Baroness Hamwee
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Justice and Security Bill [HL]
Baroness Hamwee Excerpts(12 years, 5 months ago)
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Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, like other Members of the Committee I am a bit puzzled about how polarised the debate became a few minutes ago. It seems to have swung back now. I do not see all the distinctions that have been drawn, and I certainly do not see the distinction between the committee being there to ask questions in public or as something different to get to the bottom of an issue.
I agree, of course, that the committee must have the confidence of the agencies and that it must have public confidence. I would add, perhaps as a subsection of that second point rather than as a third category, that it must also have the confidence of those affected by events. When I was a member of the London Assembly, I was involved in some work following the events of 7/7, and one of the benefits of our being able to undertake some work was that it fulfilled the need of some who had been affected to tell their story and to have their story listened to. I am not suggesting that this is a pattern or even relevant to the majority of the ISC’s work, but I would not want it to be forgotten.
I think that this debate is leading us towards there being a Select Committee and that badging it as such is important because of what that says about the focus of Parliament’s responsibility to the public. I do not think it would require the rules to be fiddled with, but it would require them to be made fit for purpose. Perhaps it is naive and untraditional of me, but I do not see why the rules of a Select Committee cannot be made fit for purpose. It might require a lot of work, but I think it ought to be done.
I have some very non-technical and rather inelegant amendments later, but the point that they are intended to raise is that the default should be that the committee works for the public and in public, not as a stage show—absolutely not, because to take up one of the points that has just been made, I for one think that the most important questions that tend to be asked are the supplemental ones. I am glad that we are having this debate because I think that it is taking us in an important direction.
Baroness Manningham-Buller
My Lords, I declare what I hope is an obvious interest—my membership of the Security Service for 33 years—although I should warn the Committee that I retired five years ago and so am out of date.
I should like to reiterate a couple of points. I listened with great interest to the points made by both former members of the ISC, current members and others with a close interest in this matter. It is certainly the case—and I do not think that I am out of date in saying this—that it is in the interests of the security and intelligence community to have either a Select Committee or the present committee as it stands seeking to give reassurance to Parliament and the public that these agencies are properly run, obeying the law and doing a reasonable job. As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said, they will make mistakes—it would be a delusion to suggest that any organisation was free from making mistakes—but certainly when I was reporting to the ISC I hoped to own up to and discuss those mistakes.
The support of members of the public is necessary not only in terms of general support for the organ of government but because, to do their work, the agencies require that support every day of the week. They need the public to join them as recruits—they want to attract high-quality recruits—they need them as sources of information, and they need them to help in whatever way possible. Someone might be asked, “Can I come and sit in your bedroom with a camera?”. I might say no but people say yes to the officers of the Security Service daily. Therefore, when we talk about public opinion, the services require the help of the public to do their job and, in my experience, they get it.
When we talk about whether to go for a Select Committee—a proposal with which I have a lot of sympathy—or an improvement on, or development of, the last one, I share the view of the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, that we will get there at some stage, although whether we will do so at the speed at which the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, would like, I do not know.
I am sorry but I feel that I must take slight issue with the noble Lord, Lea of Crondall, about the amount of information on the services that is available in the public domain. For certain, my service took its heart in its hands and commissioned a centenary history of the Security Service. We made the professor of contemporary history at Cambridge a temporary member of the service and allowed him into our records. We said, “You can make any judgment you like. We won’t seek to query it. There will be a few things that you can’t publish for national security reasons but we will keep those to a minimum”. If you look at our website—I must stop saying “our”; I left the organisation. If you look at the Security Service’s website, you will see quite extensive amounts of information.
Why do these organisations exist? They exist to try to protect the United Kingdom and its citizens, and it is in their interests that as far as possible the confidence in them is well founded and, as far as it can be, widely and publicly known. To that extent, I should like to say how much I welcome the arrival of the ISC and how much I look forward to its continuing evolution.
Baroness Hamwee
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, grouped with this amendment are Amendments 11 and 12 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, on rather different points from mine. I will confine my remarks to my amendment. Schedule 1 provides that members will hold office for the duration of the Parliament in which they are appointed. I do not read later parts of the paragraph, in particular sub-paragraphs (6) and (7), as applying to membership. This raises two issues, which I shall ask about in what is no more than a probing amendment. One is whether there should be a committee in existence during the period when Parliament is prorogued; the second is about the delay in appointing members after the next Parliament has started to sit. On the latter point, I have heard reports that some Select Committees have taken a very long time to be established—up to six months. I am certainly not arguing that the approach of this amendment is the best way of doing it. If there were to be some amendments, the arrangements would need much more detail, but I am worried that there would be an issue if there were a long lacuna. I do not know whether the Minister can help the Committee regarding the position of the current committee. Are members appointed until the appointment is terminated in a positive fashion, whether or not Parliament has been prorogued? Clearly, if an MP is not re-elected, he would not be expected to retain membership.
The ISC is so important that I would be reluctant not to have some sort of formula for unbroken oversight. It could be argued, of course, that its work is largely retrospective so it would not matter if there was a gap, but I would not accept that argument. It occurs to me that one could deal with continuing membership if enough Members of your Lordships’ House were appointed for there to be a quorum over the period of Prorogation, but that is unlikely to commend itself. There is also the question of the period between Parliaments and any delay in appointment once a new Parliament sits. I beg to move.
Lord Campbell-Savours
My Lords, I want to speak to Amendments 11 and 12, standing in my name. Amendment 11 deals with the words in Schedule 1, paragraph 1(2)(c), which states that,
“a resolution for the person’s removal is passed in the House of Parliament by virtue of which the person is a member of the ISC”.
In other words, there has to be a resolution of Parliament to exclude someone from the ISC. Have those who wrote this Bill thought that through? A resolution in the House of Commons, or even in this House, would mean that the person who is being removed from the ISC, with all the material that they have gained over the years on matters relating to national security and who may well be angry with the chairman and the system, is given free rein to get up on the Floor of the House of Commons and, in their defence on the back of the resolution, say why they should not be removed from the Intelligence and Security Committee. This is a very silly proposal. It is highly dangerous and has clearly been worked up by someone who did not understand the implications of what a resolution of the House of Commons means for public debate. It should be removed.
How could someone be removed from the Intelligence and Security Committee? First, one would go to them privately and explain the reasons why they should resign. I am sure that the Whips and the system have all sorts of ways for removing Members of Parliament without allowing them free rein to get up on the Floor of the House of Commons on the back of the resolution to defend themselves. That is my case for Amendment 11. I seek the exclusion of what I regard as a highly irresponsible proposition.
I now turn to Amendment 12, which deals with sub-paragraph (3), which states:
“A member of the ISC may resign at any time by notice given to … in the case of the member who is the Chair of the ISC, the Speaker of the House of Parliament by virtue of which the person is a member of the ISC”.
Why should the Speaker be informed? This is not a parliamentary committee; the Speaker is not a member of the committee and has no relationship with it. The committee is external to Parliament, however we want to describe it. I cannot see any explanation why, other than the fact that those who devised these sections of the Bill believe that it is necessary to have a model where they have the imprimatur of Parliament on the label. I think it is ludicrous, unnecessary, and again it should be removed from the Bill. It is trying to lead the public to believe that this is truly some committee of Parliament. It is not, because it lacks the privileges and the powers that a parliamentary committee has as a Select Committee. That is my case.
Lord Henley
My Lords, the same could apply to whoever was removing that person. We are saying that Parliament should, in conjunction with the Prime Minister, have the responsibility for appointing, and therefore that Parliament should therefore have the duty to remove. If we accepted the noble Lord’s amendment, can he not see possible occasions where there was no possibility of removing a member of the ISC from office, no matter what they had done, unless they ceased to be a Member of their House of Parliament—this place or another place? I do not therefore accept the noble Lord’s amendment.
As regards his second amendment and the idea that the Speaker of either House has to be notified, I really do not see why notifying the Speaker as a means of resigning from the committee causes any problems at all. Both the Government and the committee are of the view that the chair should no longer be removed by, or required to resign by giving notice to, the Prime Minister. Again, the committee has previously been criticised for being a creature of the Executive. If the committee is to be a creature of, or belong to, Parliament, it seems far more appropriate that a person should have to resign by the means proposed rather than tendering their resignation to the Prime Minister.
I therefore hope that my noble friend will withdraw her amendment, and I am sure that the noble Lord will not want to move his amendments.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I clearly did not explain my amendment adequately. My noble friend responded on one point, the continuity of the committee, but he has not dealt with my concern about delay in appointing members in a new Parliament. Can he help the Committee on that and give any assurances?
Lord Henley
My Lords, both Houses are normally reasonably speedy about these matters and we will obviously take the issue very seriously. I do not think that there has previously been a delay in appointing the nine members after appropriate discussions, and I cannot see that there would be any dangers of delay in the future, but whoever is in government will obviously have to bear in mind the importance of these matters and ensure that a new committee is created as quickly as possible.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I have no idea about the appointment of the ISC but I discussed this matter with a Member of the Commons who has considerable experience of membership of Select Committees. It was from him that I heard that in one case there was a delay of almost six months in appointing the committee. It is that situation that I am seeking to avoid. I do not expect the Minister at this point to say anything other than what he has said, but the issue is serious in my head.
He said that legislation is not needed for the continuity of work of the committee or of the transfer of documents. I was not arguing that point at all. As I said, this is a probing amendment. I am not sure that I have probed quite far enough, but of course I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
“(a) the ISC shall meet in public save when it determines that members of the public shall be excluded,(b) a determination under paragraph (a) may be made prior to the meeting to which it applies and may apply to more than one meeting.”
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 15 as well as to Amendment 17, which was tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, and has been grouped with my amendments because we cover very similar ground. Indeed, we have covered a fair bit of the ground already during this afternoon’s discussions, including the subjects of open meetings, question times, public hearings and so on. I am, of course, not so naive as to think that the ISC needs to meet only occasionally in closed session, but I do think it a good discipline to ask oneself regarding every meeting whether it needs to be closed. I am therefore proposing that open discussions be the default arrangement. It is also important to justify why a meeting is closed, if it is, and to that extent I think that Amendment 17 asks the right sort of question, although I would have put it differently, saying that “proceedings should be public unless” rather than “private if”. However, I think that these are all probing amendments.
The Marquess of Lothian
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way. Could she perhaps outline to the House what sort of meetings of this committee should be held in public?
Baroness Hamwee
I am saying that the committee should consider whether there is a reason not to hold a meeting in public. My approach to this would be to say that each move into closed session should be considered quite positively. I look at it the other way round; it is a different philosophy and I accept that.
I have provided in Amendment 14—these are probing amendments—that a determination could be made to apply to more than one meeting. I cannot believe, given the committee’s obligation to the public, that every meeting should be held privately unless there is a good reason to hold it in public. As I say, it is a difference in philosophy. Amendment 14 is, as I say, probing, and I accept that a decision could be taken to cover more than one meeting.
Amendment 15 is rather different. I think that there is a place for something like a public question time. The noble Baroness’s amendment suggests annual hearings with the heads of the agencies and the Secretary of State, and I think that that is a good idea. In both of our amendments, we suggest that the public should have a hand in setting the agenda of the committee. I beg to move.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 17 and then perhaps say something about Amendment 15. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, might have misunderstood our intention in Amendment 17, because I think that our intention differs very much from hers in Amendment 15. Amendment 17 is essentially, as she said, intended to probe the idea of public hearings. This idea has had a mixed response in your Lordships’ House in both today’s debate and earlier debates. What is vitally important is that the public should have confidence in the system of oversight of our intelligence and security services. I think that that has been quite clear in the early amendments to the structure and kind of committee that we are seeking. As has also been previously mentioned, the ISC itself has admitted that reform is needed urgently. One of the areas of reform that it stresses is the need to improve public confidence in its work and in its ability to function as a strong and independent check on the work of the intelligence community. Just as we would say that justice does not just need to be done, it must also be seen to be done, the scrutiny role of independent checks and balances does not just have to be done, it must also be seen to be done in order to create public confidence. I have to say to the Minister that, looking at the legislation before us, I do not think that the Government have given enough thought to the role that visibility can play in building up that kind of public confidence.
We have heard mixed responses to the public hearings held in the United States by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence with the heads of the intelligence community. Those hearings in public session—many of them televised—are a significant aspect of this issue and have produced some important public admissions by the agencies’ heads. However, I think that there is a risk of them being seen as stage-managed, as we heard earlier from the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian.
We have to recognise that a large part of the committee’s work involves hearing evidence of a highly sensitive nature that cannot safely be publicly disclosed. However, it is important to move towards a system where public hearings are considered not automatic but more routine. I do not go quite as far as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, although I think that we are going in the same direction, as I do believe that such hearings should be accepted more and be more routine. Therefore, Amendment 17 would expressly provide for the ISC to hold public hearings where it is judged that there is no significant risk of the disclosure of sensitive information, as defined by the Bill, or information that risks undermining the interests of national security. The noble Lord keeps chastising me for the wording of the amendment but I hope that he understands the theme that we are putting forward here. In effect, the amendment sets the same threshold for judging the risk of the disclosure of information in public hearings as the Bill does for the disclosure of information to the committee.
Perhaps a more appropriate set of conditions could be used here to ensure that public hearings do not lead to the jeopardising of our national security or of the work of the intelligence services. That is something that I would be happy to discuss. However, it is the principle of routine public hearings that we are trying to establish with this amendment. Similarly, annual public hearings with the heads of the intelligence services, as provided for in Amendment 17, would, as they do in the United States, send a very public signal about the accountability of our intelligence community to Parliament through the ISC.
There is perhaps just a slight difference of emphasis in our amendment compared with the noble Baroness’s Amendment 14, in that we do not think that public hearings should be automatic. However, I am slightly curious about Amendment 15 and the suggestion of a public question time. I wonder whether that would change the role of the ISC. It seems to me that its role is very specific—that of oversight of the intelligence community and intelligence agencies—and I am not sure what would be gained by putting its members into the public eye, with them being questioned by the public, as I think is the noble Baroness’s intention. I should have thought that public confidence would be achieved by members of the Intelligence and Security Committee being seen to do their job robustly and ensuring proper scrutiny and oversight of the intelligence community. This seems to be more about oversight and scrutiny of the intelligence committee by the public, although I should have thought that that was a job for Parliament rather than for the public. I should be interested to hear the noble Lord’s comments on the amendments.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am grateful for that response and for the comments made around the Committee. Of course I accept that there is nothing to prevent public proceedings, and what we have heard about the direction in which the committee is moving is very welcome. However, I felt that it was important to raise the issue in order to indicate what Parliament will expect in future. On the query about televising proceedings, I suppose that it is almost inevitable in this day and age. If proceedings are to be in public, what are the mechanisms for making them so? However, I accept the implicit point that that raises issues.
On the issue of question time, as the Minister said, there are a number of models for questioning the committee or the agencies. I am not entirely sure that there is an absolutely clear demarcation line between the two. One can imagine members of the public asking committee members why they had not asked about something. Perhaps it is a muddy area. The title “question time” can mean different things to different people. I accept that it might raise the wrong expectations. Nevertheless, it is a flavour of where work should be heading.
We have heard examples of possible subjects that might be covered. Some—perhaps not all—financial arrangements of the agencies, along with some aspects of the administration, might also be dealt with in public. The example of recruitment was very interesting. That would be a matter of broad public interest and I hope that it could be pursued. Of course, planted questions and answers are not enough, but are they not sometimes better than nothing? People will have different views on that.
I raise these issues because they are properly covered in debate at this stage of the Bill. I am not sure whether we will take them further. The issue remains very live, but whether it is an issue for legislation is perhaps a different matter. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
“( ) The ISC may consider the proposed appointment of the following including by questioning the prospective appointee at a meeting of the ISC—
(i) the Head of the Security Service;(ii) the Head of the Secret Intelligence Service;(iii) the Head of the Government Communication Headquarters; and(iv) such other persons as the Prime Minister may direct.”
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, if I have not caused apoplexy so far, I will with this amendment. I have absolutely no expectation that the Government will be minded to accept the notion of confirmatory hearings. However, I tabled the amendment because we do not have to go the way of the United States. There are more and more examples in the UK of confirmatory hearings. They do not necessarily come with a veto—in fact, there are probably no hearings where a veto is granted to the examining committee. However, holding sessions where a nominee for a position can be questioned so that the public know what they are getting in the prospective appointee is part of opening up services to public understanding as well as addressing issues of accountability.
I mentioned the Greater London Authority earlier. I will not draw too many comparisons between the organisations, but confirmatory hearings of mayoral appointments were introduced just after I stood down from the GLA. I watched one of them on what I believe is called a narrowcast on the web and it was absolutely fascinating—not just the questions but the whole experience. One could tell so much from the body language of the person who was being questioned. I thought that it was a very useful session. This is not even in hope, let alone expectation, but I do not want to think that we have to do things exactly as the United States does or discard them because of that experience.
Lord King of Bridgwater
I have a point of clarification. Is the noble Baroness proposing that these hearings should be in public or not?
Baroness Hamwee
I suppose it had been in my mind for the reason that I gave about public understanding. The noble Lord raises a very interesting point as to whether one should look at this as not a public exercise. That would raise different and very interesting issues, and perhaps fruitful ones. I am sorry I did not go there in my comments. I beg to move.
Lord Campbell-Savours
I am glad the noble Baroness did not stipulate that the hearings should be in public because that would make it quite impossible for us to carry out this function, which in many ways I have great sympathy with. If we had had the opportunity when I was a member of the committee to interview proposed heads of the agencies prior to them taking over responsibility for the agencies, it would have been helpful to the committee. In so far as it had not been in public, no damage would have been done. Certainly we would have been able to make our concerns or satisfaction known to the agency, and during the questioning of the proposed appointee we could have raised subjects that would have given us, certainly in one case, a little more reassurance than perhaps I felt I had when the particular person was appointed. I think there is merit in this amendment as long as the hearings are in private.
Lord Henley
I am afraid that on this occasion I have to disagree with my noble friend. There it is quite a distinction between Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary or the chair of the Social Security Advisory Service on the one hand and, for that matter, the Permanent Secretary of the Home Office or the Permanent Secretary of any other department on the other. We suggest that the heads of the intelligence and security agencies fit in more appropriately with that later group rather than with the former group.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am not clear whether the Minister is saying that they fit in with that group or that they are exempt under the legislation, which he mentioned. Either way, process moves forward. It is not so very long ago that we did not have the Nolan principles, but they are completely accepted now. I, too, think that this may come, although it may not come in the Justice and Security Act 2012. However, we are in Committee, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Hamwee
“( ) arrange for it to be made available to advisers to the ISC who are the subject of specific security clearance who may then advise the ISC with regard to the information including providing written material in redacted form,”
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, Amendment 18, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Thomas, is the first in quite a large group. We have other amendments in the group, as does the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and they are all about access to information.
Amendment 18 would provide for advisers to the ISC with the right security clearance to be able to have access to information. It was suggested to me by someone who was at one point a member of the ISC and who thought that it would make the process a great deal easier if some of the committee’s own advisers had that clearance and could go into the agencies and do the work that was necessary. That goes to the independence of the ISC.
The other amendments are all about accessing information when it is a necessity. If the committee is to carry out its proper role of scrutiny and to deter poor practice effectively, it should see what it wants, not what is given. Obviously others will have different views about that.
Paragraph 3(1)(b) allows the Secretary of State to determine whether information is not to be disclosed on one of the bases set out in paragraph 3(3), one of which is that the information is sensitive as defined in paragraph 4. I simply ask whether it is constitutionally appropriate for the Government to withhold access to documents which the committee considers necessary to hold the Government to account. A much happier situation would be to provide information but to be confident in the appointees and in restrictions on their using it. However, access to information is the point from which I start. I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, the Minister, who has been the subject of the many compliments flowing from the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, today, has given us quite a lot of material to think about. He has certainly given me some ideas about better drafting for my Amendment 18. Given the number of noble Lords who are here not to discuss this issue, I will do no more than end with a question. I am not sure that I expect the Minister to respond to it immediately. Under this paragraph, would a decision by the relevant Minister of the Crown—leaving aside the rank or position of that Minister—be judicially reviewable? Clearly it would have to be shown to be unreasonable and how one does that I do not know. Is this an administrative decision that would fall within the ambit of judicial review? The Minister is going to dare to respond.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I am not going to dare to respond. I am saying that there are a lot of very noble and learned Lords in this House and a lot of Members who are not necessarily noble and learned but know a great deal of law. I do not know the answer to that. I had better write to the noble Baroness. I am sure she will have a response before Report.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I am not a noble and learned Member either, which is perhaps why I can dare to ask the stupid questions. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 18.