then give it back to the person who is being controlled. So I have referred to “regulation” in the amendment. I am aware that the practice of the Treasury, which is not the same as what is stated in the Bill—although I may again be told about human rights provisions—is generally to license the granting of legal aid without anticipating what might happen to the legal aid budget. I am not convinced that that is sufficiently wide.
Amendment 22 deals with the variation of a licence. I have tabled it in order to seek assurances that the court can vary an order. Clause 27 states that a decision can be set aside. It would again be helpful if the provision were spelt out, although I suspect that I will again be told that there is Human Rights Act protection. Perhaps the Government can tell the House why it cannot be spelt out that an order can be varied rather than simply be set aside. If a decision were set aside, it would allow the designated person to go through the hoops again. However quickly the matter is dealt with, some time will be taken. However much the Treasury takes into account what the court says—it will clearly be under pressure to do so—it is all rather less direct and less clear. I beg to move.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, I support the amendments, in particular Amendment 20A. The Treasury has no interest whatever in controlling expenditure on legal advice and legal representation; its only interest is to ensure that the assets are not used for terrorist purposes. It is important that the uninhibited right to seek legal advice and to obtain legal representation is stated clearly in the Bill and that it is not left to Treasury concession.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, as my noble friend is aware, provisions within the Bill allow for a decision not to issue a licence with suitable conditions to be challenged. If I may say, this is a circular argument—how do you get the funding to challenge it?—but it is not without remedy.
I was asked whether there would be any restriction on the volume of funds. If the funds are required specifically for the purposes that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, indicated, that would not lead to a restriction. This is best dealt with, and would be dealt with, on the basis of an individual licence application. Obviously, there would be a remedy there if the person was not satisfied with the terms of the licence that was issued.
The other amendment to which my noble friend spoke relates to the position under Clause 27 for a person affected by a Treasury decision other than a designation-related decision to apply to the court not only for the decision to be set aside but for it to be varied. The amendment would in particular allow decisions relating to licence conditions—the very issue that I have been discussing with my noble friend Lord Lester—such as limits on the amount of cash a designated person could access per week to be varied by the court. The Government agree that the court should have sufficient powers to require the conditions of a licence to be varied so as to ensure that the designated person has sufficient access to funds and economic resources subject to appropriate conditions, but we also believe that the amendment is unnecessary.
Under Clause 27, the court can set aside any licence-related decision made by the Treasury. For example, if the court considers a designated person should be entitled to access a larger amount of cash per week than he is permitted to withdraw under the cash limit in the licence, the court can set aside the Treasury’s decision to impose that cash limit. While it would not be open to the court expressly to write conditions into the licence or rewrite existing conditions, the Treasury is obliged to take into account the reasons that the court gives for striking down a condition in the licence. In practice, the Treasury has immediately revised licences, taking account of the court’s view on what the licence should contain. Therefore, I hope that my noble friend will not press her amendments on the assurance that these are matters not just of good practice but of obligation, which the Treasury obviously takes very seriously.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, with that last comment, my noble and learned friend anticipates my saying that I would not wish to see this matter rest on practice but that it is a matter of obligation.
I understood my noble and learned friend to say that a licence to use funds for legal advice or representation is in part to protect the banks. I find that difficult to follow, because I am asking for a licence; I am not asking for the banks to be allowed to release funds simply on the say-so of the designated person or third party that this is the use to which the funds would be put. I make that point quite seriously, although I will not ask my noble and learned friend to come back on it if he does not want to at this point. However, which article or articles does he rely on with regard to subsistence costs? The right to a fair trial leads one very directly to the point of legal advice and representation. It is probably, although I do not want to put words into the Government’s mouth, a combination of other articles that takes us to subsistence.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My noble friend is right to say that there are other articles. The right to a fair trial is the obvious one, but there is also the right to use one’s resources under Article 1 of Protocol 1. Also used in these contexts sometimes is the right to family life under Article 8, which might well be relevant in circumstances such as these.
Baroness Hamwee
I am grateful to my noble and learned friend. Although I remain a little uneasy—that is not his fault—I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
“(3) A person must comply with a request under this Chapter even if doing so might constitute evidence that the person has committed an offence.
(4) But in criminal proceedings in which a person is charged with an offence—
(a) no evidence relating to any answer given, or anything else done, in response to the request may be adduced by or on behalf of the prosecution, and(b) no question relating to those matters may be asked by or on behalf of the prosecution,unless evidence relating to those matters is adduced, or a question relating to those matters is asked, in the proceedings by or on behalf of the person.
(5) Subsection (4) does not apply to—
(a) an offence under section 112 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 (false representation for obtaining benefit etc);(b) an offence under section 5 of the Perjury Act 1911 (false statutory declarations and other false statements without oath); or(c) an offence under section 44(2) of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 (false statements and declarations).”
Baroness Hamwee
This was another matter that I raised in Committee, and I have been grateful for the opportunity to discuss it with my noble and learned friend since then. We agreed that I would table an amendment again to enable the Government to give a slightly longer explanation than they were able to at that date.
The amendment would protect a person who does not wish to incriminate himself. The exception of reasonable excuse would apply in this situation; it would be reasonable for a person to say that he will not comply because of the right not to self-incriminate. But this is a general defence to something that is really very specific, and if the Government can take us through their thinking it would be very helpful. On the question of what is reasonable in particular circumstances, one would have to analyse the circumstances so carefully and to such a degree that the concern about self-incrimination might be trumped. That is why a provision that was—as I described it—more straightforward, although longer, would be appropriate.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
Again, my Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for raising this point, which we dealt with in Committee and which we have had an opportunity to discuss further. I hope that I can persuade her that the Bill does not really provide the ace of trumps up the sleeve; rather, it recognises—as I think would this House—the importance of the privilege against self-incrimination.
The amendment would replace a qualified requirement to provide information in the absence of reasonable excuse with an absolute obligation, but would provide that such information could not be used in subsequent criminal proceedings. Again, as my noble friend indicated in moving the amendment, the purpose of doing so would be to protect the privilege against self-incrimination.
In Committee, I confirmed to my noble friend that the privilege against self-incrimination was not overridden by the Bill. In particular, I clarified that if a person was concerned that compliance with an information request would infringe that person’s right against self-incrimination, that concern itself would form a reasonable excuse, under what is now Clause 22(1)(a), for refusing to comply with that request.
I appreciate that the amendment is prompted by a concern that “reasonable excuse” operates as a defence, and that it is inappropriate to rely on a general defence in such a fundamental area. I readily appreciate the nature of this concern, but it is misplaced as it is founded on a misunderstanding of how the prohibition in Clause 22(1)(a) will operate. In order for the offence to be committed, the person must have no reasonable excuse for failing to provide the information. If the person decided that providing the information would infringe his or her right against self-incrimination, he or she would have a prima facie reasonable excuse for withholding it and would not have committed the offence.
The onus would not be on the person to raise a defence based on the privilege against self-incrimination. It would instead be on the prosecution to show that the person’s reliance on that privilege was not reasonable in the circumstances. In practice, no prosecution would be brought unless the prosecution considered that there was a reasonable prospect of establishing this, and then it would be incumbent on the prosecution to prove that beyond reasonable doubt. I hope that this further reassurance will permit my noble friend to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, with reference to where the onus lies, the Minister’s reply is particularly helpful; I am glad to have the assurance that it lies on the prosecution in that situation. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.