(6 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord was of course a member of that committee and he knows the system well. What he loses sight of is the timing. The discussions are happening now. As far as I know, and I am sure the noble Lord knows, we are not at the table—this is a point I made early on.
If I could conclude answering one intervention, I may be disposed to take another, but I am limited in my time and will perhaps wish to continue this bilaterally. Let me deal with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr.
No, I am sorry. I am not going to give way until I have dealt with the point made by the noble Lord.
The noble Lord’s point was that if we were full members sitting at the table we would negotiate not to give away our rebate—of course, because there is unanimity. The essence of what I am saying is that the EU is making these decisions now while we are not at the table, because the decision deals with the period 2021 to 2028. We have absented ourselves because the withdrawal agreement suggests that we will leave in March 2019. His hope that we can somehow exercise a veto while we are not at the table seems somewhat futile.
I need to make progress so I will not continue on this point, but rather deal with those who believe that a Norwegian option is the answer. I have indicated to the House that I will not give way and I see the Government Whip urging me to come to my concluding remarks, so I will continue. Several noble Lords believe, as in fact the EU negotiators told us last week, that the only other option would be to remain in the single market, through membership of the EEA—in other words, the Norway option. We are told that this would give us access to everything we want. Yes, it might do so, but returning to the Norway option would involve us giving up the rebate, as we would no longer be a member of the EU, merely a member of the EEA; hence, no rebate. The resulting maths goes like this. In 2016 we paid £123 per head. Norway paid roughly £135 per head. The general belief is that Norway does not receive a great deal in receipts, as it participates in fewer programmes, so it actually pays more than we are currently paying. So those who think that the EEA is a good option need to think about how they would sell that to the people. It would be rather difficult to say that paying a bit more would result in a good deal.
I turn, in concluding, to the issue of the UK withholding the exit fee of £39 billion. My committee conducted an inquiry into Brexit and the EU budget in March 2017. We came to the view that while the UK had a moral and political obligation if it wanted a good deal, there was no jurisdiction in which the EU could challenge the UK in a court case. The negotiation on a figure was just that—a negotiation. In light of that, if the rest of the negotiation fails, I would find it odd that we would stick to just one element of it: nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. I suggest that the Government abandon this White Paper and pursue the creativity that the Foreign Secretary has called for today: either a Canada-plus-plus or another option that delivers an association agreement with enhancements as we leave.
(10 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord, Lord Richard, in addressing his comments to the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, several times suggested that this was the Government’s Bill. I just wanted to put on the record that it is a Conservative Party Private Member’s Bill, not a government Bill.
My Lords, I will speak to the same amendment in this group to which the noble Lord, Lord Richard, referred: Amendment 73. I would like to do so in a spirit of positive response to what the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said—that is to say, to attempt to improve this Bill. I will also, therefore, speak briefly.
The point of Amendment 73, as the noble Lord, Lord Richard, said, is to deal with one of the most glaring defects in this Bill as currently drafted, which is that its sole purpose is to bind the hands of a future Parliament. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, will be able to produce chapter and verse for occasions on which legislation has had a binding effect on future Parliaments, unless they chose to repeal the measure, but I would be delighted if he could produce a single example of a piece of legislation that had no purpose other than to bind the hands of a future Parliament, which is the case with the Bill as drafted.
Amendment 73 would remedy that defect. It would ensure that a future Parliament would have to pass a resolution to bring the Bill into effect. That seems to me to restore the balance in our constitutional practice. I am occasionally astonished by the nonchalance—or, some would say, the recklessness—with which the sponsors of the Bill are lopping great chunks off our constitutional practice. It is really pretty odd. Yesterday in this House, we had a superb debate about the future of the union of the United Kingdom and there was unanimity around the House, but today Members opposite, the sponsors of the Bill, are supporting a Bill that will increase the number of yes votes in Scotland in September 2014 and decrease the number of no votes. I know that logic is not normally a strong suit of our countrymen, and probably me, but I think that we are carrying this a little far now. I hope that, when he comes to reply to this debate, the noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, will take on board the importance of Amendment 73, as well as the others in this group.
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the amendment. It seems to me that it addresses an issue which desperately needs addressing in the Bill, and that is flexibility. The structure of the Bill, particularly in its elaborate nature, with the 56 possible incidences of referenda, is, frankly, a couch of Procrustes, on which we are busy stretching ourselves and on which, no doubt, our feet or our heads will one day be lopped off. It is very rigid indeed. It leaves very little appreciation to the Government of the day, although of course the Government of the day will have had to agree in Brussels that, in principle, subject to the proceedings in this Bill, they will go along with it. However, then the rigidity comes back in. It is not surprising in a way. The Government proudly call this Bill a referendum lock, the key of which they have taken out and are now throwing out of the window.
I think this amendment is one way to deal with the issue and earlier today we discussed others. I very much welcome the fact that the Government recognise that, in the handling of this “or otherwise support” issue, they needed a bit more flexibility and they have now moved an amendment, which I was delighted to see went through unopposed, which gives a little more flexibility. It enables a Minister in Brussels to say that he would take something back to London and subject it to the procedures under the Bill, but that he would support it. It enables him to say that but, of course, it does not allow it to go through in any legal sense. That is an increase in flexibility. We have just voted for an increase in flexibility for Parliament because, if less than 40 per cent of the British people are prepared to get off their backsides and vote, then Parliament will be able to take a decision itself and the result of the referendum will be only advisory.
It would be splendid if the Government would think a little more about how to introduce more flexibility into the Bill, while not removing the essence of it. I accept that it is supported by a majority in the House of Commons and that it is in the coalition agreement, which says that, if there are major constitutional changes, there will be a referendum. As the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, said, the recommendations of our own Constitution Committee are rather clear on this point but were ignored by the Government. The noble Lord, Lord Howell, quoted the bit he liked, but did not quote the bit he did not like in the Constitution Committee’s report. That was a much longer bit, which said that referendums should be used only for major constitutional innovations. If you look at the various clauses of the Bill, you will see that there are stacks of things there which are not major constitutional innovations. This provision will give a little more flexibility there, and I hope that the Government will seriously consider that because flexibility will be needed somewhere down the line. The more care taken with the legislation, the better that legislation will be for the interests of this country.
I say to noble Lords opposite that we on the Liberal Democrat Benches recognise that this amendment is intended to enhance scrutiny and to improve propositions that might be put forward by the Executive. We also accept the spirit of what noble Lords opposite are trying to do. For the record, I do not find, in the copy that I have just looked up, the elements of the coalition agreement to which the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, referred as endorsing this amendment. I would not want to tempt him to read out the entire section on Europe in the coalition agreement, as the hour is late.
I shall speak to the substantive elements of the amendment. We do not believe that it would be right to take such a dramatic step to remove from the Executive, the Government of the day, the decisions about what they will support or not and to give them to a committee of both Houses. We have had a long debate about Parliament and the importance of parliamentary scrutiny and so on. In Committee, we heard a lot of argumentation across the House regarding urgent situations and what would happen because decision-making was so late and would be so stymied. I find that the methodology proposed here would certainly add to the amount of time that would be taken to deal with measures if a Joint Committee had to rule on them. There would also be the issue of reintroducing some rather subjective concepts: urgency and national interest. We have had debates on those subjects; both are highly subjective. We are also conscious of the judicial review implications contained in the Bill.
Finally, the amendment seems to miss the underlying theme of the Bill, which is that the Executive make a call on a proposal, bring it to Parliament, Parliament agrees it and then the public are to ratify that decision through a referendum. As we have repeatedly heard from the ministerial Bench, the Bill is designed to reconnect the British public with these policy issues that emanate from the European Union. The public will be empowered, through the processes proposed here. To take that away and to give it to a Joint Committee of both Houses seems to me to entirely miss the point of the Bill. On that basis I suggest that it goes contra to where we had got. Before I conclude I give way to the noble Lord,
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it was on this day last year, and with some trepidation, that I stood as the first Liberal on government Benches in 96 years to support the Queen’s Speech. This party knew, as did the Conservatives, that Europe could create a huge rift between us. It is in the true spirit of what a coalition is meant to be, in European terms, that we have managed in this Bill to come together in pursuit of its fundamental objective of rebuilding trust between the British people and those who govern them.
Amendments 61 and 63 aim to do more or less the same thing: to suggest that the Bill is a complete waste of time and should therefore expire as soon as this coalition Government cease to exist. I have enormous respect for the noble Lords whose names are listed as supporting these amendments. They undoubtedly believe that this Bill is unnecessary and will do little to address the disconnect between the EU’s institutions and Britain’s. They are entitled to their view, but I regret that there has been no attempt on their part during the passage of the Bill in Committee to propose an alternative method of restoring trust.
Noble Lords on the opposition Benches have just been the custodians of power for 13 years. During their time in office, there were broken promises in consulting the people and precious little support for engaging the public in the European debate. Now, when confronted with the central aim of the Bill—to promise the British people that they will have a say in some matters to do with giving over more power to the EU, or at least to assure them that Ministers will have to justify their decisions—the response is to suggest that the Bill is an artificial construct intended simply to appease anti-Europeanism; and that it should therefore be dispensed with at the first opportunity, namely the Dissolution of this Parliament. This goes against the spirit of the Bill and we will resist that from these Benches.
I turn now to the principle of sunset clauses, somewhat anticipating what the Minister might say in response to the other two amendments.
I am sorry to interrupt the noble Baroness and am most grateful to her for giving way. However, it is unwise to caricature other people’s arguments, particularly when one does so inaccurately. I wish she would recognise—I ask her to do so—that many of the amendments that have been moved, by me and others, provide for the strengthening of parliamentary control over any changes in the European arrangements. It is a strengthening over what was provided by the ratification of the Lisbon treaty, for which the noble Baroness voted. We would get on a bit better, frankly, if we did not suggest that there had been no suggestions from those who are moving amendments to strengthen controls. There have been.
The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, does not particularly care for other people putting words into his mouth. I suggest that he apply the same principle to others. I was not at all proposing that those controls are not being suggested. What I was talking about was a disconnect between the British people and their institutions, whether it is in their relationship to the United Kingdom Parliament or the European institutions. The tone of the debate makes it rather difficult to take what the noble Lord says with the seriousness with which it is intended.
This is the only amendment to the Bill that I have tabled, and I should therefore be most grateful if I could continue to address the principles behind my amendment. Somewhat in anticipation of what the Minister might say in response to the other two amendments, let me speak to the amendment in my own name and in that of my noble friend Lady Brinton, Amendment 64.
Sunset clauses in legislation are increasingly becoming part of the framework of our constitutional arrangements. We have seen them in a spate of Bills over the past decade or so. It was only earlier today that a sunset clause was reprieved and put on a permanent footing in the Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act 2010. That also happened to the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. This House voted again and again to insert such a provision into the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. A host of other Acts attracted such clauses, including the Finance Act 2001, the Income Tax Act 2007 and the Climate Change and Sustainable Energy Act 2006. The list goes on and on. Why are sunset clauses there? Among the reasons is concern about the unintended consequences of the relevant legislation. There was concern that new structures and processes were being installed without clarity on how exactly they might work in certain circumstances that could not be foreseen when the legislation was passed. In other words, they cannot be foreseen here and now. On that basis, there is no Bill, once enacted, more suitable for post-hoc review and the possibility of repeal than this one. Its aims are clear and I have reiterated our support for them. What is unclear is the effect of the measures on decision-making in the future.
Several noble Lords have mentioned the need that might arise when decisions are taken in urgent situations. Others have spoken of the need for flexibility. Yet others have spoken of the level of complexity in EU legislation. All sides of the House share a central concern—that UK interests should not be put at risk due to its adoption of the complicated procedures in place in the Bill. Therefore, a sunset clause, if accompanied by a straightforward sunrise clause, would seem to be ideally suited here.
I turn briefly to Amendment 62 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard. There is little that one would fault with it, other than the proposal that the Bill should sunset at the end of this Parliament. Several noble Lords have suggested that there is no point in the Bill because the coalition has already declared—not today but at other times during the passage of the Bill—that there will be no further transfers of powers or competences. In other words, we do not need this legislation because there has been a declaratory statement of what the purpose of the Bill will be for the rest of this Parliament. That misses the point that we are intending to legislate for the future.
I turn to the issue of whether a Parliament can bind a future Parliament in this manner. I agree with the European Scrutiny Committee in the other place which said that Parliaments by necessity bind the other, as all legislation is directed at the future, rather than the past. I quote from the report:
“Laws passed by one Parliament do not contain a sunset clause at the Dissolution”.
All can be repealed by a future Parliament, if it so chooses and if that Executive can muster support. However, I recognise the political difficulties that repeal can attract, hence the simplicity of Amendment 64. First, the fact that the sunset would not take place until three years into the next Parliament would mean that a new Government would have sufficient time to see how the provisions played out in reality. Their Ministers would be able to see for themselves that their negotiating positions were not as inflexible as the Bill might appear to suggest, and that that they did not go to Brussels with one hand tied behind their back. In other words the provisions should actually work in practice. We would have sufficient time to assess whether we needed regular referendums, as the four remaining years of this Parliament plus three in the next would allow for a reasonable time span over which to make a judgment.
Finally, my amendment would also allow for an evaluation of how the judicial review provisions work. The process of judicial review can be, as we know, fairly drawn out, and we will have been able to make an assessment of whether the dire predictions of the frequency of judicial review will really bear out.
My Amendment 64 would put in place the possibility of evaluating how things will play out. This evaluation period would be sufficiently long to test the workings of the Act. The process would be straightforward: the Act will lapse if the Government think that it is not in the national interest to retain it, but if the Government of the day wish to retain it, again, all that will be needed will be an order resurrecting it—a sunrise. It will not absorb political capital or indeed take up precious legislative time. This clause is intended to be a pragmatic, evidence-based solution to ameliorate uncertainty. While I may be probing today as to the Minister’s objections, I suggest that in future years he may look back at this amendment, if accepted at Report, with some relief if he is caught in an unwelcome bind that was not evident on a glorious, sunny day in May.
Lord Grenfell: I support Amendments 61 to 63. I am sorry that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe, feels that he must now dissociate himself from Amendment 62, because the olive branch on which the amendment perches is very appropriate and could lead us out of a difficult situation.
I think that Schedule 1 is an abomination, and I always have done, and wish that it was not in the Bill. To pretend that this could possibly bring the people of this country closer to the EU and vice versa is a total myth, and I am surprised that there are those who still believe that this is the way to go in order to cement the relationship between the people and the European Union. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, is right to say that the Bill is not exactly a subject of discussion in the bars on the Champs-Élysées or even in the Quartier Latin—far from it. But it is beginning to have a little bit of resonance in the two Houses of the French Parliament, particularly in their European Union committees, where they have taken note of it. A member of one of those committees asked me the other day whether this was actually true and whether it could happen. When I said it could, he said, if I may slip for a moment into the language of Simon de Montfort in this Parliament,
“Dans ce cas-là, nous entamerions notre proper chemin”—
which means,
“In that case, we’ll go our own way”.
And indeed they will.
I honestly believe that to think that the rest of Europe will go along with this is simply not true. It will test their patience to the limit and will do us no good at all. This Bill is not a good Bill. It is full of things that should not be there. To requote something I said late one night in Committee, Antoine de Saint-Exupéry said that perfection is achieved not when everything has been said that should be said but when there is nothing left to take away. This Bill suffers from the fact that the Government do not see that there is a great advantage in taking quite a lot of this away, but I am afraid that we may have to live with a different situation.
This is not a good Bill. I support the three amendments and hope that at least we can make it better by passing them.
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, have clearly explained the problems associated with the term “or otherwise support”. I wish to give an instance of where a problem may arise. The Council in Brussels may be discussing a measure which requires unanimity—our agreement—in terms of some outcomes that would be unacceptable to us, and others that would be acceptable to us once Parliament had endorsed them. How is the Minister to express that preference? There is a real risk that “or otherwise support” could be interpreted in a way which prevents the Minister expressing that preference. That, surely, would be completely counterproductive because in such circumstances we want to be able to say—do we not?—that one or more courses of action would be unacceptable to us and we would not agree to them there and then, but that another course of action could be acceptable to us once we had the authority of Parliament to make a legal decision possible. Taking all these points together, I hope that the Ministers will break their duck and agree to a change. After all, we have been sitting here for I do not know how many hours and so far they have not managed it. I would like to encourage them to try a little harder.
My Lords, I would like to speak briefly to a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, specifically on Clause 7(3). He mentioned the coalition agreement. I think that on day five in Committee we discussed the coalition agreement and what it said about passerelles. Does he agree that the coalition agreement is clear on this particular use of passerelles, as it says:
“We will amend the 1972 European Communities Act so that … the use of any passerelle would require primary legislation”?
As regards his other more general points, the report of the Constitution Committee, which discusses Clause 7, concludes at paragraph 41:
“We agree with the re-balancing of domestic constitutional arrangements in favour of Parliament”.
Both those statements point in a different direction from that proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr.
(13 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I completely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, on the need for proportionality and I accept that things will happen that we may not be able to foresee when we are drafting legislation and giving a legal basis to aspects of future decision-making. However, before I speak to Amendment 39B, I should like to say a few words about Amendment 39A.
I welcome the explanation of the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, of how the Labour Party has moved considerably to advance accountability. It is particularly welcome given that it failed to provide for that in the time that it was in office. I do not often find myself echoing the words of the noble Lord, Lord Waddington, very much, but this afternoon’s discussion on the budget rebate was a very useful one to remind us that even when it was in office it took accountability so lightly that when the budget provisions were changed, as it appeared from today’s discussion—and nobody on the Labour Benches rebutted it—in 2005, the Chancellor of the Exchequer did not even agree with that change. Yet it happened.
I turn specifically to Amendment 39A. The noble Lord, Lord Liddle, explained what his amendment would do. I have some sympathy with the idea that you would have a level of scrutiny here that should determine what should happen—in other words, that Parliament should take a decision, rather than having a referendum. But my question would be to the noble Lord about his proposed new subsection (4B), which calls for a resolution of each House of Parliament. It is not entirely clear to me what would happen if one House of Parliament approved of holding a referendum but the other did not. Presumably, we would have a situation whereby a Joint Committee could have recommended a referendum and, potentially, the Commons would have agreed with the Joint Committee but perhaps this House would not. I wondered whether he would be able to tell us what would happen, in that case, on Amendment 39B.
In this variation, the review committee takes into account the significance, urgency and national interest at stake in its examination of the draft decision. Both urgency and national interest are, I say to noble Lords opposite, deeply subjective. We thought, with the European financial stability mechanism before us in February, that there was huge urgency in agreeing on what to do, because of the Greece, Ireland and Portugal scenarios. In fact one could argue that there is still considerable urgency, given where Spain—and, potentially, Italy—is. But the fact that other countries may be covered by that by the time the facility comes into being in 2013 suggests that something that one sees as urgent at a particular point in time may as events unfold not be quite as urgent as we thought.
Let me come to a consideration of a national interest. We know that this is notoriously difficult to define in international relations, which is one reason why this concept of national interest, which we all cherish and hold dear, has never been given legal force. I recall when I was a student reading the realist American scholar, Hans Morgenthau, who in 1951 wrote his book In Defense of the National Interest, which was contested throughout the 1950s, during the Cold War, and all through the 1960s, and is contested still today. It has never taken off as an argument that was legally testable in a court of law, so I would be concerned—while I see what the noble Lord means; we know the national interest when we see it. We can touch it; we can feel it; we can smell it. But to define it in legislation would be extremely difficult to do. I therefore suggest some caution about agreeing with the amendment. On Amendment 39B, I ask the noble Lord what he would do if one House went in a different direction from the other.
My Lords, I would like to speak very briefly in support of this probing amendment, not because I am in total agreement with every detail of it but because I think that it addresses a very serious problem to which I alluded at the end of Second Reading, when I said that the effect of the Bill if passed unamended would be to lock the door and throw the key out of the window. I believe that that is an accurate description of what this Bill will do if not amended. These amendments are a sincere and quite well thought-out attempt to keep the key in the hands of the Government and the majority in both Houses of Parliament to some extent, subject to the reporting of a committee and so on.
I think that this issue should be taken a bit more seriously, frankly, than it is by those on the other side of the House. If the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, will forgive me for saying so, about the piece that she quoted—I hate to have to construe somebody else’s coalition agreement, which has nothing to do with me—the sovereignty issue to which she referred and which she read out is dealt with in Clause 18, not in the clauses that we are discussing now. We will probably have the delights of spending a whole day discussing that next week but it has nothing whatsoever to do with referendums. No one has ever suggested that it should be. The suggestion was that you should inscribe in the Bill some test of what the basis for European law in this country is. Anyway, I suggest that the Government really ought to think about this enormous multiplicity of referendums which are provided for and which cannot be dealt with just by casual remarks such as, “Oh well, don't worry—they won’t ever happen”.
I think that the noble Lord, Lord Richard, knows exactly what I am talking about, and what I am talking about is trust. I am talking about an attitude. He can read Hansard as well as I will tomorrow, and he will see that I said that there was a tone—I did not suggest that the word “deference” had been used—in proceedings earlier this evening, and the tone is, “We know best”.
I am most grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way. I really think that she ought not to use this term “deference”. If I understand it rightly, this House is part of the legislature of this country and has a voice to express views on matters and to take decisions. We are not asking for the people of this country to express deference; we are expressing a view about the constitution of this country. That cannot be dismissed by accusing people who say that they are against referendums of camping on deference. I would like, frankly, to abandon that thought, which I do not think fits in our constitutional practice.
My Lords, again, I have to say that I think that when we say that we are giving up representative democracy in favour of plebiscitary democracy, we are on ground which is difficult to explain out there in the media. In the debate on Amendment 1, the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, said that it was undoubtedly true that the public did not trust Parliament on EU matters to the extent that they had done in the past, and that there was a disconnect—