Climate Risk Models

Baroness Drake Excerpts

Thursday 25th January 2024 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Baroness Drake]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment, if any, they have made of the accuracy of climate risk models used by (1) the Bank of England, (2) financial services firms, and (3) pension schemes.

[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Vere of Norbiton) (Con)]

The independent Bank of England’s climate biennial exploratory scenario builds on globally recognised scenarios from the Network for Greening the Financial System and represents an important milestone in assessing UK exposures to climate risk. However, we recognise that climate risk modelling is an evolving practice, and we support the Bank’s ongoing work to develop its modelling and supervision.

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

My Lords, the Bank of England’s job is the prudential risk management of the financial system, and it influences the conduct of firms and pension schemes, hence the concern when we learned that its scenarios concluded that it does not much matter whether temperatures rise by 1.5, 2 or 4 degrees: the effect on profits will still be relatively small. How will the Government ensure that the regulator properly oversees the risk to financial stability from more extreme weather and rapid changes in the use of energy?

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

The outcome of the CBES exercise shows that, if banks and insurers do not respond effectively, climate risk could cause a persistent and material drag on profitability: bank credit losses amounted to £110 billion over the late-action CBES scenario. But the Bank of England has always been clear that it was the first time it had done an exercise based on these scenarios, which came from 2021, as I am sure the noble Baroness knows. The NGFS has now refreshed its scenarios, publishing its latest group in November 2023; those will be used by the Bank of England and, indeed, by many other people in the financial system going forward.

King’s Speech

Baroness Drake Excerpts

Monday 13th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

My Lords, I reference my interests as a trustee in occupational and master trust pension funds. Pension funds have moved up the political agenda, as the Government focus on them as generators of investment for growth and net-zero infrastructure. The City sees them as potential inflows to make up for those lost by Brexit and to maintain its economies of scale and competitiveness.

In his Mansion House speech, the Chancellor set out proposals to support growing the economy through directing investment from funded private and public pension schemes into productive assets, including private equity and new businesses. He set out three golden rules: to secure the best possible outcomes for pension savers, with any changes to investment structures putting their needs first; to prioritise a strong and diversified gilt market, recognising its importance in debt funding to government; and to strengthen the UK’s competitive position as a listing destination and leading financial centre.

Alignment of the UK’s economic growth with the interests of millions of workers’ pensions savings is an aspiration clearly to support. How that alignment is achieved is where the challenge lies—how conflicts of interest are reconciled, who benefits, who bears what risks, the governance in investment structures and the governance of political decision-making.

Greater state intervention into the investment of private savings is being prepared. The prospect of government mandating how assets are invested was trialled in the December 2021 letter signed by the then Prime Minister and Chancellor. Political mandation would supplant fiduciary duty in investment decisions. Once that precedent is set in law, a Pandora’s box opens up on the extent and specificity of subsequent government mandates imposed on private assets. Mandation poses many problems, including undermining public confidence in auto-enrolment. It would be better for government to create the right conditions for attracting investment in productive finance, and the capital will follow.

As to those conditions, in the large funded public schemes, such as local government, the Government have greater powers to influence, but most private defined benefit schemes are closed. By the end of the decade, over half of their assets and liabilities will have been bought out by insurers. The remaining closed schemes will be cash-flow negative. The decline in DB pension savings, the drive to productive investment and the negative shift in market sentiment raise important questions for the future gilt market—no wonder they form part of the three golden rules that the Chancellor set.

Through automatic enrolment, funds in DC schemes will rise to well over £l trillion by 2030 and continue to grow, in effect providing capital of the future. The Mansion House aspirations expose the inefficiencies in our highly fragmented private pension market. Little is in the gracious Speech, but the Autumn Statement may address how to consolidate and scale up workplace pension schemes and how to get them to invest in start-ups and desirable infrastructure.

Consolidation to create scale is necessary to enable lower costs, better governance and increased investment capacity and capability. However, the Government must also address other inefficiencies, such as the existence of many millions of disaggregated small pension pots, which are inhibiting long-term investment. The assumption that more illiquid, higher-risk investments will produce better outcomes for savers comes with many dependencies, not least charges. In its new value assessment framework for pension funds, the Treasury chose a gross, rather than a net, investment performance metric. This is deeply disappointing, and in my view fails the Chancellor’s golden rule spelled out at Mansion House.

The Government have to facilitate the investment opportunities and the structures and governance that enhance investment, growth and value for savers. For example, in Australia, master trusts set up collectively owned vehicles to invest in their start-ups. Major Canadian and American pension schemes have taken similar ownership steps with private equity and investments. But our economic growth requires capital from both overseas and UK investors. As my noble friend Lord Livermore stressed, that requires government to set long-term economic policy, provide the consistency needed for investor confidence and adhere to high standards of governance in decision making. These requirements have not been met in recent years.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Baroness Drake Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 6th June 2023 Lords Chamber

This amendment is a logical next step to Schedule 17 to the Environment Act 2021, which, if secondary regulations are ever brought forward after over a year of delay, will ban the import of certain goods produced on illegally deforested land. This amendment would allow us to future-proof UK financial regulation so it delivers a liveable planet and a workable food system, with all the attendant benefits for global economic stability. Inaction allows these deforesting companies to continue turning a profit by undermining the basis for future prosperity. It goes absolutely in the face of everything in the Dasgupta review. I look forward to the Minister’s response, and will be testing the opinion of the House on this.

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as trustee of DB and master trusts. I will speak to Amendment 93. Government Amendment 4 is welcome because it recognises the necessary direction of travel on disclosure requirements on sustainability, but the problem is that it is not sufficient. It gives the Treasury the power to issue a policy statement on SDRs and to require the regulators to report against this, but the FCA does not have the powers to actually implement SDRs. As Amendment 93 proposes, there is a need to give the FCA the power to publish guidance on how asset managers must consider the long-term consequences of any decision; consider the impact of climate, nature and society on their investments; consider the impact of their investments on climate and nature; and publicly report on their considerations.

It is interesting that the explanatory statement accompanying the published government amendment states that it supports

“the regulation of disclosure requirements relating to sustainability”

by requiring the FCA not only to have regard to Treasury policy but to inform a policy statement by the Treasury. It is difficult to see how the FCA could optimally inform Treasury policy if it does not set guidance on expected content and open reporting by asset managers on the impact of their investment decision-making.

Confusion among fiduciaries about the extent of their duty to consider such impacts is not limited to occupational pension schemes; it runs across the length of the investment chain. The FCA has broad powers to issue guidance under Section 139A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, but there is still an ambiguity. Amendment 93 gives the FCA the explicit power to issue guidance on the disclosure of considerations of sustainability impacts as a core part of the investment managers’ duties. This is not inconsistent with the existing duty on trustees, in Regulation 2 of the occupational pensions investment regulations, to report on how they have complied with the Section 35 duties of the Pensions Act 1995.

The proposed FCA guidance is not legally binding: regulated firms would be free to diverge from it, but there is an expectation that they would need to explain why they have done so. There is a need to apply the guidance to contract-based personal pension schemes as well, to avoid the risk of regulatory arbitrage between a weaker FCA regime and a more robust TPR disclosure regime.

The concept of fiduciary duty borne by those responsible for the best interests of pension scheme members is evolving, and, as we heard, the Government’s updated green finance strategy of 2023 includes a commitment to review pension trustees’ fiduciary duties and stewardship activities. That trustees must act in the best interests of scheme members must not be a principle in doubt or, indeed, overridden. The key issue is what “acting in savers’ best interests” means in law for fiduciaries, and the extent to which it includes stewardship and ESG engagement. If fiduciaries ignore the impacts of investment strategies on society, climate and nature, or vice versa, those major externalities will eventually impact them at a later date.

In seeking more productive investment by the finance sector, the Government should acknowledge that pension funds are not the only decision-maker or the beginning and end of the problem; asset managers have an equally key role to play in managing impacts and considering the long-term consequences. Amending FCA regulation powers to guide open reporting on these matters will encourage investment away from environmentally and socially damaging activities, and towards supporting efficient transition to net zero, nature protection and healthy societies, in a way that is in the savers’ best interests and that supports the successful transition of the wider economy.

Guidance from regulators is required along the length of the investment chains as risks become more acute. Pension schemes contract with fund managers to manage assets. If schemes are expected to consider the sustainability of their investments, they need fund managers to support them by undertaking that activity too. Trustees’ ability to discharge their ESG and stewardship responsibilities to greatest effect has a dependency on how regulators expect asset managers to discharge their duties. Expectations placed on pension funds and asset managers are a complement to, not a substitute for, government policies on efficient transition to a sustainable economic future. Government regulations that perversely drive greenwashing or green asset bubble risk are equally unsustainable.

The Government want to see more productive investment by the financial sector, but mandating how citizens’ private assets are invested would displace trustee fiduciary duty with state control of private assets, inviting litigation and risking impacting public attitudes to private saving. But, in giving the FCA power to guide the content and require open reporting on sustainability, Amendment 93 can assist confidence in aligning members’ best interests with increasing productive investment. I commend it to the House.

[Lord Naseby (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome Amendment 4. Having listened to my noble friend on the Front Bench in Committee and subsequently, I know that she played a major role in this absolutely vital amendment coming forward.

The noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, was quite right. Let us reflect on two key areas where we desperately need the SDR policy statement. First, in terms of the energy market, is the national grid. Today, all sorts of decisions have to be made by the energy market, whether on nuclear, solar or whatever else. People in that market want to know at what point the national grid will be in a position to be connected to them—that is absolutely key to sustainability.

Secondly, in my judgment, the public in general are confused and have no understanding of what they should do about making their contribution to net zero with the condition of their property. Some of us had a good briefing on that situation from the building society movement today. We must address this. But the principle is here, and I thank my noble friend on the Front Bench for how it has come forward.

I declare an interest as a trustee of the Parliamentary Contributory Pension Fund. Noble colleagues will not be members of it unless they have been in the other place or are ministerial colleagues. Nevertheless, I can assure anybody who knows anything about that particular area that, in my judgment, our fund—given the care and attention paid by its chairman and the members in terms of the time put in freely and the trouble that is taken to ensure that we listen to asset managers, question asset management and challenge the advisers we have—is aware of government policy, whatever it may be. Yes, we welcome guidance and particular in- depth information. But—and this is a very big “but” in capital letters—our primary duty is to the membership and the beneficiaries, and we must never forget that. We are not there to take risks, unless we really have to take them, and we debate these issues.

All I will say in relation to the forestry dimension is that I do not welcome that particular one more than any other. I want concrete material that is of benefit to those who are the beneficiaries. With that, I do not think that I need to say any more.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Baroness Drake Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 7th March 2023 Grand Committee

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

I apologise; I am completely confused.

The due diligence system reintroduced for companies under Schedule 17 to the Environment Act is world-leading in its intentions. However, we have to finish the job to end our financing of deforestation. The GRI Taskforce has been unequivocal in its advice that financial actors should conduct deforestation due diligence too for their own sake as well as for everyone else’s. In the meantime, as somebody mentioned last time, Britain’s financial institutions are contributing $16.6 billion to businesses implicated in deforestation.

This is a huge global issue. Experts say that we must end commodity-driven deforestation by 2025 if we are to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees centigrade. At present, as a result of those investments, climate-critical tropical forests are shrinking. This is absolutely appalling. The UN’s high-level climate champions have begun to refer to deforestation as the new coal in investors’ portfolios. There should be no investment in companies involved in deforestation. It is quite simple.

The amendment responds powerfully to the GRI Taskforce’s advice. It has significant cross-party backing in the House of Commons. The Government are inclined to go for a weaker policy against the advice of their own expert task force on deforestation. I hope that the Minister will do all she can to persuade her colleagues in the other place to support Amendment 199 before Report. Rishi Sunak has promised that the UK

“will be the world’s first net zero financial centre”.

His support for Amendment 199 is an obvious step on the way. I thank the WWF, Greenpeace, Global Witness and Mighty Earth for their excellent joint briefing. I call on all noble Lords to support Amendment 199.

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 168 and 201. I refer to my interests as a trustee of defined benefit and master trust pension schemes.

The loss of financial stability can occur quickly. History shows us that risks that crystallised and caused that instability were often insufficiently captured by regulators and that actions to mitigate their impact were not taken in good time. It would be extraordinary for any Government to believe that financial regulators could deliver the objectives of competitiveness and sustainable growth without embedding in that delivery the finance sector’s response to climate risk.

Climate change brings immense risk, but it is not specifically factored into either the regulatory capital risk requirement for banks or the solvency requirements for insurers. We already see the weaknesses: banks and insurers still retain exposure to fossil fuel investments and a significant number of the largest UK banks do not have interim targets to cut funded emissions. I could quote many other statistics to confirm that weakness.

As the Bank of England stated in the executive summary of the Results of the 2021 Climate Biennial Exploratory Scenario, its assessment is that UK banks and insurers still need to do much more to understand and manage their exposure to climate risks. The Bank admits that there is a lack not only of managing that exposure but of understanding it. That makes Amendment 168 important in calling for a PRA review of capital adequacy and solvency capital requirements, having regard to the full implications of climate change physical, transitional and liability risks and for financial stability.

Failing effectively to factor climate risks into regulatory requirements tolerates the failure of firms that make unwise bets on the continuation of “business as usual”. Inevitably, it necessitates government intervention, socialising of losses and consequences for taxpayers. When a similar amendment was sought previously, the Government argued that the CBES work that I have just referred to would assess the implications of climate change risks for investment, stranded assets and financial stability. However, we have heard from speakers in this debate, including my noble friend Lady Worthington, and read from informed commentators worrying concerns with the work, reinforcing the need for the PRA to review its risk assessment approach and modelling. In a Policy Exchange publication, the former chief economist of ING Group put those concerns succinctly when he concluded that

“central bank scenarios have been based on assumptions and models which ignore or downplay crucial elements of climate risk and critical triggers, tipping points and interdependencies between climate, economy, politics, finance and technology”.

As has just been referred to, the Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak, promised that the UK would create the world’s first net-zero financial centre. However, London recently lost its position as Europe’s most valuable stock market to Paris. The London market is more heavily exposed to unpredictable sectors such as mining and oils and we now see the issue of listings emerging as a problem.

Achieving a net-zero financial sector requires regulators having the necessary mandate and accountability. The finance sector’s practices, as a major investor in companies and as an insurance underwriter, have a vital role to play in the transition towards zero carbon. In an area with which I am familiar, the closure of private defined benefit pension schemes has been followed by an accelerating trend for trustees to enter buy-out financial agreements with insurance companies, paying premiums in return for individual annuity policies covering members, with assets and liabilities transferring to insurers.

Buy-in is also occurring, such as the record-breaking £6.5 billion buy-in recently by the RSA pension scheme. That market saw a £30 billion transfer in 2022 of pension liability to insurers. It could exceed £40 billion in 2023. There were many billions that preceded 2022 and the trend means that there will be many more in 2024. Auto-enrolment means that billions of pounds of defined contributions are being invested each year. The market is consolidating into fewer master trusts, some set up by vertically integrated finance companies that also manage the assets in those trusts, and individual pensioners. Tomorrow’s pensioners will be much more dependent on insurer stability. That clearly reinforces the need for the PRA review and for raising the bar on the investment duties of asset managers, as Amendment 201 seeks, by requiring the FCA to publish guidance on the consideration by investment managers of the long-term consequences of decisions, the societal and environmental impact of investments, standards of conduct in governance and transparency of reporting.

The UK Sustainable Investment and Finance Association reports that it continues to see a common lack of understanding within financial services on the extent to which ESG factors form a core component of investors’ fiduciary duties. The Principles for Responsible Investment Association similarly identified that lack of understanding and recommended further regulator guidance. As a jobbing trustee, for want of a better phrase, there is a part of me that wonders to what extent there is such a lack of understanding, rather than a reluctance to understand, but there is a problem. The investment association found that only 14% of members incorporated ESG across their entire portfolio in 2019, while 44% said that it accounted for less than 25% of their portfolio.

The Government want to see more productive investment by the financial sector. For government to direct how citizens’ private assets are invested would displace fiduciary duties which rest with trustees, providers and asset managers and raise issues of state liability, political expediency trumping best interest and litigation. Amendment 201 could assist regulators, providers and asset managers in considering decisions on productive investment consistent with fiduciary duties and identifying the barriers to aligning these. We can perhaps address some of those barriers on another amendment later in the Bill.

However, the ability of trustees to discharge their ESG and climate risk duties to greatest effect has a clear dependency on how regulators expect asset managers to discharge their duties. We cannot do ours well unless asset managers do theirs well, too. It also depends on central bank scenarios and the regulation of the finance sector’s response to climate risk, because it will influence attitudes and the value of different assets. The whole eco- system needs improvement in both transparency and due diligence. The two amendments that I speak to, on the PRA reviewing its whole approach to modelling, regulating and embedding climate risk, and the contribution that asset managers are required to make to mitigating climate risk, both have merit and are badly needed.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Lords, I will address the amendments just addressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, and others, which are intended to discourage investment in fossil fuels. There are two routes to net zero: one is to phase out demand, which is the route that we have adopted in this country. My noble friend Lord Deben, who is not here today, provides guidance and forecasts to the Government on how to phase out that demand to meet net zero by 2050. That is the sensible way of doing it. The alternative is to try to phase out supply. If fossil fuel producers invest in more production capacity for those fuels than is needed for declining demand, they will lose money. They may even be left with oilfields that have not been fully depleted —it could not happen to a nicer bunch of people.

I am really touched that so many green noble Lords and noble Baronesses are determined to protect the oil industry from losing money. That is not their real intent, of course; that is to discourage investment and reduce it as fast as possible, if need be by reducing the supply of fossil fuels faster than we reduce demand for them. If they achieve that, we will have a shortage of fossil fuels. We will have rising prices with those shortages and will have done to ourselves exactly what Putin has done at the moment. Is that what they want?

Noble Lords pretend on the first argument that they want to save the banks and the industry from being left with stranded assets. As I say, it is touching that they should be so concerned about them, but why do they think they are better at forecasting the future demand and supply balance for fossil fuels than the oil companies and others whose business it is, or others in the City whose business it is to try to work out whether it is worth investing? I used to be an energy analyst in the City; it was my job to try to forecast these things. In some years, I was the most highly rated analyst in the City on these matters, presumably because I was making long-term forecasts and no one could tell that they would prove wrong. But the idea that the PRC knows better than people in the City—

Savings (Government Contributions) Bill

Baroness Drake Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & 3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 12th January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

My Lords, increasing saving in the UK is good for people and for the economy. In recent years, the Government have introduced a raft of reforms to incentivise saving. Freedom on accessing pension saving and LISA are just two. The Explanatory Notes observe that this,

“range of reforms”,

is needed,

“to ensure that the right incentives and products are in place to meet savers’ needs”.

Unfortunately, it is increasingly difficult to understand exactly what the Government’s strategy is for savings, and for pension savings in particular. What are the “right incentives”, and why? What outcomes are they intended to achieve? What are the characteristics of the “right products”? Do they differ for different groups? What is the Government’s intention on tax relief to support savings? For employers, providers and consumers, the answers are increasingly confusing, complex and uncertain.

A LISA is another new savings product, but its introduction raises two fears that the Government have not addressed. The first concerns the risk that some people will opt out of a workplace pension in order to save into a LISA, believing that it offers a better proposition when it does not. The second is that the LISA is a government stalking-horse to trail the reform of pension tax relief and replace current workplace pension arrangements with a pension ISA. That would mean that the current pension saving regime—whereby income paid in pension contributions and investment growth on savings are both tax free and on retirement when savings are withdrawn, the first 25% is tax free, the rest being subject to tax—would be replaced with an ISA regime where contributions are made from taxed income but investment growth on savings and future withdrawals are tax-free.

Those fears germinated when, in July 2015, the Government issued Strengthening the Incentive to Save: Consultation on Pensions Tax Relief. Concerns grew that the Government wanted to address current fiscal demands and reduce the current budget deficit by heavily reducing pension tax relief at the point of saving, which, for those who had those concerns, would be at the expense of building an adequate level of pensions savings, undermine the momentum in workplace pension saving, have a negative long-term impact on the Exchequer, and mean that people retiring in the future would make a limited tax contribution but consume high levels of public services, which would be deeply unfair on future generations. Pensioners on modest retirement incomes would lose out from the removal of tax relief at the point of saving and gain little from tax-free withdrawal of savings as they would not be paying tax anyway.

A fairer distribution of pension tax relief from the higher to the lower-paid saver is desirable. What is a sustainable level of fiscal support for long-term savings, given today’s public deficit and debt, is a legitimate question. Tax relief for private pension contributions through incentives to employers and employees is big—£48 billion last year, although that is a noticeable fall on previous years, with the lion’s share going into defined benefit schemes. But there is a real tension that the Government are not acknowledging between a Treasury that sees tax relief at the point of saving as an undesirable cost, given the current state of public finances and Brexit anxieties, and those who believe that tax relief at the point of saving is an integral part of supporting people in building an adequate and sustainable pensions system for the future.

Under current arrangements, an individual choosing a LISA rather than a workplace pension may end up with a smaller savings pot in later life—50% smaller. For a basic rate taxpayer saving into a workplace pension, 50%—half—of the minimum 8% contribution would come from the employer contribution and tax relief. If they opted into a LISA, they would receive only a 25% bonus from the Government on their savings from taxed income. The more generous the employer pension contribution, the greater the potential loss from saving into a LISA rather than a pension.

The LISA is a long-term saving product, with penalties for early access, with the exception of the add-on access for house purchase, but ISAs do not have the governance, value for money and regulatory requirements that workplace pensions have. Mis-selling risks abound. The Financial Secretary to the Treasury commented in the other place that,

“we heard that the pensions system on its own is too inflexible for young people”,

so the LISA is,

“giving people a new option that has been designed with flexibility in mind”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/10/16; col. 606.]

But the DWP evidence contradicts her. It reveals that young people have the lowest opt-out rate from auto-enrolment of any group. If there is a problem with accumulating savings for house purchase, Help to Buy schemes are the answer, not a new, long-term saving product.

The Treasury costings do not assume that people will opt out of their workplace pensions to pay into a LISA. That may be right: the majority of people save into a pension by inertia. But if the Government turn pensions into an ISA into which employers auto-enrol their workers, workers will save into an ISA through inertia too. The concern is that that is exactly what the Government intend to do. A LISA is likely to be of benefit to people who have reached the limit of their allowance in tax-free pension saving, or who earn sufficient to save in both a LISA and a workplace pension. That may well increase the UK’s savings rate—there may be an element of substitution. It will provide a new option for the younger self-employed—40 is the age limit for opening a LISA—but, given that the average age of self-employed people is 47, it will not be accessible to the majority.

The real concern with the LISA is that the Government are further blurring the line of vision on savings. The distinct concept of pensions saving is at risk. The Minister may well dismiss my concerns, but if employers are not confident in the direction of government policy on private pensions, that will influence their behaviour and put a downward pressure on employer contributions into workplace pensions. I believe firmly that it is already happening.

Financial capability in the UK is persistently low, so measures to tackle persistent undersaving are welcome. The Money Advice Service 2015 Financial Capability Survey highlighted that lack of saving is a key risk to the financial resilience of households. The statistics make depressing reading: 17.3 million—44% of the working-age population—do not have £100 in savings; only four in every 10 save something every month; low income is a barrier to saving for families with children and those paying down debt; 44% of working-age people in the UK with no savings are classed as overindebted. But some on lower incomes do save: 26% of working-age adults in households with incomes below £17,500 are saving every month. A buffer against financial shocks helps to avoid inappropriate debt. For a mum in a low-income household with young children, replacing a broken washing machine is her financial shock. Some 71% of adults experienced an unexpected bill in the past 12 months, resulting in unexpected costs of some £1,545, yet of the people with no savings, 76% could not spare the money to pay an unexpected bill of even £300.

The Government’s Help to Save scheme is welcome as a measure to help boost the resilience of low-income households. I just wish that the Government were more ambitious, particularly given their recent high-profile commitment to address the challenges faced by those who are just about managing. The Help to Save scheme is targeted at 3.5 million people in lower-income households, costing up to £70 million in 2020-21. This compares with the expected cost of £850 million a year by 2020-21 of the LISA bonuses and increase in ISA limits. A fairer distribution of those incentives should have been considered.

The intended government match on savings up to £50 per month could be greater than 50%. Many of the target population will not be able to save £50. If they save £30, with a match, it will take them two years to save the £1,000 figure which StepChange, the debt charity, says is the minimum amount needed to reduce the number in problem debt by 500,000. Why is it necessary to wait two years before the match is paid? Financial shocks can hit people every year. The Government argue that two years is the optimal time to embed a savings habit, but their own evidence suggests it can be nearer 18 months.

Only one in seven, 500,000 of the target 3.5 million, are expected to take advantage of the scheme. That is low. The Government have a lot of contact with this group through the social security system, so I conclude by asking the Minister whether the Government will commit to bringing forward a plan, no later than six months after Royal Assent, which targets achieving a 50% participation rate by the eligible population in the Help to Save scheme.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

It is an important but esoteric point. If I may, I will write to the noble Lord. I am sure that in time I will understand these arrangements better. On his point about saving on behalf of others, individuals will pay into accounts and receive a government bonus. There will be no restrictions on what individuals do with the bonus or savings, or where the money has come from. However, HMRC will carry out additional checks on a number of accounts and will respond to any intelligence it receives from third parties where this gives rise to doubt about a person’s eligibility.

The noble Lord asked about the Government’s latest position on borrowing from lifetime ISAs. The Government continue to consider whether there should be flexibility to borrow funds from an individual’s lifetime ISA without incurring a charge if funds are fully repaid, but have decided that it will not be a feature when it becomes available in April 2017.

The noble Baroness, Lady Drake, said that the Help to Save scheme was not generous enough. On increasing the 50% bonus, our pilots for the saving gateway showed that a higher match rate of 100% made people only 5% more likely to open an account than a 50% match, and the amount of money saved into accounts was not significantly affected. On the two-year bonus period, I can make it clear that no one will be penalised for early withdrawals if they need to make any. The rationale of the scheme is to encourage people to develop a regular savings habit that will last beyond their participation in the scheme because it is valuable more generally.

[Baroness Drake]

I appreciate that this is a money Bill, but on the noble Baroness’s last point—I really do want the Help to Save scheme to work—the fact that the evidence shows that a matching contribution from the Government raises the participation rate by only 5% is not a reason not to match, because for those who are participating, their resilience is greater. A sort of apples-and-pears argument is being deployed here. A more generous match increases the resilience of those who do participate.

On the participation rate, all the behavioural evidence is that simply having good information does not necessarily deliver the level of behavioural response. More of a nudge, more of an active plan, may deliver more than a one-in-seven participation rate.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

I take note of the noble Baroness’s point. There is a balance here. I have set out why we have got to where we have got to. Indeed, I look forward to debates on the statutory instruments for this Bill in the fullness of time. I am sure nobody has ever said that before.

The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, asked about other providers. He referenced a discussion in the other place about the involvement of credit unions. We have appointed NS&I as the scheme provider to remove significant administrative and compliance costs associated with allowing different providers to offer accounts. An option where we fund NS&I to provide accounts while allowing other providers to offer accounts on a voluntary basis would not provide value for money, but—this answers his question—we shall not rule out the option for a range of providers to offer accounts as long as they deliver national coverage. We felt that the credit union did not do that. That is why the Bill has been drafted to accommodate different models of account provision, although other models are not in the current plan.

Queen’s Speech

Baroness Drake Excerpts

Wednesday 25th May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

My Lords, the gracious Speech heralds yet another pensions Bill, and recent Budgets have been characterised by intense speculation prior to yet more changes to the savings regime. There has been so much change but so little clarity on the long-term objectives of government savings policy. People are not sure where the Chancellor is going, and they certainly do not know what will happen next. The behavioural response of employers, consumers and the market to these changes is not fully considered. Freedoms and choice exercised in a market where the consumer side remains weak and conflicts of interest prevail results in ever more regulation and complexity, yet there has been a limited attempt to build a consensus.

Pension policy has a 30-year incubation period. It is a responsibility to be shared by Chancellors across the generations. No one can claim to have delivered the answer, as they can never be around to see it to fruition. There has been much comment about the lifetime ISA and whether it will compete with savings under auto-enrolment. My concern is less with that risk and more with what that decision trails for future policy. What is a sustainable and fair level of tax relief for long-term saving is an important issue and a legitimate question. However, I fear that the Chancellor may proceed to snatch defeat from the jaws of the auto-enrolment victory. There needs to be a more open consensus about the impact of any change, not only on today’s fiscal deficit but on the impact over the longer term.

Auto-enrolment gets people saving through harnessing inertia, but employers and their contributions are key to its success and the overall level of savings. Yet the Government’s consultation document on tax relief made no reference to the employer role until the penultimate paragraph. The emphasis was all on the individual voluntary incentive to save—a very significant shift in policy thinking but with little evidence of the analysis of the behavioural implications.

Auto-enrolment has seen millions start to save, but their savings need to be held in institutions that are fit for purpose. Workers in master trusts represent the biggest group of new pension savers: some 6 million. However, these trusts require no licence to operate, there are few quality standards for market entry, and unsustainable players are putting savings at risk. Some 59 master trusts are used for automatic enrolment. They cannot all achieve the necessary scale to survive. Yet there is no infrastructure or legislation in place to support the wind-up of such a trust and protect workers’ savings. The proposed tougher regulation announced in the gracious Speech is long overdue.

Individuals are required to take increasing responsibility for their own financial planning, so the Government’s intention to introduce a pensions guidance body and a money guidance body providing access to guidance on debt and on money is welcome. However, pensions guidance needs to be impartial and provided by guiders who have a depth of knowledge and expertise. Without that expertise, guidance becomes merely an information service. It does not add value; it simply replicates what providers routinely offer and does not fill the market gap. People have low levels of knowledge, and the presenting question is often not the issue. The diagnostic of the customer’s issues is key to adding value from the guidance, and, without those elements, it will not deliver what people need.

The Bank of England chief economist, Andy Haldane, speaking recently at the think tank New City Agenda, suggested that even advisers do not understand pensions, admitting that he too cannot make sense of the increasingly complex pensions market. He also referred to providers having made financial products difficult for the public to understand and more complex than necessary, with consumers charged a premium for buying them. He suggested that such complexity is a desperately poor basis for sound financial planning and that the problem is becoming more acute because more of the risk associated with financial decisions is being shouldered not by the state or companies but by individuals.

However, guidance and financial education can achieve only so much. We keep coming back to the profound need to change the behaviour of the providers in the market. For example, achieving transparency of disclosure of transaction costs on savers’ assets is still unfinished business, but I assure noble Lords that resistance is alive and well. Which provider will be the first to break rank and release their costs if they think it is to their detriment? There are so many costs outside those that the saver is told about. Many of the implicit costs are hidden in the change in the market value of assets. However, as the Transparency Task Force observed recently, it is actually even worse—some costs or revenues do not show up anywhere. Without further action by government on compelling disclosure, the desired transparency will not be achieved and the markets will remain unfair.

Finally, I too congratulate the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Newcastle on her maiden speech. Her passion for the people of the north-east shone through and she certainly did them proud.

Queen’s Speech

Baroness Drake Excerpts

Thursday 4th June 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

My Lords, the Governor of the Bank of England recently stressed that productivity performance is the single most important driver of prosperity and growth in wages, but productivity in the UK has not improved in eight years, breaking a trend of around 2% annual growth. The FT reports the Conference Board as showing that, on the measure of total-factor productivity, the UK has suffered three consecutive annual falls. The drop in productivity growth is a global problem, but, as the IMF observed, it is deeper in Britain than in any other member of the G7. The ONS reports that UK productivity slow-down is three times as great as in the rest of the G7.

The Government have announced through Her Majesty’s gracious Speech a series of supply-side reforms. The MPC offers three possible explanations for the problem: low interest rates and lenders’ reluctance to crystallise losses, allowing inefficient businesses to survive; weak business investment; and the growing proportion of lower-skilled employees, which has been bad for output per hour. I comment on this latter explanation.

The UK has a flexible labour market, and the Chancellor’s further drive to deregulate it has not made productivity rise. Indeed, it fell in the last quarter of 2014. Wages may have begun to increase, but productivity has to improve if growth in real earnings is to be sustained. The Government should consider raising the national minimum wage to much nearer the living wage as part of their portfolio of measures to drive inefficient firms to be more productive, to reduce welfare expenditure and to raise the living standards of lower earners.

According to the Centre for Policy Studies, the evidence suggests that increases in labour costs in low-paying firms have been met by increases in labour productivity, not from reductions in employment but from increases in total-factor productivity, and that raising wages at the lower end of the labour market can improve productivity. One hundred and forty research projects from the Low Pay Commission show that the minimum wage had little negative effect on employment even when the rate increased faster than average wages. Yet some sectors and businesses remain stuck in a low-pay, low-productivity cycle that is self-perpetuating. The way in which some companies operate means that increasing numbers of workers are reliant on in-work benefits. In 2014, around 1.2 million over-21s earned the minimum wage, a proportion doubled since 1999, and a further 1.1 million earned within 50p of that minimum. This year, nearly £30 billion will be spent on tax credits to top up the low wages of those in work. Taxpayers are subsidising company pay bills. Seventy per cent of tax credits are paid to in-work families and by far the biggest increase in the tax credit bill has gone to such families, not to out-of work families.

The CPS, whose head of economic research argues the case for raising the national minimum wage as part of a portfolio of measures, demonstrates using data from the Labour Force Survey and the IFS that for every £1 increase in low wages the Government get a 50p fiscal boost due to lower welfare payments and higher tax revenue from higher incomes. Only a quarter of FTSE 100 companies have signed up to the living wage.

Too many British businesses operate on low wages and low productivity. The overall rate of return for British companies in 2014 hit its highest level in nearly 20 years. Profits drive growth and employment. Successful businesses are the bedrock of a growing economy. However, recent growth has within it declining labour productivity and a polarisation of jobs. The employer benefits from flexibility, but risks are transferred from the employer, through the employee, to the taxpayer. When an employer has a limited obligation in the wages they pay, the universal credit system takes the downside risk. This is a disincentive on employers to increase their productivity. Simply cutting tax credits without increasing the minimum wage will simply make working families poorer and reduce productivity even further.

Yes, low-paid workers should be able to keep more of what they earn and be better off in work. The Government are focused on increasing the personal tax allowance to address low pay. However, they are also reducing the work allowance—it is frozen for three years—which is the amount a family can earn before benefits are reduced and is crucial to making work pay. It is an inefficient way of improving incomes for many working families, because increases in net income as a result of reduced income tax payments increase household income brought to account for some benefit purposes and universal credit, thereby reducing the value of benefits received and offsetting the reduced income tax gains.

If low earners were taxed less and paid a higher national minimum wage, public expenditure on in-work benefits would be less, incentives to work would almost certainly be stronger, and companies would be incentivised to increase productivity. It would also benefit the many part-time employees on very low earnings who pay little or no income tax and so benefit little from increases in the personal tax allowance.

I conclude by congratulating the noble Lord, Lord O’Neill of Gatley, on his maiden speech. I hope his desire to increase productivity and drive growth throughout the north and other areas of the country remains a passion, because it certainly should be a passion.

Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Bill

Baroness Drake Excerpts

Wednesday 11th March 2015 Lords Chamber

I cannot believe that anyone would defend this practice of cancellation without pay, when the worker has turned up as required—often summoned overnight by text—and then finds themselves having to pay for the privilege of being denied work by paying for their costs out of their own pocket. I cannot believe that anyone in your Lordships’ House today would defend this practice. Along with the CBI, we all know that it is not right. With your Lordships’ help today, we could change that. I beg to move.

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

My Lords, the drive behind the amendment is to encourage employers to give workers reasonable notice before work which has been offered is withdrawn and to require, where a shift is cancelled at short notice, that workers have the right to compensation.

The recession in 2008 led to lower levels of unemployment than anticipated, due in part to employers responding by using more flexible employment to manage the consequences of the downturn. Their response heralded significant changes in the UK labour market, including a sharp increase in the use of zero-hours contracts. The ONS annual business survey of employers conducted in early 2014 estimated that there were 2.7 million zero-hour contracts on employers’ books, of which 1.4 million provided work to people and 1.3 million did not. By August, those figures had risen to 1.8 million and 1.4 million respectively. Those contracts are now common among larger employers, with 50% of those with at least 250 employees using them.

Those findings are consistent with a survey conducted by the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development. The Labour Force Survey estimated that in the last quarter of 2014, there were 697,000 people on zero-hour contracts in their main job, up from 586,000 in 2013 and 250,000 in 2012. Increased awareness following media coverage may partly explain that rise, but, as the ONS concedes, the survey may also significantly underestimate the true level because it is based on interviews with workers who often lack awareness of their type of contract. Whatever the qualifications about the data, the trend is undeniably upwards. With concentrations in sectors such as education, accommodation and food, and health and social care, women accounted for 55%, and young workers 50%, of those on those contracts.

The advantages for employers are clear: managing peaks and troughs in demand and cost-efficiencies from a supply of workers available at short notice. Zero-hours contracts may give some people choice, but others are offered them on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The ONS Labour Force Survey confirms that zero-hours workers’ average weekly earnings were just £188, compared to £479 for permanent workers. One in three has no regular amount of income and is far more likely to want more working hours compared to other types of staff.

In 2008, 19% of zero-hours contract workers reported that they were in temporary work because they could not find a permanent job. By 2014, that figure had jumped to 41%. For those in the 25 to 29 age group, more than 58% said that that was because they could not find a permanent job—a depressing statistic.

Although there is a place for such contracts in the modern economy, their misuse causes real concern. In some sectors, they are becoming the default setting. True flexibility rests in a genuine reciprocal arrangement, but the increasing body of evidence reveals an imbalance in the employment relationship, not least when the promise of work is withdrawn at short notice, leaving the worker high and dry. The imbalance means that the employer reaps the benefit of flexibility and the risks and insecurity are transferred to the worker. Employers are required to pay zero-hour contract workers only for the time that they actually work. They are under no obligation to pay an individual who, at the behest of the employer, prepares to go to work or turns up but for whom work is not provided. The employee loses the chance to earn wages and may have paid for fruitless travel costs or childcare.

Findings from the survey revealed that 46% of zero-hour staff receive little notice or find out at the start of a shift that work has been cancelled. The CBI and the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development recognise these problems. In its March 2014 zero hours briefing the CBI stated:

“An intervention which creates a simple formula for compensation … when a shift is cancelled at short notice … would be better targeted.”

Peter Cheese, chief executive of the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development told the Bill Committee that people on zero-hours contacts had concerns,

“if they were called in to work at short notice and that work was then not subsequently provided. So, for example, they had to travel for half an hour … and then be told, ‘Really sorry, but the shift is not available’. We think there should be some form of compensation for that … a reflection of what we saw as good practice”.—[Official Report, Commons, Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Public Bill Committee, 14/10/14; col. 65.]

This amendment is not challenging flexibility or making the UK labour market uncompetitive; it addresses a real and deep unfairness. When an employee is offered work which they accept and then at short notice that work is not subsequently provided, they should receive compensation. Many zero-hours workers already face a pay penalty. The unpredictability of their earnings makes it difficult to access credit or secure mortgage and tenancy agreements. Constantly varying hours impacts on families, making it difficult to organise childcare and have a social life. Compensation for employees who are offered work which at short notice is not then provided is a most modest correction to the imbalance in the employment relationship, one which my noble friend Lady Hollis has confirmed that both the CBI and the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development say they support.

An uncertain employment status can make it difficult for zero-hours contract workers to complain. If they do, they may be “zeroed out”, meaning they receive even fewer hours. This makes it even more important that regulations should require employers to pay compensation to workers whose shift is cancelled at short notice. This is not a challenge to flexibility but a call for simple fairness.

[Lord Stoneham of Droxford]

My Lords, no one wants to see exploitation of zero-hours contracts, but we need to see the wider picture. There are obviously some particular issues which need to be addressed but we need to have a wider view of the benefits of some of these practices. I obviously welcome what the Government are seeking to do on getting rid of the unwarranted exclusivity aspects of zero-hours contracts, but let us not forget that we are recovering from a recession and the most important thing in a recession is to find jobs for people. That gives them confidence and well-being. In previous recessions we found it much more difficult to get flexibility and enable jobs to be created at the pace that they have been in the last couple of years.

We may have certain concerns about the growth of zero-hours contracts, but they have certainly provided flexibility both for employers and employees in the labour market. As the labour market tightens, as we hope it will as growth picks up and productivity improves, we expect that the growth of these contracts will probably slacken because employers in a tighter labour market will have to offer permanent contracts to keep people in the jobs that they have offered them. They will obviously have to do that; that is the nature of the labour market at the moment and there has been a huge benefit to people in it remaining flexible.

We have had certain statistics about people on zero-hours contracts and we have to understand the nature of people who are doing this work. Some 17% are in full-time education, 6% are over 65; people on these contracts work more than 25 hours per week: there is no great resistance to them, in fact. We have already heard that a lot of people on these zero-hours contracts have been on them for some while. Maybe it is convenient to them as well. Some 60% have been on these contracts for more than a year, 66% do not want more hours, only 3% want additional jobs and only 10% want to change jobs to get more hours. So there are some benefits on both sides.

By all means, we should consult and review what is happening with zero-hours contracts, but wait a year or two and see whether we can maintain the growth of employment that we have had over the last couple of years and whether the economy is genuinely moving ahead before we start to interfere with these contracts in a way which could be detrimental to the growth of employment.

There are lots of other things we should be doing, such as looking at public sector contracts which are forcing some of these zero-hour practices in the public sector. I declare my interest as a director of Housing & Care 21, which is involved in the care sector, so I understand that we need to work on that area. We want also to look at the living wage but you cannot at the same time put your costs up, unless productivity is rising and we can sustain employment. There was quite an influential article in the Sunday Times a couple of weeks ago by David Smith, who said:

“People need to be safeguarded against exploitation but clamping down too hard on zero-hours contracts would risk throwing the baby out with the bathwater”.

I ask the House to be very cautious about supporting this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Drake]

My Lords, I support Amendment 74C. It is an argument that many in this Chamber are familiar with. As my noble friend Lady Hollis so clearly explained, there is a group of workers caught by the rules whereby someone has to earn in a single job an amount above the lower earnings limit—the LEL—currently £5,700 a year, to come into the national insurance system. If, however, someone has two jobs, both of which pay below £5,700, but which may still involve them working, say, 30 hours a week, they cannot add the wages of those jobs together to get above the lower earnings limit and into the national insurance system. If they are not in the national insurance system, this affects their eligibility to statutory sick pay, statutory maternity pay and the accrual of the state pension.

In the past it was thought that perhaps 50,000 people, mostly women, were affected, but the scale of the problem is now far greater because of the increase in the use of minimal-guaranteed-hours contracts in the economy, particularly over the last five to six years. It is the scale of the increase in the problem in recent years that has made this such a significant issue on the agenda—not that it was not always significant for the 50,000 people who were previously affected.

Contracts with minimal guaranteed hours deliver little or no wages in some weeks, if little or no work is offered. Workers may need several casualised jobs to get an income and may then find that not one of them pays above the £5,700 entry level for the NI system. It is estimated that two in five zero-hours contract workers earn less than £111 a week, which is the approximate weekly equivalent of £5,700. The incidence of working zero-hours contracts, agency working and limited-hours contracts has, as I said, increased since the recession and brought with it the incidence of low and unpredictable pay. As I quoted in a previous debate, in August 2014 there were some 3.2 million zero-hours contracts on employers’ books, of which 1.8 million provided work to people in the period when the survey was undertaken.

A modern welfare state has to be responsive to the realities of the contemporary labour market. In the earlier debate on zero-hours contracts we heard arguments from the Benches opposite that one has to keep flexibility in the labour market. However, if that is the case, the welfare system has to be responsive to the realities of that contemporary labour market.

Pension Schemes Bill

Baroness Drake Excerpts

Tuesday 27th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bradley]

My Lords, this amendment is connected to Amendment 22. We had an extremely interesting debate in Committee on the merits of what is known as the second line of defence, and I am pleased that we are able to return to it today as a result of our amendment.

I preface my brief remarks on this matter with our general approach to the Bill throughout its passage in the House. While we broadly support the new freedoms and flexibilities in the Bill and its related Bill on taxation, we have sought throughout to ensure that the interests of pensioners—customers—are protected in what has often been a very dysfunctional annuities market. Our overriding aim has been to ensure that those protections for the public are in place before the Bill is enacted at the beginning of April.

To return to this specific amendment, we argued in Committee that a second line of defence was vital. We discussed evidence from two reports from the Financial Conduct Authority, quoted in Committee, that the market is often not functioning as it should and is letting consumers down. We believed that action was needed immediately to protect savers when making possibly the most complex financial decision that they will ever have to make.

In Committee, the Minister did not seem to accept that action for a second line of defence should be in place by April this year, when the new freedoms and flexibilities are implemented. Instead, he suggested that, because the FCA is a relatively new body with new powers, and has committed to reviewing all its rules in the first half of this year, we should in effect await the outcome of its deliberations before any further action was taken. In response to the Minister, I said that while I would reflect on what he had said, I believed that the public sought reassurance and the confidence that a second line of defence would give them. That is why we have continued to champion a second line of defence throughout the passage of the Bill in both Houses, as have many pension groups and organisations outside this House.

I and my noble friends therefore welcome the Government’s apparent change of heart today, and the fact that they have recognised the strength of the arguments to protect pensioners that we have been making. It is with pleasure we received, and read, the very welcome letter from the Financial Conduct Authority, dated 26 January, saying that it would ensure the,

“appropriate protection of consumers, accessing their pension saving”.

This is extremely welcome, and starts to put together a proper second line of defence.

At this stage of the debate, though, I have three questions for the Minister. First, as the letter says:

“Subject to agreement of the Board, we are minded that it is appropriate to bring these rules into force on a temporary basis from 6 April, and prior to consultation, to provide important additional protection for consumers”.

Will the Minister confirm that the Board will agree to putting this second line of defence in place and that, at a future stage, the Board may decide that it is not necessary?

Secondly, the letter goes on to say:

“As part of that consultation we will also consult on whether to retain or modify the temporary rules that we are proposing to introduce in April”.

Will the Minister assure the House that, after the temporary period that the Financial Conduct Authority is proposing, there are no circumstances in which it would then remove the second line of defence?

Thirdly, in relation to trust-based schemes, it is my understanding that the Pensions Regulator is responsible for these schemes, not the Financial Conduct Authority. Will the Minister assure the House that similar protections for trust-based defined contribution schemes will be made by the Pensions Regulator, in parallel with the FCA?

The merits for a second line of defence seem now to be accepted. I look forward to the Minister’s responses.

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

My Lords, I had a lengthy and impassioned speech prepared on the need for a second line of defence to address the risks that pension savers might make detrimental and irreversible choices when they access their savings. However, this has been tempered by the letter from the FCA, so my contribution is shorter and less passionate as a consequence.

This amendment sets out a duty on the Financial Conduct Authority to protect savers accessing their pension savings when they are engaging with providers during the decision-making and purchasing process. This is distinct from the duty on the FCA to protect savers receiving guidance from designated guidance providers.

The guidance guarantee, now referred to as Pension Wise, is a key measure for helping people navigate the complex retirement options arena from April 2015. There are people working hard to make its delivery a success, as it will provide a very important service to savers. The FCA will expect providers to check whether a customer has used the guidance service and, if not, to encourage them to do so. In popular parlance, this is the first line of defence.

Beyond the guidance stage, the saver has to move to the process of making a decision, and of selecting or purchasing a retirement income route. It is what happens at this stage—the exchange between the consumer and the provider—that is causing so much anxiety and to which the amendment is directed. It puts a duty on the FCA to secure an appropriate degree of protection for the consumer at that stage. This is what is popularly referred to as the second line of defence.

As my noble friend has said, we have now received the letter from Mr Woolard, Director, Strategy and Competition at the FCA, advising that FCA board approval is being sought for this second line of defence. It is minded to bring these rules into force on 6 April 2015, pending a review of all the current regulatory requirements around the customer’s interaction with the providers. The CEO and chair of the FCA have made some thoughtful and welcome speeches that have set the framework for debate in addressing the challenge of poorly functioning financial services markets.

The recent FCA reports on retirement income markets have been hard hitting and on the nail. It is worth reminding ourselves what they observed: annuity sales practices were contributing to consumers missing out on a potentially higher income; consumers’ tendency to buy from their existing provider lowered the potential for higher income; consumers will be poorly placed to drive effective competition; the retirement income market is not working well; and the introduction of greater choice and potentially more complex products will reduce consumer confidence and weaken the competitive pressures on providers to offer good value. The anxiety was that that analysis and the heightened risk of consumer detriment with the advent of the new freedoms would not translate into sufficient regulatory protection. Against that background, the FCA letter is most appreciated, although I await with interest the answers to my noble friend Lord Bradley’s three questions.

The second line of defence is not a total solution to the risk that consumers will make decisions that are not in their interest, but it will make a very important contribution to what we know is a poorly performing market. I therefore welcome the FCA letter and thank the Minister for facilitating its publication.

[Lord Hutton of Furness (Lab)]

My Lords, it has been clear to everyone following this debate about the latest tranche of pension reforms brought forward by the coalition Government that if we were to mitigate some of the obvious risks that are created by this new world of choice and flexibility at the point of retirement for people saving in DC schemes, it would be necessary to put into place something that we have now called the second line of defence.

The need for the so-called second line of defence was crystal clear quite early on. It is important that we do not treat people at the point of their retirement like children; they have saved all their lives for that point. However, the lack of a requirement to take guidance, because it is a choice or option, certainly creates a substantial risk that the benefits of the Government’s reforms—the greater freedoms—which I think most of us would welcome, could create some very unfortunate outcomes. We know from the failure of the open market option, and from previous attempts to get this right, that the real risk we need to mitigate here is that people will make the wrong decision, and in the later years of their retirement they will find that they just do not have enough money to pay their bills, and will present themselves and seek benefits. That would be a terrible outcome.

Therefore, the decision to put in place the second line of defence, which we heard recently from the FCA, is to be enormously welcomed. We do not know what this second line of defence will actually be; we do not know what will prompt them—what questions consumers will be asked by their pension provider before they take any final decisions. But at least we now have something in place that holds out the prospect that these reforms will work. There was a very real danger that if we did not put this second line of defence in place, the reforms would fail, and that the failure would live with us and haunt us for decades—people who had saved and worked hard all their lives would find themselves running out of money during their retirement. That would represent policy failure on a grand scale.

Today, therefore, we have an opportunity to make these reforms work. I suspect that means that probably we will not need a vote on my noble friend’s amendment, which, like my noble friend Lady Drake, I was very keen to support today. I hope that we would have had a majority in this House for the amendment. This prudent step is not about wrapping up these new freedoms with overly regulatory responses, and so on, but about taking the right course of action to mitigate the obvious risk of policy failure while preserving at the same time the essence of the new freedoms, which is to choose and to make personal financial decisions at the point of retirement.

So I, too, would welcome some further clarification from the Minister today about exactly how this so-called second line of defence will work. We do not know very much about it, but it has to be in place pretty quickly, and there will be lots of concerns out there about exactly what it will mean and who will effectively have the responsibility to enforce it and oversee it.

Pension Schemes Bill

Baroness Drake Excerpts

Tuesday 27th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, for his contribution and recognise that “decumulation” might be jargonistic—I am sure that I have used jargon myself—but “rip-off” certainly is not, and I think we agree that we do not want rip-off charges. The Government are as much against them as the Opposition, I am sure. I will do my best to answer the specific points that the noble Lord raised.

This amendment was tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Bradley and Lord McAvoy, also in Committee earlier this month, so noble Lords will forgive me if I have dealt with some of this previously. As I mentioned on that occasion, the Government take the issue of charges on pension products very seriously and are committed to taking action where there is evidence of consumer detriment. I can reassure the noble Lord on that point.

I am pleased to be able to say that the Government have powers under the Pensions Act 2014—specifically, Section 43 and Schedule 18 confer them—to limit or ban charges borne by members of any pension scheme, including any new flexi-access draw-down funds, if this proves necessary to protect consumers.

Similarly, the Financial Conduct Authority has wide-ranging product intervention powers, including the ability to cap charges on flexi-access draw-down funds. These existing powers cover all the institutions that could offer such draw-down arrangements.

Flexible draw-down is a relatively niche product, aimed primarily at those savers with large pension pots. HMRC data from the start of 2014 showed that only 5,000 people per year have entered flexible draw-down, which has been in place since 2011. Flexible draw- down is clearly not currently a mass-market product.

With the introduction of the new flexibilities from April of this year, we expect this to change. We have given the industry a great deal of flexibility to develop a range of more flexible retirement income products and offer consumers greater choice. We want to see a vibrant and competitive marketplace, bringing forward products that meet consumers’ needs and enable consumers to make reasoned choices. The Government believe that a competitive market is the best way to ensure that products are well priced and we expect the expansion in take-up of draw-down products to exert a downward pressure on charges. Moreover, as scheme members can withdraw variable amounts, draw-down products generally require more administrative activity than accumulation-phase products. With the introduction of the new pension flexibilities, none of us can be absolutely certain how this market will develop. This was a point made quite fairly by both the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, in Committee.

Imposing a charge cap on draw-down at this stage, before we have seen the charges on the new products that are currently under development, could therefore risk setting a new norm and arrest any reduction in charge levels, or set a charge that is too low to be deliverable and stifle the draw-down market altogether. We therefore need to monitor how this market develops from April to gather further evidence about average charge levels before making any decision on what would be an acceptable charge level. The Government and regulators are therefore monitoring the development of new retirement income products, including the next generation of draw-down products, very closely.

Innovation and flexibility in the retirement income market must, of course, be for the benefit of consumers, not at their cost. The Government welcome the FCA’s commitment in its recent policy statement that it will commence a full review of its rules in relation to the retirement income market in the first half of this year. If these measures reveal evidence of sharp practice—rip-off charges, in the noble Lord’s phraseology—the Government and the FCA have the powers to act quickly to protect consumers. Along with the Financial Conduct Authority, we are also legislating to require reporting of charges and information on transaction costs by trustees and independent governance committees respectively of all workplace pension schemes from April this year. We are also committed to consulting further in 2015 on the transparency of additional costs and charges, to enable comparability across schemes; we will be considering draw-down funds as part of this work programme. We covered some of these transparency issues in Committee.

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

The Minister made the point that I had not heard before that, from April 2015, the independent governance committees will be invited to report on draw-down products, which is to be welcomed. Could he clarify whether the full remit of the independent governance committees will apply to draw-down products, or is it just a question of reporting?

[Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth]

As I understand it, it would certainly cover the point that the noble Baroness makes about draw-down products; it will not simply be a question of reporting.

To conclude, while the Government share the concerns about member-borne charges, the Government and regulators are equipped with the powers to cap charges in all pension schemes, including draw-down products. We feel that intervening in the market at this stage would be wrong: intervention must be based on evidence, but it is an intervention that the Government have not shied away from making elsewhere in the market. We are closely and proactively monitoring developments in the decumulation market to consider whether there is need to use those powers.

In the closing remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, in Committee, he stated his hope that we would act in the interests of consumers if we were to see excessive charges in the new draw-down products that come to market. I can reassure him that this remains our intention. I therefore respectfully ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

This is a complete mess, and frankly, the Government should be embarrassed. They are tearing up the rulebook on the treatment of capital within DWP by tearing up the rulebook on access to pensions in HMRC. Once the Government have finally got their head clear, when we may have some consistent policy between DWP and HMRC, may we hope that that same luminous clarity will be conveyed in guidance to those millions who may be affected to their detriment and who do not know what to do? That guidance is essential. I beg to move.

[Baroness Drake]

My Lords, this amendment addresses the need for the Government to make savers aware of the interplay between pension freedoms, entitlement to income-related benefits and assessment for care and support. Pension reforms give rise to a significant risk that those with modest incomes will be overtaxed when they take cash out of their pensions—a concern shared by the FCA, the Pensions Policy Institute and the International Longevity Centre.

In the face of complexity, people get security from taking cash and putting it in the bank. They may not understand that that could result in their facing a significant tax bill, generating less income for their retirement. However, that is not the end of it. Savers accessing the cash from age 55 may not understand the risk of depriving themselves of income-related benefits. Some savers therefore risk both moving into a higher tax band than normal and paying unnecessary income tax, and losing benefit income because cash in the bank means loss of entitlement to benefits.

For pension savers below the state pension age who are claiming income-related benefits, the DWP will not take into account their pension savings if they do not access them. Once they do, however, the funds accessed will be treated as income, such as an annuity, or capital, depending on how they take them; the rules are different. Savers receiving benefits—such as housing benefit, council tax deductions, income support and income-based jobseeker’s allowance—could therefore experience benefit loss if they take significant cash out of their pension pot. For example, and as my noble friend explained, under current rules, anyone below state pension age with capital below £16,000 can apply for housing benefit. When an individual’s wealth goes above £6,000, they will start to see a reduction in benefit, and once it reaches over £16,000 it will stop completely. Reductions in council tax operate on a similar principle.

For pension savers above the state pension age, under the new freedoms, as now, pension savings are taken into account when assessing entitlement to benefits —whether or not the saver has accessed them. Defined contribution pots are given a notional income, or the actual income taken from the pension pot is used. Under the new freedoms, a saver, through income draw-down, can keep varying the amount of cash that they draw down. As it is not a single decision, will people have to report every time they access their savings?

If the saver takes all of their pension pot in cash—not to behave irresponsibly but to put it on deposit in their building society—they might meet a loss of entitlement to benefit. The noble Lord, Lord Newby, in his letter to my noble friend Lady Hollis, states:

“We believe that people should use their funds responsibly if the alternative to doing so is claiming income-related benefits”.

I completely agree with that sentiment. However, that message has not been communicated clearly to people on income-related benefits or to those who are potentially on those benefits. It has been lost in the “Your Money, Your Choice” promotion. Pension savers who take the cash and put it on deposit may not believe that they are behaving irresponsibly. As Martin Wheatley of the FCA observed: when faced with complexity, people prevaricate. If the simple option of just taking the money and putting it in their bank is given to them, they may just make that snap judgment.

Where savers take the cash and go on a spending spree, they risk being caught by the “deliberate deprivation of assets” rule, which is meant to stop benefit abuse. I will paint a scenario. Complexity and behavioural bias push people towards taking cash. They are overtaxed and the value of their savings falls. The cash, put responsibly in the bank, results in a loss of benefit income so the real value of their savings falls further. If they spend their capital too aggressively they could be caught by the deliberate deprivation of assets rule. One could say that it was their freedom of choice: they made the mistake and took the cash and put it in the building society; or they blew it, so they should not be allowed to fall back on the state. However, we should at least make sure that people understand that. I am pretty confident that most people out there do not have a clue on the interface between the benefit system and the pensions freedom. If the Government want them to make an informed choice, they are entitled to and need to know.

How does one police the new arrangements? Does the DWP have the capacity to keep track of how pension cash has been spent? Will providers have to keep records of savers’ behaviour, and for how long? What if someone takes their savings in cash in their 50s, when working, and there is a long gap between taking it, spending it and seeking benefits? What evidence will be used for determining deliberate deprivation? Will it include taking too many cruises? The Government’s policy and rules need to be clear and people need to have clear information so they can take informed decisions. I do not demur from the sentiment explained by the noble Lord, Lord Newby, but at least allow people to understand how they discharge responsible behaviour.

There is also a lack of clarity on how the Government’s pension freedoms are intended to complement their policy on the provision of care and support. I have not seen any analysis that has worked through the subtleties of that interplay. Rather, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, confirmed in her letter to my noble friend Lord Hunt, the Government’s view is that the impact on care and support in the longer term is difficult to assess, because it is difficult to predict how people will behave under the new freedoms. The Government have therefore chosen a practical response on how people will contribute to the cost of care. In essence, people will be charged and assessed on the basis of their assets at the point of needing care. Cash taken from pension pots is an asset to be taken fully into account. If a saver has an annuity, that income will be taken into account. If the saver has not accessed their funds, a notional income will be calculated. These are complexities which have to be explained to the saver who is looking to make an informed decision. On the one hand, if people take all their pension fund in cash and put it in a savings account, it could be utilised more quickly when paying for care. On the other hand, if people do not take an annuity and spend their pension cash quickly, they will make less of a contribution to the funding of social care costs. This presumably has policy implications for any Government.

How will access to cash from income draw-down products be monitored or required to be taken? If draw-down is to be treated as income, could you take such a little tiny bit that you protect your pension assets and have a minimal amount taken into account? I do not have a clue and I am sure most people do not either. Will the rules require you to take a certain amount from your income draw-down product when you are being assessed for care support? I do not want to get into debate on government policy, but people need clear information on what the policy and rules are so that they can make informed decisions.