Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
Baroness Doocey Excerpts(12 years, 6 months ago)
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Baroness Doocey
My Lords, I broadly welcome the Bill, but I have some concerns about Part 1. My greatest concern is how the Bill will affect the battle against child trafficking and I endorse all the comments made in this area by other noble Lords.
It is not clear to me where responsibility will sit in the proposed new set-up or how the NCA will address the trafficking of children as part of its remit. The information available suggests that responsibility will be split between two separate operational commands of the NCA and child trafficking will not be a primary duty of either of them. If this assessment is correct, the Bill will create a very unsatisfactory situation. The ideal solution would be the establishment of a single, child-focused operational command within the NCA, whose specific remit is to deal with all child-related crime, including all forms of child trafficking and child exploitation.
I would like now to turn to budgets. The NCA will have a wider reach than its predecessors, yet it is proposed that the NCA will be delivered within the budget of its precursor organisations. This is to be achieved through effective prioritisation and smarter use of assets. But the NCA will be a major new organisation, which will require considerable IT support and equipment for it to be effective. I have great difficulty believing that this can be achieved within existing budgets.
I very much welcome the proposal to establish an intelligence hub within the NCA, but it will not be effective unless it is properly resourced, staffed with real experts, and equipped with state-of-the-art information technology. Efficient IT must play a key role in the NCA. However, most existing police IT systems are incompatible, antiquated and require the endless keying and rekeying of the same data. Given that the intelligence hub will be central to the functioning of the NCA, and that IT will be central to the functioning of the intelligence hub, it is absolutely essential that IT systems facilitate easy access to electronic intelligence. So we need to know how the Government propose to resolve the issues around the interoperability of the various IT systems.
The Bill is unclear about the relationship between the NCA, chief officers and police and crime commissioners. In particular, the directive powers of the NCA, especially directed tasking, appear to conflict with the statutory responsibilities of PCCs for the totality of policing within their jurisdiction. The Bill seems to assume that the priorities of PCCs will automatically be aligned with the directive powers of the NCA’s director-general. But what happens if the NCA requests or requires police force A to provide assistance to police force B just before an election, when the PCC of force A wants his officers to concentrate all their energy on local issues in order to get re-elected? The Government need to provide greater clarity regarding the interrelationship between the NCA and PCCs and how conflicts will be resolved.
The NCA will have considerable powers, so formal scrutiny, investigations and inspections must be rigorous and transparent. The NCA will be subject to investigation by the Independent Police Complaints Commission and to inspections by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary. The Bill proposes that the IPCC will treat any wrongdoing in the NCA in the same way that it treats ordinary police forces. Although the IPCC may implement any of four modes of investigation, in practice, in most cases, it opts for supervised investigations, which effectively means the police force investigating itself. The IPCC justifies this policy on the grounds of limited resources.
The NCA will have far greater powers than an ordinary police force. It therefore follows that any wrongdoing must be independently investigated, so that the public can have confidence in the processes and procedures. Likewise, the proposal that HMIC will arrive at an agreed framework for inspections with the NCA is unsatisfactory. There also need to be unannounced inspections to help maintain public confidence.
At least some, and perhaps most, NCA officers will have operational powers, but NCA officers do not necessarily need to have held operational powers previously. There is also a proposal to appoint volunteer officers, similar to special constables. I very much welcome that, because I think that it will enhance the agency, but there will be a significant need for training for both full-time officers and volunteers. This training will need to be done on a one-to-one basis rather than by officers sitting in front of a computer, so it will cost a lot of money. Will the new professional police body be responsible for organising training for the NCA, or will training be split between various providers? If the latter, how will consistency be maintained?
How will the culture and benefits of employees who come from significantly different backgrounds be brought together? How will police terms and conditions be aligned with those of the security services or Customs and Excise? If one employee has a larger pension, does it follow that another gets higher pay? If there are differences in pay and benefits between NCA employees, that could cause internal problems, but if the employees are all on similar benefits, there could be disparities with the organisations from which they are drawn. That could lead to perverse incentives at one end of the equation or the other, with either a glut or a drought of employees with particular skill sets.
I hope that the Minister can address those concerns in his response.
Police (Collaboration: Specified Function) Order 2012
Baroness Doocey Excerpts(12 years, 7 months ago)
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The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)
My Lords, the order concerns the arrangements for providing air support to the police forces of England and Wales. It specifies the provision of police air support as a function that must be carried out through a collaboration agreement applying to all police areas in England and Wales.
Sections 22A to 23I of the Police Act 1996 make provision for police collaboration in England and Wales. Section 22A provides for the making of collaboration agreements involving policing bodies and chief officers of police. Section 23FA enables the Secretary of State to specify police functions that must be the subject of collaboration. The order is to be made under Section 23FA. Orders made under this section must be approved by both Houses beforehand; this procedural requirement is imposed by Section 23FA(4). This is the first order made under Section 23FA.
The scope of the collaboration agreement to be made under the order will include the operation of aircraft, staffing, equipment, airbases, ground control facilities, and maintenance arrangements, facilities and other resources necessary for such air operations. The order establishes the required outcome—a national collaborative agreement for the provision of air support—but the detailed terms are a matter for policing bodies and forces to agree.
The background to the order is a review of police air support completed in 2009. The service-led review identified scope to save £15 million per year by reducing the number of police aircraft and bases while providing a more consistent service. Since 2010, proposals for a collaboratively organised national police air service— the NPAS—have been developed under the leadership of the chief constable of Hampshire. The principle of a national service has been endorsed by all chief constables.
Discussions between the NPAS project team, police forces and authorities have continued, but full agreement has not been achieved. In January 2012 my right honourable friend the Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice announced the Government’s intention to make the order. The Government consulted the Association of Chief Police Officers, the Association of Police Authorities, the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary on the proposed order. Responses were also received from other police authorities and police organisations.
No responses directly opposed the order. Some suggested that it was premature and some expressed concerns about financial and operational aspects of the business case for the national police air service. The concerns expressed by respondents about the governance and management of the proposed NPAS and about precise costs and savings were important. The Government’s view is that the best way to resolve the concerns is through the detailed negotiation of a collaboration agreement by all forces and policing bodies. Therefore, it is timely and not at all premature to make the order. It will ensure that all forces and policing bodies will focus on reaching an agreed set of terms, conditions and governance arrangements for collaboration.
A feature of the proposals for collaborative delivery of a national police air service is that a single police force should take the lead. Several respondents to the consultation noted that any force, and its policing body, taking lead responsibility would require reassurance regarding the continuing commitment to collaboration by other forces and policing bodies. The order will provide that reassurance by ensuring that there is a collaboration agreement in place to which all forces and policing bodies must be party.
The order provides a basis for a more efficient, effective and economical provision of police air support that noble Lords will want, and I commend it to the Committee.
Baroness Doocey
I hope that noble Lords will forgive me; I am losing my voice. I have no problem in principle with the order. As a former chair of finance of the Metropolitan Police Authority, I am very much in favour of anything that can be done to make economies of scale and efficiencies. However, I have a number of concerns. Wearing the hat of somebody who sat for eight years on the Metropolitan Police Authority, I emphasise that my knowledge and experience is of the Met rather than of police forces nationwide. Therefore, with that caveat, I know that there are various concerns in the Met, and I wonder if the Minister can help to allay some of those concerns, particularly about the issues of governance and structure as set out in the draft agreement.
The strategy board has got quite a lot of power: it can approve annual capital budgets and determine the direction of the service. However, there is no representation on the board for PCCs—and in the case of London, for the MOPC—other than from the lead force. Can the Minister tell us how these people will be consulted, as the introduction of PCCs is clearly one of the key parts of the government legislation, and what proposals and process will there be for considering any concerns that emerge?
I appreciate that the Minister talked in his introduction about issues being resolved locally. However, I have a slight concern that if there is not quite a good steer from the Government on how these issues can be resolved, that might be a major problem down the line. I think that it would be helpful to address those issues now.
I have another concern. Although having an integrated strategy for the air service is clearly sensible, how will this affect the local accountability of local police forces? I wonder if the Minister could address that point as well.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, I welcome the principle of what the Government are seeking to do here—I do not think that there can be any disagreement on it. However, like her, I have some concerns. I am sure that the Minister can help allay those concerns when he addresses the questions.
I was interested when the Minister spoke about the consultation that took place. He quoted the parts that were in the impact assessment, which was very helpful. As I mentioned to the noble Lord previously, I tried to access the Home Office website to get more information on the consultation responses. I hope that my complaints about the website do not become a familiar theme in these Committee sittings or when I discuss Home Office matters. However, I find it the most difficult website to access that I have ever used. It has crashed on me something like six times in the past week, which is as long as I have been in this post. I therefore felt at a disadvantage on this order by not being able to read the consultation responses. I take on board entirely, and accept the Minister’s explanation, that none of the responses was directly opposed.
However, the situation with the website makes this slightly more difficult. I would have liked to know the difficulties that have prevented voluntary implementation from taking place. The noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, has been very helpful in using her experience with the Metropolitan Police to outline some of the issues.
The Minister says that there have been discussions for some time, that no one is directly opposed to it and that everybody seems to think that it is a good idea—and yet it does not happen. So, what is the precise nature of the difficulties? One wonders whether those difficulties, depending on how practical they are, can be removed simply by implementing legislation. If they are practical difficulties which the police are trying to resolve, putting legislation in place will not make them go away. One question—if we can legislate to change things—is whether he thinks that the police are simply being difficult by not reaching a voluntary agreement on the issues of concern which have prevented voluntary collaboration to the degree that the Minister would like. As the police, presumably, will still have to agree the details of the arrangements being put in place, it would be helpful to have a little more information about the difficulties and how they will be overcome by legislation.
I appreciate that savings have to be made—I am not querying that. I would never deny the need to make savings. Indeed, I am one of those who look for genuine efficiencies to save money. However, when police forces are fully under the budgetary cosh in many ways, collaboration can become more difficult for them—understandably, it makes it that little bit harder to co-operate. If the Minister can say something more about the agreements that need to be put in place, and the discussions taking place to make that happen, that would be welcome.
Perhaps I may also say something briefly about savings versus efficiency. Where crime prevention and crime detection are concerned, efficiency savings are one thing, but cuts in service, or reduction in the quality of service, is another.
I am seeking assurances from the Minister, because the impact assessment is perhaps slightly woolly on this. It says that in some areas it is expected that the collaboration will be resolved by some increases in response times for air support. It goes on to state the positives, including that a 24-hour service will be available to all forces. Will the Minister quantify what those increases in response times will be? Will they be significant? Which areas will be affected the greatest? Assurances from the Minister on that would be most welcome. In principle, the direction of greater co-operation and collaboration between police forces is welcome. I should be grateful if the Minister will address the issues that I have raised.
Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Temporary Class Drug) Order 2012
Baroness Doocey Excerpts(12 years, 7 months ago)
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The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)
My Lords, this order was laid before Parliament on 3 April—that is, if it is to remain in force. The order was made on 29 March and came into force on 5 April 2012. It makes—I have to stress that this is one of those words that I find difficult to say—methoxetamine, and its simple derivatives, temporary class drugs under Section 2A(1) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 for up to 12 months.
The Government identified and monitored methoxetamine, through our drugs early-warning system, in 2011. In light of the available evidence, I referred methoxetamine to the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs for advice in relation to temporary control in March. I thank the advisory council profusely for the quality of its advice, which was provided within 15 working days, allowing a decision to be made within a matter of days rather than weeks as has previously been the case. It is the first time that the power to make such an order has been used since it became available to the Secretary of State on 15 November 2011. It was also the first time that we invoked our drugs early-warning system to this effect.
The Home Secretary was satisfied, in consideration of available evidence, that the ACMD’s initial advice that the conditions to make a temporary class drug order were met. Methoxetamine is a drug being misused, and much misuse is having sufficiently harmful effects to warrant temporary control. The ACMD likens the effects of methoxetamine toxicity to those of acute— class C—ketamine use, including hallucinations, catatonia and dissociative effects. It further indicates cardiovascular effects, agitation, hypertension and cerebellar features such as ataxia—unsteadiness on the feet—rarely seen with controlled drugs.
The order applies UK-wide to protect the public while the ACMD prepares full advice on methoxetamine. It enables enforcement action against traffickers and has already had an impact through self-regulation of the online trade. We know that at least 70 websites previously offering methoxetamine for sale—the number of which increased from 14 to 52 in early 2011—have ceased this activity.
The order also sends out a clear message to the public, especially young people, that methoxetamine is a harmful drug. Of course, we will continue to monitor data on the drug to measure the impact of the order through all available channels, and share this information with the ACMD.
I take this opportunity to bring to the Committee’s attention the recent publication of a cross-government action plan to tackle new psychoactive substances, as an annexe to the first review of our drugs strategy. We also published our response to the ACMD’s advice, which helped to inform the action plan, and the 2011 report of the Home Office’s forensic early-warning system, on the Home Office website, which I hope the noble Baroness will find easier to access in due course.
I commend the order to the Committee.
Baroness Doocey
My Lords, I will be very brief. This is clearly a sensible precaution. It is very necessary and I very much welcome it. In view of the very nasty and harmful effects of what is known of this drug—which I am not even going to try to pronounce—it is, if anything, overdue, and I think it is a splendid idea.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
My Lords, again I thank the noble Lord for his explanation. We welcome and support the order. The purpose and the benefits are quite clear. I will not follow in his footsteps and try to pronounce it. I am told the street name is “mexxy”—MXE—and I will stick with that because it is far easier to pronounce.
I have a couple of concerns, not around the specific action taken here but about the process and time it takes to get to this point. Both Switzerland and Russia have already banned MXE. I have a slight concern over whether the processes in place are quick enough to respond to the changes that are made. I know that the Minister is aware of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, which has a key role in detection and assessment of new drugs within the EU. There is a recognition that these “legal high” drugs require very rapid action across Europe.
Since the Government came to power, the EMCDDA has identified 90 new substances during 2010-11, but I am concerned that the Home Office early-warning system has only identified 11. I am not clear why there would be a discrepancy between the two. If the Minister was able to say something about that, it would be helpful. It may be that the processes that we employ here in the UK mean there are others in the pipeline—perhaps they are with the ACMD, I do not know.
It would also be useful to know when the Home Office became aware that MXE was a drug on which action should be taken. If the Minister can say anything about the work with the EMCDDA, that would be helpful. It seems quite clear that the EMCDDA is very much ahead of the game as to what is happening across Europe as a whole.
I was quite shocked when reading about this SI—and the Minister reiterated the point—by the easy availability of these drugs via the internet. That does not confine itself to national boundaries. Also, the number of internet stores selling MXE increased in a very short space of time. In January 2011 there were 14 online stores; by July, within six months, this had risen to 58 online stories selling MXE. Any delay in banning such drugs allows them to become established very quickly. How is it possible to monitor such internet sites? Is this the responsibility of SOCA, which is to become the National Crime Agency? How are these sites monitored to ensure that they do not take hold in the same way?
One of the things that the impact assessment said was that there was a risk that a minor chemical change in the drug could make a new drug that would then be legal and unaffected by the order being made today. Are the Government looking at this issue? If they are not, we could have a constant flow of temporary orders each time there is a minor chemical change in the drug.
Finally, the impact assessment and briefing notes from the Home Office highlighted the importance of education in drugs awareness. Young people hear about the drug, but think that it is a legal high and do not realise the quite devastating implications and consequences. At the moment, we have the Drug Education Forum, which brings together 30 high-profile, high-quality and knowledgeable organisations across the UK, including ACPO and the NSPCC. Unfortunately, the Department for Education has withdrawn the funding from this body. My colleague Diana Johnson, Member of Parliament and shadow Minister for the Home Office in the other place, has written to the noble Lord about this and I think that it would be helpful if the Government were able to look at this again. Clearly, by their own analysis, education is key to young people understanding the dangers of such drugs. It would be very sad to see good action in one part of the Government being undermined by action in another part that makes it more difficult to tackle this problem. We certainly support the order but would be grateful for responses to these questions.
Police: Misconduct and Corruption
Baroness Doocey Excerpts(12 years, 7 months ago)
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Lord Henley
My Lords, the noble Lord makes a number of points. First, I make it clear that this is not just a matter for the coalition Government; it is a matter that goes back to the 2002 Act which brought in the IPCC. I think all sides of this House agree that there should be an Independent Police Complaints Commission and that it should be independent. It can be independent of government only if government cannot intervene. It would be quite wrong for my right honourable friend the Home Secretary to intervene in individual cases. It would surely undermine the IPCC’s independence if she tried to second-guess its decisions. The noble Lord went on to mention two cases. Gary McKinnon has nothing to do with any allegations of police corruption because his case is purely about extradition. The case of the Hofschroer family is, as the noble Lord knows, a matter that has gone to the IPCC. It is a matter for it to produce its decision and if those involved in that case do not like that decision, they can then take the appropriate action in the courts.
Baroness Doocey
My Lords, the revelations that senior Metropolitan Police officers accepted inappropriate hospitality have led to the Met setting up a monthly register that now lists all gifts and hospitality that police officers have accepted. Do the Government agree that all police forces should be required to set up such a register and to publish it monthly?
Lord Henley
My Lords, I welcome what the Met has done. I think it is something that other police forces should consider doing, but that is a matter for them to consider. As I said in response to the original Question and the first supplementary, I believe that complaints should be dealt with in the manner that they are; that is initially by the police and then, in more serious cases, by the IPCC. I do not see a case for the Home Secretary intervening.
Police: Vehicles
Baroness Doocey Excerpts(12 years, 9 months ago)
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Lord Henley
My Lords, the noble Lord refers to his time in government. I was trying to make clear in my original Answer that there have been considerable changes since then. That is why we have brought in the framework, which brings in co-ordination of a great deal of procurement across all police forces that we believe will save something of the order of £350 million a year. This is money that we need to save.
Baroness Doocey
My Lords, do the Government agree that there is no justification for the Metropolitan Police keeping 32 luxury cars not for security purposes but to chauffeur senior officers to and from their homes?
Lord Henley
My Lords, obviously I cannot comment on decisions made by the Metropolitan Police Authority —that is a matter for the mayor’s office. If it is spending money inadvisably, I hope that it would look carefully at the circumstances in which it could possibly save money in the future.
Protection of Freedoms Bill
Baroness Doocey Excerpts(13 years ago)
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Baroness Doocey
“(3) In section 113B of the Police Act 1997, after subsection (4) insert—
“(4A) Prescribed purposes under subsection (2)(b) include licensing authorities determining the fitness of—
(a) taxi drivers to be licensed in London under section 8 of the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869 and paragraph 25 of the London Cab Order 1934;(b) private hire vehicle drivers to be licensed in London under section 13(2)(a) of the Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 1998;(c) taxi drivers to be licensed outside London under section 47 of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 and section 59(1) of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976; and(d) private hire vehicle drivers to be licensed outside London under section 51(1) of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976.””
Baroness Doocey
My Lords, the purpose of this amendment is to ensure that licensing authorities have access to information disclosed in enhanced criminal records checks, for the purpose of licensing the drivers of taxis and private hire vehicles. I declare an interest as a Member of the London Assembly.
Local licensing authorities must determine whether an applicant is a fit and proper person to hold a licence or whether public safety would be compromised by issuing a licence to a particular individual. Licensed taxis and minicabs provide a vital service in many parts of the country. Both are crucial to the vibrancy and sustainability of the night-time economy. They are particularly important late at night, as other services wind down or become less frequent, but there can be risks. This is why Transport for London, which is responsible for licensing in London, has launched a “Safer Travel at Night” campaign, which stresses the importance of using a licensed taxi or minicab and warns that using an unlicensed car is the same as getting into a stranger’s car.
Anyone who uses a taxi or minicab is effectively putting their faith in the checks that the licensing authority has made into the background of their drivers. Department for Transport figures suggest that women aged 16 to 20 undertake the greatest number of trips in taxis and private hire vehicles. These women would not fall into the legal definition of a vulnerable adult, but they are vulnerable when they get into a taxi or a licensed minicab late at night, particularly if they have been drinking. To ensure the public's confidence in licensing, authorities rely heavily on the information disclosed in an enhanced criminal records check. This provides the authority with valuable information relating to offences and so-called soft intelligence on the interaction between applicants and the police or the judicial system that is not available under a lower level of disclosure. It allows the authority to consider information on the balance of probabilities and to look for patterns of behaviour, which is very important. In some instances, there may never have been any convictions or cautions. However, the additional information provided through an enhanced disclosure can often show a pattern of behaviour that raises alarm bells with the police force and/or the licensing authority.
Earlier this year, licensing authorities were informed by the Criminal Records Bureau that enhanced criminal records checks should no longer be sought for taxi and private hire drivers unless they transported children or vulnerable adults under a contract. That move by the Criminal Records Bureau would end a system that has operated well for the past 10 years in which authorities have been able to base their decisions on information from an enhanced disclosure. In London, approximately 10 per cent of applications for a licence were turned down in that period on the basis of something picked up from the enhanced disclosure. In London alone, that amounted to at least 240 licences annually that were not issued on the grounds of public safety.
The bodies representing the taxi trade recognise the importance of the information provided by an enhanced disclosure to the reputation of their members. The Suzy Lamplugh Trust and London TravelWatch both agree with licensing authorities that the information in enhanced disclosures is crucial to ensuring public safety. This amendment would address their concerns by amending Clause 79 to add at the end a subsection inserting in the Police Act 1997, as amended, a clarification that the prescribed purposes for which an enhanced criminal record check can be sought include the licensing of taxi and private hire vehicles in London and by other licensing authorities in England and Wales. I beg to move.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon
My Lords, I support the noble Baroness in her amendment. It seems extraordinary that taxi companies are going to have to desist from requiring enhanced disclosures. I completely agree with her point that it is not just children and vulnerable adults at risk; many young women, especially when they have had a drink, are extremely vulnerable. I fully support the noble Baroness.
Lord Henley
Anyway, my Lords, I express my gratitude to my noble friend for moving this amendment. She is seeking to amend the Police Act 1997 to make taxi and private hire vehicle drivers eligible for the enhanced criminal record checks. The legislation currently provides that, in the majority of cases, they are eligible for only standard criminal record checks. I assure my noble friend that we have had representations on this issue from the Mayor of London and Transport for London, and at this stage we are actively considering whether a change in the law is needed. In examining this issue, our priority obviously will be to ensure the safety of the travelling public. Further, we hope to come to a decision on this issue very soon indeed—certainly in advance of Report. I undertake to write to my noble friend and, on this occasion, to all other noble Lords who have taken part in this debate when an announcement is made.
I also offer an assurance on one small technical point. Were we to conclude that it was appropriate that all taxi drivers and private hire vehicle drivers should be eligible for that enhanced criminal record check, we could effect that approach through secondary legislation. On this occasion, primary legislation would not be needed as we could do that under the Police Act 1997. Briefly, I say to my noble friend that we are alive to this issue and intend to come to a very early decision that will certainly be before Report, which we have worked out is not likely to be before the beginning of February. I hope, therefore, that on this occasion my noble friend can withdraw her amendment and await that sympathetic letter, which she will get in due course.
Baroness Doocey
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that sympathetic response and I look forward to receiving the letter. I hope that this can be sorted out because it is a very serious matter. Most parents, in my experience, say to their young children, “Whatever you do, make sure that you get into a licensed taxi or a licensed minicab so that you will be safe”. I am sure we all want to make sure that it is kept that way. With that assurance from the Minister, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Protection of Freedoms Bill
Baroness Doocey Excerpts(13 years ago)
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Baroness Doocey
Baroness Doocey
My Lords, in moving Amendment 23, I shall speak also to Amendment 41. Both amendments deal with the collection of DNA under the Terrorism Act 2000 and the governance surrounding the storage of that DNA. I declare an interest as a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority.
Under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act, the police have considerable power and may act “whether or not” they have “grounds for suspecting”. They may also, under Schedule 7, take DNA and fingerprint samples from suspects, although the proportion of cases where this occurs is rather small. However, there remains a need for clarity and transparency in relation to this biometric information, its storage, and the governance surrounding it.
The Bill limits to six months the retention of DNA profiles taken as a result of Schedule 7 examinations. This is a great improvement on indefinite retention, but it is still contentious to retain such profiles at all, bearing in mind the nature of the power under which they were first obtained. The six-month period is recognition of the time required to obtain a DNA profile and carry out the necessary checks to identify whether or not an individual poses a threat and then for a national security determination application to be made, which, if approved, would allow for a further two-year retention but on a renewable basis.
Therefore, in theory, a DNA sample obtained from an individual who has never been convicted of a crime can be retained by the police indefinitely. Amendment 23 would redress this balance by ensuring that whenever DNA is taken, the same governance rules apply, whereby the data are not retained if the person is subsequently not arrested.
Amendment 41 deals with the governance of all databases where DNA material is held—not just the DNA database. The Bill would strengthen the oversight and governance of the National DNA Database, but these rules should apply also in respect of all databases, including the counterterrorism DNA database. This would be in line with the findings of the 2011 Annual report of The Ethics Group: National DNA Database, which concluded:
“All databases containing DNA information including the counter terrorism database held by the police service should be subject to a robust statutory governance framework, appropriate systems and controls, and should be transparent and only be used for statutory purposes”.
This was accepted by the National DNA Database Strategy Board.
The Bill limits to six months the retention of DNA profiles taken as a result of Schedule 7, but there must be clarity in terms of where such profiles and the physical samples are retained. The National DNA Database retains all profiles obtained as a result of individuals being arrested for a recordable offence. However, if only certain DNA profiles obtained from a Schedule 7 examination, which are not recordable, are retained on the separate counterterrorism DNA database, we need clarity about where the remaining profiles are retained and, more importantly, who has access to them. We cannot have a system where DNA profiles from individuals not convicted of any crime are not stored and managed with the same safeguards as DNA obtained from an individual as a result of an arrest.
There are certain elements of governance that need to be observed for the counterterrorism DNA databases, including scientific standards, ethical oversight and meeting the Data Protection Act requirements. Amendment 41 would ensure that suitable governance arrangements are in place for all DNA samples and profiles that are retained by the police. I beg to move.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon
My Lords, forgive my intervening at this stage. I am grateful to the Minister for his response to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. From what I heard of his response, I think that I would agree with him that her amendments should not be pressed, but I imagine that they are probing amendments.
As I mentioned earlier this afternoon, I intend to bring forward amendments on Report relating both to a period during which evidence can be collected before the Government’s proposals were introduced and to the period for which DNA samples and fingerprints could be retained—for six years rather than three years. If my amendments are accepted, a consequential amendment will be required to subsection (6) proposed in government Amendment 28, but that is for a later stage. For the moment, I am content to accept the noble Lord’s amendments.
Baroness Doocey
I thank my noble friend for the clear way in which he addressed my concerns. I say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, that as soon as he got to his feet, I thought to myself, “I hope I will never get to court and meet someone like him”, because I think I would just throw my hands up in horror and plead guilty, regardless of how innocent I was. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Doocey
“( ) The Commissioner must make a report to the Secretary of State about the impact of the retention periods for fingerprints and DNA profiles on the police service, in particular, the estimated cost of processing samples on an individual basis.
( ) Such a report must be made within six months of this section coming into force.”
Baroness Doocey
My Lords, the Bill will place a large administrative and financial burden on all police forces. I believe that we need to monitor the impact of this, particularly in the current climate, when police budgets are under threat and facing severe cuts.
Each DNA profile and sample will need to be processed individually to ensure that they are deleted within the correct time parameters. Furthermore, this process must take into account any subsequent reoffending by the individual, as well as an application for extended retention.
The Metropolitan Police estimates that implementing the Bill will entail a one-off cost of £2.5 million, with ongoing costs of nearly half a million pounds a year. That is a huge sum of money when you consider how tight budgets are going to be, and it could pay for 10 police officers per year. Amendment 39 would ensure that the impact on the police service of the retention periods for fingerprints and DNA profiles and, in particular, the estimated costs of processing samples on an individual basis were reported back to Parliament.
An operational risk is also inherent in the complexity of the retention regime. While the Bill will in theory put in place mechanisms to ensure that DNA data are deleted at the right time, no system is perfect. If, as could well occur with the volumes involved, the deletion process were out of sync and not carried out at the appropriate time, DNA profiles which should have been deleted could remain on the database. If these profiles were then to be matched with the DNA from a crime scene or the victim of a serious crime, this evidence could not be used, since by law the profile should not have been there in the first place as it should not have been retained.
That is what happened in two cases, both of which necessitated changes to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. In both, a DNA match was obtained but their profiles should already have been deleted from the DNA database. In the first case, which concerned a rape, the judge refused to admit the evidence and the prosecution was abandoned, and in the other case a conviction for murder was quashed by the Court of Appeal on the grounds that the DNA evidence should not have been admitted. The House of Lords subsequently ruled that it should be left to the discretion of the trial judge as to whether evidence in these circumstances should be admitted. We would not want history to repeat itself.
We therefore need some form of reassurance that we will not be put in the invidious position of perhaps identifying another rapist or a murderer but not being able to use the DNA match in evidence. I beg to move.
The Earl of Erroll
Does a case collapse just because one bit of evidence is not quite right? I cannot believe that that one bit of evidence would be the only thing to bring about a conviction, in which case why on earth do we let people off? That seems quite dotty to me, as a lay man, unless the whole thing hinged on that one bit of evidence, in which case there could be some ambiguity about it.
Lord Henley
Of course questions from my noble friend are not criticisms. I hope that I answer them as well as I am able to do.
Baroness Doocey
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response, which goes some way to reassure me but I still have major concerns, particularly about the financial implications on the Met. I would like to address these and the other issues that I raised perhaps outside the Chamber. At this stage, I am happy to withdraw the amendment.
Human Trafficking (Further Provisions and Support for Victims) Bill [HL]
Baroness Doocey Excerpts(13 years ago)
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Baroness Doocey
My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Lord, Lord McColl of Dulwich, for introducing this Bill, which proposes some significant changes and much needed improvements on the current system. Clause 9, which provides for the appointment of a legal advocate for child victims of human trafficking, is sensible and in line with the ECPAT proposals. It would also fulfil the UK’s obligations as a signatory of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. I should like to focus my remarks on the problem of the international trafficking of children through our airports, ports and railway stations. I declare an interest as a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority.
An unfortunate side-effect of the globalisation of the economy is the globalisation of crime. The trafficking of people into slavery, although reprehensible, is nothing new and has been going on in one form or another for many centuries. But the increasing ease of international travel has brought fresh challenges and the law must keep up with these changes because the current system is not adequately equipped to deal with the problem. The greatest challenge is the large number of children brought into Britain as domestic slaves. The number of unaccompanied children entering Heathrow Airport gives some indication of the scale of the problem.
Some years ago, the Metropolitan Police and the UK Border Agency jointly set up a pilot project at Heathrow called Operation Paladin Child. In just three months, it found that 1,800 unaccompanied children came through the airport. Of these, it judged that 600 were vulnerable and almost half were under the age of 11.
Children are trafficked for a variety of reasons. Many are put to work as domestic slaves or childminders. Some, like Oliver Twist, are forced into street crime. Others are used for benefit fraud and, when they come of age, many are sexually exploited. Criminal gangs make very big money out of children. The Metropolitan Police estimates that each child forced into street crime makes £100,000 a year for their gangmasters. Benefit fraud is also hugely profitable, particularly the widespread practice of passing one baby from one gang to another so that gang members posing as the child’s relatives can make multiple benefit claims in many different parts of the country. Often, the children’s parents are tricked into sending them to the UK with a promise of a good education but, instead, their children are condemned to a life of slavery. Perhaps the most notorious case is that of Victoria Climbié, who was brought into Britain by her aunt to be used for benefit fraud.
Let me give two examples of the pain and suffering that these children often endure. A 14 year-old boy from South Africa was smuggled here on a containership with a number of other boys. By day, they were locked into the containers; by night, they were taken out and gang-raped by the crew. When the ship docked in the UK, one of the boys was put to work in a London factory by his uncle. After a while, he could not cope with it much longer. When he complained, his uncle showed him a photograph of his mother, dead from gunshot wounds, and gave him a choice: he could either continue to work in the factory or he would receive another photograph of the rest of his family who would suffer the same fate.
My second example is an eastern European woman accompanied by three children who was stopped at a regional airport in the UK. After much questioning, she finally admitted that the children were not hers—she did not know them; she had just met them; and she had been paid to deliver them to a central London address. More shocking still was her admission that this was her third such trip. Each time, she had been accompanied by three children. Who knows what fate awaited these children?
The team at Heathrow is very successful and has made it much more difficult for child traffickers, so the gangs have simply moved to easier points of entry such as the Eurostar terminal at St Pancras International railway station. Entry to the UK by train does not have such rigorous standards of security as air travel. Children of 12 and above may travel unaccompanied provided they have a form signed by their parent or guardian. However, there are no checks on the authenticity of the parent or guardian who signed the form, so the whole procedure is less than useless. Unaccompanied minors are on their own from the time they get on the train until the time they get off at St Pancras. To make matters worse, there are no dedicated child protection measures in place at St Pancras, so children can just get off the train and simply disappear into the ether.
The way we treat our children defines us as a society. It is totally unacceptable that, in the 21st century, children are still being trafficked into this country. This Bill will go a long way towards helping stamp out this evil trade.
Protection of Freedoms Bill
Baroness Doocey Excerpts(13 years, 1 month ago)
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Baroness Doocey
My Lords, I focus my remarks on aspects of the Bill relating to policing matters. I declare an interest as a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority.
I begin by expressing concern about the proposals in the Bill regarding the regulation of biometric data, particularly the DNA database. DNA profiling is critical to the successful investigation of crime, particularly in cases of serious violence and sexually motivated crime where the perpetrator is a stranger to the victim. At the same time, the blanket and indiscriminate retention of DNA profiles is wrong, as the recent judgment in the European Court of Human Rights made clear.
There are some very welcome provisions in this Bill: the intention to put the National DNA Database and the National DNA Database strategy board on a statutory footing; the destruction of DNA samples within six months; the assurance that the DNA profiles of those found not guilty of an offence will in future not be loaded on to the database; and the deletion of existing DNA profiles of those who have been found not guilty of an offence.
However, there remain some concerns and areas that I believe could be improved. I have a particular concern regarding the complexity of the new retention regime for biometric data. We need a regulatory system that is robust and which enjoys public confidence, but we do not need one that is excessively burdensome. Deciding how long to retain DNA profiles is a complex business. The retention periods stated in the Bill are not fixed, but are subject to complex decision-making—for example, the provision for the biometrics commissioner to extend the retention period by two years in certain circumstances. While not every profile will need to be assessed, it is unlikely that it will be possible to automate the process of deletion as a result of this provision. The administrative burden on the Metropolitan Police service—and indeed other police services—is likely to be significant. The Metropolitan Police estimates the initial cost of implementing the Bill at £2.5 million plus ongoing costs of £500,000.
There is also an operational risk inherent in the complexity of the retention regime. No system is perfect and, if the deletion process is out of sync and is not carried out at the appropriate time, there is a real risk of “illegal” matches that could connect someone with a serious crime such as rape but then could not be used. The police must not be put in the invidious position of identifying a rapist or murderer but being unable to use the DNA match in evidence.
A further concern in this section is about the regulation of the counterterrorism DNA database. Given the proposals within the Bill to strengthen the oversight and governance of the National DNA Database, for the sake of consistency, similar moves should be made in respect of all police databases relating to DNA and other biometric materials, including the counterterrorism DNA database.
We should also consider Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and how this Bill relates to it. At present, the police may obtain DNA profile data and fingerprints from people stopped under Schedule 7. However, there is a need for clarity regarding the treatment of these data. The proportion of people stopped under Schedule 7 who have their DNA and fingerprints taken is low, but Schedule 7 gives the police very considerable power. An examining officer may exercise his powers,
“whether or not he has grounds for suspecting”.
There is consequently a need for clarity and transparency regarding where this biometric data information is then stored, and if it is subject to the same safeguards governing DNA taken from an individual on arrest.
I will refer briefly to the question of closed circuit television and automatic number plate recognition, included in Part 2 of the Bill. The regulatory framework proposed in the Bill is a positive step. However, the code should specifically address the covert use of both automatic number plate recognition and CCTV. The Minister in his opening remarks referred to Project Champion, which is a very good example of how ill thought through proposals and a lack of engagement and consultation can undermine confidence in policing. We also need clarity as to whether the responsibilities of the proposed Surveillance Camera Commissioner could be undertaken by the existing Chief Surveillance Commissioner. When we move to Committee stage, I shall be seeking to return to some of these issues.
Police: Station Closures
Baroness Doocey Excerpts(13 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Henley
My Lords, I am aware of the research in the Sunday Times to which the noble Lord refers. I am not sure it was conducted on the most scientific basis and therefore we will not take much notice of it. I am also aware of what my honourable friend Ms Featherstone had to say about issues in her own constituency. I understand her views were purely about her own constituency, and she is a very good constituency MP. I can assure the House that, like all government Ministers, she is fully committed to what the Government and the Home Office are doing to make the necessary savings—savings forced on us by the profligate manner in which the party opposite behaved when they were last in government.
Baroness Doocey
My Lords, I declare an interest as a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority. Does the Minister agree that the economic situation and budget cuts may force the new police commissioners to choose between maintaining police numbers and selling police properties?
Lord Henley
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that question, and I am aware that she is a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority. The question is about police contact, and the important thing to remember is that police contact is not just about stations; as I made clear in my original Answer, it is about police stations and all other means by which we can achieve that police contact. Police stations are not necessarily always the best means of doing that.