18:25 - Division on Amendment 5 - Ayes: 221 / Noes: 216 - Amendment 5 agreed.
19:35 - Division on Amendment 5A - Ayes: 158 / Noes: 208 - Amendment 5A disagreed.
Lord Liddle
My Lords, I rise to move this amendment in a purely formal way. I anticipate that, in speaking to Amendment 2, the noble Lord, Lord Howell, will give us assurances that will enable us to withdraw this amendment, but without further ado I would like to hear what he has to say.
The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Howell of Guildford)
My Lords, I am grateful to those noble Lords who have sought, through the tabling of these amendments and in Committee, to clarify the spirit of the provisions in the relevant clauses of the Bill by tabling all but one of the amendments before us in this group. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, who has just indicated that he is moving his amendment formally in order, quite rightly, to elicit from the Government our case for the amendment that we have tabled within the group.
As my noble friend Lord Wallace made clear in Committee, it has not been and nor should it be the Government’s intention to tie the hands of Ministers and their officials who negotiate assiduously in the development of European Union legislation in order to protect and maximise the UK’s interests and priorities. The fact is that Ministers and officials have participated constructively for many years in the earlier stages of the development and negotiation of various EU measures, and nothing in this Bill will prevent that from continuing in the same way. When it comes to the point at which the final decision is taken in the European Council or the Council, what the provisions of the Bill are designed to do is to prevent a Minister from voting in favour of a treaty or other measure specified in Part 1 at this final stage, or otherwise allow the adoption of a treaty or measure to happen, unless and until he or she has the approval specified in the relevant clause of the Bill. As we know, this may be an Act of Parliament or it may be an Act and a referendum where there is a transfer of competence or power. The Bill does not prevent the Government from signing up finally to and participating in anything at the EU level, but Ministers would first have to have the support of Parliament and, where necessary, of the British people before doing so.
The amendment tabled in my name in the Marshalled List makes the position crystal clear, and I hope to the satisfaction of noble Lords. The effect of the amendment will of course govern the use of the phraseology we are concerned with throughout the whole Bill, and therefore not oblige us to table a series of consequential amendments because this change to Clause 1, which is interpretive, will govern the whole Bill.
As my noble friend Lord Wallace explained in Committee, the words we are concerned with, “or otherwise supporting”, are included to make clear that, at the point of the final and formal decision in Council or the European Council, a Minister would be unable to allow a measure to be adopted in Council or the European Council through means other than a positive vote, which under this Bill would have to be preceded by the necessary national procedures—namely, an Act and a referendum, if required. Articles 235(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 238(4) make clear that abstentions at the point of final and formal decision in Council do not serve to block, but rather are treated as support for the adoption of a proposal requiring unanimity. Therefore, letting a measure through by abstention in the Council and then claiming by way of excuse or explanation, as it were, that although it transferred competences or powers and should have had national approval somehow it slipped through and Ministers could not help it, would not be allowed.
In addition, as many of your Lordships know, in Brussels matters often do not proceed to a formal vote. The chairman may just seek the sense of the room, and if no one dissents, take it that the proposal has been finally agreed unanimously. It is then ticked and it goes through. That could happen only after national procedures, which would require parliamentary approval, while if competences and powers are being transferred, it would of course require a referendum. So the phrase “or otherwise supporting” seeks to ensure that Parliament and the British people can be confident that there is no possibility that any inaction on the part of the Government of the day could allow a measure to be finally decided and agreed without the proper approval of Parliament or the people or, indeed, both. To allow a measure to be adopted in such a way would represent a sleight of hand that would cheat both this Parliament and the public out of their rightful say.
My noble friend also made the point that, in this way, the Government were replicating the phrase used by the 2008 Act, which was introduced by the previous Government when Parliament was approving the ratification of the Lisbon treaty. However, we accept the point—made, I think, by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford—that, although that was the position before, there is no reason why we cannot improve the drafting of provisions from the past, as indeed we can improve on much else that went on during the past Government and seek to do so.
We have reflected further on this point, as we have on all the amendments tabled in Committee, as we should. For the reasons I have given, we have tabled a government amendment to spell out, in the interpretation in Clause 1, exactly what is meant by “or otherwise supporting” and to explain when and where it applies: to wit, that it is only at the final and formal stage in the Council, or the European Council, that the bar on voting for or abstaining on—in other words, otherwise supporting—measures applies, unless or until there is parliamentary and, where necessary, public approval, in which case of course the support could go forward.
We feel that providing this amendment to the definition provides the clarity that noble Lords were seeking in their amendments. It spells out unambiguously the limitations on Ministers and in doing so makes clear—and I make clear now—that this and future Governments may negotiate proposals in future in the same way as they do now and they should seek the views of the scrutiny committees of both Houses in the same way as they do now and undertake any other existing national approval procedures that are required before finally agreeing to a proposal in the European Council or the Council.
That is the position. I hope noble Lords will accept that clarifies the concerns we all had in Committee on this matter and therefore I will beg to move the Government’s amendment. This will confirm to noble Lords that we have heard and addressed their concerns. I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment, which seeks an exactly similar effect.
Lord Hannay of Chiswick
Before the noble Lord sits down, perhaps we could be just a little clearer. I thank him very much for the letter he sent me and other noble Lords about what I described as the chicken-and-egg situation, which is part of this nexus that he has been dealing with. That was a very helpful letter and I would be most grateful if he could agree that that letter should not only go to noble Lords who participated in this debate but could also go in the Library of both Houses, because I fear that sometimes the other place does not take very much cognisance of what is said by Ministers in this House. On this occasion, what is said in that letter, in particular about nothing in this Bill inhibiting Ministers from participating in negotiations other than on the final decision, is very important. I hope he can agree that the letter should go in the Library of both Houses.
On another point arising from what the noble Lord himself said, I have to confess to some slight confusion about how many of the instances of “or otherwise support” get taken out and how many get left in and whether there is not a degree of potential ambiguity from leaving any of them in at all. Perhaps he could just clarify that point. I had at first thought, and from what he initially said this afternoon, that he was actually saying that all the references to “or otherwise support” were going and that the statement would simply be that we would not allow any decision to be taken. That is, I think, the sense of what the Government have been trying to do and what those of us who have been trying to amend this provision are trying to do. However, I am still not quite clear where we are on that point.
Lord Howell of Guildford
On the first point, I will certainly endeavour to see that the words and wisdom of your Lordships’ House are spread as widely as possible and that the correctness of our view is recognised, in the way that we are changing the phraseology of the past in an improving way.
As to the question of what is amended by our proposed amendment, I think that I said that by changing the definition in the interpretative Clause 1, that change governs all references to the particular words we are concerned with throughout the Bill. It simply overrides and governs all those references, so that there is no need for your Lordships to be bothered with the task of going through each clause amending or adding the amendment at every stage of the Bill. By putting it in Clause 1, in the interpretative section, we are governing and rendering effective in the light of the amendment everything that is said throughout the entire Bill. That is the position as I would like to put it to your Lordships and I believe that that is the correct one.
Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne
I pay tribute to the Minister and to the Government for listening with such deep concern to what seemed to me to be perfectly acceptable phraseology, but which gave noble Lords opposite considerable difficulty. It seems to me odd that something that is comfortable, which we already passed in the UK 2008 Act, should somehow become a discomforting phrase here, but I am none the less absolutely delighted to see that the Minister is able to come forward with what is clearly to other noble Lords a major concession and clarify a phrase which to some of us seemed perfectly adequate. It is always good that we should have a consensus in this House—your Lordships are known for a consensual approach—and I congratulate and thank the Minister.
Lord Liddle
My Lords, I would not go as far as the noble Baroness in describing this as a major concession in the Bill. However, in the spirit of good will in the consideration of the Bill on Report, we are prepared to withdraw the amendments in my name in the light of what the noble Lord, Lord Howell, has said, subject only to two points of clarification: first, that his letter to the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, will be deposited in the Library; and, secondly, that we are absolutely clear that the amendment to the interpretative clause, Clause 1(7), does therefore govern all the other references to “otherwise support” in the rest of the Bill, and that no one is going to turn around at a later stage and say that a Minister cannot publicly advocate a position, either in the Council or in a wider forum, until the point at which a formal decision has to be taken, so it is possible for Ministers publicly to advocate their support for a position, subject to the final decision having passed all the requirements of this eventual Act.
Lord Howell of Guildford
My Lords, as a final word I repeat that the definition will apply to any use of this wording elsewhere in the Bill. That is the definitive statement I am making, and that applies.
Lord Howell of Guildford
“(a) voting in favour of the decision in the European Council or the Council, or(b) allowing the decision to be adopted by consensus or unanimity by the European Council or the Council.”
Lord Stoddart of Swindon
I will make the point of order whether there are interruptions from other parts of the House or not. The noble Lord, Lord Triesman, said that we had had enough of this debate and that, when he got up, no other noble Lord would be able to speak. This is not in accordance with the Companion to the Standing Orders and Guide to the Proceedings of the House of Lords. If noble Lords turn to paragraph 8.139, on page 152, they will see that, as long as the House accepts that they should do so, noble Lords may speak until the Minister gets up. After this, there shall be no speeches. However, before the Minister or spokesman gets to his or her feet, with the permission of the House, any Member of the House may speak
Lord Howell of Guildford
My Lords, if the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, is correct, as I have got up, this debate now comes to a close.
As always, it has been a fascinating debate with many profound remarks. It has predominantly been a debate about referenda, but I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Williamson, that the debate has been entirely separate from the Bill. Speaking as one of the, I suspect, rather few ex-Ministers who have taken a referendum Act through the other place in the distant past—the Northern Ireland referendum Bill—I suppose that, in the eyes of my noble friends Lord Deben and my noble and learned friend Lord Howe, I am damned before I start.
Nevertheless, let me set out one or two of the arguments that have perhaps not been exposed as clearly as they should. We know that the purpose of these amendments is to include a minimum turnout threshold for any referendums arising as a result of the Bill. If the threshold is not met, regardless of the result, hey presto, the referendum would become advisory and not mandatory. This proposition has a whole string of disadvantages, which are not all obvious but become clear if you think about them. First, as many of your noble Lords have pointed out, instead of it being mandatory on the Government, it leaves the British people in real doubt about what the effect of their vote will be. The noble Lord, Lord Triesman, is incidentally entirely wrong that it will be mandatory on Parliaments; it will be mandatory on Governments, though it is true that Governments often, but not always, control Parliaments. However, this goes by the board if we pass the amendment. It will be the end of the British people’s mandatory certainty and they will be back where they started, passing the ball back to Parliament and the party and Government controlling Parliament. This is where the record has, frankly, not been brilliant or reassuring. This is one of the reasons why we are facing these problems.
We have the glorious assertions of excellent and eloquent spokesmen like the noble Lords, Lord Tomlinson and Lord Triesman, that the only need is for the Government to say no. However, they have not said no. They have said yes, when many people have felt that this yes was the wrong and inappropriate proposition. The fear is that, now that we have said yes to Lisbon, we have said yes about handing many important powers to the European Union. We work with the European Union and believe that they should have powers. However, will it be a no or yes in future? The doubt remains. The doubt must be removed. The reassurance is not there. For the vast majority of the people, the call is for the reassurance to be there. Though the noble Lord, Lord Pearson, will not agree with me, I suspect that the vast majority in this country want us to be good Europeans and to be effective in Europe and effective in allowing Europe to use—and not have us unravel—its vast range of existing competences. They are, however, worried as to whether it will be a yes or a no in future. The noble Lords do not seem to have grasped this central point. It is simply not right to lead people in doubt about what their role will be. It leaves them with a doubt—a dangerous doubt—about whether they will be listened to, about the lack of clarity and about whether their views will count.
The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, brought us back to Edmund Burke. I love Burke. He is one of my favourites. However, he is not particularly my favourite when he warned that democracy only works if, as he put it, there is a policeman within each one of us. It is slightly different from the proposition about parliamentary democracy. We all know perfectly well that Burke was not operating in today’s situation. He perhaps did not foresee the iron discipline of party politics, where some parties get a complete grip on Parliament. Has the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, recently read—or ever read—Lord Hailsham on elected dictatorship? In it he would find a heavy antidote to the glorious idealism of the Burkean age, in which the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and Mr Burke could speak out to their conscience freely unaware of any party restraints. I have spent 31 years in the other place and I am afraid that every day I was aware of party restraints.
I cannot see that this 40 per cent threshold would reconnect the British people with the decisions being taken in their name at the EU level; it certainly would not do so. These devices do not serve to solve the problem, as astutely identified by a great many commentators day after day on the radio or in the newspapers. I see that my brief refers to the BBC’s Europe editor, who said the other day that,
“Across Europe voters feel insecure, suspicious of an elite with its own vision of an ever closer union but which doesn't necessarily address their hopes or fears”.
I would hope that this wise House of Lords, where we wear our party allegiances somewhat more lightly, would support efforts to resolve this concern and to see the European Union on a more solid basis than, frankly, it is today, not only for lack of popular support but because it is facing very serious policy issues as well. For those of us who want to build a better relationship between the British people and the EU and, indeed, people generally and the EU right across the 27 countries—soon to be 28 or more—I would have thought that this is the way to go.
By the same token, the amendment before us undermines that whole aim of the Bill. That is the first point which must be taken into account and cannot be dismissed, unless those who do so think that popular support and consensus are irrelevant, do not arise and that parliamentary wisdom is so entrenched and admired that anything decreed by Governments in Parliament will be immediately accepted—it will not. Secondly, the point has rightly been made that thresholds of this type encourage game playing during a referendum campaign rather than a proper presentation of the arguments to achieve a desired result. For example, if supporters of the yes campaign know that Parliament supports the treaty change in question, they have a huge incentive to keep the vote down below 40 per cent rather than going out and making the case for change.
Thirdly, the Government believe that we should encourage public participation rather than providing reasons for keeping that down. We could wish that the internet age had never occurred and that the days of massive and wide public consultation had not developed, but they have. As my noble friend Lady Nicholson rightly pointed out, are we saying that local elections are not legitimate? We can wave a hand and say that they are different but that is just an assertion. I do not think that they are all that different. Are we saying that the European parliamentary elections are not legitimate? What does it do to the trust in the body politic if a majority have voted no in the referendum but Parliament decided, because it has the power to do so, to go ahead anyway? That would be extremely damaging.
Fourthly, the Lords Constitution Committee, to which some of my noble friends referred, in its wisdom—it is a very wise committee—shares opposition to thresholds. Its report on referendums in the UK concluded that,
“there should be a general presumption against the use of voter turnout thresholds and supermajorities”.
Thresholds are bound to distance voters from the issues on which the British people want to have their say. Incentives to campaign to abstain would be vastly increased.
There is a further question. During our first days in Committee on the Bill, the wise noble Lord, Lord Kerr, said that during the debates on the EEC Referendum Act 1975, the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher—then Margaret Thatcher—had objected to the possibility of the referendum being mandatory. She also said:
“The Government might regard themselves as bound, but the result could not fetter the decision of Parliament”.—[Official Report, Commons, 11/3/1975; col. 315.]
That, of course, is exactly our point. That is why I fear that the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, is wrong. These referenda, or the referendum that might occur—I think that it will occur only once every few years, but I will come to that in a moment—are mandatory on government. That is the whole point of the Bill. However, they are not mandatory on Parliament. They cannot be. Parliament’s view of the treaty will be taken during the passage of legislation for the referendum. If Parliament did not support the treaty, it would not pass the legislation, so Parliament has its say and remains supreme in every sense.
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard
My Lords, I need to recant. In Committee, I was against the amendment on the grounds that it complicated things. However, now it seems that it may be the only hope for dealing with a problem that I had hoped would be dealt with by another route. I was young, innocent and idealistic; I did not realise that we would end up cheering a government concession that means that, in the Bill, “support” is a term of art defined at the beginning, and the various prohibitions on Ministers of the Crown in any way supporting X, Y and Z does not mean that they cannot propose, advocate or support them in Brussels—just that they cannot vote for them. This is a huge advance and I am beginning to understand how difficult the legislative process is.
Clauses 2 and 3 have two different procedures, depending on whether the treaty amendment emerges by the classical method plus a convention, or by the accelerated method that is meant to deal with emergencies. We have two different procedures, and one of the paradoxes is that we have a significance test in the second but not in the first. Therefore, we envisage that any treaty amendment by the first, traditional method plus the convention must be significant. The second curiosity is that I thought that a treaty amendment was a treaty amendment, whichever route it came by. The third curiosity is that the accelerator method, covered in Clause 3, is meant to be used in an emergency, but we do not have any emergency or urgency test built in.
The charm of the amendment, as I now see, is that it brings in these tests. It would get significance into the traditional method, where it is not at the moment. It would also bring in urgency and the national interest, which perhaps is not a bad idea. It is a complication and it is a great pity that we have not had any clear rationale for the separate methods that depend on the origin in Brussels of the treaty amendment. However, we are where we are and clearly the Government are not going to give us any concessions on that. Therefore, faute de mieux, I support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Liddle.
Lord Howell of Guildford
My Lords, I begin by dissociating myself entirely from the statement of the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, that somehow the Bill gives encouragement to referenda and public votes “on anything and everything”. That was his phrase, but it could not be further from the truth. It would be impossible to think of a proposition that is more remote from what the Bill is intended to do. The Bill is about transfers of power and sovereignty—over a wide range of issues, I concede—from the United Kingdom and this Parliament to the European Union. I am left almost speechless; what is unimportant or trivial about that? These are issues that we have dealt with again and again—the famous red lines that successive Governments have found to be of extreme importance to Britain. The argument is not that we should not be involved with the European Union in all these areas, but that we should retain a veto power if we are pressed too far; that all the powers that are needed have been conceded under the Lisbon treaty; and that those that were left out—the remaining issues where unanimity must prevail, where the veto must be kept in place and where no further treaty competences should be transferred—are all the important remaining ones, which many of the 27 countries insisted on preserving.
These are the important issues: defence and security, national security, military issues, national tax, fiscal and energy policy, provisions under the EU budget, financial management of the EU, citizenship and elections, foreign policy and social security. These are not trivial issues that can be dismissed. What prevails in these comments is a devastating lack of understanding of the importance of the remaining issues that are not within the competence and power of the EU because the nation states do not feel that it is necessary for them to be there—and, on the contrary, think that they should remain under national and sovereign control. Therefore, the starting point of many of these comments is so far removed from what is in the Bill and what the Bill is concerned with that I find it very hard to find a bridge of words to link the two, but I will try my best.
Under these amendments, decisions on whether a referendum on treaty change or a decision—these are big issues—should be held would be made by a special committee of both Houses. This is similar, though not identical, to the debate we had on amendments in Committee. They were limited to Clause 6 decisions, and seem to have widened the scope of the so-called European referendum scrutiny committee to cover treaties and Article 48(6) decisions. This is a big assignment of discretion to this parliamentary committee. How this committee would come about, I am not too sure. I have to say in the best of spirits to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that if he thinks that this committee would be free of interference from the Government or party-political pressures of various sorts, then his innocence is not entirely lost.
I am at least pleased that this amendment recognises that consideration should be given to the need for a referendum when treaties or Article 48 decisions are to be made. This is a clear step forward from the status quo, where it was entirely down to Ministers to decide whether a referendum was to be held and where, as we have sadly seen, Ministers and Governments can and do change their minds—hence many of our problems. The amendment appears to have retained the provisions in the Bill—which is good—that all treaties and Article 48 decisions must in future be ratified through an Act of Parliament. At least it retains a greatly increased role for Parliament, which this Bill stretches for and seeks to provide. This is a definite advance.
Moving from ministerial discretion over whether a referendum should be held, to parliamentary discretion over whether a referendum should be held, really is not sufficient. What we would have is an extra step in the process of deciding whether to have a referendum, which I suspect would merely diminish further rather than increase the confidence and trust of the British people when compared to the current provisions in the Bill and to what the Bill is trying to do. It would cut right across, and therefore potentially diminish, the work done by the European scrutiny committees of both Houses, which—despite the overrides, which one must concede have been too frequent—has been valuable in giving some impression to the general public and to the electorate of this country that there are some brakes on the system.
Why would the arrangements for the proposed European referendum scrutiny committee diminish public trust? The answer is that because whereas the Bill is, with the exception of the narrowly defined significance test, very specific about which transfers of power and competence would lead to a referendum—that is what this whole Bill is about—these amendments would do away with the certainty. In agreeing the Bill as drafted, Parliament would be giving a clear signal to the public as to when a referendum would be held. If the amendment were agreed, the whole process would be lost in a whirlpool of subjective political judgments and, I have no doubt, of manoeuvres as well, and of all the pressures that operate through our political system—perfectly properly, because that is the way that a democratic system works. The idea that they would be absent and that an isolated, divinely independent judgment could be reached by this committee is absurd and naive.
These amendments require the committee to assess all treaties and Article 48 decisions against significance, urgency and the national interest. These are highly subjective terms which are capable of a far wider range of interpretation than the criteria in Clause 4, which have been carefully analysed and crafted. This amendment moves the whole debate away from an objective consideration of whether power or competence has been transferred from the UK to the EU. It moves it away from objectivity to subjectivity of precisely the kind which works against trust and against confidence, and against support for the whole European Union project which I thought so many noble Lords wanted to see reinforced.
Government and Parliament will of course take into consideration issues of urgency, importance and certainly the national interest when negotiating a treaty change, and in passing Acts to ratify treaty change. These are centrally important issues, but they are not the right criteria on which to decide whether a referendum is needed before a treaty change or an Article 48 decision is ratified.
The other problem with these amendments is that the decisions on these highly subjective issues will be made, frankly, by a small number of parliamentarians. I have said that we are not quite sure how they would come to be on this committee. The way this committee is set up means that it could only ever deny the public a referendum, which is what is promised under this Bill. I do not like to say it, but when my noble friend Lord Hamilton points it out, it is a fact that the British people’s trust in the institution of Parliament and the political parties within it has, in this area, been eroded over the years, particularly on issues of Europe; I sometimes think that on other issues it is grossly exaggerated. One always marvels at how many people are generally critical of the political class, but when they start talking about individuals—the hard-working Members of Parliament—they say, “Oh no, our person is splendid. It is just the general lot we do not like”. It can be overdone. However, on the issue of Europe, it is quite clear, by every measure that we have seen of the public’s support and the general tenor of the public debate, that a lack of trust is noticeable. People have been promised a referendum on a treaty change, only to see it taken away again. This is reflected in the number of people who do not value the EU, who do not trust it or who simply do not seem to grasp its work, aims or purposes. There is a sense of apathy, because people feel powerless to influence decisions which affect their daily lives. To deny this really is to shut our minds to the good and valuable side of the EU’s work, which I believe is enormous and often underestimated.
The coalition Government intend to address this cynicism, apathy and lack of trust. The aim is to reconnect the British people directly to the key decisions on the EU and assure them that, while there are now vast powers and competences in the EU’s hands, any further expansion of these would have to be very carefully argued and in many cases put to the British people for their approval. It remains a mystery to me why the Opposition still somehow argue that there should be these extra powers—that we are going to need these future treaty changes—but what for? One is left groping the air, trying to understand the mystery of it all. It is a sort of apophatic doctrine, that somehow there are issues ahead so complicated that the people cannot put them into words or understand them, and that these require the flexibility which the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, keeps returning to.
We know that the British people want a say. The June 2009 survey by the European Parliament found that eight out of 10 people in this country agreed that future EU treaty changes should be decided by referendums. Fewer than one in 10 disagreed. These amendments do not represent the modern reality about transparency and openness that we in the coalition Government want, and which reflects a modern attitude to participatory democracy. They are a step back in time which may be nostalgic and romantic, but they take us away from reality and away from the future.
I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Waddington, who is not in his place at the moment, for what he said about these proposals in Committee. He said that,
“you are moving even further away from a situation where the general public has any confidence at all that its views are considered when vital decisions are made”.—[Official Report, 16/5/11; col. 1230.]
However well intentioned these amendments, they cannot serve to enhance this Bill or its underlying virtues and purpose. The Bill is deliberately designed to set out as clearly as possible which treaty changes would require a referendum, while avoiding the need for trivial referendums. That seems to me to be a scare story which I hope we are not going to hear repeated because it is not connected with the reality, the intention or the possibilities which arise from this Bill. Leaving it to the discretion of a committee of parliamentarians to decide whether a referendum is needed will do nothing whatever to reconnect, re-engage and regain the trust of the British people. I believe this is an amendment that we could do without and that does not help the Bill or the underlying purposes, which I believe most noble Lords in all political parties and in none basically want reinforced. I think these amendments go the other way and take away from us the purposes and goals that we should be pursuing, so I ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.