(10 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my Amendments 120A and 120B in this group both concern the use of force in secure colleges. Amendment 120B would delete paragraph 10 of Schedule 6 which provides—I say iniquitously—that:
“If authorised to do so by secure college rules, a secure college custody officer may use reasonable force … in carrying out functions”,
which include ensuring good order and discipline on the part of young offenders in custody and attending to their well-being. Amendment 120A would introduce restrictions on the use of force which accord with good practice, with the civilised treatment of young persons in custody and with the European Convention on Human Rights. Furthermore, my amendment accords very closely with the principles set out in the Government’s consultation paper published last week on the proposed secure college rules.
The authorisation of the use of force for the purpose of ensuring good order and discipline—said in the consultation paper to be clarified or modified by the proposed secure college rules—has been the subject of a judgment against the Government in the Court of Appeal in the case of C v Secretary of State for Justice 2008 concerning secure training centres. The clear view of the Joint Committee on Human Rights in relation to the Bill is that provisions authorising the use of force for the purpose of ensuring good order and discipline should be deleted. Those words can go without affecting the implementation of proposals for the sensible and modified use of force, suggested in the consultation paper. What is proposed is not a clarification but a departure—and if it is a departure, good order and discipline should disappear from the legislation altogether.
It is not right for the Government to say that merely because the use of force is authorised by the statute, as circumscribed by the rules, it would be appropriate for the legislation to authorise force for the purpose of enforcing good order and discipline. I believe that the correct conditions for the use of force should be plain in the Bill. There is no reason for not limiting the authorisation in the Bill to accord with what is appropriate. There should be no chance of any misunderstanding or misconception of what is and is not authorised and no internal inconsistency, apparent or real, between the primary and secondary legislation. The Joint Committee on Human Rights considered the Government’s case that there was a distinction to be drawn between the requirements for the Bill and those for the rules—and it rejected it.
On a practical note, as the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, pointed out, the Government’s consultation paper on the secure college rules has only just been released. The Government’s response to the consultation cannot possibly come before Royal Assent for the Bill. That means that unless the Bill is clear about the restrictions that should be imposed on the use of force, the secondary legislation may not properly reflect the will of Parliament, even allowing for the affirmative resolution procedure being applicable to the rules—if it is.
My amendment would make the position clear. The first three purposes for the use of force are uncontroversial. They are to prevent injury to the young person concerned, to prevent injury to others and to prevent serious damage to property. The limitations on the use of force, as contained in the second to fifth conditions of my amendment, are also uncontroversial and in accordance with best practice. They are that force must be used as a last resort only, that the force authorised must be the minimum necessary to achieve its purpose, that it must be applied for the minimum duration necessary to achieve that purpose and that the techniques used should be in accordance with an approved system of restraint. Furthermore, it is important that all those authorised to use force should be properly trained in its application and in techniques of minimum restraint.
However, since Committee, and in the light of the publication of the consultation paper, I have been convinced by the two so-called “scenarios” set out in the consultation paper that there may be a need for force to be authorised also to maintain a safe and stable environment, subject to extra conditions. The first of the two scenarios is where an abusive young person in a secure college disrupts a visiting session for all those in the visiting room, including other detainees, their visitors and families, and simply will not move. The second is where an aggressive young person needs to be moved to protect another young person who is threatened by him, where that other young person is at unusual risk from that aggression. In both these cases I can see that some force may be required to move a detained young person. However, such force as may used in those circumstances—that is, to promote a secure and safe environment—should be limited to circumstances in which a young person poses a risk to the present safety or welfare of another person and should never involve pain-inducing techniques.
These restrictions represent the Government’s view, clearly expressed without reservation in the consultation paper. I simply cannot see why they should not be expressed in the primary legislation, particularly when the secondary legislation will come so late in the day.
The issue of the use of force in secure colleges is serious. We should not forget that in April 2004 at Rainsbrook secure training centre, 15 year-old Gareth Myatt was asphyxiated while being restrained in an approved hold; nor that in August 2004, 14 year-old Adam Rickwood committed suicide at Hassockfield secure training centre after being subject to the so-called “nose distraction technique”. Accordingly, I ask the Government to reconsider their position, to limit the use of force in the Bill in accordance with the principles set out in their consultation paper, and to accept either my amendments or those of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham.
My Lords, I have added my name to three amendments in this group, and will focus particularly on some of the health aspects. The question of how these colleges will be run becomes critical.
In his response to the previous amendment, the Minister said that there would be assessment of those with acute needs and vulnerabilities. I suggest that the health needs are far greater than has previously been estimated. I declare an interest as president of the BMA. Our report Young Lives Behind Bars is due to be published on 4 November. I have had extensive discussions with my successor, Al Aynsley-Green, who was previously the Children’s Commissioner and who looked at length into the management of offending children. He was particularly struck by the smaller units in Spain, and was clearly persuaded that moving children away from their original area of domicile, to which they would eventually return, was potentially quite harmful because of the disruption to the support for their health and well-being.
Children in the offending group generally have a much higher incidence of serious problems. About 12% are known to have been bereaved of a parent or sibling; that is far higher than the incidence among children in the general population. About 60% have significant speech, language and learning difficulties, 20% to 30% are learning disabled and up to 50% have learning difficulties. Put simply, about one in four has an IQ estimated to be below 70 and over a third have a diagnosed mental health disorder. Over a quarter view drugs and alcohol as “essential” to their well-being.
When the House of Commons Justice Committee examined reports on acquired brain injury, which affects around 10% of the general population, it found that it typically affects between 50% and 80% of the offender population. A relatively small 2012 study, covering 179 male offenders, found that 60% reported some form of brain injury and 40% reported a loss of consciousness, which indicates probably quite severe brain injury.
(12 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I believe that I have answered the question. I accept that it is important. We believe that the provisions that are now to be in the Bill, given the government amendments and an assurance that I hope to receive from the Government, will cover the position.
I was explaining that, when we tabled Amendment 220B, we believed that there should also be an individual arrangement for agreement with Monitor so that all considerations could be balanced when considering any substantial increase in private income. However, in discussions, the Government agreed to respond to amendments that Liberal Democrat Peers tabled in Committee on the involvement of governors. Those amendments that the Government now pursue—Amendments 220BZA and 220BZB—represent that response. They ensure that any increase of more than 5 per cent would have to be approved by the governors voting, as I say, by a majority. The governors have to be satisfied that the plans put forward by the foundation trusts for attracting private income would not interfere with the treatment or welfare of NHS patients. I suggest that that scheme represents a devolved, local scheme that is consonant with the structures in the Bill and the desire to keep local decision-making at a local level.
There may still be concern that the governors of individual foundation trusts will primarily have in mind the concerns of their own foundation trusts. However, under amendments that have been agreed, Monitor is now to have continuing powers of supervision and intervention over foundation trusts. If we are assured that in every case where the governors approve a proposal for an increase in private income in excess of 5 per cent Monitor will consider whether the interests of NHS patients as a whole are to be safeguarded, and if it is not so satisfied it would intervene, I suggest that that assurance will meet that concern. We will not move Amendment 220B but we seek that assurance from my noble friend the Minister.
My Lords, I have an amendment in this group. I recognise that it is badly worded and simplistic and I shall not be moving it. However, I would like to address other amendments in this group which are far better worded than mine. The adversarial debate that we have had has been unconstructive in view of the importance of the amendments we are discussing. Amendment 220C has the great advantage of involving all stakeholders. Some people will be affected when the balance of provision within a foundation trust changes. I am concerned about the amendment to which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has just spoken because, as he admitted, the concerns of the foundation trust governors may be paramount as it is in their interests to look after their foundation trust and therefore the interests of others will be secondary in their minds. However, it is important to know what the local health and well-being board thinks about a proposed change, and that the clinical commissioning groups are involved and consulted on what could effectively be a change of provision.
I make it clear that I am not opposed to foundation trusts having private patient business. Indeed, I can see that it would be beneficial to all patients if we were to revert to the position that applied 30 years ago when these bodies were completely integrated. If highly specialised consultants provide outpatient and inpatient services to private patients on one set of premises in an area, they are on hand when things go wrong or an opinion is needed on a patient who has come in as an NHS patient. By driving some private provision outside that hospital campus, those consultants may be unavailable when they are needed because they are on premises down the road or they are on the end of a phone and cannot run down the corridor, see the patient and plan what is to happen strategically with the rest of the team and then monitor it.
An issue that has been resolved is the situation where a UK patient receives private treatment but something goes wrong and they need to go into intensive care, a renal unit or some other unit provided by the NHS. That previous episode of care has finished, they are now in a new episode of severe critical care and they go in as an NHS patient. That integration is therefore solved. But I hope that the Government will look kindly on Amendment 220C, despite some of the tone of the debate, because it ensures that all stakeholders are involved in the discussion. The change in provision is therefore planned and can happen smoothly and that decision is not taken on business grounds alone but can be for the benefit of the whole population that is being served.
(12 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberI, too, support this suite of amendments. I shall speak only briefly, not in favour of a reinvigorated Earl Howe but in support of Amendments 234 and 234A, which are to the same effect and concern the termination of the appointment of directors of public health.
The Bill provides for joint appointment of the directors of public health, by the local authority and the Secretary of State, and it is right that it does so. I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Patel, that it is therefore essential that the Secretary of State should also have a crucial vetoing part to play in the termination of such an appointment. It is not only that it is logical and sensible that he should do so. It is also that it is more important upon termination that the Secretary of State has that power of intervention. It is important because the director of public health has to have a sense of independence and security. As my noble friend Lady Cumberlege and the noble Lord, Lord Warner, have pointed out, there is considerable potential for disagreement between the local authority and the director of public health. It is therefore crucial that, in the event of friction, the director of public health can act with confidence to disagree.
This is exactly the kind of decision in which it is the Secretary of State, having ultimate responsibility for the health service, who should have that role. The Secretary of State’s role is therefore the best guarantee of the independence and the freedom of action that directors of public health ought to have.
My Lords, my name is to Amendment 339. The other amendments have been spoken to most eloquently, having been introduced fully by my noble friend Lord Patel. One additional point, and the reason for having these directors of public health on a register, is that the person appointed may be fit to do the job today but they need to be fit to do the job tomorrow as well. By having them on a register, issues of revalidation, continuing professional development and so on would be maintained, and a level playing field would be maintained in an upward direction.
We have heard today about infection, but the greatest threat to public health may well come not from infection but from issues such as cyberterrorism around our major utilities and the havoc that that could cause. These directors of public health will have an enormous amount on their shoulders, and they need to be linked into the national and international disaster planning groups. Some of those aspects of their work will be ill understood by those in local authorities, who may feel that such things are remote and unlikely to happen. In the event of a disaster, those skills will have to be drawn on immediately, and the directors of public health have to be prepared and able to take the leadership role.
I urge the Government to consider carefully any good reason why not to register directors of public health. I cannot see any reason not to register these people who are trained specialists. You have to have a really good reason not to, in the face of all the evidence that they should be registered.
(12 years, 12 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 175E, 176AA to AD, 213C and 220A, all in the names of my noble friend Lady Williams, the noble Lord, Lord Patel and myself, and in the case of 220A in the additional name of my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones. The purposes of these amendments are first to secure on the face of the Bill a thoroughly robust regime to avoid conflicts of interest sullying the commissioning process, and secondly to ensure transparency in the commissioning process to the greatest extent that is commercially possible. Taking the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, a moment ago, that this is not an entirely new area, I suggest that the arrangements for commissioning proposed in this Bill risk raising the threat level from conflicts of interest in the commissioning process from “moderate” to “severe”, if I may use the intelligence services’ scale. That is because of the greater involvement of practitioners in the commissioning process, which is of course to be welcomed for many reasons, and the increased likelihood that many practitioners may also be providers of other healthcare services or have interests in such providers.
Our task is to reduce the threat at least to “substantial”, and then to manage the threat in such a way as to avoid commissioning decisions ever being skewed by the private interests of those making the decisions. Much of what we propose ought to be uncontroversial, and merely represents good practice, but we suggest, and in this I agree with my noble friend Lord Greaves, that it is important that our commitment to best practice is made clear on the face of the Bill. Amendment 220A would impose on any provider of medical services who is also a member of a CCG a duty to declare any financial interest in a commissioning decision—a bare minimum proposal, I suggest. Amendment 213C would impose on the NHS Commissioning Board a duty to refer a member of a CCG to his or her relevant professional body for material breach of the provisions or of the guidelines we propose. I entirely agree with the further point made by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, that this is an appropriate way of dealing with offending by practitioners. It should not be for the board to act as, or to set up, a disciplinary tribunal, but it is sensible and a greater deterrent, I suggest, for the professional bodies to do so.
However, the meat of our proposals is in Amendments 176AA to 176AD. We propose a thoroughly transparent regime as the best and most effective way of protecting commissioning from the insidious effects of conflicts of interest. I say insidious—and this is a point in which I pick up on what was said by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay—because it is not only when a public decision-maker acts deliberately to favour his private personal interests that conflicts arise and threaten the system. It is also when the decision-maker at least persuades himself that his interests and the public’s interests coincide. It is only public scrutiny of the process that can properly test that.
The provisions in the Bill permitting some public access to the meetings of governing bodies of commissioning groups are, I suggest, over-cautious and too limited. The system should be made more open. The public should not be excluded from governing body meetings during the all-important discussions involving a choice between potential providers. I entirely accept that that would involve a new openness about commercial transactions and decision-making. However, these decisions are about choices between providers at public expense; I question the need for meetings to be held behind closed doors in relation to them.
Secondly, in the case of other decisions where the public are excluded from governing body meetings in the public interest, then a record of decisions made should at least be published, and quickly. That is the subject of Amendment 176A.
Our amendments set out a code for dealing with conflicts of interest in new paragraphs to go into the schedule. There would be a requirement for a register of interests of all CCG members. That register should be kept up to date. It should be kept available for public inspection. Then there would be a provision to exclude from the governing body of any CCG a director of a healthcare organisation or anyone with a significant financial interest in such an organisation if there is a contract in existence between that CCG and that organisation.
Thirdly, there would be a provision to ensure that a member of such a governing body who would be excluded if such a contract came into existence would have to stand down from the governing body while any negotiations for such a contract were in progress.
Finally, our amendments import the admirable guidelines produced by the General Medical Council, entitled Good Medical Practice. Those are the guidelines to which the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, referred. I am grateful to the GMC for producing a document of such clarity and for welcoming our use of it in these amendments. The emphasis of the guidelines is on honesty and openness; that is what we are trying to achieve in this Bill. I believe it is what the Government are trying to achieve in this Bill. These are probing amendments, intended to give the Government an opportunity to consider how they might import such guidelines into the Bill at Report stage. However, our central point is this: we believe that the present provisions of the Bill do not display the seriousness, the clarity or the robustness that are required to meet the risks posed by the new arrangements. I suggest that the Bill cries out for a code in this area such as the one we have proposed.
My Lords, there is an additional area which I think means that the provisions in this Bill have to be different from other previous legislation. We face a huge financial challenge across the whole of healthcare, with budgets squeezed in a way they have not been squeezed before. So the potential for conflict of interest will go up as very difficult decisions are made. One can envisage the situation where somebody on the governing body of a clinical commissioning group will have a relative with a certain condition—and I refer back to the example I used previously, motor neurone disease. Say that person needs end-of-life care, and say that is a clinical commissioning group that has decided that it is not commissioning it in its area. There would be a direct personal conflict of interest, because that person would obviously want that care for their relative, but they would need to stand back. With the financial stringencies, the proposed amendments become even more important. While they are probing amendments, I hope the Minister in responding will recognise the importance of this area and agree to come back to it—hopefully, with a Government amendment—at a later stage.