(1 year, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the debate in Committee was extensive and expressed concern that the wording of Clause 9, whether it intended to or not, was setting a dangerous precedent in which free speech and opinion, through giving out leaflets, could be criminalised in state-designated zones around hospitals and clinics. Some of us asked, “Where next?”, and I put down amendments to Clause 9. I am really pleased that the debate led to people changing their minds because concerns were heard, and I commend the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, on listening. Amendment 45 is undoubtedly a different provision from having that Clause 9 and, in my opinion, is much improved from a civil liberties point of view.
We should therefore note that the proponents of Clause 9 now do not support it. Good—that is that out of the way. However, I have several problems with Amendment 45 but will concentrate on one at this time. It is about its proposed new subsection (1)(a), which has the idea that there should be no attempt to influence
“any person’s decision to access … the provision of abortion services”.
Influencing has been discussed here this evening in appropriately legalistic terms, which are important, but I want to bring a different perspective. It is dangerous to suggest that influencing someone to change their mind about a decision made should be against the law, in almost any circumstances. This is not the same as suggesting that the appropriate place to have, as somebody called it, the free speech debate on abortion is outside an abortion clinic. I organise a festival called the “Battle of Ideas”, but we should not be having a battle of ideas outside an abortion clinic when somebody is trying to access healthcare. That is not the basis on which free speech is threatened by these buffer zones going national, which I think it is.
Many women are very firm and clear; they have made a rational decision that they want an abortion. They have given a lot of time to that decision and will not be deterred. I do not think they would even be deterred by anti-abortion vigils going on, because they know what they want to do. It is a bit distressing but they go in, and good luck to them. However, some women may be unsure. If they are toing and froing, they should and must be free to change their mind at any time and in any direction, up until either termination or what have you. It is not coercive if you think again. If a woman is trying to work out, “Should or shouldn’t I have a termination?”, they can go to see a counsellor at BPAS or a Marie Stopes clinic because they are not sure. If somebody tries to influence them—not in one way or another, but by getting them to talk it through and think about it—a woman might then leave that counselling service and say, “I’ve thought about it now. I’ve made my mind up and I’m going to have a termination”. That is a woman’s moral autonomy and we assume she is not coerced in that situation. A woman who may not be sure and is still thinking about it, even as she goes in for a termination, might be given a leaflet and then says in her own defence, “I’ve changed my mind. There may be an option of getting some practical support for pregnancy”.
Whatever the reason is, that is their choice. The point is that I am pro-choice. I do not want us to undermine women’s agency in our enthusiasm to support laws presented as protecting women. We should not legislate on the basis of worrying about women, how they feel, and their being distressed. Influence is something we should protect. I want to influence you now. I might be failing, because you have the capacity to listen and make a decision. Influencing is the basis of democracy. We should be careful about saying that we should not be allowed to influence because a Bill in Parliament said, “Don’t influence in that bit of the country”.
I consider these vigils insensitive and a nuisance. I disagree with the anti-abortionists outside. I think that abortion is a woman’s right to choose and a key right for women. I find the views of the people on these vigils offensive, and their demonstrations are often objectionable and distressing. However, in a democracy we have to tolerate people who sometimes have views we find distressing or offensive.
I want to emphasise that earlier we had lots of debates about proportionate law-making and civil liberties. Everyone on this side of the House has made some fantastic speeches about how we have to be careful about bringing in laws and what the thresholds are. Amendment 1, which I spoke on and supported, suggested a much higher threshold for what we consider “serious disruption”. I do not think these vigils, however obnoxious they are, would merit even the lower threshold the Government had. Basically, what I am saying is that I do not like them, but I do not think we need a law against them. I listened in Committee, as well as the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, and changed my mind. I was trying to amend Clause 9, but instead I do not think we should amend it at all. We should review whether we need nationally mandated buffer zones at all. I do not want to amend the buffer zones; I want to stop, pause and look at the evidence.
Throughout Committee and since, I have talked to lots of people on all sides. I have been inundated by my mates on the pro-choice side and people on the other side. What struck me was the variance in what I was hearing. We have heard from a former police leader that he has gone round and there is a real problem. We heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, that this is escalating. There is American money, and all sorts of things are happening. We have heard that, since Roe v Wade, there are lurid stories of quite aggressive things happening outside abortion clinics. I have also heard on the other side that all anyone is doing is silently praying and it is completely benign.
The truth of the matter is that, if we are going to make such a dramatic change in the law from locally decided PSPOs, where there is a particular problem, to a national decision to carve up some public space and say, “No, you are not allowed to stand there”, when there might not have even been a problem, can we not at least base it on what is really going on? Public space protection orders are local remedies. I do not like that carving up of public space, but it is there and it is used. In 2018 the Home Office asked the same questions we have asked tonight, did an extensive review of vigils around abortion clinics and concluded that introducing national buffer zones would not be a proportionate response considering the experiences of the majority of hospitals and clinics and that the majority of activities are more passive in nature. People who wanted this clause say, “No, that is out of date and completely wrong. The 2018 review does not hold”. Fine; let us have a 2023 review. That is all I am saying, let us find out; I am adamant about that.
One of the things I have been completely won over on is that the victims of these vigils are often not women trying to access a termination but the staff day after day. When you are going in for the termination, they might annoy you once. I cannot imagine anything more irritating than having to walk past this if you are trying to do your job providing women’s reproductive healthcare.
Let the review look at whether we can have a particular way of dealing with that. When I was talking about PSPOs, I heard, “PSPOs don’t work, you know; they’re useless at this”. In that case, we need a review. Come back in less than a year, so we can have decent legislation that fits the facts, not the virtue signalling. For the sake of women’s rights, it seems important to me that we take this seriously and not just do it as a political act.
My Lords, I shall support Amendment 45, subject to one important qualification. My experience in relation to this derives from presiding in the Court of Appeal over the very first buffer zone case, Dulgheriu & Anor v the London Borough of Ealing. Ealing set up what is now called a buffer zone around the Marie Stopes clinic, and I will refer to a couple of matters that have arisen in the course of this debate which informed the judgment in that case. We dismissed the application for a public spaces protection order, which was made by a Christian group called the Good Counsel Network. It protested daily, and its protests comprised a variety of different actions, including presenting people who were going into the clinic with posters of foetuses at various stages of development, distributing prayer beads and putting up tents. Overall, the object was to prevent an abortion taking place. There was also evidence that they called out “Mum” to the women going in, that they presented puppet babies and that they held both verbal and non-verbal vigils. The evidence was that that was extremely distressing to vulnerable women, who were going into the clinic for advice or treatment, and it was equally clear that the staff were also extremely upset by what was happening.
I am afraid that I disagree with those who say we need a review to see whether the legislation is necessary. It is clear that the 2014 Act under which the public spaces protection orders are made is not designed to protect individuals in this way; it is designed for the benefit of a community when there is an action or activity that is harmful to the community. So there is no legislation that can provide this sort of protection, so far as I am aware and Ealing was aware, and which is designed specifically for this type of attack, in effect, on very vulnerable people seeking medical advice.
I agree with my noble friend Lord Hogan-Howe in this respect: this is not like the protests we have discussed so far today; these are actions directed to particular people who are particularly vulnerable. There is no other legislation, so the only question is: do we have this on a national or a local scale? Under the 2014 Act, a number of consultations have to be conducted. They can take a great deal of time—not just weeks or months but sometimes years; the Ealing consultation took a very long time to complete—so, from my perspective, legislation of this kind is needed for the protection of vulnerable individuals. Amendment 45 covers the ground perfectly, subject to one thing: I do not believe that it is consistent or appropriate for the maximum penalty for this type of offence to be limited to level 5 on the standard level.
For tunnelling, the penalties range from fines to imprisonment. Many of these religious groups are very well-backed; I do not anticipate at all that, if there was a fine, that would be the end of the matter. I think there would be repeat offences. Consistently with the earlier provisions in relation to tunnelling, for example, on indictment there should be provision on repeat offences for there to be the ability to pass a sentence of imprisonment.
(1 year, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThat was a natural break in proceedings as I am now going on to talk about the definition of serious disruption.
As we have heard, Amendments 5, 14, 24 and part of Amendments 50 and 51 relate to the definition of serious disruption. The Minister will no doubt cite the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis in saying that the police would find it helpful if the definition of “serious disruption” were clearer.
Amendment 1, to which I have added my name, provides greater clarity in relation to, what—with the best will in the world—will ultimately be a judgment call by the police. I respectfully suggest that
“Significant harm to persons, organisations or the life of the community”
provides the clarity the police are seeking in ways that the alternative, from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, does not. It even provides examples of what might constitute “significant harm”.
I turn to the amendments in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. The noble and learned Lord probably realised that he had gone too far in his definition when the Minister signed them. I am not a lawyer. At university, I studied philosophy, not law, but I am not sure that defining “serious” as being “more than minor” is that helpful or reasonable. Surely it begs the question, “Well, what is minor?” Does the noble and learned Lord define minor as “less than serious”?
Having taken a common-sense rather than legal approach, I thought that serious was the opposite of minor. They are at opposite ends of a spectrum, in the sense that black is the opposite of white, not just the next level up. There are 50 shades of grey, apparently, between black and white; anything lighter in tone than black is not white. To use another analogy, the definition of a serious injury is not “anything more than a minor injury”.
I am reminded of the story of a student at Oxford University where the rule was that cats could be kept as pets, but not dogs, so he called his dog “Cat”. Saying that “serious disruption” is “anything more than minor” does not make it serious, even if the noble and learned Lord wants to call it that.
Of course, if the Government want to ban all protest that prevents or would hinder individuals carrying out their daily activities to more than a minor degree, they should say that in the Bill. They should not try to disguise the fact by saying that anything more than minor is serious—that dark grey is white. More than a minor degree cannot reasonably be defined as serious. We will vote in support of Amendment 1 and, if necessary, against Amendments 5, 14 and 24.
Government Amendments 48 and 49 deserve additional mention, over and above their adoption of the noble and learned Lord’s definition of serious as anything more than minor.
The police are asking for clarity. Let me quote from Amendment 48. Among other things, proposed new subsection (3A)(c) states that
“(c) the senior police officer reasonably believes that one of the conditions in subsection (1)(a) to (b) is met in relation to the procession mentioned in paragraph (a), and (d) the senior police officer reasonably believes—(i) in relation to a procession mentioned in paragraph (b)(i), that one of the conditions in subsection (1)(a) to (b) is met in relation to the procession, or (ii) in relation to an assembly mentioned in paragraph (b)(ii), that one of the conditions in section 14(1)(a) to (b) is met in relation to the assembly ... (3B) The senior police officer may—(a) give directions under subsection (1) in relation to—(i) the procession mentioned in subsection (3A)(a), and (ii) any procession mentioned in subsection (3A)(b)(i) in relation to which the condition in subsection (3A)(d)(i) is met, and (b) give directions under section 14(1A) in relation to any assembly mentioned in subsection (3A)(b)(ii) in relation to which the condition in subsection (3A)(d)(ii) is met.”
I am not sure that is the clarity the police are seeking.
These amendments go far beyond a too-weak definition of “serious disruption”. In considering whether a protest may result in serious disruption, the senior officer must have regard not just to the protest they are considering but to any other protest being held in the same area, even if they are organised by different people, involve different people, or
“are held or are intended to be held”
on the same day. The next thing the police will be telling protesters is that they cannot protest in central London because “There have been a couple of protests this month already”.
What is more, the police can define what “in the same area” means. When the police were given powers to designate a delimited area for a limited time for stop and search without suspicion under Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000, they designated the whole of London every day for years. There is nothing in these amendments to stop the Metropolitan Police, for example, designating the whole of London as the area in which the cumulative impact of protests needs to be taken into account.
The police are asking for clarity, so can the Minister please explain proposed new subsection (2ZH)(a), to be introduced by Amendment 48? What does
“all disruption to the life of the community … that may occur regardless of whether the procession is held”
mean? How can the life of a community be disrupted if a procession is not held?
These amendments would give the police extraordinary new powers to limit where, when and for how long marches and assemblies can take place, even if the protest is going to be peaceful and is not itself going to cause serious disruption, but, taken together with others in the area, even on a different day, may cause serious disruption. They would also allow the police to define what “area” means. These are yet more totally unjustified, unreasonable and excessive powers being given to a police service that no longer enjoys the confidence of large parts of society. We will vote against the amendments.
My Lords, we genuinely saw a demonstration there during an argument about what might constitute a “serious” or “minor” disruption. We could argue for ages whether it was “serious” or “minor”, but one thing I want to stress is why I support raising the threshold to the maximum and why I will support the amendments.
However, I want to ask the Minister, and the Government in general: who are the Bill and these amendments aimed at? Too much of the justification for the Bill that we heard in Committee, in newspaper articles since and in statements by Ministers, focused on the tactics of Just Stop Oil and Extinction Rebellion. Those organisations boasting that they wanted to maximise serious disruption to people’s lives to force and shock society into acting undoubtedly did not help those of us trying to be liberal about the right to protest. They did not exactly help my side of the argument, and I am certainly no fan of those tactics—but how on earth will the Bill confine itself to only those protesters? That is my point.
When we were talking earlier about serious disruption, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, made the point that those of us who get stuck in traffic jams know what serious disruption is. She used the point to illustrate that she feels there are too many cars on the roads, but in London—and not only London—there are lots of disputes concerning low-traffic neighbourhoods. Local people will tell you that, because the councils have put up obstacles and bollards on local roads, journeys that once took 15 minutes often take an hour and a half, and that that often goes against public consultations.
My Lords, I would like to think about how we got here. First, there has been a series of events over the past few years during which people criticised the police, the CPS and the Government for not intervening when people were seriously disrupted. That is why we are having this debate. We could go through various cases, whether it is Heathrow, the M25 or the taxis around Parliament Square, when the drivers were kind enough to leave a lane around the outside; that was their decision, a point I shall come back to. Therefore, people have complained that the police have not been intervening.
One reason why the police have not been intervening concerns the offence that they usually rely on: obstruction of the highway, which is a very simple and absolute offence. There is no intent to be proved; all that needs to happen is obstruction of the highway. The Supreme Court has had to consider that simple offence, and it concluded that there was more to consider than whether the highway was blocked. It asked whether there was an alternative route and other action could have been taken by the police. There was lots of talk about intent in respect of what is really a very simple offence. Usually the penalty is a fine; very rarely is imprisonment imposed.
The second reason why this issue is having to be considered is that the public have got angry and sometimes started to take action themselves when the police have not, which is always dangerous. We can all recall seeing film of someone sat on the top of a tube carriage and the crowd dragging him off. That is very dangerous for everybody involved—a terrible situation, and it should not happen. We have seen cases where the motorways have been blocked, and the people at the front have started to intervene because they are fed up with waiting. It appears that nobody is going to do anything and, in any case—
Certainly in Committee, the point was made—and I wonder what the noble Lord felt about it—that this was a crisis of policing, with the police not enacting laws we already have. It is entirely fair that the public have got frustrated, demanding that something should be done. If the police are uncertain what to do with a huge armoury of public order offences that could be used and sometimes are used, but in a fairly arbitrary fashion, why will giving them more powers and laws solve the problem of not using the ones they already have? That will disillusion the public even more with the whole process of criminal justice.
(1 year, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI entirely agree with the legal analysis by the noble and learned Baroness. As I hope I made clear in my earlier Answer, further money is provided—I mentioned £15,000—to each local authority in relation to the unaccompanied asylum-seeking child.
My Lords, I have listened carefully to the answers given. Having read the lurid headlines and newspaper reports, I was under the impression that people trafficking of these young people was a given. It is possible that I am confused, so can the Minister clarify that there is no evidence of what has happened or why these children have gone missing? If there is no evidence, is it not attendant on all of us in this place not to allege what we do not know to be true as though it were fact?
The noble Baroness is very perceptive. Unfortunately, there is a temptation to adopt the most lurid interpretation but, as I said a moment ago, there are many reasons why children go missing. There is no basis on which to make generalisations as to those reasons.
(1 year, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I had no intention of speaking on this amendment, but I feel I must, because my late husband, Philip Bassett, was an industrial journalist who covered many strikes, most significantly, I suppose, given what we are discussing, the miners’ strike, which the whole team of industrial journalists on the Financial Times covered. If this legislation stands the way the Government have drafted it, people like my late husband, and indeed the team with whom he worked, which included the very eminent journalist, John Lloyd, would have been open to prosecution. As it is, for their coverage of the miners’ strike they won journalist of the year.
My Lords, the speech from the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, really was excellent, and I hope it gets a wide hearing beyond this place and the numbers here.
When I have discussed this, I always hear the argument from people who are opposed to Just Stop Oil that the people we are talking about are not real journalists. There is something about the concentration on Charlotte Lynch from LBC that somehow says that the other people who were arrested on the same day did not really count, and I want to address that briefly.
There is no doubt that, when the protests that we are seeing at the moment are so performative, activists may well film what is going on, often because they want records of what they are doing to put out on social media. It is tempting, therefore, to treat them differently from journalists. However, I would urge against that and have argued against that. In the end, who decides who is the journalist and who is not? As the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, said, the whole act of bearing witness and truth has nothing to do with views on the protest. Whether you are enthusiastic about the protest or hostile about it is irrelevant to those of us who want to know what has happened on the protest. Sometimes, even activists with a film camera are valuable for truth. The argument that it will incite more protest is misguided, because it treats those who are viewing these films as though they are just automatons who will see them and immediately rush out and protest. You might well see the film intended to illicit your support and think what idiots they are. That is not the point. The truth is what we should be concerned with.
I just say to the Government that I am concerned in particular about the serious disruption prevention orders. I have said throughout the discussions on the Bill that there are so many unintended consequences. I have no doubt that the Government are not intending to use serious disruption prevention orders to stop journalism in its tracks. I think the orders are a terrible blight, by the way, and should be removed from the Bill, but that is not the point I am making. The consequences of them could well be that they thwart journalism. That is the point. I urge the Government to consider that they can support their own Bill and accept these amendments in good faith—I thought the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, explained this well—because they are trying to ensure that what they do not intend to happen, which is that journalistic freedom is compromised, will not happen and that journalists will not get caught up in this. We know that they will. That is the reality. It is a danger and a threat that the Government should get rid of.
My Lords, I have been following this Bill carefully but have not been able to take an active part in it so far. It is difficult not to agree with what the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, said about the importance of journalism, and I am sure the whole House agrees. I declare an interest as the chairman of the Independent Press Standards Organisation.
Of course, a good and accurate record or recording of what takes place at a demonstration is important for all parties, whether they be demonstrators, the police or the public. What concerns me a bit about the amendment is what it actually does, apart from sending a very important message. That may be enough; I do not know. It seems to me that in fact it would not be lawful for a constable to arrest anybody anyway for observing, recording or reporting a protest, and nor would the exercise of police powers in relation to those matters or indeed any other matter, but I will listen carefully to what the Minister says.
I would also be grateful for some clarification of how this might interrelate to the reasonable excuse defence that exists in various parts of the Bill. I know that there is some uncertainty at the moment about its scope, where it features in terms of the definition of the offence and whether simply saying—understandably, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said—that this an incredibly serious cause, ie, climate change, and therefore justifies all the potential offences here. This is a fascinating and important amendment, and I seek clarification in due course from the Minister as to its scope.
(1 year, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the most reverend Primate for encouraging us to consider the question of asylum from a moral position, but I warn those who made such interesting maiden speeches—I warmly welcome them—that debates in this House are not always so erudite or ethical.
One concern when we discuss this topic is how we are regularly urged to deploy our moral sentiments in feeling compassion for refugees. Is it emotionally manipulative to suggest that policy should be decided by such one-sided emotional concerns? There are millions of people who could have their lives enhanced by living in the UK. When I watch the news and see the plight and suffering of those around the world, I am tearful and want to do something desperately, but, as the most reverend Primate admits, we cannot take all the world’s suffering as refugees here. We have to prioritise, and that does not make us immoral. I therefore feel uncomfortable when some accuse those who raise concerns about the numbers arriving in small boats of lacking a disposition of generosity or not caring. Is not that demonising and dehumanising language too?
Let us not pretend that this is an easy moral question. For all the moral righteousness expressed here, I ask what the moral difference is between a man fleeing a war-torn country, which is considered legal, and a man fleeing grinding poverty, which is not. This highlights a moral problem thrown up by the asylum system: it treats the cause of someone fleeing a country as the basis for creating deserving and undeserving migrants. It implies somehow that a refugee is a victim worthy of our generosity, unlike economic migrants.
I am not sure the fashion for emphasising that Jesus was a refugee helps, if I am honest. It feels like a bit of a cheap shot. Did not Christ allegedly die for us all? This sanctifying narrative and the present system definitely incentivise anyone arriving to follow the script and claim they are refugees, but, as explained so well by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, people arrive without papers or with letters from tyrants as evidence. There is a problem: the system is open to abuse.
If the host authorities say they will give asylum to Syrians, those from the Middle East will inevitably claim to be Syrians. If the rules say asylum will be given to under-18s, young-looking 20-somethings will understandably claim to be younger. In 2016, the Church of England clerics warned about fake conversions from Islam to Christianity. In Nick Timothy’s major report published this week, he notes that modern slavery laws are being “abused”. It is now standard advice, especially for those coming from Albania, to claim they are victims of trafficking.
Noting those truths is not about blame. I do not blame people for trying their luck—they want a better life—so there are no accusations of “scroungers” or “invaders” from me. But it is simply disingenuous to suggest that the objectivity of the law is not being strained when determining asylum status is so difficult. I am especially worried when we gaslight the British public, who feel that some are gaming the system—and they are right to think that. They also believe that, no matter how many times they vote for control of our borders, they are being ignored at the expense of asylum seekers.
When people considered the original 1951 convention on refugees, the spectre of those fleeing the Holocaust death camps informed the spirit of “never again”. Many Jewish refugees were, shamefully, turned away. British citizens understand that, and they understand those fleeing the bombs and terror of Putin’s barbaric war in Ukraine and our obligation to those escaping the Taliban in Afghanistan, and so on. They are more than welcoming, but they are also understandably upset about the 40,000 currently crossing the channel, who they know are not fleeing from the terror of the Nazis or the Taliban, but who are leaving peaceful France.
They are right as well to ask British politicians about their priorities. Did your Lordships see the film of the recent public meeting in Skegness, called by the mayor in response to the local seaside hotels? There was a lot of hostility in that meeting, but it was aimed not at refugees but at the local MP. It was frustration at a system where, without consultation, asylum seekers in their midst were being given free accommodation, utilities and three meals a day, while local people face desperate times and the brutal reality of austerity. Homelessness is on the rise in the town, and the veterans sleeping rough in Skegness also deserves our compassion; the interviews with them were heart-breaking. Of course refugees are not living in five-star hotels, and I am not suggesting that, but can we also empathise with citizens who cannot get to see a GP, get into A&E or get medical treatment for chronic pain when they are told that medical services are being made available to refugees in local hotels?
Dismissing the plight and aspirations of our own citizens, so well-articulated by the noble Baronesses, Lady Stowell and Lady Stroud, is just as divisive and mean-spirited as using the language of invasion. This issue requires that we deploy a full range of moral principles. Our duties stretch beyond compassion for migrants. If we flaunt the democratic duty to uphold the integrity of national borders and treat the social cohesion of settled communities as a distasteful, inconvenient obstacle, we indeed risk a backlash against all refugees and migration schemes, which would be terrible. In my view, we need a complete overhaul of the laws on the issue. At present, who is in control?
In his foreword to the recent pamphlet From the Channel to Rwanda: Three Essays on the Morality of Asylum, Doctor Michael Nazir-Ali, the former Bishop of Rochester, wrote:
“if people smugglers can simply nullify carefully thought-through and debated legislation and policy by landing people in small craft on the beaches in Kent, this cannot indefinitely be acceptable in a democratic and law respecting nation.”
I think Nick Timothy is right that, if human rights laws or the 1951 refugee convention prevent us democratically deciding our priorities, we must be prepared to leave both if necessary. Those who disagree, who think there should be more refugees, should argue for that democratically and push that up the next election’s list of things to be debated.
The noble Baroness has run out of time.
(2 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak to a range of amendments associated with Clause 9: Amendments 80, 81, 82, 83, 86, 89, 92 and 94. I have also put my name to Amendments 88 and 90 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and have some sympathy with Amendments 98 and 99 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans.
Clause 9 creates a new criminal offence of interfering with
“any person’s decision to access, provide or facilitate the provision of abortion services”
in a designated buffer zone. The most contentious aspects of the clause centre on the definition of “interfering with”, which criminalises a wide range of activities usually associated with free speech and the right to assemble.
However, Clause 9 also makes any gathering outside an abortion clinic or a hospital providing abortions the subject of criminal law. Currently, where there have been problems outside a building facilitating abortion services, the mechanism for dealing with them has been locally decided and designed through public space protection orders—PSPOs. Police and local authorities have the ability to set up zones in response to complaints over gatherings around specific abortion providing facilities. Clause 9, in contrast, introduces a catch-all blanket ban across all service providers, regardless of whether there are problem protest activities taking place. This seems to me to be totally disproportionate.
Although I am no fan of PSPOs per se—councils carving ever more public space away from public use is not a positive trend—none the less, the aim of my Amendments 88, 89 and 90 is to repose the solution in relation to abortion protests as localised PSPOs based on consultation and reviewed annually, so as not to normalise prohibitions.
Because Clause 9 focuses on the issue of abortion, which we know is an emotional and morally challenging issue, it is worth taking a step back. The Government’s reason for bringing forward the Bill overall is to deal with the new protest tactics of Extinction Rebellion and its offshoots. Many of us have noted in previous debates that we do not support these anti-social tactics and some of us have even been clear that we have no sympathy with the nihilistic, catastrophising philosophy behind the eco-guerrilla warfare that activists have been waging against the British public.
Despite that, there have been widespread concerns across the House querying whether these new laws are necessary or proportionate, and noting that we already have laws on the statute book to deal with aggravated disruption, even if these laws are not being used effectively by the police, which is a different problem. There has also been widespread unease, which your Lordships have illustrated in myriad ways, about how various clauses in the Bill might have unintended draconian consequences for the general right to protest, far beyond Just Stop Oil activists or our attitudes to them.
For me, the same concerns are absolutely true of Clause 9. However, the difference is that many opposing the Government on the rest of the Bill are supportive of this clause. Seemingly, this is because noble Lords want to be unconditionally supportive of every woman’s right to access abortion facilities without hassle or hostility. As a passionate advocate of women’s reproductive rights and bodily autonomy, I am very sympathetic to this view. However, this is not the key prism that should inform our approach to Clause 9. I urge your Lordships to scrutinise Clause 9 with similar dispassionate and impartial eyes as have assessed the rest of the Bill in relation to Just Stop Oil—that is, beyond our attitudes to abortion.
Stella Creasy, the MP who effectively authored this clause, was quite right when she said in the other place that this new clause is not about the abortion debate. However, she argues that it is about ensuring safe access to abortion healthcare, and this is where the dispute starts. All the evidence indicates that the activity happening outside clinics, while undoubtedly unsavoury, does not threaten safe access. What is more, if there are any instances of women’s safe access being obstructed, which is totally unacceptable, many pieces of legislation already exist to protect women if they face intimidation or harassment, as Home Office Minister Kit Malthouse pointed out in the Public Bill Committee debate in June. For example, the Public Order Act 1986 prohibits causing harassment, alarm or distress, and includes a specific power to impose conditions on assemblies that seek to intimidate others not to do an act they have a right to do.
As with other parts of the Bill, the police have the powers to target specific instances of behaviour or activity if they constitute blocking safe access to abortion facilities. In 2018, the then Home Secretary, after concluding an in-depth review of the abortion clinic buffer zones, stated that he was
“adamant that where a crime is committed, the police have the powers to act so that people feel protected.”—[Official Report, Commons, 13/9/18; cols. 37-38WS.]
Given the importance of the rights at stake here, it seems particularly important that the police use their resources and their existing powers appropriately, to protect staff at abortion facilities and service users alike —but for that to happen, none of this requires Clause 9.
Do not get me wrong; I have very little sympathy for those who think that it is appropriate to gather outside abortion clinics. It is wholly unpleasant to target any individual woman going into hospital to access a legal termination. Waving gruesome images of dismembered foetuses, following women and medical staff doing their jobs, calling out, “your baby loves you” or “murderers”, hanging clothes around clinic entrances—this is crass insensitivity rather than compassion.
However, to be balanced, pro-life activists who attend these vigils will dispute these anecdotes and claim to be simply offering crisis pregnancy support, giving women choices by offering help financially, in raising a child, et cetera. There are, I concede, two competing narratives. I am conscious of the 2018 Home Office review, which found that those gatherings largely comprise passive activities such as prayers, leafleting, placards, singing hymns and so on. Regardless of which narrative you buy, it is wholly insensitive and intrusive to try to engage individual women at such a time, effectively demanding that they account for their personal moral decisions to strangers at a rally. I have no doubt that this would upset most women. It would upset me.
But whether it is upsetting is not what we should be talking about. The key question is whether it should be illegal and whether it constitutes a threat to safe access. My problem with Clause 9 is that it does not distinguish between activities causing actual objective harm and harassment, which threaten safe access, and activities with which we may disagree or which we might find disagreeable. Therefore, we must resist the temptation to create a law that criminalises otherwise legal activities based on a distaste for those activities. How the Bill defines “interferes with” will make an extraordinary range of activities in a particular area punishable by lengthy stints in prison or unlimited fines.
Some of the most egregious and censorious parts that my Amendments 88 to 90 seek to strike out are,
“seeks to influence … advises or persuades, attempts to advise or persuade or otherwise expresses opinion … informs or attempts to inform about abortion services by any means, including, without limitation, graphic, physical, verbal or written means”.
In other words, Clause 9 outlaws leafleting, holding placards, expressing opinions, persuading and informing. Some will say, “Don’t worry; this is only to be used in very specific instances of access to abortion, and it is only confined to designated areas”. But as Big Brother Watch points out, creating prohibitions on protest on an issue-by-issue basis is not an appropriate way to make law. It sets a precedent that will inevitably lead to attempts to prevent speech, expression, information sharing, assembly or the holding of protected beliefs around other sites or in relation to other controversial or unpopular causes.
Parliament is in a position to make a judgment about these matters. I was in the House of Commons for nearly 30 years—not as long as my noble friend Lord Cormack—and I was well aware of, in many circumstances, from evidence which came from many quarters, the kind of abuse to which women seeking an abortion were subjected by those who demonstrated outside abortion clinics. I strongly suspect that is why the House of Commons voted for Clause 9 in such substantial numbers, because it knew it was happening and that it was wrong. We do not need a further review to establish those basic judgments.
My Lords, my difficulty is this. In interpreting things in the way he is, the noble Viscount is suggesting that he knows why people did something. I have no idea why people in the Commons voted in the numbers they did. The noble Viscount has a view on what might have driven that; others might have another view. Generally speaking, since I have been in this place, the House of Commons has voted in huge numbers for things I have disagreed with, and unless the Opposition is going to go home, what am I supposed to do? I cannot keep saying, “I think they really did it because they were really motivated —we do not know, do we? Will the noble Viscount clarify why he keeps stressing that? Is it relevant to us?
It is, because we are being asking what the evidence is. I was telling the noble Baroness that, when I was a Member of the Parliament, for a very long time, I was conscious of some of the abuse that was going on from speaking to people coming to my surgery. In the House of Commons, we get a reflection of the views of Members of Parliament who are encountering the same response from their own constituents.
The query about “reasonable excuse” has come up before. It has been suggested that free speech would be used as a “reasonable excuse”. I will try to clarify what I was trying to explain, and perhaps the noble Lord will come back at me. There are many ways in which you could be found to be breaching the criminal law—it is so broad. The noble Lord, Lord Beith, illustrated the variety of things you might be doing that might mean you inadvertently broke the law. I wanted there to be some excuse, such as “I am accompanying someone and having an argument with them”. There are problems with the wording of the clause, and I would be more than happy to be advised how to tighten up my amendment so as to not use this phrase or look as if I am giving the police too much power.
The noble Baroness is wrestling with the same problem I had in dealing with “reasonable excuse” in relation to locking on. There seemed to be cases where people might have had a genuine reason for locking on because it is so widely defined.
One might say that the “reasonable excuse” defence would be suitable if it were sufficiently qualified so that it did not provide the police and the courts with the problem of having to decide whether or not the pro-life argument was a reasonable excuse. If one looked at the offences, one would say that this kind of argument would not stand up to what this legislation is all about. There are other instances where one might find that there was an excuse for what was done which was quite detached from what this clause is really driving at. If the noble Baroness could find a way of expressing this, I should be delighted. That is what I was trying to do in the earlier debate.
I hope I have made my position clear. As it stands, this would not be acceptable. I think that paragraph (b) raises a very interesting point of definition.
I suggest that the noble Lord goes back and reads the clause and the terms of interference. I do not think that what he describes comes under that, which is why the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, and I are trying to make sure that this law is as explicit and clear as possible. We do not want to do what the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, does and create loopholes whereby those who are currently harassing people can move around the country and continue to do so in different ways.
The fact is that we need this law because the current patchwork system does not work. It does not protect staff or women at all. It is a proportionate measure which, I accept, can be refined further through the amendments put forward by myself and the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, and those that may be put forward in a similar spirit.
I have an inquiry about PSPOs which has been raised. When PSPOs were originally advocated by pro-choice people, I was unsure about their use. My colleagues in BPAS, for example, were keen on PSPOs as a good, targeted way of stopping problems outside specific clinics, and they assured me that it was at specific clinics where problems were occurring. Is the argument of Clause 9 that things have got so out of hand that the original arguments in defence of PSPOs are redundant? The noble Baroness would not be against one who was not against PSPOs as a remedy in the past.
The answer is that the situation has moved on, so what was an answer before the existence of PSPOs is no longer relevant.
I have said enough. I think we all know where we are on this and the positions we came from. I would like to work with those Members who want to, and with the Minister, to make sure that we get to where the vast majority of us, and of the public, want to be: women being able access a service legally and safely, and 150 metres down the road you can be as extreme in your opposition as you like.
I say again to my noble friend—I have said it before, and I am happy to say it again—that the Government respect the will of the House of Commons.
My Lords, I thank all Members of the Committee for a wide range of speeches, ensuring that we have covered a lot of ground on this important issue. Contributions have been thoughtful, sometimes tetchy but largely civil; it is important to have these arguments out. I listened to what everybody said, and one thing I noted was that all speakers on all sides have condemned the harassment and intimidation of any woman going into a clinic or a hospital for an abortion. It is important that we note that we have that in common, because sometimes it can be presented as though people who are against Clause 9 are indifferent to the intimidation or harassment of women. Everybody has said that it is wrong; this is a question of how you deal with it.
The dispute is also about exactly what happens outside clinics. We have heard the clash of narratives in the contributions that I referred to, which makes the call for a new review from the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, all the more appealing. Indeed, the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, herself suggested—backed up by the reply to me from the noble Baroness, Lady Barker—that the situation has got a lot worse since 2018, and particularly very recently. That is disputed by people so, for the clause to have legitimacy, maybe we need a public discussion to get the evidence—that would be important.
(2 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have put my name to Amendments 36 and 37 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I could also have backed a number of other amendments. The noble Lord clearly explained lots of problems with the clauses discussed in this group. The only thing that I did not agree with—the noble Lord, Lord Hain, also said this—was when he compared present-day protesters with the suffragettes. The suffragettes were democrats without the vote; Just Stop Oil are anti-democrats with the vote. There is a real distinction there.
Although I have very serious reservations about this Bill and think it is unnecessary, we need to approach the discussion and debate going on outside this House with a little more humility. On the first group, a number of noble Lords raised the point that the country was up in arms about the Bill. I do not recognise that description; actually, many people in the country are up in arms about the Just Stop Oil protesters. They are so frustrated that we have people ruining their daily lives and getting in the way and that not enough is being done about it. My argument with the Government is that this is a crisis of policing, which they will not tackle and instead have introduced a whole new set of laws that we do not need.
As legislators, I understand the need for a definition of “serious disruption”, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, explained the difficulties around defining it. But the people we are talking about who are locking themselves on, tunnelling and so on, boast that they are seriously disrupting things. They say, “What choice have we got? We’re involved in serious disruption.” They do not have a definitional problem; they say, “We’re trying to seriously disrupt the ways of life of everyone until we get our way and until you agree with us”.
So in some ways it is important that the Government do not exploit the fact that we have protesters who say “Our job is to seriously disrupt the lives of ordinary people” and ordinary people who are completed frustrated that nothing is being done about these people seriously disrupting their lives, and say that we need all these laws—because this is not the solution to that problem. It is a con, as I said in my Second Reading speech. An answer should be given to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Horam, that, if the Government’s argument is that we do not have laws on the statute book that can deal with very specific issues, they have to be very clear about exactly why the laws do not work at present. If it is the Supreme Court, then say that—but at the moment there is a muddle on that question.
On the specific amendments dealing with “serious disruption”, given that we have protesters—I think they are more people who indulge in stunts, rather than protesters—who admit that they intend to cause serious disruption, I am concerned that there should be some intent to cause serious disruption, which is why Amendment 37 is important. The noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, made a hugely important point about the way that the term “reckless” will be used to clamp down on this; the idea that your intention is read into it as being reckless indifference is one of the great ways that censorship is happening in this country. I am very nervous about having in law a situation where, whatever you intend, the law can decide that you intended something. That is why I support Amendment 37.
Amendment 36 would limit the offence to an act that actually causes serious disruption, rather than one that is capable of causing serious disruption. It seems to me that if something does not cause serious disruption, it is not serious disruption. It seems blatantly ridiculous for a Bill to criminalise something that is not seriously disruptive because it could be seriously disruptive at a different time and a different place.
I rather liked the example of what happened recently in Germany, where people locked on in the Volkswagen museum. They did not cause any serious disruption because the curators turned the lights out, turned the heating off and went home, leaving them there. As it happens, the protestors response to this was to complain that they had been left in the cold and that they could not order in food. Instead of draconian and criminalising bills, perhaps what we need is a bit more of that kind of attitude, both from the police and from institutions, which seem to stand by and do nothing as disruption occurs. However, I do not want the law to compensate for that spinelessness either.
My Lords, having not spoken at Second Reading, but having listened to the debate, I want to contribute one thought which I think follows rather well from what the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said. This debate on the definition of the word “serious” is really pretty sterile. Talking about the word “serious” is rather like talking about whether a work of art is good or not good. What we are really talking about is judgment, and the judgment of many different groups: of the demonstrators, of the police, and of the courts and within the courts—juries, magistrates and all the rest of it. All we are striving to do is to get what the people as a whole—who are demanding something better than what is happening at the moment—want: better solutions when things happen. I do not believe that we can be precise in laying down in law what is serious or not serious, but that does not mean that we cannot use the word “serious” as shorthand for the collective judgment of all those interests involved.
My Lords, I put my name to a number of amendments, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, read out. He has largely explained my reservations and why I put my name to, in this instance, Amendments 19 to 21. This is the focus on what equipment is “intended” to be used for.
I think it extraordinary that the Bill would criminalise somebody holding equipment that “may be used” for something. Completely innocent objects can be interpreted in the most malign way, and it seems far too speculative. Everyone should remember that, while we have in our minds locking on and Just Stop Oil, this piece of legislation does not mention Just Stop Oil. Therefore, anything that speculates about what people might be about to do with an object could be used to criminalise any range of behaviours. That is one of my concerns. It feels as though, rather than being proactive policing, as the Minister discussed earlier, it allows people to be scooped up just in case they use any object in a particular way.
Amendments 48 and 49 focus on the offence of “being equipped for tunnelling” and the requirement for the object to be used not specifically by the person with the item but by “any person”. My concern is that this puts into law a kind of guilt by association. Somebody has not committed a crime and there is no indication that they have, but somebody else has used an item that they had and then committed a crime. It reminds me of the worst of the joint enterprise laws that led to so many injustices for all involved. I would really like to see that go. In fact, I would like the whole thing to go—but if we are going to have it, et cetera.
Finally on Amendment 65, which focuses on key national infrastructure, this is one of the things that the public most worry about—that key national infrastructure will be targeted by these kinds of stunt protesters. Somebody described it as guerrilla warfare, and it sometimes feels like that. We all know how important key national infrastructure projects are to any country. That is why Russia targets them in Ukraine. You know that the maximum number of people will suffer if you attack the things that keep any country going at any given time. So I am very keen that we protect them, but it is about the wording on the extent to which they are attacked and the illustrations that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, gave. Again, it is not only Just Stop Oil. We have to keep getting that out of our minds, because this affects anyone who does anything to possibly disrupt a key infrastructure project.
Perhaps I might echo, in a glib way, the comments made earlier by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, in relation to the NHS. I thought she had a point there. In this instance, when I read about “key national infrastructure”—
“road transport infrastructure … rail infrastructure … air transport infrastructure … oil infrastructure … gas infrastructure”,
et cetera—I thought, “Who needs Just Stop Oil?”. Most of that infrastructure does not work. I spend most of my time not being able to get trains, and the energy system is in total crisis. If noble Lords want to know what is likely to create the greatest threat to most of the national infrastructure projects in the forthcoming months, I can tell them: it is not Just Stop Oil but austerity cuts coming from the Government. Although that is a slightly glib point, it indicates why using these things in the law, if you are not precise about exactly what you describe as “disruption”, can get you into hot water.
My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of Amendment 21 from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to which I put my name. The principle it seeks to uphold is that the offending person must be the one committing the offence or intending to commit the offence, rather than somebody else connected with that person. That is a very important point, because “in connection with” is another of these vague phrases that have crept into this kind of legislation. It is also there in counterterrorist legislation. How connected? Friend, lover, colleague, co-religionist? What is the nature of the connection? All these things are undefined. What counts as a malicious connection? That is why we want this amendment.
(2 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will be opposing the Bill but I want to make some broader observations first.
Recently, one commentator wrote that it feels like a class war has broken out on the streets of London. Working people, fighting for their right to do their jobs and attend to their daily business, are being hindered in doing so by catastrophising eco-warriors. Each of their nihilistic stunts seems aimed at causing maximum chaos to the public. Hugely infuriating delays and total inconvenience are indeed their tactics.
Then there are their aims, which seem misanthropic, to say the least. They include that society should cease all production of fossil fuel energy in the middle of an energy crisis. While millions are worried that they will not be able to afford to keep the heat on this winter, here is a minority movement demanding that the Government produce less energy. When allies of the protesters warn that they may alienate the public, they miss the point because the whole movement is not interested in the public. The protesters do not care whether they alienate or inconvenience ordinary people. That is the point: to grind us down until we give in to their demands.
I recently engaged with some superglued activists. When I pointed out how desperate the locals were in just wanting to get to work, and pleaded with the activists to let them through, I was told by one activist that it was shocking that so many were driving to work as a single person in an empty car. Another, more generously but patronisingly, explained, “We’re doing this for their good”, but then added, “We tried persuading people. It doesn’t work. They just won’t listen.” That is the problem: these activists are explicitly anti-democratic. Some compare their tactics to those of the suffragettes; they have a bit of a nerve because those heroines did not have the vote. However, these Extinction Rebellion types do but, because they are not winning at the ballot box, they bully instead.
Noble Lords may gather that I have little sympathy for these protesters, but I do not want popular revulsion at their tactic to lead to anti-democratic laws either. When I witness the desecrating vandalism of great works of art—saving the planet by trashing the best of human civilisation—it is tempting to say, “Lock them up and throw away the key”. I certainly find myself cheering when I see London’s citizens dragging protesters off the roads and screaming abuse at the selfish road hoggers, but it is dilemma. I am keen on direct action but, obviously, vigilantism is a result of a collapse in public order, which is a problem.
One clip shows an exasperated workman shouting, “Where’s the police? What are we paying our taxes for—to have our lives inconvenienced by these idiots? This is wrong.” That man is right to be exasperated, and to ask where the police were and what we pay our taxes for. The question we face here is: what has gone wrong that means the authorities are not sorting this problem out? The Minister claims that these protests are taking excessive hours and resources from the police. Well, you could have fooled me. The police seem slow and reticent; as someone said earlier, it is “softly, softly”. As someone pointed out to me, if you want swift, hard-line police intervention, post a gender-critical tweet and they will clamp down on you as a hate criminal before you can draw breath.
The Government said that we need the Bill and these new offences to solve things, but why would it make any difference when the police will not use the laws they already have to solve things? All the complained -about tactics could be dealt with by criminal offences already on the statute book, but they are not being dealt with. Why are those laws not being used effectively? I think we have a broader policing crisis. The Bill is not a “culture wars” Bill, as some have claimed; it is a weak, defensive invasion of the political authority by the Government in tackling this policing crisis.
Instead of action, we get performative legislation that is just as attention-seeking as those dousing London’s finest architecture in orange paint. Both sides are saying, “Look at me, I’m doing something”. It is also a con to tell the public that these laws will be narrowly targeted at nuisance protesters. In fact, they are so broad and all-encompassing that anyone’s right to protest or dissent on any issue is being put in jeopardy. Perhaps you might take at face value those very specific new offences such as locking on or tunnelling, although three years in prison for
“being present in a tunnel”
seems a tad disproportionate.
However, consider the possible uses of Clauses 19 and 20, with their serious disruption orders or protest banning orders. These can be doled out to anyone who has been on more than one protest over the last five-year period—that certainly counts me in. If you are issued with one of these orders, you can be banned from going to a particular place, associating with particular people, encouraging someone else to go on a demo, using the internet in a particular way— that is to say, you can be punished by the state for retweeting an advert for a protest. You can also be issued with an electronic tag for up to 12 months using GPS data technology, allowing the police to monitor your whereabouts for 24 hours a day. That extreme level of surveillance for individuals is aimed at explicitly innocent people who have not committed a crime.
We should not allow these anti-democratic laws to be passed just to allow the Home Office to paper over the cracks of policing failures. This was the point made by Conservative MP Sir Charles Walker, already quoted, in a scorching speech in the other place in Committee. He said that
“the Government’s attraction to SDPOs”—
serious disruption prevention orders—
“demonstrates our own impotence as legislators and the impotence of the police as law enforcers to get to grips with the laws already in place and to enforce them.”—[Official Report, Commons, 18/10/22; col. 581.]
This impotence is now being covered up by creating unnecessary laws, and it seriously threatens reputational damage to the rule of law, which is already fragile.
Finally, no matter how much we despise protesters, we must have consistency in lawmaking. So why have so many on the Opposition Benches been celebrating the Government’s acceptance of amendments banning protests around abortion clinics? As a long-standing pro-choice campaigner, I believe that it is totally vital that women are able to safely access reproductive healthcare services. If they are being obstructed or harassed, we have public order laws to deal with this, and we should deal with them harshly. However, as we have already heard, Clause 9 criminalises and bans seeking to influence, advising or persuading, attempting to advise or persuade, or otherwise expressing an opinion.
Many of us may feel little sympathy with people who are viewed as anti-abortion cranks. However, as Big Brother Watch notes, this sets a precedent that will inevitably lead to attempts to prevent speech, expression, information sharing and assembly in relation to other controversial and unpopular causes. It is also worth noting that at least five councils with PSPO buffer zones around abortion clinics have banned silent prayers. This institutes a law of genuine thought crime and betrays any commitment to religious freedom, and we should totally oppose it.
In conclusion, I support the right to protest for all, not just the protesters I admire but those I despise as well.
(2 years ago)
Lords ChamberI thank my noble friend for that different perspective, and I absolutely commit to looking into it. I think it is worth reminding people what public spaces protection orders are intended to deal with. It is a particular nuisance or problem in a specific area that is detrimental to the local community’s quality of life. I do not think these conditions are unreasonable.
Sorry, my Lords, but this fining for profit really is a scandal. In north Wales, there is a massive social cost and the North Wales Against Kingdom Security Facebook group has described the effect of local private enforcement on this region. Never mind this idea of people who do not care about the neighbourhood; the group says:
“These operatives terrorised the elderly and vulnerable in my area. One 94-year-old lady was fined when a tissue blew out of the bottom of her wheelchair. Some elderly people stopped taking their dogs out because they were so afraid of being fined”.
Will the Minister at least agree to read the Manifesto Club report that details this? Defra—unless you think it does not understand it—has made a decision, so why does the Home Office not do the same?
Well, I have read the Manifesto report to which the noble Baroness refers—all 48 pages of it. I am afraid that I did not necessarily agree with all the conclusions, some of which required—shall we say?—a bout of syllogistic gymnastics to arrive at. I did look at some of the named councils’ websites and found limited public outrage—maybe I was looking in the wrong place. However, I do think that no one should be terrorised in the way described by the noble Baroness.
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, 38 Bills—surely this raises the question about whether legislation is being overused, a technocratic substitute for moral authority. I was struck by the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Sherbourne of Didsbury, when he wittily moved the Motion for the humble Address, quoting the then Lord Mancroft from 70 years ago:
“we have been … over-legislated … glutted, filled … and stifled with legislation.”—[Official Report, 4/11/1952; cols. 4-9.]
I have to say, I empathise. Is the only way for society to show disapproval to resort to banning or criminalising, or the only way to endorse certain behaviours or social norms to set them in legal stone, avoiding the harder job of winning hearts and minds? For example, I have always been a critic of the boycott and divestment movement. I think we should vigorously argue against academic arts organisations and councils boycotting specifically Israel, and I will point out how discriminatory and censorious such policies are. However, do we need a Bill to ban boycotts? It just seems such an illiberal way of confronting anti-Semitism in public bodies.
Similarly, as someone who for years has been raising the alarm about the increasing cancel culture on campuses, I have often faced gaslighting denials, even in the face of, for example, gender-critical academics being driven out of their jobs and increasing numbers of speakers at universities being no-platformed. Yet I still feel queasy about the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill; a law to ban campus censorship just sits uneasily and could easily be used to avoid tackling deeper cultural trends, such as the bullying of many students to conform to the orthodoxies of identity politics such as being told that they have to repeat the mandated mantras of language codes such as the use of pronouns, the eradication of the word “woman”, and so on.
In the context of this concern about overlegislation, the Brexit freedoms Bill is to be heartily welcomed: at last a chance to roll back unnecessary laws retained from the UK’s EU membership. However, an email I received yesterday from the European Movement alarmingly declared that this Bill epitomises “the calamity of Brexit” and strips back all our rights. Surely this confuses political rights with laws. I should like to see the spirit of the Brexit freedom Bill expanded: that we look at scrapping all those stifling laws that we do not need here at home, not only those drawn up in Brussels. That rights become a matter for civil society, not the law courts, would be my aim.
The legalistic mindset also seems to inform much of the response to the replacement of the Human Rights Act by an updated and slimmed down Bill of Rights, but I welcome the move, which recognises the dangers of a dependence on lawyers as the main guarantors of rights and welcome an antidote to judicial overreach. The incremental increase in litigiousness as a political tool can be and is used as a barrier to enacting decisions made democratically by the elected Government of the day, even when it is not a Government that the majority in this unelected House voted for or that the majority in the legal profession voted for.
I have heard this new Bill of Rights sneeringly dismissed as bowing to populism, as though being popular with the voting public should be a badge of shame, but there is something chilling about human rights lawyers suggesting that the only defence of rights is an Act that was brought in only in 1998 by Tony Blair. It is as though all those hard-won rights achieved by rank-and-file activists, trade unionists and all those who have fought for racial and sexual equality for decades before the HRA existed are irrelevant. These rights were not gifts handed down from on high and will not disappear without the HRA.
I urge that we burst the myth that we need to rely on the law to defend freedom, a point viscerally illustrated recently. Where was the HRA or its advocates when we saw the widespread suspension of all civil liberties during the lockdown period: people dragged before the law courts for social gatherings and inhumanely denied rights to visit loved ones locked away in care homes or dying in hospital? Indeed, under the HRA, we have seen increasing criminalisation of speech.
So I welcome Dominic Raab’s emphasis on using the Bill of Rights to guarantee free speech. How refreshing to hear a government Minister of any party prioritise codifying the importance of free speech in enhancing public debate. As a director of the Academy of Ideas, which organises such public debates, I say “Hear, hear.” But as we have already heard so well-articulated by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, another piece of legislation might well cancel out any free-speech gains of the Bill of Rights.
The Online Safety Bill should really be renamed the online censorship Bill. The ministerial boast that the Bill will make the UK the safest country in the world online uses “safety” as it is used by safe space warriors at universities, as a synonym for censorship and silencing. Of course it is proportionate for the law to tackle protecting children from pornography, those vile suicide sites, online grooming and harassment, but the bulk of the Online Safety Bill targets adults’ freedom to say and read lawful but harmful speech, as explained by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar. Surely it is legislative overkill when the law is used to curtail lawful expression and a non-legal term such as “harmful” is expanded into the subjective category of psychological. To note, in today’s free-speech wars, that equals offensive speech some deem traumatic.
We are told the Bill will empower users, but instead it will empower—indeed, incite—big tech to remove what it decides is misinformation. But what is misinformation? The Wuhan lab leak? The biological fact of sex? Passages of the Bible? Who decides? The Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill is, we are told, designed to ensure that academic staff feel safe to question and test received wisdom and put forward controversial and unpopular opinions. Good, but is that open-ended approach to ideas allowed only for academics? Surely all citizens should be equally free to question received opinion and have access to controversial views, yet the Online Safety Bill will deny them that equal right under the law.
To conclude, the law cannot guarantee free speech or freedom, but it can be used to curb and criminalise these liberties. We in this House must be wary of this when scrutinising the contradictory legislative priorities contained in the Queen’s Speech.