Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness Finlay of Llandaff Excerpts

Friday 5th December 2025 Lords Chamber

I look forward to hearing from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. If he is to suggest that 18 is still the appropriate age, I would be keen to hear the rationale as to why he will not be accepting the wise amendments of noble Baroness, Lady Berger.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Berger, has opened up an important point in this debate and her excellent opening speech certainly highlighted many of the issues.

The noble Lord, Lord Winston, spoke about cognitive reasoning. The evidence is that cognitive reasoning is well-developed at the age of 18 but that other aspects—such as being sensitive to stress and social influence, impulse control and emotional regulation—do not develop by that age. The evidence is that these carry on developing until the age of 25.

I found it interesting to hear that noble Lords consider that the age limit for children or young people driving in cars with peers should potentially be raised. That is because of the problem of peer pressure. When I had the pleasure of having a visiting professorship in the Netherlands, I came across a fairly horrifying case of a young man in his late teens who had been diagnosed with a very aggressive tumour. His friends all came round and said, “When are you going to go for euthanasia?” He had not even had discussions on treatment, and this happened to be a tumour that was going to be very chemotherapy sensitive. I was quite shocked at the influence that a peer group can have on somebody.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, spoke about suffering and pain. One of the difficulties we have with the Bill is that neither “suffering” nor “pain” occurs anywhere in it.

I wonder whether the noble and learned Lord, in considering how he manages this group of amendments, will recognise that one solution may be to require an enhanced assessment of those between 18 and 25 if the age limit is not going to be raised. Young people should have a more in-depth assessment, not only of their—

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

The noble Baroness will know that, at present, an 18 to 25 year-old with a terminal diagnosis has the legal capacity to withdraw consent to treatment. Do they go through a different capacity assessment from somebody who is over 25?

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

I am delighted that the noble Lord has asked me that question, because it reminds me of a patient I had. He was a young man with an advanced testicular tumour and had refused treatment. He was referred to me, and I looked after him for a couple of years, during the time that he became more and more ill with his metastatic disease. He consistently refused treatment. However, when he was moribund, and his parents had come in and were sitting at the bedside, he suddenly asked me, “Is it too late to change my mind and have treatment?” At that point, I was indebted to my local oncologist, who I phoned, and we arranged transfer that day to the Royal Marsden Hospital, which then treated him because that was his wish. My assessment every time I saw him was not to persuade him to have treatment but to allow him to talk about his fears and difficulties. That is the role of specialist palliative care when you are looking after these young people who are very vulnerable. I am simply suggesting that, due to the way the Bill is written, the assessments may not be adequate.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

I listened to the noble Baroness’s individual case. My question was very specific. Is somebody who is 25 or over given a different mental capacity assessment based on their wish to withdraw treatment from somebody who is 18 to 25? That is the specific question based on what the noble Baroness is now suggesting happens in the Bill.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

The issue with the Mental Capacity Act is that each assessment must be done individually. It relates to the decision that is to be made, the size of the decision, the time and the personal characteristics. There is no absolute. If we are talking about safety in relation to the Bill and avoiding abuse, I am simply trying to suggest that one way forward may be to ensure that the assessment of young people’s eligibility is particularly thorough. That may mean having different criteria and looking at whether they have pain or suffering.

[Lord Winston (Lab)]

I wonder whether the noble Baroness might be kind enough to clarify. She is, after all, a hugely respected individual in the field, of which she is such an expert—I do not doubt that for a moment. Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, a fellow of the Royal Society, has been spending her time looking at peer pressure. That is what her publications have largely been about. Is the noble Baroness really suggesting that a young person of, say, 18, dying of a horrible and painful cancer, would be subject to peer pressure? They might be subject to pressure from doctors but I doubt that they would be subject to peer pressure.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

I was simply relating what I found when I was in the Netherlands relating to peer pressure on young people because of the normalisation of euthanasia across that society.

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[Baroness Berger (Lab)]

My Lords, I will very briefly raise my serious concerns about the three amendments that remove the specification for domestic abuse training. They are Amendments 290, 366 and 931. In the Commons, this was a significant area of concern for all MPs, specifically the risk to those suffering domestic abuse, and, as such, the sponsor of the Bill there accepted the amendment that introduced explicit requirements for training on domestic abuse, including

“coercive control and financial abuse”.

I listened very closely to the intervention from my noble and learned friend about the definition contained in Clause 56(2) that refers to control and financial abuse. But just because the definition of domestic abuse in the Bill includes coercive control and financial abuse, that does not mean training on domestic abuse will always include both those things. A training provider would not have an obligation under the Bill to cover all aspects of the definition, whereas the Bill, as currently drafted and as we received it, includes specifically both coercive control and financial abuse in that training. I urge my noble and learned friend to reconsider those amendments, based on the contributions in the other place, and to ensure that training covers and encompasses all those specific elements.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

My Lords, I have some questions for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, about his Amendment 6, because my concerns also relate to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan. It does not seem to reflect the way that seriously ill children behave.

I have looked after children dying of malignancies. They knew that they were dying and asked really straightforward questions. They would ask about how they would die and would want to have in-depth conversations. I recall one little boy who asked me if he could play football in heaven, after another little boy in an adjacent room had died a few weeks earlier. These children asked for explicit details and wanted to have lots of conversations. Another one said that he would die after his goldfish died. Sadly, that was prophetic and when he was close to death, he asked his divorced parents to come in and promise to look after his siblings together. These children know each other; they want to ask questions and need to have them answered.

I am not sure how, with Amendment 6, doctors are meant to respond to these children when they ask questions. At the moment, you respond gently and openly, and explore with them what they are really asking about in an age-appropriate way. I have a concern that this could make people feel risk-averse about having open communication with these children, and let children remain isolated with their fears. They hear about assisted dying on the news and in the media; the ethical aspects are part of the senior school curriculum in some areas. I am really concerned that Amendment 6, while well-intentioned, and the adjacent amendments, might actually make the day-to-day looking after of these children as they are dying more difficult.

Amendments 170 and 405 seem to lower the threshold for communication. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, for pointing out that whenever an interpreter is used they must be a registered public service interpreter, to avoid the poor communication scenario which I referred to last week. Speech and language therapists are essential, so can the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, explain how with one would judge “effective”, as is listed in his amendment, and assess “reasonable steps”? These seem very subjective and I am not sure how they would be monitored. Others have spoken to the other amendments, so I look forward to hearing the comments from the noble and learned Lord.

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

I will speak briefly to raise attention to Amendment 170, which has recently been added to the group. In an effort to short-circuit, we will come to the issues of interpreters much later on.

I have laid Amendment 174, which quite simply says that an interpreter must be over the age of 18. It will not surprise the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, that I have a whole cluster of amendments to deal with what may be inadvertent situations that are not covered off for under-18s. I invite the noble and learned Lord to look at that amendment to see whether it can swiftly be clarified and dealt with, along with the others that relate to children.

In this group, I will also speak to the noble and learned Lord’s Amendments 332, 417 to 419 and 425, which I believe are a genuine attempt to deal with the report from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. It advised the sponsor of the Bill to remove the Clause 15 power and to align the other clauses, because there were inconsistent wordings. I want to reiterate that reassurance was given in the other place that there would be one second opinion by another doctor. This goes back to the noble and learned Lord’s opener: when we talk about “cannot”, we need to cover that off in the Bill. The Bill was covering death or illness—obvious situations where the function cannot be fulfilled—but “will not” is obviously a different scenario.

Unless the doctor is unable to perform that function, for whatever reason, if we do not stick to the word “cannot”, we will potentially get the opening up of the ability to choose a number of doctors and maybe having some kind of discussion. Then they may not want to act, which may be for the reasons outlined by the noble Baronesses, Lady O’Loan and Lady Goudie. Then we might have a number of assessments or discussions that do not become a formal refusal which is then documented. I do not think the noble and learned Lord intended, by changing Clauses 10 and 13, to broaden the scenarios where a further referral could be made to any situation in which the doctor is unable or unwilling to continue; I think this has happened inadvertently. I know that my noble friend Lord Harper has laid amendments regarding particular scenarios beyond “death” and “illness”, and I think that the Minister in the other place, Mr Kinnock, mentioned family circumstances or emergencies. Perhaps the way ahead here—I am trying to pre-empt a further group, when we get to it—is that we could have a clause that outlines more circumstances than the two that are in the Bill.

Obviously, as lawyers, we know we can never cover every circumstance that would justify a doctor saying, “I can’t do this function any more”, not “I won’t”. Perhaps there could be a system whereby a doctor who wants to withdraw, and his or her circumstances are not in the paragraphs, should have to go to the panel and say, “I’ve got a situation that isn’t within the framework of the legislation, but I can’t for these reasons perform that function”. So I hope the noble and learned Lord will not move those amendments, as he has promised, but we could come back to this in the group that deals substantively with exploring scenarios where the doctor cannot act.

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Moved by

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff]

10: Clause 1, page 1, line 8, leave out paragraphs (c) and (d)

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

My Lords, we now come to issues around residency. My Amendment 10 is a probing amendment. I had to word this this way, because I was trying to put in other wording about residents in the Crown dependencies who may be treated in England or possibly Wales, but I was told that that was out of scope. After several attempts at wording, this seemed the only way for us to address the issue. I make it clear that I do not want make England and Wales a destination for death tourism. Therefore, I will be withdrawing Amendment 10, but it is the only way I can address this major loophole.

In the Select Committee on the Bill, I raised the issue of those who live in the Isle of Man, Jersey or Scotland, where proposed legislation has different eligibility criteria to the criteria outlined in the Bill. Many patients from across these borders are treated in England. Patients from Jersey regularly go to Southampton in ambulance flights or, if the sea is calm, by sea. Similarly, patients from the Isle of Man go to Liverpool. They go for treatment procedures, including radiotherapy and all types of investigations and procedures, because on those islands the facilities are, understandably, relatively limited. A cross-border flow from Scotland is therefore less than this.

A patient who is seriously ill may be transferred for treatment. When they are aware that they have a rapidly progressive, serious and life-threatening illness, they may want to be transferred back to their home to avail themselves of an assisted death in that area. We know that, at the time of being given bad news, suicidality and thoughts of death are at their most prominent, because patients are shocked and often have not actually considered their own mortality in depth; therefore, it is when they are being treated in England that they are most likely to raise the question of an assisted death when legislation is passed in their own jurisdictions.

In Select Committee, I asked Minister Sackman from the Ministry of Justice what the position would be for a doctor, nurse or other healthcare professional involved in arranging transfer back to the Isle of Man or Jersey, knowing that that transfer would facilitate an assisted death outside England and Wales, and the patient would not be eligible under the parameters of the Bill. The response from both the Minister and from Paul Candler, who was her accompanying official, was that it would indeed be a criminal offence to facilitate such a transfer, because they would be caught by the Suicide Act. As Paul Candler explained, the Bill essentially carves out from prosecution people who are acting in England and Wales in conformity with the scheme set out in the legislation. So an assisted death being arranged outside England and Wales is outside the parameters of the scheme of the Bill and would therefore be caught by the 1961 Suicide Act.

I asked the same question of Sir Max Hill, as he was Director of Public Prosecutions. His reply was that if you are operating as a medical or other professional within the legal jurisdiction of England and Wales, you must obey the law of England and Wales. He said:

“the guidance is simply to obey the law of the country in which you are acting, taking decisions and the rest of it. I think, I am afraid to say, that it is as simple as that”.

I ask the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, what is the position for doctors and nurses treating any very seriously ill patient, principally in Liverpool or Southampton, who may say, in the course of an in-depth conversation about their illness, the potential course of it and so on, when they may be contemplating death for the first time, that they want to go home to have an assisted death in their own home? What discussions has he had with the Medical Defence Union and the BMA about this legal liability? What is the legal position of these doctors if they actually accede to the patient’s wish to return home?

I will now turn to my other Amendment in this group—

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am sure that the legal advice the noble Baroness has been given is absolutely correct. My point is that surely this problem arises now. This Bill does not change the position in any way.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

With all due respect, I am not aware that the legislation has actually been enacted in either the Isle of Man or Jersey.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Until it is enacted, there is not a problem. When it is enacted, the problem arises, whether or not this Bill is enacted.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

We are discussing the wording of this Bill, with due respect. I raise this as a concern for clarification. It needs clarification because, if noble Lords are anticipating that this Bill and the legislation in the other jurisdictions will pass, we cannot leave a legal loophole or difficulty that might jeopardise the care of patients coming to England from the Crown dependencies. That is why I have raised it.

I turn to Amendment 11. Currently, the Bill speaks of the person being “ordinarily resident” in England and Wales, but there is a problem with “ordinarily”. In 1983, Lord Scarman stated in a House of Lords judgment that

“‘ordinarily resident’ refers to a man’s abode in a particular place or country which he has adopted voluntarily and for settled purposes as part of the regular order of his life for the time being”.

So far, so good. However, in the healthcare context, the 2012 Review of Overseas Visitors Charging Policy said:

“The vagueness of the definition means that OR”—


ordinary residence—

“is difficult to interpret and apply on an individual case basis”.

People fell through the gaps and the NHS was not recovering its costs. Then, during his time as Immigration Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Harper, pointed out that

“we need to do a better job of making sure that front-line professionals have a simpler system”.—[Official Report, Commons, Immigration Bill Committee, 7/11/13; col. 290.]

The problem with the definition in the Bill is that it could cover someone who is now living in another country but has an address of convenience in England and Wales for whatever reason. We know that there are thousands of empty properties owned by people who are not living permanently in this country. Apart from the more than 187,000 homes that are owned by people living permanently abroad, there are 5.5 million people who are British passport holders or have residency visas to live in the UK but are living abroad permanently. What will be the position of these people if they wish to access an assisted death here? Currently, they would not be eligible for NHS treatment if it were to be funded by the NHS. If they came to live in the UK for a year, they would then become eligible for the NHS, but, with the prognosis of six months or less, they would be expected to be dead within that time. Of course, this assumes that there is any accuracy in prognostication, which there is not.

Let me put to your Lordships a scenario that is, sadly, not infrequent. A person working for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in an embassy abroad becomes seriously and terminally ill and is repatriated to the UK. Their house is rented out and they have to give notice, so they go to live in a different area—one, they hope, with good specialist palliative care services that can provide them with support. However, not being able to be in their own home and surrounded by their own things, and without contact with people who would otherwise have a role in their lives, they easily become very depressed.

Let us look at that scenario under this Bill. Suppose they decide that they want an assisted death. They will not have been resident for 12 months prior to making a first declaration to request an assisted death. Will that person, who may have worked all their life in service of this country, now be ineligible? I see that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, is nodding that they would. I believe that, under the wording of the Bill—

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

Hold on—my nods must not be misinterpreted. I understand the question. If, for example, you live in Britain and you go and become the First Secretary in the US, you do not cease to be ordinarily resident in the UK. If you are a soldier and serve for nine months abroad, you do not cease to be ordinarily resident. I was nodding only to say that I have got the question, but I would not necessarily agree with the solution that the noble Baroness proposes.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

I am grateful for that clarification and we will come back to the noble and learned Lord’s comments on these issues afterwards.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

If one reads Clause 1(1)(c), it not only says that the person has to be ordinarily resident but that they have to have been

“so resident for at least 12 months”.

Consequently, unless being in an embassy is still seen as being resident for the previous 12 months, the point that the noble Baroness made is entirely right.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

I am most grateful for that intervention, because many people who work in the embassies abroad do not live in the embassy; they live in apartments, houses or whatever in its vicinity.

The wording of the Bill prompted my probing amendment, so I ask the noble and learned Lord, in the light of this, whether he is comfortable with the vagueness of the term “ordinarily” or whether he sees merit in reconsidering this wording carefully to clarify the residency requirement to avoid death tourism and ensure that others are not discriminated against. I beg to move.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I had originally tabled Amendment 15, which I withdrew, because it looked like I was trying to be nasty and stop the bucket list for people or stop them going on holiday, but that was not my intention. My intention was to think about residency in a proper way. Bearing in mind previous comments from the Minister, I have ended up replacing one amendment with four in order to be precise throughout the Bill.

In essence, I am not convinced that simply being ordinarily resident is enough. I say that because you can be ordinarily resident in more than one country. You can only be domiciled in one country. The issue here is: who is the Bill trying to cater for? I think, frankly—bearing in mind Amendment 23, proposed by my noble friend Lord Frost—that we should be looking at UK citizens and those whom the Government have decided to give indefinite leave to remain, and keep it at that. The element of “ordinarily resident” is that you can have settlement for a purpose. The single purpose could be that you just state that your settlement—your purpose for being ordinarily resident—is simply to take advantage of this Bill. I do not think that is enough.

As regards the amendments that have been tabled by my noble friend Lord Lansley, I also do not want this extending to someone being able to live anywhere in the United Kingdom. Indeed, my noble friend Lord Moylan has perhaps anticipated some of the situations where people have moved abroad and then want to come back. The essence of the Bill should be that it is focusing on providing provision in this country for people who permanently live in this country, which is why “domiciled” is a better test than simply “ordinarily resident”, because, as I say, you can be ordinarily resident in more than one country.

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[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I am sorry to hear of the noble Baroness’s surprise. I am simply setting out where the Government have particular concerns within the scope to which I referred. My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer may be able to comment more appropriately, if he wishes to do so, on the points that she raises.

Amendment 14, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, would widen the eligibility criteria to include UK citizens of pensionable age who are living abroad. There are two main issues with this amendment. The first is that the UK has obligations under international agreements that enable residents of partner countries to receive certain benefits, including some health service provision, in the UK. These agreements are, as I mentioned, with the EU, EEA states and Switzerland. As I set out, these agreements prevent restrictions based on nationality, although they permit those based on residency. Therefore, the amendment would have the effect of opening access to provision of assistance under the Bill to EU, Swiss and EEA residents of pensionable age, provided that they satisfy other eligibility criteria. Widening access only to UK nationals of pensionable age would be contrary to the UK’s obligations under those agreements.

Secondly, by including those who have “moved to live abroad”, the amendment would enable pensionable-age citizens from Northern Ireland or Scotland who have moved abroad to access the provision of assistance, in accordance with the Bill, if they satisfy the other eligibility criteria.

For all the other amendments in this group, on which I make no comment, any workability concerns are less significant. For example, Amendment 10 would remove two eligibility criteria from Clause 1, while Amendment 13 would change the requirements relating to ordinary residence in England and Wales. As Clause 1 is largely descriptive, these amendments would have limited legal effect without corresponding amendments being made to operative provisions later in the Bill.

While these are choices for noble Lords, these amendments may introduce inconsistencies and ambiguity into the Bill. As noble Lords will be aware, these amendments have not had technical drafting support from officials, so the way in which they are currently drafted means that they may not be fully workable, effective or enforceable—but, of course, the issues raised are rightly a matter for noble Lords to consider and decide on.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

Given that Jersey and the Isle of Man, if I am correct, are not EEA countries, how is the contract for health service delivery affected by this Bill in the light of the problems that I highlighted right at the beginning of what has turned into quite a lengthy debate? I was trying to look at a carve-out for those countries so that those contracts could continue, but I was told that it was deemed out of scope of the Bill.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I am sure the noble Baroness will understand that I am restricted in the comments that I can appropriately make here. I heard my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer say that all these matters needed consideration, and I am sure that he will expand further on that very point.

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[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My Lords, I honestly think that is a smokescreen. The Bill says, in a way that the law has recognised time and again—because this Parliament has to make choices from time to time about who gets benefits—that the benefits of the Bill should be given only to those who ordinarily live in this country. That phrase has not given rise to problems. The courts understand it, doctors understand it and the panels will understand it. If we in this Parliament cannot say that we will give rights only to those who are ordinarily resident, which is a phrase that means something, we will never be able to determine who is entitled to our rights. I say, with the greatest respect to the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, that what we are trying to do in the Bill is clear. I invite the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

My Lords, I will now sum up at the end of this very interesting debate. I am relieved to hear that people do not want doctors to be immigration officers. I am a little disappointed that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has not accepted the amendment from the noble Earl, Lord Howe, because it is so straightforward. If, as the noble and learned Lord says, it would not be a problem for over 99% of patients, it would not be a problem to be satisfied. It would add a degree of security for doctors who are being asked to provide these assessments of eligibility.

I was also glad to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Harper, that those working for the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, in embassies or wherever, are covered, and that that is not a problem. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, raised the issue of those working as volunteers abroad for a very long time. I hope that the ability that applies to Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office workers also applies to those working for charities, such as some of the major charities, who may be abroad for a very long time but view their permanent home as the UK.

I remain concerned about Jersey and the Isle of Man. What conversations has the noble and learned Lord had with the Public Bill Office about how to get this in scope? My attempts have failed, and I understood that here in the House of Lords we are not able to widen the scope of the Bill. I worry that without widening the scope of the Bill, we will not address it, and those doctors treating patients with all kinds of really serious illnesses, particularly in Liverpool, as referred to by the Front Bench, and in Southampton, could inadvertently find themselves in a very difficult position, which would be an unintended consequence of this legislation.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I do not know whether the noble Baroness has discussed with the Public Bill Office the BMA’s proposal in relation to this, which is that it is not a crime under the Suicide Act if the assistance you give is not unlawful in the Isle of Man or Jersey. The idea that that is out of scope seems obviously wrong, because the Bill is crafting an exception to the Suicide Act. If the noble Baroness and I go to see the Public Bill Office and explain that, I would have thought that there would be no difficulty about the scope.

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

I would be delighted to go with the noble and learned Lord, because he may have a little more success. The Public Bill Office has been unfailingly helpful. This is no criticism whatever of it; it has worked incredibly hard. With that and the promise of going to see it with a matter of urgency, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 10 withdrawn.