Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, has made a good suggestion with this amendment. He makes the broad point that the police misconduct process takes far too long, and I agree. To be fair, it is not the only misconduct process that takes a long time, but this one is particularly challenged.

I will particularly mention two things. First, time deadlines would be helpful. There are two ways to approach that. One is that there might be an absolute deadline of 12 months, as the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, suggests, and then some independent, legally qualified person looks at the case. That could work. The alternative is to set some deadlines so that, for example, 90% of cases are resolved in one year, which at least would give the system a kick. At the moment, I am afraid the system is not getting any better—rather, it is getting worse—so either something statutory or some kind of guidelines would be a good idea.

On Tuesday I raised the issue of firearms officers, a group particularly affected by this, and that is what I want to speak to here. I have argued that there should be a higher bar before they are prosecuted for murder, but the Government do not accept that at the moment. They have offered anonymity, and we are to debate that shortly.

Part of the problem, particularly for firearms officers, is the incredible length of time in some cases. There have been two cases over the last 20 years that took 10 years: the case of PC Long, who was prosecuted after a series of legal machinations only to be found not guilty 10 years later, and that of W80, where after a public inquiry—basically an inquest led by a High Court judge because intercept evidence was involved in the case—the High Court judge decided that there was no unlawful killing, the IOPC or its predecessor decided that there should be some gross misconduct, the Metropolitan Police disagreed, the Supreme Court ordered that there would be a misconduct hearing and the legally qualified chair of the independent tribunal said there was no case to answer. After consideration by the Supreme Court, an officer had been under investigation for 10 years. That cannot be right.

Some of the problems are to do with the sequential nature of the decision-making in these cases. Officers are often under jeopardy, first from the IOPC and then from the CPS. Then obviously it could go to court and there may be a finding of not guilty, but then—for firearms officers in cases where someone has died—the case can go back to a coroner’s inquest, which can find an unlawful killing verdict, at which point it goes back through the cycle again. That is one of the reasons why some of these problems are arising.

First, deadlines would be a good idea as either an advisory or a mandatory limit. Secondly, I do not understand why some of the people involved in the decision-making that I have described have to do it sequentially, not in parallel. For example, why can the CPS and the IOPC not decide together whether something is a crime or misconduct?

At the moment, not only are there many links in the chain that sometimes come to contradictory conclusions but, more importantly, it is taking too long. I argue that in all this there are two groups of people who suffer: one is firearms officers, the group whose case I am arguing, but the other is the families waiting to hear what is happening. If people have lost someone, they deserve to hear whether or not this is a crime or misconduct, but at the moment that is not happening.

This amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, is a sensible suggestion and I support it. If the Government do not, perhaps they would like to make some indication of how they intend to improve the misconduct system, particularly as it affects firearms officers in the circumstances I have described.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, this has been a short debate. I agree with many of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. I find it almost extraordinary that misconduct investigations linger on for so long; it really is a disgrace for everybody involved. Police professional standards departments have for too long been seen as something of a Cinderella function within forces, chronically underprioritised, underfunded and understaffed, and now they are buckling under the surge in the volume of complaints. This is combined with a narrowing of the remit of the IOPC, which increasingly takes on only the most serious and high-profile cases, resulting in a growing backlog and indefinite drift.

Amendment 422A confronts this head on. Such independent legal oversight could act as a checkpoint, strengthening individual case oversights and extracting timely lessons from failures. Criminal investigations would stay exempt, protecting the pursuit of serious crime.

There are risks in setting time targets for investigations—there is no question about that—not least the incentive for officers to delay co-operation if the clock is ticking. We have concerns that a rigid cap could risk corner-cutting on complex investigations. At the very least, stronger guidance on the expected length of inquiries is now required, as well as real scrutiny when these expectations are missed.

There also needs to be a much sharper focus on leadership and case management. Complainants should not face long waits, especially knowing time will diminish the strength of their evidence; neither should innocent officers endure years in limbo, with their careers stalled and well-being eroded. Taxpayers should not bear the rising cost of suspensions while losing front-line capacity at the same time.

Amendment 422A would restore some balance by prioritising fairness to officers, closure for victims and credibility for policing. We are happy to support it, and I look forward to the Minister’s reply.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington for tabling his Amendment 422A and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for ably stepping into the breach to allow it to be debated. It is a very important matter and I am glad we have had a chance to debate it.

I am very sympathetic to the amendment’s goals. It aims to set a 12-month time limit for misconduct and gross misconduct investigations within police forces. As others have said, timely legal restitution is the only way that justice is effectively served. That applies both to those in the police who are under investigation and, obviously, to victims who are let down by delays that are needlessly, but often, the result of administrative workload. Applying a strict deadline for remedies, excepted under only extraordinary circumstances, is an easy way by which institutions can be encouraged to proceed with investigations in a timely fashion.

That said, I am a little wary of fully endorsing a blanket time limit on police forces for investigations. Although in some cases, perhaps even most, misconduct investigations can and should be sped up, it would be heedless to assume that all forces are simply being inefficient in the time that investigations take. There is a vast disparity between forces’ capacity to deal with their primary function of investigating crime, let alone with administrative internal matters, such as misconduct matters. Certain forces’ ability to spare the resources to source, for instance, legally qualified adjudicators should not, therefore, be assumed. Officer numbers are down, crime is up, and we should be careful about placing additional requirements on police forces that expedited conduct investigations might entail.

Of course, we support the aim of increasing efficiency and ensuring justice is delivered. I thank my noble friend for his amendment and look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

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[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, from these Benches we support a carefully framed presumption of anonymity for firearms officers facing criminal charges, but we believe that it should be tightly drawn and subject to clear judicial safeguards.

Giving automatic anonymity to firearms officers who face criminal charges would mark a major and highly sensitive change. It deserves careful and measured consideration and scrutiny to strike the right balance. The public must have confidence that wrongdoing by officers will be dealt with fairly and transparently. But equally—and I think this is very important—officers must feel assured that if they act in good faith and follow their training, the system will protect and not punish them.

We welcome the wider provisions of the Bill to strengthen police accountability, particularly those speeding up investigations by the IOPC, but we understand why firearms officers seek reassurance. These are exceptionally difficult and high-risk roles, where hesitation can have tragic consequences. With fewer than 6,000 operational firearms officers across England and Wales, those concerns cannot be lightly dismissed.

At the same time, we recognise the force of the arguments made by those noble Lords who support the stand part notices proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and accept that a broad, inflexible anonymity system sits uneasily with the principle of open justice. The public have a legitimate right to know when those entrusted with legal powers are alleged to have acted unlawfully. Our preference is for a statutory presumption in favour of anonymity in firearms cases, rebuttable when the court is satisfied that identification is necessary in the interests of justice or public confidence.

We should trust our judges to apply a clear statutory test, protecting officers where necessary, while safeguarding the principles of open justice on which confidence in policing depends. A narrowly tailored presumption, coupled with robust judicial oversight, can provide the reassurance that firearms officers need without creating the perception of a two-tier justice system that treats police officers differently from everyone else. Of course, rebuilding trust in policing must be our shared priority, and ultimately that rests not on secrecy but on transparency, fairness and confidence that accountability will apply equally to all.

Thankfully, fatal police shootings are rare, and it is even rarer still for such cases to reach the courts. In these exceptional, highly charged cases, a carefully limited presumption of anonymity is a reasonable and proportionate step to keep skilled officers in these vital roles, while upholding open justice.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, as I think we all agree, this is a profoundly important issue, and one in which there is realistically no perfectly right answer. But let us start with the position that it remains one of the greatest triumphs of British policing that to this day we do not routinely have armed police officers. The image envisaged by Sir Robert Peel when he established the Metropolitan Police—that of policing by consent and the avoidance of a militarised police force, when he had the example of what he saw on continental Europe at the time—has endured. I have listened anxiously to the speeches today, which have been thoughtful and balanced. But we start, on this side, in His Majesty’s Opposition, with the view that on balance the approach of Clauses 152 to 155 is the right one. I shall say more about that in a moment.

While the vast majority of police officers in this country are unarmed, we know that, in order to protect the public, a few thousand brave officers volunteer to put themselves in harm’s way and become authorised firearms officers. The latest figures show that, as of 31 March 2025, there were 6,367 firearms officers in England and Wales. Of those, 5,753 were operationally deployable. That represented a decrease of 108—or 2%—from the previous year. There is a downward trend in the number of armed police officers, which should be a matter of concern to us all. It has to be arrested.

It is not hard to see why fewer and fewer officers are willing to take on this role. The recent prosecution of, and events surrounding, Martyn Blake demonstrate what can go wrong. Throughout, Martyn Blake was public property. He was left in limbo for two years while awaiting an IOPC investigation, a CPS decision and then a murder trial. As we have heard, he was eventually acquitted in October 2024. Despite that acquittal, the IOPC then announced that it was launching a further investigation for gross misconduct. This remains unresolved. Through all of that, he has been publicly known to everyone.

Matt Cane, the general secretary of the Metropolitan Police Federation, has criticised that in the strongest terms—with which we, on this side, broadly agree. The concern and criticisms which he raised have real-world consequences. Police officers feel that their reasonable use of force may be treated disproportionately or unreasonably after the event in a manner which does not recognise the pressures they face when they make split-second decisions.

During the trial of Martyn Blake, dozens of officers handed in their weapons. There was a serious concern that, in the event of a guilty verdict, police forces across the country would be faced with real, severe shortages of armed officers. The publicity given to all that must have been an aggravating factor for Mr Blake. We have to protect these police officers.

We have heard powerful speeches, from the proposer, my noble friend Lord Black, my noble friend Lady Cash and others, not least the noble and learned Lords, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers and Lord Garnier, either in full support of these stand part notices or asking us to look very carefully at them with a view to doing something along those lines.

There are important issues to consider: open justice; whether or not there should be special treatment for police officers; and concerns about unintended consequences. I remind the Committee of the provisions in Clause 152(3), which says that the court must, first,

“cause the following information to be withheld from the public in proceedings before the court, in each case unless satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so”;

then come the identification details. The court must also

“give a reporting direction … in respect of D”—

the defendant—

“(if one does not already have effect), unless satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so”.

This is putting in place a presumption which can be rebutted.

I feel that this is rather broad. In practice, it would be helpful for the courts and for those who have to deal with applications to act on that presumption and to lift that bar, if this was put rather more clearly, with some examples. I do not have any to put before the Committee today, but I came to that view when listening to the debate. I invite the Government to think very carefully about whether something should be done about the terms in the clause. This might go quite a way to addressing the concerns of those who are legitimately concerned about the wrong sort of special treatment being given to police officers, and about open justice more generally.

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[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I thank the noble Baroness very much.

At the moment the rule of law is not for us all, as exemplified by the way we treat police in some cases. On pensions, why do the Government prefer decisions about pension forfeiture to be taken later behind closed doors rather than in open court, where reasons are given and can be tested on appeal? If a judge has heard all the evidence in a criminal case involving a police officer, and has seen the harm done and the abuse of trust, why do the Government think that a judge should have no say at all over a publicly funded police pension?

I ask this out of long experience. We have been told for decades now that existing systems are enough or that reforms are coming, and clearly that is not happening. I personally would like to see, instead of these little baby steps, a bold, straightforward move towards the kind of accountability that people can see and understand. Time and again, in cases of serious police misconduct, the consequences remain unclear and invisible to the public.

From the public’s point of view, the current system makes very little sense. Some serious criminal convictions of police officers fall outside the pensions rule altogether, simply because they do not meet a narrow legal definition. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain why judges who hear the evidence are excluded and why transparency in court is still seen as a step too far.

When this Labour Government got elected, I really hoped for some changes in the way that we apply a sense of fairness to the whole of our legal system. Quite honestly, they have disappointed me very badly. They are no better than this side of the Chamber. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, we have been waiting a long time for this, and a Labour Government should really put it right.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, both these amendments seek to sharpen the consequences for police officers, serving or retired, who commit criminal offences. High-profile cases and damning reports have exposed toxic elements of policing culture, eroding public trust. Yet the vast majority of police officers do an excellent job and are let down by a small minority. Recent cases highlight public expectations that the law should rightly demand higher standards of personal integrity from police officers and, at the very least, adherence to the law of the land.

There is also no question but that public confidence in policing’s ability to police its own is fragile. While the latest figures from the Independent Office for Police Conduct show record high complaints, over a quarter of the public lack confidence in the organisation itself, most cannot even describe what it does, and nearly half distrust the police complaints system. That should give us pause for thought, because it is really quite serious.

When officers are seen to evade scrutiny or punishment, trust erodes further. This has major repercussions for those doing the job properly, because many members of the public then say, “Well, they’re all the same, aren’t they?” I fully accept the noble Baroness’s argument that more can and should be done.

Amendment 425 would create a rebuttable presumption that police service can be treated as an aggravating factor in sentencing. This rightly recognises the unique betrayal of public trust when those entrusted to uphold the law instead break it. However, I have a concern that in marginal cases, being a police officer could flip from helping to reduce the sentence, as somebody who has served the public, to becoming an automatic burden.

Amendment 426 goes further, granting courts the power to forfeit a sizeable chunk of an offender’s police pension. This could serve as a highly effective deterrent. However, I worry on two counts. First, it could discourage quality recruits, who fear that one mistake could destroy their and their family’s lifetime financial security. Secondly, it could entail taking away pension benefits that the officer has already earned fairly during what were presumably good years of service.

These amendments definitely merit serious consideration, but they also focus on symptoms rather than causes. From these Benches, we want to see the Government go further to strengthen the front line of police misconduct systems, with vetting that catches risks early and misconduct processes that are swift, transparent and trusted. Only then will sentencing reforms such as this land with any amount of force.

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Moved by

[Baroness Doocey]

427: After Clause 166, insert the following new Clause—
“Police training – independent review(1) Within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must establish an independent review of the quality of in-service police officer training within police forces in England and Wales. (2) The review must—(a) assess the consistency, effectiveness and outcomes of all training provided to police officers after completion of their initial entry-level training, including all—(i) in-service training,(ii) workforce development programmes,(iii) refresher courses, and(iv) specialist training,(b) consider the extent to which training equips officers with the necessary skills, knowledge and professional standards to reflect the demands of modern policing, including—(i) digital skills,(ii) investigative skills,(iii) trauma awareness and conflict management, and(iv) processes by which police officers are informed of, and trained in, changes to the law, and(c) make recommendations for improvement, where appropriate.(3) The review established under subsection (1) must complete its work within 12 months of its establishment.(4) Within three months of receiving the review, the Secretary of State must lay a statement before Parliament containing their response and proposals to take forward the recommendations in the review.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to establish an independent review on police training.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 427 concerns one of the most vital levers for improving the performance and professionalism of our police service: the training of front-line officers. The amendment would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review of the training that officers receive once deployed by their forces. At present, the College of Policing sets national standards and issues codes and regulations, but it cannot force them to comply. Implementation depends on the forces themselves, the Home Office and inspectorates to give those standards real force. The result is uneven training and a postcode lottery for the public.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

It is important to do that, but I also say to the noble Baroness that the police are not mental health experts, nor should we expect them to be. At the end of the day, they will be the first responders who have to identify and support people. The work on the Right Care, Right Person project over the last two years by police and health partners, to ensure that people who are in mental health crisis get the right response from the right person with the right training and skills at the right time, is important. That work has shown a decrease in unwarranted police intervention in mental health pathways. We want people with a mental health challenge to have support. The police are dealing with the crisis in the moment, and perhaps the consequential behaviour of the crisis, rather than the underlying long-term trends.

There will always be a role for police in dealing with mental health calls where there is a risk of serious harm. It is important that police have access to relevant health information and use their police powers to do that.

Importantly, as I have mentioned already, there is an important set of training material available, which goes to points that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, mentioned. The College of Police’s mental health training is for all new officers to go through. There is an additional suite of training material I have referred to that provide, I hope, the approach to the culture change that the noble Baroness is seeking. This training provides officers with knowledge to recognise what mental health challenges there are and to communicate with and support people exhibiting such indicators.

I think this is a worthwhile discussion, but I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that it would be helpful to withdraw the amendment now, and we will reflect on the outcome of the White Paper in due course.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response and my noble friend Lady Brinton for her summing up, which I thought was excellent. I just want to make a couple of quick points.

I am very much aware that the College of Policing determines what training should be provided for police officers. However, the point I was making—perhaps not strongly enough—is that the training does not work. The training is inappropriate; every police chief will tell you that. HMICFRS, which is the inspectorate, has said on multiple occasions and in multiple reports that the training is inadequate and there need to be changes, and nothing has happened. I honestly think that, whatever happens, there has to be an independent national audit of police training because there has not been one since 2012. The last one was a PEEL inspection, which examined individual forces but not the national picture.

I am so looking forward to the Minister’s White Paper. I cannot even begin to describe how excited I am about it. I think I am correct in saying that the Minister has referred to it—that it will solve all our problems—in almost every topic we have ever discussed. My only concern is that, if it contains as many subjects and if it is going to solve as many problems as the Minister suggests, it will probably be more like an encyclopaedia than a White Paper. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 427 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Doocey]

429: After Clause 166 insert the following new Clause—
“Neighbourhood policing(1) The Secretary of State must ensure that every local authority area in England and Wales has a neighbourhood policing team which must be assigned exclusively to community-based duties, including—(a) high-visibility foot patrols,(b) community engagement and intelligence gathering,(c) crime prevention initiatives, and(d)s solving crime.(2) The Home Office must publish proposals detailing the additional funding that will be required to ensure that police forces can meet these requirements without reducing officer numbers in other frontline policing roles.(3) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report detailing—(a) the number of officers and PCSOs deployed in neighbourhood policing roles,(b) the total cost of maintaining the required levels, and(c) the impact on crime reduction and public confidence in policing.(4) If a police force fails to meet the minimum staffing levels required under subsection (1), the Home Office must intervene and provide emergency funding to ensure compliance within six months.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to ensure that every local authority area in England and Wales has a neighbourhood policing team which must be assigned exclusively to community-based duties.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 429 and 430, in my name. An effective, responsive and trusted police service must be built from the ground up, not imposed from the top down. I hope the forthcoming White Paper will start from that premise and reflect the Government’s stated commitment to community policing.

The Minister will no doubt highlight the neighbourhood policing guarantee and the promise of named officers in every community, and much of the Bill is described as strengthening neighbourhood officers’ ability to tackle the priorities of most concern to local communities—respect orders, tighter shoplifting laws and new vehicle seizure powers. However, none of this addresses the central challenge for chief constables: how to deliver on these promises amid rising demand, high turnover and chronic funding shortfalls. Front-line delivery depends on forces retaining officers in visible community roles rather than constantly redeploying them to plug shortages elsewhere.

Despite the new neighbourhood policing grant, the early signs are troubling. Last month, Cheshire police announced a 70% cut in PCSO numbers, from 87 to 27, despite public opposition, citing the need to save £13 million. Nationally too, PCSO numbers fell by 3.3% in the year to March 2025—a loss equivalent to 253 full-time officers—while front counters continue to close, and more and more school liaison programmes disappear.

This simply is not good enough. Public confidence rests on local responsiveness, yet neighbourhood policing teams today have about 10,000 fewer officers and PCSOs than in 2015. The police inspectorate has warned that some forces lack sufficient neighbourhood officers to deal effectively with anti-social behaviour, with huge variations of service across the country. Between 2019 and 2023, over 4 million anti-social behaviour incidents were not attended by an officer in person. Some forces responded to every report; others to very few. Of course, trusted neighbourhood officers are critical to tackling not only anti-social behaviour but knife crime, domestic abuse and retail theft, to name just a few.

Amendment 429 therefore seeks to guarantee for every local authority area a dedicated neighbourhood policing team protected from being routinely diverted to fill response gaps, and to require an annual Home Office report on the state of community policing.

Amendment 430 would make it a statutory duty for forces to maintain neighbourhood teams at effective staffing levels, the level to be determined by forces, councils, communities and ward panels to ensure that resources meet local demand. To support this, we propose ring-fencing 20% of future police grants, supplemented by a share of recovered proceeds of crime. This approach preserves operational flexibility. Forces could, of course, choose to exceed the minimum level if they so wished. I urge the Government to work with these Benches towards our shared goal—restoring visible, trusted and effective neighbourhood policing. I beg to move.

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for tabling Amendments 429 and 430. Neighbourhood policing is one of the most important facets of the job, and we support any approach that intends to increase the presence of officers within neighbourhood communities. It is all consistent and very much part of the approach of that great Conservative Sir Robert Peel. Visible police presence on the streets of local communities is an incredibly important role. There is the obvious consequence that more officers out on patrol results in more crime being deterred and prevented, but the latent impact is that more noticeable, familiar and engaged officers contribute to an atmosphere of order and civility within local neighbourhoods—in other words, generally better behaviour.

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[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The Government work closely with the Police Federation and will always listen and gauge the situation with them. I have met the chair of the Police Federation on a number of occasions, and other Ministers in government do the same. We will engage with that body. Like other federations or any form of trade union—although it is not a trade union—there will on occasion be differences between the organisation, the police chiefs and the Government, as is perfectly natural. I believe that we are investing in supporting police officers on the ground to do a better job in what they are trying to do and ensuring that the Government undertake a focus on neighbourhood policing, as the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, seeks. On that basis, I urge her to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

I thank the Minister for his response. I do not think that we are miles and miles apart. To be clear, I would never do anything that I thought chief constables would not be very much in favour of. They do a fantastic and astonishing job, and I would never do anything that I thought would be operationally wrong for them.

Our amendments are designed to complement what the Government are trying to do, but our aim is to ensure that all communities receive a guaranteed minimum level of visible local policing attached to the funding that makes that happen. I look forward to discussing in further detail with the Minister how that can happen. We are not miles apart and I am sure that when we see this mythical White Paper it will give us all the answers that we require. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 429 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Doocey]

431: After Clause 166, insert the following new Clause—
“Duty to record algorithmic tools(1) Each police force in England and Wales must disclose its use of any algorithmic tool used in the exercise of its functions that may affect the rights, entitlements or obligations of individuals by completing entries in the Algorithmic Transparency Recording Standard (ATRS).(2) Under subsection (1) “algorithmic tool” means a product, application or device that supports or solves a specific problem using complex algorithms.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment places a duty on police forces to disclose any algorithmic tool used in the exercise of its functions.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, powerful AI tools are transforming policing and reshaping how forces investigate, patrol and make decisions, often with profound implications. This amendment would make it a legal requirement for forces to disclose any algorithmic tool used in this way that might affect a person’s rights or freedoms.

The Government’s algorithmic transparency recording standard, ATRS, provides a consistent way for public bodies to explain how their algorithmic tools work, what data they use and how human oversight is maintained. Its goal is a public, searchable record of these systems. Use of the ATRS is mandatory for arm’s-length bodies delivering public services, though the previous Government did not extend that to the police, despite calls from the Committee on Standards in Public Life and from the Justice and Home Affairs Committee.

The College of Policing has now integrated the ATRS into its authorised professional practice. Forces are expected to complete an ATRS report for all relevant tools. That is welcome progress. The hope is that forces will increasingly comply to build public trust and meet their equality and data protection duties. However, while compliance is now expected, failure to record a tool is still not a legal requirement. A force could still choose not to use the ATRS, citing operational necessity, and it would not be breaking any law.

Transparency is vital across public services but nowhere more so than in policing, where these systems have the power to alter lives and restrict liberty. That is why Justice and civil liberties groups such as the Ada Lovelace and Alan Turing institutes want police use of these tools to be publicly declared and for this to be placed on a statutory footing. What is ultimately needed is a national register with real legal force—something the NPCC’s own AI lead has called for.

Government work on such a register is under way. I welcome that project but it will take time, while AI capabilities advance very rapidly indeed. The ATRS is the mechanism we have for now. This amendment would immediately strengthen it, requiring every operational AI tool from facial recognition to predictive mapping to be publicly declared.

Why does this matter? Take gait analysis, identifying people by how they move. No UK force has declared that it uses it, but its potential is recognised. Ireland is already legislating for its use in serious crime. Without a legal duty here, a UK force could deploy gait analysis tomorrow, with no public knowledge or oversight, just as facial recognition pilots proceed today with limited transparency.

This year, forces will spend nearly £2 billion on digital technology and analytics. With growing demand and limited resources, it is no surprise at all that forces turn to AI for efficiency. Yet, without total transparency, this technological shift risks further eroding public trust. Recognition of that need is growing. No one wants to return to the Met’s unlawful gangs matrix, quietly risk-scoring individuals on dubious grounds. For that reason, I urge the Government to accept this vital safeguard. It is a foundation for accountability in a field that will only grow in power and in consequence. I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Doocey explained, Amendment 431 seeks to place a statutory duty on every police force in England and Wales to disclose its use of algorithmic tools where they affect the rights, entitlements or obligations of individuals.

We are witnessing a rapid proliferation of algorithmic decision-making in policing, from predictive mapping to risk assessment tools used in custody suites. Algorithms are increasingly informing how the state interacts with the citizen, yet too often these tools operate in a black box, hidden from public view and democratic scrutiny. As we have discussed in relation to other technologies such as facial recognition, the deployment of advanced technology without a clear framework undermines public trust.

This amendment requires police forces, as my noble friend explained, to complete entries in the algorithmic transparency recording standard. The ATRS is the Government’s own standard for algorithmic transparency, developed to ensure public sector accountability. My Private Member’s Bill on public authority algorithmic and automated decision-making allows for a more advanced form of reporting. In my view, the ATRS is the bare minimum required for accountability for AI use in the public sector.

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[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. Yesterday, I looked at the public ATRS repository that is meant to record what AI tools police forces are deploying. It contained only two entries for police AI tools, even though we know that many are already being used, including systems such as live facial recognition, which is not listed at all. A great deal of AI development takes place within individual police forces, rather than through national programmes, and there are several reasons why these tools may not be appearing in the central record. Some forces believe that putting information on their own website is sufficient to meet transparency requirements. Others may avoid reporting tools by categorising them simply as standard software rather than as algorithms or AI systems. There may also be worries about publishing full information which could make it easier for defence lawyers to challenge decisions in court.

I think, therefore, that both the Government and we are clear—as well as the Official Opposition—that there absolutely is a problem that needs to be addressed, because it is not being addressed at the moment. AI is moving at such a rapid pace that this is not something that can be kicked into the long grass; it really needs to be addressed now. I therefore look forward to seeing the proposals that the Government are going to come forward with—I will not mention the war or the White Paper—but, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 431 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Baroness Doocey]

432: After Clause 166, insert the following new Clause—
“National plan on police data intelligence systems(1) Within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must publish and lay before Parliament a national plan to modernise police data and intelligence systems in England and Wales.(2) The plan must include steps to be taken to further the aims of—(a) replacing any antiquated police technology;(b) closing capability gaps identified in the National Audit on Group-Based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse;(c) enabling real-time secure information exchange between police forces and partner agencies;(d) supporting improved—(i) risk identification,(ii) early intervention, and(iii) co-ordinated action,to protect children.(3) The national plan must set out clear milestones of how to achieve the aims set out in subsection (2) within five years of the plan being published.(4) Every 12 months after publication of the plan under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must lay a further report before Parliament outlining the progress to date in achieving the aims set out in subsection (2), until those aims have been completed.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment aims to take forward part of Recommendation 7 of Baroness Casey’s National Audit on Group-Based Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, relating to updating police information systems.

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[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 432 seeks to press the Government on their plans to address long-standing problems of fragmented police and criminal justice data systems. I must tell noble Lords that I was working on this very subject when I was a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority, which I left more than 16 years ago, and the system has neither changed nor got any better. The recent national audit on group-based child sexual exploitation produced by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, described policing’s data intelligence infrastructure as antiquated and identified systemic failures that continue to put children at serious risk. The audit also highlighted the wider paucity of technology underpinning policing.

These concerns echo what has been said for many years, and when I served on the Metropolitan Police Authority, the same warnings had already been voiced about creaking systems that did not keep pace with the demands placed on them. Yet despite endless reviews, there is still no fully integrated digital system linking the police with the rest of the criminal justice system.

Fragmented, outdated IT undermines public protection more broadly. Officers’ time is wasted on manual workarounds; investigative opportunities are missed; prosecutions are delayed, and known risks are not always identified, let alone shared. As digital evidence proliferates and crime becomes more cross-border and complex, the lack of seamless data sharing between forces and agencies becomes even more damaging.

Concerns about poor IT integration between the police and the Crown Prosecution Service were being formally raised as far back as the late 1990s. A major joint inspection published in July 2025 reiterated that the CPS case management system was never designed to interface properly with the 43 different police IT systems, contributing to delays, low charge rates and victim frustration. In other words, the same structural problems persist nearly three decades on.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I will certainly defer to the noble Baroness’s knowledge of the Procurement Bill because I think it went through the House before I was in the House. I am happy to share what detail that we can under the details of that Act. I hope that that satisfies the noble Baroness.

I will also go away and look at the issue of capital funding. I am afraid I do not have the figures in front of me, but of course it is important that we fund all these systems adequately. We would contend that, unfortunately, for the past 14 years some of the investment in policing that we would have liked to see has been lacking, and we have been very clear about our wider approach as a Government to investing, particularly in neighbourhood policing but in policing at all levels. We want to improve on recent experience.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

I thank the Minister for his response, but I am, frankly, gobsmacked at his suggestion that my amendment was not needed because the Home Office had a role in deciding what IT the police had and making sure that they had what they needed. For more than two decades, report after report has documented the same weaknesses: fragmented systems, wasted effort, and vital intelligence lost between agencies. People who did not understand would find it almost impossible to believe that vital intelligence can be lost between agencies, but it has been happening for years and years. We cannot keep treating this as a series of isolated IT upgrades that are needed when what is needed is a national strategy, with clear responsibility and sustained investment. There is no way past that; that is what is needed and it is what must be provided. This amendment does not prescribe the solution. It simply asks for leadership and for a timetable to deliver what everyone thinks is now essential.

The Minister mentioned talking to different people and finding out what was needed. All you have to do is talk to 43 chief constables and they will tell you exactly what is needed, for free. We do not have to go out to thousands of people and run various inquiries, taking days and months trying to work out what is needed. Everyone knows what is needed: the money, the will and the leadership. But, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 432 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his intervention, but I return to my central point, which is, as he pointed out in his intervention, that the normal law of the land is for stop and search on reasonable suspicion that the individual in question is a cause for concern: “I have reasonable suspicion that that person may be carrying a knife, et cetera, or otherwise involved in criminality”. These are special powers given to a relatively junior police officer; this is not a chief constable, let alone a magistrate or a judge. It allows a police officer to change the law of the land for a time-limited period for that area, to change what the stop and search regime is in that area. It is quite right that a power of that kind be tightly circumscribed because of the problems that the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, spoke about and because citizens do have rights to go about their business without fear of arbitrary stop and search.

This brings me back to my question about the relationship between Amendment 411, which is in this group on its own, and Amendment 415, which noble Lords opposite have in a separate group, and the apparent dichotomy between them. Amendment 415 says that, where there is a stop and search, an officer should not be allowed to require the presentation of digital ID; it does not even say “compulsory digital ID”. So if, as I think the Government now propose, digital ID becomes available to people to partake of, if they want, as a more convenient method of ID, we are going to have circumstances where noble Lords opposite will have more routine stop and search, but when a stop and search happens, an officer would not be able to ask the person searched to identify themselves if all they have with them is digital ID. That seems like a contradiction to me. I, for one, have always been very concerned and opposed to compulsory single identifiers, not least for the reason that they will lead to routine stop and search with people required to identify themselves to the police when they have done nothing wrong. I should be very interested if noble Lords opposite could square the relationship between this amendment and the one that follows.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, there is now considerable evidence about how stop and search powers are used in practice, their impact and long-term consequences, not least in building trust, which is so vital for effective community policing. Stop and search powers, especially under Section 60—suspicionless powers —already fall disproportionately on marginalised communities, particularly black and minority ethnic young men. Lowering the threshold from “serious violence” to “violence” can only increase the frequency and breadth of those powers and with it the disproportionality. This is not an abstract civil liberties concern but goes directly to trust and confidence.

It is also just 18 months since the Home Office accepted the findings of a police inspectorate report that identified serious shortcomings in the use of Section 60 powers, including low arrest and seizure rates for weapons, inadequate training and failures to adhere to statutory duties, such as PACE Code A or voluntary frameworks such as College of Policing APP guidance.

From a Liberal Democrat perspective, the test for expanding intrusive powers is a simple one. Is there a clear and compelling operational case, supported by evidence, that the existing powers are inadequate and that widening them will improve outcomes without unacceptable collateral damage to rights and community relations? We do not believe that the case has been made here. What is on offer is a lower legal bar for the most intrusive stop and search powers we have, imposed on communities that already experience it acutely, with no serious account taken of the long-term impact on policing by consent. On that basis, we cannot support the amendment.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this has been a very interesting short debate, and I thank my noble friends—

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for moving her amendment. Noble Lords will recall my work on a particular police force and abnormal loads. I am confused that it was the chief inspector who informed the Home Secretary that there was a big problem. I am grateful to her for dealing with it, but I thought that the IOPC was responsible for dealing with misconduct and that the chief inspector was looking more at efficiency and the proper use of resources. It would be extremely useful to the Committee if the Minister could explain where the dividing line is between the activities of the IOPC, which I see as being concerned with conduct and discipline, and of the chief inspector, who is concerned more about efficiency.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, the amendment rightly exposes a serious weakness in our current system. As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, points out, HMICFRS can diagnose deep-seated problems within police forces but it does not have the power to make sure these problems are fixed. There are simply too few national levers to deal with police underperformance. Labour’s manifesto included a clear commitment to give HMICFRS new powers to intervene in failing forces, and Ministers have signalled that they want to legislate to do this. We welcome that, but the Bill contains no such clause. I appreciate that a White Paper might be imminent. Even so, I urge the Government not to miss this golden opportunity to legislate now for clear, time-bound duties and proper escalation mechanisms, so that police forces are required to act on inspectorate findings.

Amendment 416A seeks to take the Government further by building this question into a wider statutory review of policing oversight. We support that intention, but we part company with the noble Baroness on the mechanism she proposes. Setting up yet another independent commission, with the terms of reference to be devised by the Secretary of State, approved by the Commons and then followed by nine months of deliberation, risks delaying change for at least another year. The evidence base is already substantial. What is missing is not diagnosis but the authority to enforce it. The noble Baroness is quite right that enforcement is a wider problem, one that extends beyond HMICFRS to the Independent Office for Police Conduct, where lessons are not always learned, to put it mildly. I agree with the spirit of co-ordination, but we must remember that the IOPC’s role is distinct—to oversee complaints and investigate the most serious misconduct. It is not, and should not become, a general performance regulator for police forces. That role properly lies with HMICFRS and, ultimately, with Ministers.

From these Benches, our preference is clear: do not commission another review and, instead, move directly and decisively to give the inspectorate the power it so clearly needs. For too long, we have had excellent reports, full of well-reasoned recommendations, almost all accepted by the police and the Government, but nothing happens. That inaction is rarely followed up. Measures that ensure that we no longer see the same failures repeated again and again would be very welcome.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for bringing forward Amendment 416A. While I recognise the intention to ensure that policing is subject to effective scrutiny and that regulatory bodies have the tools they need to drive improvement, I do not believe this amendment is necessary, nor do I think it would represent a proportionate or effective use of time and resources. His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services already plays a well-established role in ensuring accountability. It has extensive powers to inspect, report and make recommendations, and these reports are published and robust. They are laid before Parliament and used by the Home Office and policing bodies to drive reform. Where forces fall short, the existing framework already enables escalation, follow-up inspections and external pressure.

I was also worried that this amendment risks duplicating work already being carried out within existing structures. The policing oversight landscape includes His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, the Independent Office for Police Conduct, police and crime commissioners and parliamentary scrutiny through Select Committees. Co-ordination between these bodies is important, and I suggest it would be more constructive to ensure the better use of these mechanisms rather than create a new independent commission.

It is also worth noting the practical burden imposed by this amendment. It would require the Government to establish a commission, set detailed terms of reference, run a comparative review across multiple regulators, and timetable parliamentary debates in both Houses within a very tight timeframe. That is a significant undertaking that may not be justified, given the absence of clear evidence that His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services lacks the necessary authority to fulfil its core function. For those reasons, while I very much respect the motivation behind the amendment, I do not believe it necessary or proportionate and therefore cannot support it.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Doocey]

379: Clause 125, page 152, line 37, at end insert—
“(4) After section 14, insert—“14A Imposition of conditions: live facial recognitionPrior to imposing conditions under either section 12 or 14, the senior officer of the Police Force in question must confirm that live facial recognition will not be in use, unless a new statutory code of practice for the use of live facial recognition surveillance in public spaces in England and Wales had previously been presented to, and approved by, both Houses of Parliament.”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that police cannot use live facial recognition technology when imposing conditions on public assemblies or processions under Sections 12 or 14, unless a new, specific code of practice governing its use in public spaces has first been formally approved by both Houses of Parliament. It is intended to safeguard public privacy and civil liberties by requiring democratic oversight before this surveillance technology is deployed in such contexts.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 379, I will speak also to Amendment 471. When used responsibly, live facial recognition can help to protect the public. The real question before us is not whether it is used but how, under what safeguards, with what scrutiny and by what authority from Parliament? At present, the answer is deeply unsatisfactory.

Police forces are rolling out live facial recognition at speed, without a clear legal framework, consistent oversight or meaningful public consultation. Its operational use has more than doubled in a year. Millions of pounds are being spent on new systems and mobile vans, yet there is still no reference to facial recognition in any Act of Parliament. Instead, the police rely on a patchwork of data protection law, the Human Rights Act and non-binding guidance. Parliament must now act urgently to put its use on a clear statutory footing. The police themselves say that this is vital to maintain public trust.

Recent Home Office testing of the police national database’s retrospective facial recognition tool found significantly higher error rates for black and Asian people than for white people. For black women, the false positive rate was almost one in 10 when the system was run on lower settings. It also performs less reliably with children and young people. The human consequences are already here: schoolchildren in uniform wrongly flagged and told to prove their identity, and a black anti-knife campaigner stopped on his way home from volunteering and asked for his fingerprints because the system got it wrong. These are not theoretical risks; they are happening now.

When this became public, Ministers ordered a review and testing of a new algorithm, which is welcome. But questions remain. Why was the bias not disclosed earlier? Why on earth was the regulator not informed? Why are biased algorithms still in use today? A false match rate of nearly one in 10 for black women is not a technical glitch; it is a civil rights issue. Running thousands of searches every month before strengthening statutory oversight only deepens public mistrust. That is why the measures in Amendment 471 deserve very serious consideration.

Amendment 379 is modest and practical. It focuses on one of the most sensitive uses of live facial recognition: protests and public assemblies. It would require the police to pause its use at such events until a new statutory code of practice, approved by Parliament, is in place. That code would set out clearly when surveillance is justified, how watch lists are compiled, what safeguards apply and, crucially, what redress is available when things go wrong.

This Committee has already heard concerns about the gradual narrowing of protest rights. Each new restriction may seem small in isolation, but together they add up. Elsewhere in the Bill, as we heard on Monday, the Government seek to criminalise those who wish to remain anonymous at protests. Combined with expanding facial recognition, that places even greater pressure on protest rights. Taken together, these measures risk discouraging peaceful dissent and undermining freedom of expression.

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[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

I do not normally disagree with the Minister, although we might be on different sides of an argument, but I found that last comment very bad. We are all on the same side—we all want to catch criminals and prevent crime. That needs to go on the record. From what he just said, it was almost as though he was suggesting that he is on the side of that but we are not. To make it clear, we are not sitting here for the sake of it; we are here because we genuinely believe in this and we want to catch criminals and prevent crime.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Let us put out the hand of friendship and make common cause on those issues.

To respond to the noble Baroness’s amendment, I simply say that the consultation is there. Amendment 471 would go quite a long way beyond even that which the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, brought forward. I believe this to be a potential future crime-fighting tool. It needs regulation around it and that is what the Government are intending to do. We are very clear about that on page 5 of the consultation. How it is regulated and what is regulated, and how this is approached, is what the consultation is about, but I agree with the basic principle of the noble Baroness’s amendment. Therefore, I ask her to withdraw it.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

I would like that in writing.

I thank the Minister for his response and thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. The Minister mentioned the consultation, and I am pleased that the Government will legislate, but I hope Parliament will be very much involved, because, like anything, the devil will be in the detail. Whatever comes out of that will be very important.

Can the Minister tell me what happens if, in response to the consultation, the public say that they do not want the police to access particular databases? Will the Government then take those clauses out of the Bill? Perhaps he could just clarify that.

I have a concern that, even before the consultation began, the Home Office was saying that it hoped the process would pave the way for wider rollout. That does not really inspire confidence that Ministers are keeping an open mind. A consultation should not be used as a rubber stamp; it should be the start of a genuine national conversation about the limits that a free society wants to place on mass biometric data surveillance. For that conversation to mean anything, the public need to know the full picture, how accurate the systems are, and where and when they are being used. Right now, that transparency is not there.

We have heard that the Home Office thinks that:

“Any new laws informed by the consultation would take about two years to be passed by Parliament”.


That is far too slow, given the pace of technological change, and that comment was made in December 2025. All we are asking is that Parliament sets the rules before the technology sets them for us. I hope Parliament will be involved in setting those rules. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 379 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 396 in my name raises fundamental issues about this part of the Bill. My concern is about Clause 138 and its clear potential to enable facial recognition searches of the DVLA’s vast image database. That would be a dramatic change. At present, drivers’ data can be accessed only for road traffic purposes.

Amendment 396 would place a safeguard in the Bill to prevent authorised persons using information obtained under these powers for the purposes of biometric searches using facial recognition technology. It would ensure that the private images of millions of citizens cannot be repurposed to feed live or retrospective facial recognition systems without full parliamentary debate and explicit consent. Around 55 million facial images are held by the DVLA; they are collected in good faith and with a clear expectation of privacy, alongside names, addresses and medical records, for the routine purposes of getting a driving licence. Turning that repository into a police biometric pool would mark a profound shift in the relationship between the state and the citizen. Combined with live facial recognition on our streets, it would create the infrastructure for real-time, population-scale surveillance, scanning the faces of tens of millions of law-abiding people as they go about their daily lives.

In effect, most of us would find ourselves on a perpetual digital watch list, our faces repeatedly checked for potential wrongdoing. That is troubling not only because of the bias and misidentification in these systems but because it is simply not proportionate policing. The public broadly support the use of technology to catch criminals, but they also want limits and safeguards. A 2024 survey by the Centre for Emerging Technology and Security and the Alan Turing Institute found that only one in five people—just 19%—trusted police forces to use biometric tools responsibly.

That anxiety is particularly strong among women. Barely three years ago, the Casey review exposed appalling misogyny and a serious abuse of data access within policing. Against that backdrop, granting digital access to millions of female drivers’ personal details and photographs is hardly reassuring, especially when previous safeguards have failed so spectacularly. Last year alone, 229 serving police officers and staff were arrested for domestic abuse-related offences, and a further 1,200 were on restricted duties linked to such allegations. The fear is real that combining facial recognition with DVLA access could allow abusers within policing to misuse these powers to trace survivors, to remove their freedom to hide and to undermine public trust still further. We also know that this technology misidentifies members of ethnic-minority communities far more frequently, compounding injustice and eroding confidence in policing by consent.

I share the ambition for policing to use data more intelligently. Forces need joined-up intelligence systems across the entire criminal justice network, but there is a world of difference between targeted access to high-risk offender data and a blank cheque to harvest the personal information of millions of people.

Clause 138 is far too wide. It allows the Secretary of State to authorise digital access for policing or law enforcement purposes, which frankly could mean anything. What information may be accessed, and for what purpose, would later be set by regulation made under the negative procedure, giving Parliament only the most cursory scrutiny of measures, with huge implications for privacy and liberty. Such sweeping powers should not be slipped through in secondary legislation. The public did not give their driving licence photographs to become part of a national face search system. There has been no debate, no consent and no assessment of the risk to those who have good reason to remain hidden. Once civic freedoms are eroded, they are very rarely rebuilt.

When the Minister replies, I hope we will hear what the Government’s policy intention is. If their intention is to keep open the possibility of using DVLA data for surveillance, they should say so and try to justify it. We know that the police have specifically asked for this. It is not good enough to say, “This is our intention”; my amendment would ensure it cannot happen. That is the safeguard the public expect and the least this Committee should demand.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to speak in favour of Amendment 396, to which I have added my name—my notes are only two pages long. It would ensure that the DVLA drivers database was not used for a purpose for which it was never intended; namely, to search drivers’ photos for a match with images collected by live facial recognition.

Facial recognition technology could be a useful tool in fighting serious crime if it was properly regulated and supervised, which is the case with other biometric technologies such as fingerprint and DNA, but currently it is open season on facial recognition, with no statutory constraints on its use or misuse. That means that this deeply invasive, mass surveillance tool poses a serious threat to the civil liberties and human rights of UK citizens. If used in combination with the DVLA drivers database, it would be a disproportionate expansion of police powers to identify and track innocent citizens across time and locations for low-level policing needs. It would give the authorities access to the biometric data of tens of millions of our fellow citizens. It is vital that safeguards are introduced in law to prevent this happening. This is precisely what Amendment 396 would do.

In Committee in the other place, the Policing Minister said that

“police forces do not conduct facial matching against images contained on the DVLA database, and the clause will not change that”.—[Official Report, Commons, Crime and Policing Bill Committee, 29/4/25; col. 442.]

But Clause 138 allows regulations to be made at a later date setting out how driver licensing information will be made accessible to law enforcement. All that Amendment 396 does is create safeguards to ensure that the regulations made under Clause 138 cannot provide for facial recognition searches of the DVLA database. I commend it to the Committee.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Doocey]

357: After Clause 111, insert the following new Clause—
“Prevention of resale of stolen GPS products(1) The Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act 2023 is amended as follows.(2) In Section 1(2)(b), after “commercial activities” insert, “including GPS equipment”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause extends the Equipment Theft Act 2023 to specifically include the theft of GPS equipment.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 357, first tabled by my party in the other place last year, would extend the operation of the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act by making explicit reference to GPS equipment or, as the industry now prefers, global navigation satellite systems.

For several years, Liberal Democrats have highlighted the sharp rise in rural crime, with organised gangs systematically targeting farms and rural businesses. Their focus has been on stealing high-value GPS drones, receivers and in-cab screens from tractors and harvesters. This equipment is worth thousands of pounds and is essential for modern precision farming. The loss of these units leaves farmers facing costly delays and crop losses at critical times of the year. These thefts have formed part of a well-organised international trade whereby equipment is stripped, containerised and shipped overseas, often beyond recovery. Crucially, offences spiked as rural policing came under ever-increasing strain. Local stations were closed and experienced neighbourhood teams hollowed out, taking with them the deep local knowledge that underpins effective intelligence gathering.

Organised gangs stepped into that vacuum, criss-crossing county boundaries with little deterrence. We recognise that real progress has been made over the last year, with insurance claims for GPS theft now starting to fall, thanks to greater collaboration between farmers, insurers, police and the National Rural Crime Network, whose invaluable work is now rightly benefiting from strengthened national funding and support. The Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act should build on that work, offering a strong framework for prevention, giving the Secretary of State powers to require immobilisers and the marking and registration of agricultural machinery, and to extend these measures to other equipment by regulation.

Amendment 357 would strengthen that framework by naming GPS units explicitly in the primary legislation. This would give a clear signal of intent, ensure momentum and guard against any further delay in bringing the provisions into effect. We welcome the Government’s recent commitment to include removable GPS units in future regulations and I am pleased that Ministers have listened to evidence presented from these Benches and others. The reality, however, is that the key provisions of the Act have not yet been brought into force and the secondary legislation required to implement them is still pending. Our amendment would ensure timely and decisive action, so that farmers and rural businesses see the benefits on the ground sooner rather than later. This is a simple, practical step that would support the Government’s aims and help stop the theft and resale of vital agricultural technology. I beg to move.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I start with a simple question: where on earth are the regulations that we were promised way back in 2023 when we passed the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act? I took that Bill through this House with all-party support, getting Royal Assent in July 2023. The Home Office promised that it would consult urgently on the necessary regulations and started that consultation immediately.

The consultation closed in July 2024, but the Government announced their conclusions only on 17 October 2025 and have dumped some of the most important provisions of the Act. It will now apply only to new all-terrain vehicles with forensic marking and registration, and to removable GPS units. Dumped are the proposals for immobilisers and extending it to other agricultural machinery. A £5,000 quad bike is protected, but not the £500,000 combine harvester. If someone breaks into the £300,000 John Deere tractor and steals the £10,000 GPS unit, that is covered, but not the John Deere itself. I saw one advert for a GPS that said, “Put this in your tractor, and you will be able to track it if the tractor is stolen”. Well, that is only if a farmer makes it impossible to remove and the thief has to steal the tractor as well as the GPS unit.

Dumping the proposals covering hand tools may be a wise measure, even though an incredible number are stolen. I accept that a forensic marking and registration scheme for power tools needs more time if it is ever to happen. It is estimated that the power tools market may have reached £1.5 billion in 2025. Professional power tools average about £200 each; a DeWalt combi kit of six tools sharing the same battery will come in at about £1,000. Therefore, if tradesmen are spending about £1.5 billion on £200 per item tools, that is over 7 million new tools bought per annum—I think I have half of them in my own garage, actually, but that is another matter. It would be a massive logistical task to register those 7 million tools, but large machinery is different.

Last year, 10,241 tractors, worth £1.6 billion, and 400 combine harvesters, worth £160 million, were registered in the UK. Some 34,000 excavators, diggers and earth-moving machines were sold, worth £1.5 billion, while 8,000 ATVs were sold with a total value of just £80 million. We will therefore have 44,000 big machines worth £3.4 billion with no forensic marking or isolator scheme, but we will have one for just 8,000 ATVs worth a mere £80 million. I do not understand the sense or wisdom of that. If it is possible to devise a forensic marking registration scheme for 8,000 vehicles, it should not be rocket science to devise one for 44,000 vehicles worth 42 times more. I therefore urge the Home Office to lay the ATV and GPS regulations immediately and then get on with drafting the next phase of those regulations to apply them to big farm machinery and construction equipment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I do not want to commit to any particular timescale. It probably ill behoves me to do so, but I will point out that, having published our response to the call for evidence a couple of months before Christmas, we are obviously trying to motor ahead with it, if noble Lords will forgive the pun.

I turn now to Amendment 368, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, which proposes two changes: first, to expand enforcement provisions under the 2023 Act and, secondly, to introduce a statutory aggravating factor for theft of tools from tradesmen under the Sentencing Act 2020. The Government recognise the distress caused by tool theft and its impact on tradespeople and small businesses, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies, spoke to. As he said, these tools are essential to livelihoods, and their loss can cause real financial and emotional harm. That is why we are already taking action through the National Vehicle Crime Working Group, which brings together specialists from every police force to share intelligence and tackle emerging trends in vehicle-related crime, including tool theft.

On sentencing, the current framework is sufficient and robust. Courts must follow guidelines issued by the Sentencing Council, which already require consideration of harm, culpability and aggravating factors such as financial loss, business impact and emotional distress. Courts also have powers to impose compensation orders to ensure that victims receive financial compensation. Introducing a statutory aggravating factor, as this amendment calls for, would duplicate existing provisions unnecessarily and have limited impact on outcomes. Indeed, I am reminded that a wise man once said,

“I am sceptical of the need for more aggravating factors”.—[Official Report, 15/12/25; col. 585.]

That was of course the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, speaking just three weeks ago, on 15 December, in response to an amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, to Clause 102 on self-harm. I could not have put it better myself.

I hope I have been able to reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that we accept the spirit of her Amendment 357 and we are working to give effect to this issue. I hope too that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, will understand why we do not consider his Amendment 368 to be necessary, and forgive my light ribbing a moment ago. For all these reasons, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his response and to the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Davies of Gower, for their support. We all want this legislation to be effective, but we want swift implementation of the Act, not in the fullness of time, and stronger rural crime prevention, including forensic marking, to deter the theft and resale of tradespeople’s tools.

GPS theft cost farmers over £1 million last year. Frankly, this just cannot be allowed to continue. There is legislation ready to go—there is an Act of Parliament—and it needs to be implemented now. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 357 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, we come back to fraud. As the Minister will be well aware, this is not the first time I have raised the issue of ensuring that the technology and telecoms companies take their share of responsibility for the use of their services or platforms by fraudsters and are made to contribute to the costs of reimbursing victims. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, and the noble Lords, Lord Young of Cookham and Lord Holmes of Richmond, for their support on this amendment.

On a previous group I mentioned the Fraud Act 2006 and Digital Fraud Committee, on which I was privileged to sit. Our report, Fighting Fraud: Breaking the Chain, which was published in November 2022, made the very clear conclusion:

“Until all fraud-enabling industries fear significant financial, legal and reputational risk for their failure to prevent fraud, they will not act”.


That has been borne out over the three years since. There has been no significant improvement, despite the voluntary charters that have been agreed. Only the banks are on the hook for the costs of fraud under the mandatory APP reimbursement rules that were brought in by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023. The banks must now pick up 100% of the reimbursement liability, and there is evidence to suggest that this is having a positive impact on the efforts that the banks are making to identify and prevent fraud.

Similarly, the Payment Systems Regulator’s six-monthly reports on the performance of the banks has provided welcome transparency as to which banks and payment services are doing most, and least, to combat fraud. As an aside, it would be good to have confirmation from the Minister that the subsuming of the PSR into the FCA will not reduce the important reporting and oversight of APP fraud that the PSR has been providing.

The banks are picking up the liability, but they are not where the fraud originates. According to UK Finance statistics, around 70% by volume and 30% by value arises from online platforms, and 16% by volume and 36% by value arises from telecoms—calls and texts. Let us name names. According to the PSR, over half of APP scams originate on Meta platforms—Facebook and so on.

Nothing has changed that would change the conclusion of the committee that these industries will not take the issue seriously until they face liability for what they allow to happen on their platforms or services. The banks have sharpened up their acts, in part because of the mandatory reimbursement requirement that we have imposed on them. The banks face real liabilities for the fraud that goes through their accounts.

The Online Safety Act includes some important measures to prevent fraudulent content and scam advertising, but it does not make the companies liable for the losses. We have mandated that the banks should reimburse victims of APP scams after we decided that the voluntary code was not working, and it is now time that those who enable the frauds should pick up their share on a compulsory, not voluntary, basis. There are many possible ways to achieve this, so I have not been prescriptive in the amendment. It could be as simple as bringing the telcos and tech companies into the reimbursement requirements, or we could look at extending the new failure to prevent fraud offence so that it covers the use by third parties of services provided by a company. The failure to prevent offence currently covers only actions by employees or associates, so it would not cover scams in this situation.

Amendment 67 would simply require the Government to bring forward proposals for how to do this within six months of this Bill passing. It is not enough to keep publishing more fraud strategies. The one that is due to be published shortly, which I am sure the Minister will refer to, will be the third fraud strategy since I have been a Member of this House. The Minister said earlier that the fraud strategy would be published soon—I think he said, “in very short order”. I know that he cannot give a date, but it would be helpful to know whether that will be before Report. The content of the strategy might make this amendment unnecessary, so it would be very helpful if we could see it before Report.

Fraud and scam figures are not falling; they still make up around 40% of all crime in the UK. It really is time that we make those who allow their services to be used by the fraudsters, and those who enable the fraud, liable for their actions—or, rather, lack of action. It is the only way to make them take the issue seriously. I beg to move.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

We are very happy on these Benches to support this amendment. We all know the grim scale of fraud, now our most common crime. Authorised push payment scams are driven by online platforms, adverts on social media fuelling shopping and investment frauds, and hacked accounts enabling ticket scams. Yet, as has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, platforms such as Meta, which owns Facebook and Instagram, can still take six weeks to remove illegal content, allowing scammers to resurface again and again—so-called “life-boating”.

This amendment is designed to cut through that inertia. It would provide a clear statutory duty of care on tech and telecom firms to prevent scams at source, using their own AI and tools. It would also require them to share the financial burden with payment providers, which must already imburse many victims of authorised push payment fraud. That seems a fair step, given that the platforms host most of the scams and profit from the engagement that keeps users scrolling. Weak voluntary charters, non-binding Ofcom guidance and even the Online Safety Act’s proportionate measures have let these firms do the bare minimum—reacting to reports rather than proactively detecting fraud through verification, AI-driven scans and systematic audits. Big tech has unparalleled know-how—the AI, software and manpower to spot fraudster patterns and take them down. Banks cannot fight this alone and nor can the police. This amendment would compel these companies to protect their users, stopping scams upstream.

We hope that the Government’s fraud strategy follows the example of this amendment and goes even further with a failure to prevent fraud offence, backed by strong fines and tougher binding Ofcom standards. Meanwhile, Amendment 367 would provide some timely backbone, giving tech and telecom firms a real incentive to act swiftly before yet more victims lose potentially everything.

[Lord Young of Cookham (Con)]

My Lords, I put my name to the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. I want to add a brief footnote to the speech that he made in support. In an earlier debate, the Minister was very complimentary about the work of the fraud committee on which we both served, and he can convert that praise into action by accepting one of the recommendations which we made in our report.

It is worth quoting the relevant sections of the report that led up to that recommendation. On page 162, paragraph 57 states:

“However, banks are the last link in the fraud chain and cannot be expected to foot the fraud bill alone”.


Then we come on to our recommendation:

“To incentivise companies to act on fraud and more accurately reflect the balance of responsibility for fraud, the Government must establish a mechanism by which fraud-enabling sectors—in addition to the outgoing and recipient PSP—are required to contribute to the costs of reimbursement in cases where their platforms and services helped to facilitate the fraud”.


That is a very clear recommendation. We came to that conclusion after taking evidence from, for example, TSB and academics. They all made the point that there was absolutely no incentive on the part of the telecommunications companies to do anything, because their business case rested on generating revenue and they faced no penalties. That was our recommendation.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 17th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for raising a point that really had not occurred to me in years of gazing at Sections 4A and 5 of the Public Order Act. I also thank the noble Lord for his reference to the Handyside case, quite correctly observing that freedom of speech means nothing if it does not include the freedom to offend, shock and disturb. But, of course, Handyside was about ideas that offend, shock and disturb. Sections 4A and 5 are not talking about ideas; as the noble Lord said, they refer to threats, abuse and insult.

Outside the rarefied walls of academe, the cases in which Sections 4A and 5 are applied are to the objectionable drunk, on a train or in a doorway, who yells at somebody and can cause, in the words of the statute, distress or alarm. I agree with the noble Lord that they are not very different. In fact, he said it would be otiose to have both “distress” and “alarm” in the sections, but surely there is a shade of difference between the two. If there is some lasting upset, we could call that distress, but if it is a question of frightening or unsettling somebody by yelling an insult in their ear, that is probably closer to alarm. Although I agree with the noble Lord and the noble Baroness about the evils of overzealous prosecutors, I suggest that there is some purpose to these two very similar words both appearing in these two sections.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I have listened to this rather short debate against the particular backdrop of the Government’s increasingly unsettling approach to public order—a direction of travel that raises real concerns on these Benches. The current stance seems to involve simply doubling down on the pattern set by the previous Administration, which, in our view, risks overpolicing protest, overburdening an already stretched justice system, diverting resources from serious crime and threatening legitimate speech.

In that context, we have sympathy with this proposal. However, I have some concerns about changing a standard legal formula in public order and anti-social behaviour law. It is widely embedded in guidance and operational policy; in removing it, there is a risk of creating uncertainty and confusion within the police, local authorities and the courts. At the same time, it is equally clear that the concepts of alarm and distress have, in practice, been stretched far beyond what Parliament ever intended. Some people are very easily alarmed or distressed by noisy but peaceful demonstrations, or simply by views with which they profoundly disagree. These cannot be a sound basis for criminal liability.

There is a real risk that an overbroad test inhibits free expression, penalises vulnerability and hands too much discretion to those who are most intolerant of difference. If the Government will not support this amendment, will the Minister explain how they intend to ensure that public order powers are not used to criminalise mere annoyance, eccentricity or disagreement, but are focused on genuinely threatening, abusive and harassing behaviour?

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

I thank my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough for tabling Amendment 352. It is welcome to see such a cross-party collection of noble Lords supporting it: the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, are not names always seen together on an amendment.

The amendment proposes to remove “alarm” from Sections 4A and 5 of the 1986 Act, as we have heard. As others have said, alarm is a word that denotes impression, mood and temperament. It is a word that allows the criminal law to stray beyond the prevention of genuine disorder and into the policing of irritation, discomfort or unease. Several legal cases have shown where this can lead. In a case called DPP v Orum in 1989, a conviction was upheld under Section 5 for shouting abuse at police officers. The court accepted that even trained officers, accustomed as they might be to a degree of verbal abuse, could none the less be persons likely to be caused “harassment, alarm or distress”. Although that may be understandable up to a point, it demonstrates how low the threshold has been set. If professionals whose job it is to face confrontation can be alarmed by rude language, one begins to wonder who cannot be.

Another case is called Norwood v DPP in 2003, in which a man was convicted for displaying a poster saying “Islam out of Britain” in his window. The reasoning again rested partly on the likelihood of causing alarm. Whatever one thinks of the views expressed—many of us would deplore them—the case illustrates how “alarm” can operate as a gateway through which deeply subjective reactions become the basis for criminal liability. It seems that these cases represent symptoms of a statutory provision that has no clear boundary. “Alarm” does not mean “fear of violence”—it does not require intimidation; it does not even require serious upset. It has been stretched to cover being offended, unsettled or merely uncomfortable. I suggest that is not a sound basis for criminal liability.

As others have said, the law retains and contains safeguards where genuine harm arises: “harassment” would remain in the wording of the statute, “distress” would remain in the wording of the provision, and Section 4 remains available for

“Fear or provocation of violence”.


Other statutes address stalking, threats and coercive conduct. My noble friend’s amendment would remove nothing that is truly necessary to protect the public. It would restore a measure of seriousness to public order law. Criminal offences should address conduct that is objectively wrongful, not speech or behaviour that happens to alarm someone whose threshold for alarm may be very low. This amendment has our wholehearted support, and I hope that it has the support of the Minister too.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Sugg (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to the amendments in my name in this group. Amendments 353 and 355, co-signed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester and the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, relate to a statutory definition of honour-based abuse and a duty to issue multi-agency statutory guidance.

Honour-based abuse is a form of domestic abuse motivated by an abuser’s perception that a person has brought, or may bring, dishonour or shame to themselves, their family or their community. It can take many forms and is often complex to identify, but it centres on controlling individuals to compel them to behave in certain ways or subscribe to certain beliefs. For some, the concept of honour is prized above the safety and well-being of individuals, and to compromise a family’s honour is to bring dishonour and shame. In extreme cases, this is used to justify abuse, disownment or physical harm. Honour-based abuse is not a cultural tradition or religious practice. It is a form of abuse that can occur within any community, regardless of faith or background.

Despite increased reporting to the national honour-based abuse helpline, commissioned by the Home Office, it remains the least prosecuted form of violence against women and girls. Across agencies, it is inconsistently recognised, poorly understood and inadequately responded to. Without clarity, front-line professionals are unsure how to spot the signs, and victims can slip through the cracks.

The need for change is starkly illustrated by the story of Fawziyah Javed. Fawziyah was a lawyer; she understood the importance of evidence and tried to protect herself and her unborn child. She repeatedly sought help, reporting to health professionals, contacting the police and gathering evidence against her abusers, but her situation was not taken seriously. Her case exposes a persistent and systemic failure to recognise honour-based abuse within statutory systems. Multiple perpetrators were involved, but they were overlooked because investigations often focused on a single individual, reflecting approaches designed for intimate-partner domestic abuse rather than the extended, collective and coercive nature of honour-based abuse.

In late August 2021, when Fawziyah made a second report to the police, the risks she faced had still not been recognised. On 2 September 2021, Fawziyah, aged 31, and 17 weeks pregnant with a baby boy, was tragically murdered when her husband pushed her from Arthur’s Seat in Edinburgh. Immediately after this, as was shown in the Channel 4 documentary “The Push: Murder on the Cliff”, he did not call 999; the first call he made was to his own father. This illustrates the family-involved dynamics of honour-based abuse, which are too often overlooked by statutory systems.

Fawziyah’s mother, Yasmin Javed, has led the campaign to ensure that her daughter’s legacy drives meaningful change, and has permitted me to share Fawziyah’s story. Yasmin’s courage and advocacy ensures that survivors’ voices are heard and their experiences are recognised. She believes strongly that the lack of understanding of honour-based abuse and the absence of a universal statutory definition meant that Fawziyah’s experience and the perpetrators were missed.

Fawziyah’s story demonstrates why we urgently need a statutory definition and accompanying guidance, not just for the police and prosecutors but for teachers, social workers, healthcare professionals and everyone who has an opportunity to identify abuse early before it escalates. It will help professionals understand its complex dynamics and act decisively to protect victims.

In August, the Government announced six new measures to tackle honour-based abuse, including legislating, at the earliest opportunity, to introduce a statutory definition and multi-agency guidance. I am very pleased that we are on the same page on that.

Turning to the definition itself, Amendment 353 puts forward a suggested definition that has been developed over a number of years. It is not my definition but the product of sustained work by the sector, legal experts and, most importantly, survivors with lived experience. From 2022, survivors worked with the University of Nottingham to develop a survivor-informed definition. This work identified serious limitations in existing non-statutory definitions and provided a framework that captures the collective and coercive nature of this abuse. Building on this survivor-informed foundation, barrister Naomi Wiseman, drawing on extensive experience in this field, led further work with violence against women and girls sector partners to draft a statutory definition. Through multiple iterations, consensus was reached upon a definition that reflects the complexity of honour-based abuse.

To date, this work has engaged survivors, over 60 organisations and specialist legal expertise. It combines lived experience with professional knowledge to bring clarity, consistency and stronger protections. This process has been truly sector-wide and survivor-led. Survivors’ voices have shaped every iteration, ensuring that the definition reflects the realities of honour-based abuse. I wish to put on the record my sincere thanks to all those involved, particularly the survivors. Their dedication and insight, born from personal experience and gaps in professional responses, has ensured that future victims can be recognised, protected and believed in the ways that they were not.

This survivor-led process has required significant time, expertise and emotional labour, often carried out amid ongoing abuse, ostracism and bereavement. Every consultation involves survivors and bereaved families retelling painful and traumatic experiences. They do this out of a sense of duty, so that their survival can mean something for the many who are not able to speak out. Dame Nicole Jacobs, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, has welcomed this work. She said: “I recognise the significant progress that has been made to date and emphasise the importance of grounding any definition in survivor experience. I support the ongoing work led by survivors, the specialist sector and Karma Nirvana to ensure the definition is effective”.

Of course, we all want a definition that works, and I therefore welcome the debate to come, so we can agree a definition that is fit for purpose—one that respects survivors’ lived experience and treats their contribution with the seriousness that it deserves. I am grateful to the noble Baroness the Minister and Home Office officials for their engagement to date. I know that work is ongoing on a revised definition, and I hope that we can work together, with survivors, experts and the sector, to return on Report with a workable, legally sound definition that reflects survivors’ experiences, strengthens protection and supports effective multi-agency working.

Timing matters here. For years, survivors, the sector and front-line professionals have called for a statutory definition, and this Bill is the vehicle through which change must be delivered—it really cannot wait any longer. The CPS and police are revising their guidance, which is due mid-next year, and they need a statutory definition in place to do so effectively. The success of this reform will also depend on the rollout of clear, comprehensive communication and training, a commitment that I am pleased to say that the Government have already made for next year. We need the definition to make that effective. For too long, perpetrators have escaped accountability, while victims have been failed. The time to act is now.

I turn to Amendment 354 in my name, co-signed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester and the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws; the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, has tabled a similar amendment in this group. Amendment 354 would recognise honour as an aggravating factor in sentencing. It would ensure earlier identification of honour-based abuse in investigations and prosecutions, and that sentences properly reflect the gravity of the offending. Safeguarding would be strengthened for victims facing risk from multiple perpetrators, and it would also act as a stronger deterrent.

The murder of Somaiya Begum, a 20-year-old biomedical student, exposed a critical gap in the criminal justice system. Despite an active forced marriage protection order, Somaiya was murdered by a family member. Evidence at trial demonstrated the role of family pressures and honour dynamics, yet the court concluded:

“It is not possible to identify a motive for this dreadful attack”.


In his defence statement, the defendant explicitly relied on notions of honour to shift blame on to other family members. Despite this, the judge did not recognise honour in sentencing. This demonstrates how the absence of formal recognition allows key motivations to be overlooked, weakening justice and accountability.

Somaiya’s case and other cases such as the terrible murder of Banaz Mahmod, to which I know the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, will refer, illustrate several wider systemic failures. Yesterday would have been Banaz’s 40th birthday—and I pay tribute to Banaz’s sister, Payzee Mahmod, who has been a tireless advocate for changes to the law in Banaz’s memory, and whom I have worked closely with on this campaign. I also want to acknowledge Banaz’s sister Bekhal, who is calling for change in this area too.

When we do not recognise the aggravation of honour in the perpetration of these crimes, there are multiple consequences. First, there is the erasure of victims; when honour motivations are not named, survivors and families feel unseen and invalidated, deepening mistrust in the justice system and perpetuating silence. Secondly, there is unreliable data: judgments rarely reference honour, creating the false impression that such cases are infrequent or absent, despite evidence to the contrary. Thirdly, there are low prosecution rates: between April 2024 and March 2025, only 95 honour-based prosecutions were brought, with fewer than half resulting in conviction. Supporting this amendment would address these failures, improve data, strengthen accountability and ensure that courts formally acknowledge honour-based motivations, giving survivors and families the recognition and justice that they deserve.

Given that we are a little later than planned, many noble Lords who were going to speak in favour of these amendments are sadly no longer in their place. That includes the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, who, given her long experience, fully supports these amendments, in particular making honour-based abuse an aggravating feature, to send a clear message to communities and sentencing judges.

I pass on my sincere thanks to the Minister for the meeting to discuss this issue with not just her but three Ministers and officials across both departments. I am also very grateful for her own suggestion that she speak to the sector and survivor representatives ahead of this debate to hear from them directly. I listened with interest to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, earlier in response to the Urgent Question on the VAWG strategy, and I look forward to reading that strategy tomorrow, given his reference a number of times to honour-based abuse.

I appreciate that the Government are clearly working to make progress on this, and I have two questions for the Minister. Will she commit to continuing to work with the sector to bring forward amendments on an agreed definition and guidance for Report? Secondly, while I heard the Minister’s explanation on Monday on existing aggravating factors and sentencing practice, we know from reviewing sentencing remarks in cases of clear honour-based abuse that, in practice, these factors are inconsistently applied and often fail to capture the collective, coercive and family or community-driven nature of the abuse. In that context, could the Minister set out the Government’s position on formally recognising honour-based abuse as an aggravating factor in sentencing?

In conclusion, I pay tribute again to the tireless work and bravery of survivors. Without them the progress on this work to date would not be possible. I would also like to thank Karma Nirvana, whose incredible work supports victims and survivors, brings the sector together collaboratively and campaigns for these life-saving changes alongside over 60 leading organisations. I am deeply grateful to the survivors and sector representatives who attended a briefing for noble Lords here last month. They reminded us plainly that honour-based abuse remains an invisible crime, with invisible perpetrators and, tragically, invisible victims. They told us that making progress on these amendments will save lives, prevent immeasurable harm and deliver recognition and justice for those who deserve it. Fawziyah, Somaiya, Banaz and so many others cannot speak for themselves, but through the courage of their families and advocates, we have the opportunity to act. In their names, I beg to move.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, for moving her amendment. This group also includes Amendment 356 in my name and in the name of the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady Blower, whose support I greatly appreciate. I also thank Southall Black Sisters for their tireless campaigning in this vital area.

I echo the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, in paying tribute to Banaz Mahmod and to the extraordinary courage of her sisters, Bekhal and Payzee, whose tireless campaigning has kept the spotlight on honour-based abuse in the hope that Banaz’s legacy will drive real and lasting change. Banaz was just 20 when she was murdered by her father, uncle and five male cousins. Her crime? Leaving her abusive husband and having a boyfriend she wished to marry. Her family convened a council of war to plan her killing, claiming that her wish for divorce and choice of partner brought shame on the family and the wider community. She did everything that we tell victims to do. On five separate occasions, she reported rape, violence and threats to kill—even an attempt on her life by her own father. She named those who would later murder her, yet she was not believed or protected. Her murder is not an isolated tragedy but emblematic of wider patterns of institutional failure to identify and respond to honour-based abuse.

That is why I have I have also added my name to Amendments 353 and 355, calling for a statutory definition to be brought forward as quickly as possible, alongside guidance, so that the thousands of incidents of such abuse reported in the UK each year are treated with the gravity they deserve. I too urge the Government not to miss the opportunity presented by the Bill, and I hope that the Minister will provide that reassurance.

Amendment 356 would make honour a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing. A similar amendment in the other place limited this to murder, but here it is deliberately broader. This would ensure that any offence committed in the name of honour is explicitly treated as aggravated in sentencing. It shares the aim of Amendment 354 but, in the absence of an existing statutory definition, it defines the aggravating factor independently, focusing instead on the perpetrator’s conduct and mirroring existing language from racial and religious aggravation laws. This approach would allow the aggravating factor to take effect immediately, while consultations on the definition take place between the Government and the sector.

Critically, Amendment 356 also recognises the frequent involvement of multiple perpetrators and colluders. In Banaz’s case, police estimated that around 50 men were involved, either in the killing or in shielding those responsible. This recognition is vital for improving how agencies identify and respond to such abuse.

I have reflected on the comments made during Monday’s Committee about the concept of honour already being adequately covered in legislation. I do not want to anticipate the Minister’s response, but I imagine she will say that judges are already familiar with the concept of honour and that evidence of its presence will already result in a stiffer sentence.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 17th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, has explained all my reservations about these clauses very articulately, so I will not repeat them. They add an unnecessary implication that the public are a threat to emergency workers. Why are religiously and racially aggravated offences being highlighted here, as though members of the general public were somehow prone to that kind of behaviour? It is an unhelpful signposting because, as has been rightly pointed out, if emergency workers are dealt with aggressively or harassed in any way, we have laws to deal with it. To highlight this implies that there is something extra to be added, that there is a problem out there of the public going around racially abusing workers, and that there are particular offences in mind. Duplication of law ends up being virtue signalling. I am not sure that virtue is being signalled, but none the less it seems to be a box-ticking exercise rather than an effective piece of lawmaking.

I am also very worried about the notion of “insulting behaviour”. I am probably guilty of it; one does get frustrated sometimes. What on earth does it mean? It is entirely subjective. What is insulting behaviour? It would be helpful for the Minister to give us illustrations and examples of what constitutes insulting behaviour. How will people be charged with this? It immediately makes people fearful of raising complaints or of being frustrated in public. If the ambulance has not turned up for a long time and your husband is dying of a heart attack, you might be a bit fraught. Somebody might interpret that as insulting behaviour. It might be perfectly rational, reasonable behaviour and not criminal. I am worried that this is creating a toxic atmosphere where none need be there. I cannot understand why it is there.

The words “likely to cause” feel far too much like pre-crime. What is “likely to cause”? These are criminal offences. If you are charged with them, you will be seen potentially as a hate criminal. Therefore, the Government have to give us a very detailed explanation as to why they feel these clauses are needed, so that we can scrutinise it. As they are presently given, I am not happy at all. I will support any move to have them removed from the Bill.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, on these Benches we take a very different view and strongly support Clauses 107 and 108, which recognise a simple reality. Emergency workers can face racially or religiously aggravated abuse whenever and wherever they are carrying out their duties, including in private homes. They cannot choose their environment or walk away from hostility. Their professional duty is to step into what are at times chaotic, volatile situations, and to stay there until the job is done. The law should follow them into those settings and make clear that such targeted hostility is no more acceptable in a hallway or a living room than it is on a street corner. This debate has shown that the issue is not about policing opinion or curtailing lawful expression but about drawing a firm line between free speech and deliberate acts of intimidation directed at those who protect the public.

These clauses are drafted to catch only behaviour that crosses that line in aggravated circumstances, and they sit alongside, rather than in place of, the wider framework of public order and hate crime. In our view, striking them out would send the wrong message, undermining our commitment to those who protect us. Looking ahead, it will of course be vital that their use is monitored and that guidance for police and prosecutors is kept under review, so that the balance struck here remains both proportionate and effective in practice.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, before the Minister rises, could I ask a simple question? It would seem to me that, under the definition of emergency workers in Section 3(1)(j) of the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018, an emergency worker is

“a person employed for the purposes of providing, or engaged to provide ... NHS health services, or … services in the support of the provision of NHS health services”.

I think we all support the words of the Secretary of State for Health, but is he in danger of falling into the trap of criticising the BMJ for the action it has taken?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I too support the objective of Amendment 348—who would not support the objective of preventing illegal violence and harassment in the workplace? I suspect that the main argument against Amendment 348 will be the burden that it would impose on employers, particularly small ones, and the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, made that point very eloquently.

I will briefly identify one reason why it is very much in the interests of the employer to have these duties. It is because if there is illegal violence and harassment in the workplace which causes, as it will, damage to the victim, she—and it normally will be she—will be looking for remedies, and the person against whom she is most likely to be advised to sue is not the rogue other employee but the employer. The employer is particularly vulnerable to such a civil claim if they have not, as required by Amendment 348—which no doubt can be improved in its drafting—conducted any sort of assessment to identify potential risks, have not implemented policies and procedures to eliminate those risks, and, in particular, have not provided at least basic training to all employees on the importance of these matters. So, yes, this will impose a burden on employers, particularly small ones, but it is very much in their interests to protect themselves against legal liability and to deter such action taking place.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, these amendments ask employers not only to react when something goes wrong but to look ahead, identify the risks and take sensible steps to prevent harm before it happens. That is especially important for women and those in insecure or public-facing roles, who we know are more likely to be targeted and less likely to feel safe reporting what has happened to them.

The statistics are damning. There were nearly 700,000 incidents last year alone, with attacks on lone workers surging by 132% over three years. We strongly support the aim of these amendments; however, as we did previously, we have questions around how a duty to eliminate risks, so far as reasonably practicable, would work in small businesses on tight margins. Layering new mandates on top of existing duties under the Equality Act and employment law risks confusion, which could dilute accountability. This is not an argument against doing more, but a practical issue which needs to be addressed.

There is also a wider cultural point. Legislation can set clear expectations, but workers will be safer only if staff feel confident to report incidents and these reports lead to action, not to victims being sidelined or blamed. Training, confidential reporting routes and proper follow-up, all mentioned in the amendments, are not extras; they are essential if any new duty is to change what has sadly become everyday reality for many people just trying to do their jobs.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, for her thoughtful amendments, which seek to place prevention of illegal violence and harassment in the workplace on a clear statutory footing and to expand the duties of the Health and Safety Executive accordingly.

It is clear from the debate that, across your Lordships’ House, we take violence against women and girls extremely seriously, whether that violence occurs at home, on the street, online or in the workplace. We know that gender-based violence remains alarmingly prevalent. Data for the year ending March 2024 shows that 6% of women aged 16 and over experienced domestic abuse, 4% experienced sexual assault and 4% experienced stalking.

These amendments focus on violence at work, in the employment context. Sexual harassment at work is far from uncommon. A recent study by UCL found that nearly one in seven UK workers encountered workplace abuse in the past year, with women reporting significantly higher levels of harassment and assault. Those figures remind us that work must of course be a place of safety, dignity and respect for all employees.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 15th December 2025 Lords Chamber

The amendment consciously seeks to maintain the balance between the responsibilities of parents and those of the state. It would preserve the long-standing exemption for family members and friends, ensuring that informal arrangements, such as enterprising sixth form students from the same school or a family friend providing support, are entirely untouched. Parents would not become regulated activity providers and would incur no legal duties. The amendment would simply close off the route by which a barred individual can present themselves as a tutor and make it an offence for a barred person to do so. This is not a partisan matter. It is a straightforward safeguarding correction to ensure that the DBS regime operates as intended. I urge the Government to accept it.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I am pleased to support Amendment 337A, which is about consistency and common sense. The same standard of protection should apply wherever a child is taught, whether in a classroom, online or in their own home. Parents assume that safeguards already exist, and they are shocked when they learn that someone barred from working with children can still legally offer tuition. In my experience, the vast majority of parents do not know this. As the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, has said, this is a huge loophole, and something needs to be done about it as a matter of urgency.

The targeted change would simply ensure that the law reflects modern patterns of learning and closes an indefensible gap without adding either bureaucracy or cost. It would strengthen public confidence in the DBS system and in the integrity of child protection as a whole. Tutoring is now a central part of many children’s education, especially those who are already vulnerable or struggling, and the law really does need to keep pace with this reality. By backing the amendment, the Government can demonstrate that safeguarding principles are applied consistently across all settings, formal and informal alike, and that known risks will never again be allowed to fall between the cracks of overlapping regulations. It is a modest step, but one entirely consistent with our shared commitment to protect every child from exploitation and harm. In the end, it is simply a test of resolve. If we know where the danger lies, we have a duty to act before another child is placed at risk.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, just to demonstrate the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, this is a cross-party matter and he has my support. I would be interested—he may or may not know—in the number of children affected by the failure of the regime to make sure that these tutors and so forth are properly registered. In any case, I wholeheartedly agree that this is a common-sense measure and needs to be brought in as soon as possible.

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[Lord Katz (Lab)]

The important change that we are making is that it enables parents to access checks at the higher level, so they will be able to decide on whether to engage somebody. The parent will be able to access the check, see their history and, based on what the DBS check throws up, decide whether they will be engaged without necessarily becoming classified as a provider as in the current regime. That is an important distinction. It does not pull them into a different sphere of activity but allows them to ask a crucial question: is this person fit to be a tutor for my child?

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I am still not clear. There are 90,000 names on the DBS barred list. I understand the Minister to have said that parents will now be able to access the enhanced barred list, therefore things that would not be picked up in a lower-level DBS check will be picked up with the enhanced one. However, if somebody asks, “Is Fred Bloggs okay?”, can they just ask for his enhanced records or will it say that “Fred Bloggs is one of the 90,000 people that are on the DBS barred list”?

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

To be clear, they will have the same rights and access as a school has at the moment. We are equalising the scheme, so yes, they would be able to see that he is on the barred list and have access to the record. I hope that clarifies it for the noble Baroness.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

It would say, “This person is barred”.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

Absolutely.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 15th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I was very happy to add my name to the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Royall. I arrived slightly later to the party than the noble Baronesses, Lady Royall and Lady Brinton, because I was not around when they nobly started tackling this difficult subject. However, once I arrived, I was happy to try to help in whatever way I could.

The amendments in this group are interwoven with an awful lot of other legislation that we have passed in recent years and are discussing today because many of the same traits, particularly behavioural traits, are still there, together with some of the challenges that the different authorities have in trying both to understand this behaviour and to do something about it. The parallel drawn in Amendment 330A between the DAPO, to which domestic abuse perpetrators are subject, and the stalking protection order, which has nothing like the same power or speed, is a good analogy. I ask the Government to look at and consider that very carefully. If the Government were to talk with the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, they would find, I suspect, that Dame Nicole Jacobs—a dame as of last week—would be very interested in discussing it further with them and would argue the case for that.

Amendments 330AZA and 356E, which deal with the ingenuity, frankly, of perpetrators in using online means to find different ways to get at their victims, has many parallels with what we look at in many areas that deal with online abuse. I appeal to the Government that we be joined up, in terms of the experience that different departments and specialist teams are gaining through the different pieces of legislation and guidance that we are enacting, so that we are learning from one another and not operating in silos, which, I fear, we sometimes do.

Amendment 330AA, which would remove the excuse of one’s religion or the need to be in an educational establishment—again, another ingenious excuse for finding a way to get to the perpetrator—is a loophole that I hope the Government will look at very carefully.

A stalking protection notice to accelerate and streamline the process would be extremely valuable. I am sure that, if the Minister and his team were to talk about this with some of the most advanced areas of the country and police forces—in particular, the county of Cheshire, which has five gold stars for doing this really well—and to ask whether they would find a stalking protection notice useful in order to move quickly, the answer would, I suspect, be a resounding yes. Going to talk to the people who are on the front line in dealing with this day in, day out would be a very useful use of time.

On Amendment 330C, of course the Secretary of State should have the power to issue stalking guidance, not least because, as stalkers get more and more ingenious and devious in some of the ways they find to make their victims’ lives horrible, it is important that the guidance keeps up. It is often two steps behind. The people who suffer because of that are the victims and the people who gain are the perpetrators, because it gives them the breathing room to do what they do and the law is quite slow to catch up.

I am broadly in sympathy with all these amendments. Stalking is one of the main causes of distress to victims in this country, alongside domestic abuse and anti-social behaviour. They are the unholy trinity and the largest volume affecting people, predominantly women. The ways perpetrators pursue their victims are often quite complex. These are quite devious and often quite intelligent individuals. We need an intelligent response in order to do something about it.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, this debate has underlined that stalking is not an occasional nuisance but a pattern of behaviour that our systems still struggle to recognise and act on early enough. The debate shows a familiar picture: warning signs are missed, threats are minimised and tools that Parliament has already provided are used patchily, if at all.

These amendments point towards a more joined-up and confident response, in which the police, prosecutors and other agencies share information, understand the particular dynamics of stalking and intervene at a much earlier stage, including online, before behaviour escalates into something far more dangerous. Looking ahead, there is now a real opportunity to embed that approach in the forthcoming review and in the VAWG strategy. Many of the ideas we have discussed—stronger use of stalking protection orders and notices, better guidance and training, and clearer expectations of consistency across forces—could and should be reflected on here.

The underlying purpose of these amendments is surely uncontroversial: to ensure that the law and practice keep pace with the reality of stalking and to give victims a response that matches the seriousness of the threat they face, so that this debate becomes a turning point rather than a missed opportunity.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, stalking is an offence which constitutes severe harassment and can instil grave fear into victims, as we have just heard. It is absolutely right that the law bears down on perpetrators of stalking. The Stalking Protection Act 2019 gave magistrates’ courts the power to impose stalking protection orders on application by the chief officer of police. Clause 97 extends this power so that a Crown Court can impose such an order where a person has been acquitted of any other offence.

The Government will no doubt argue that they are taking the necessary action to further prevent cases of stalking through this part of the Bill, but let us not forget another Bill they are currently taking through your Lordships’ House. The Sentencing Bill will suspend sentences for anyone charged with the offence of stalking. Section 2A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 states that a person found guilty of stalking is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for up to 51 weeks—less than the 12-month time limit for the presumption of a suspended sentence order.

Furthermore, the offence of breaking a stalking protection order is also likely to lead to a suspended sentence under the Sentencing Bill. Although a custodial sentence of up to five years can theoretically be imposed on conviction on indictment, the Sentencing Council’s guidelines state that in most cases of culpability and severity the starting point will be one year’s custody, and the ranges can go down to 12 weeks in custody and even a community order. This may very well be proportionate for low-level stalking offences, but the fact is that a person with a high degree of culpability and a medium to high level of harm will fall into the range that will mean their sentence is highly likely to be suspended.

If the Government are serious about bearing down on stalking, I suggest that letting anyone convicted of that offence walk free is not a good move for the safety of the victim. The Minister might try to rebut this argument by talking about the stalking protection orders, but I gently say to him that there is no good in letting a stalker roam the streets just because they have an order slapped on them. Given the falling police numbers, what is the likelihood of a person who violates their order actually being arrested? I also suggest that victims of stalking will not feel safer simply because their stalker has been given a court order.

What makes this even worse is that there is a very real possibility that a person who breaks the terms of their suspended sentence order will still not receive a custodial sentence. Although the automatic presumption will not apply in that case, the Government have opposed Conservative amendments to explicitly exempt people with a history of non-compliance from suspended sentences. They have also resisted our amendments to exempt repeat offenders from being handed suspended sentences.

Under this Government’s legislation, there is a very real possibility that a stalker could continually stalk their victim, break their stalking protection order and their suspended sentence order and never face jail time. That is not protecting victims. Against this backdrop, I suggest that it does not matter what we do in this place regarding stalking; we can table all the amendments we like to toughen up the protection orders, but they will not protect victims or prevent stalkers if the Government let than walk free. I will be very interested to hear what the Minister has to say in response.

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Moved by

[Baroness Doocey]

334A: Clause 102, page 133, line 2, at end insert—
“(6) In determining the sentence for an offence under this section—(a) where the encouragement or assistance of self-harm is preceded by a history of domestic or “honour”-based abuse committed against the victim or other person by D, the court must treat their offence as aggravated by reason of such history;(b) where D has subjected the victim or other person mentioned in subsection (1)(a) or (b) to physical, psychiatric or psychological harm that results in that person’s death by suicide, the sentence shall be one of life imprisonment.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment recognises that where a victim has been subjected to domestic or “honour”-based abuse, any encouragement or assistance of self-harm is an aggravated offence for sentencing purposes, and that where such abuse, including physical, psychiatric or psychological harm, results in or significantly contributes to the victim’s death by suicide, the perpetrator can be subject to the same range of sentences as for murder.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 334A is in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Blower. I am grateful to Southall Black Sisters for the detailed evidence it has provided. On Wednesday we are going to cover broader issues around codes of honour and the deployment of these as a motivation and an excuse for horrendous crimes against the person. Amendment 334A deals with, in some ways, an even more insidious and hidden issue. It recognises the growing number of suicides and self-harm cases linked to domestic and so-called honour-based abuse.

I remember meeting a group of young women when I was a member of the London Assembly and hearing with horror the widespread acceptance that a murder could be justified by codes of honour in their community. It most certainly cannot. Culture does not transcend or trump the law, and nor should it. We are all familiar with the concept of death by a thousand cuts. Prolonged abuse and prolonged encouragement of self-harm can have devastating consequences beyond the physical and the immediate.

Last month, an inquest into the death of Michelle Sparman, a Caribbean woman who died by suicide in August 2021, reached a landmark verdict at Inner West London Coroner’s Court. The assistant coroner concluded that Michelle’s state of mind was “contributed to by neglect”, and that her prior relationship was marked by “toxicity”, highlighting an abusive pattern of relentless coercive messaging from her ex-partner that undermined her confidence and mental well-being. Crucially, the coroner identified this abusive conduct as the key causative factor in her death—a rare explicit recognition of prolonged domestic abuse that had contributed to her suicide. But there is a serious gap in the law. Michelle’s family were told by police that suicides were outside their remit and there was no case because Michelle had not reported domestic abuse when she was alive.

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[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response. I am not a lawyer and certainly do not understand the law, even vaguely, but I really do not understand this. If what I am asking for is not necessary—I totally accept what the Minister has said—how come we have three cases of suicide a week, which is suspected to be an underestimate, and only one conviction since 2017? Those numbers do not seem to add up to me.

I take the point the Minister made about the Law Commission’s review. Reviews are helpful, but a recent report by the Domestic Abuse Commissioner exposed ongoing failures by government to act on the lessons from domestic homicide reviews. Only a quarter of national recommendations were fully implemented between 2019 and 2021, and this extends to domestic abuse suicides. It is very sad that victims have waited years for concrete changes and it now seems that there is not a huge amount, according to what the Minister said in her response, that will make the difference. There needs to be something, so I will think carefully about everything she has said. I certainly plan to come back at the next stage with something that perhaps will not have so many holes in it. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment for now.

Amendment 334A withdrawn.

Social Media: Scam Adverts and Fraudulent Content

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Thursday 11th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord is absolutely right. The Government have accepted that there is a challenge in that area. There are resources going into educational opportunities, particularly targeted at university students, to help them avoid money laundering. Some months ago I visited a scheme—as it happens, in my home area of north Wales—where educational opportunities were being undertaken by regional organised crime agencies to meet students to explain how money laundering works and how they can become victims of money laundering without realising they are involved in it. There is a great educational opportunity and we are trying to work through that, but self-evidently I will continue to look at what more can be done.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, how will the Government ensure that the new fraud strategy leads to a genuine increase in fraud cases being properly investigated and taken to court? Will the Government make clear that success will be judged not by the volume of fraud cases reported but by the convictions secured, the investigations opened and the charges made?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Baroness is absolutely right. One of the things that we are trying to do—again, trailing the fraud strategy—is to ensure that we have better criminal justice outcomes for investigations. We are just starting—this will become clearer when the fraud strategy is produced—a better journey for victims of fraud in terms of reporting, keeping them informed and getting to criminal justice outcomes. There is a real wish by the National Crime Agency in particular and the Serious Fraud Office to look at how we can bring criminals to justice. A number of measures have already taken place where we have seized assets and brought people to court, and I want to see that continue. It is vital that we make the UK the hardest place possible for fraudsters to operate, which means not just protection and better investment in telecommunication platform issues but putting in an element of serious risk for those fraudsters to ensure that they end up behind bars or lose their assets.