(1 week ago)
Lords ChamberIt is right that we should put children at the focus of county line activity. By that, I mean preventing children from being involved in county lines, not criminalising those children who are involved in county lines but seeing them, as I think my noble friend indicated, as victims who need our support. I will take away her contribution and discuss it with my right honourable friend the Police Minister, see what steps are being taken to do that, and contact my noble friend accordingly.
My Lords, more than 27,000 suspected drug suppliers are either on bail or released under investigation due to forensic and digital backlogs. One in five of those cases has been going on for more than a year, and currently there are more than 25,000 digital devices waiting to be examined. While a government funding boost is always welcome, what is being done specifically to address the lack of regional and national co-ordination and the insufficient numbers of trained forensic personnel?
The noble Baroness makes a valid point, and I will start from that premise. The Government have put an extra £1.1 billion into police forces with the police settlement that was approved by the House of Commons just a few weeks ago, and that is providing a range of functions. It is for police forces, chief constables and police and crime commissioners to determine the use of that resource locally, but she makes a valuable point about co-ordination and central management, which I will continue to reflect on because we need to ensure that there is not a backlog. The amount of digital material we have on our phones now—Twitter contents, phone calls, texts, Facebook messages and everything else—means that when someone is arrested there is a giant amount of digital information, and that is growing daily and monthly. It is important that we focus in on getting the right digital information to ensure convictions and drive up the conviction rate from the figure that I mentioned for between July and September last year, and that means tackling the backlog that the noble Baroness has rightly mentioned.
(1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy noble friend hits on an important point. Domestic violence does not just happen when an individual reaches a certain age; it is inbuilt and ingrained over a long period of time. Therefore, in order to prevent domestic violence downstream, the way young people in primary and secondary schools and beyond are educated in mutual respect and understanding, and in non-violence, is extremely important. I would hope that my colleagues at the Department for Education, and indeed in the devolved Administrations in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, recognise that need for early intervention and resilience building to ensure that we do not create the perpetrators of the future who will then need the required investment and intervention I talked about in my earlier answers.
My Lords, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner found that 60% of domestic abuse survivors wanted their perpetrator to attend a behavioural change programme, but that only 7% could do so because of the lack of availability. We do not have enough programmes and we do not know which programmes work best. Although some studies, such as Project Mirabal and the Drive programme, show promising results, the programme evaluation overall has been painfully slow. What steps are the Government taking to accelerate it?
As I mentioned in my original answer, the Government have put £20.5 million into perpetrator intervention programmes currently, and those are under evaluation as we speak. The evaluations are slow by their very nature and, again, I can only answer for post 4 July 2024. What we are trying to do is examine, with the violence against women and girls strategy, what works effectively and what interventions we can take forward. Therefore, both the points that the noble Baroness made and other considerations of intervention—and how we evaluate that intervention to make sure it has a real impact and give comfort to victims primarily—are important issues. We will be examining that during the development of the violence against women and girls strategy.
(1 week ago)
Lords ChamberPlan B is part of plan A, which is also to provide the 292 4G mobile phone sites that the noble Lord mentioned in his question. We have picked this up. We have made a decision to terminate the previous contract; we had a court case to do that. We are now putting in place a revised contract—we have to exit the former contract—and resilience will be built in to make sure that this is the most important service that can be provided, because this is how police, fire and other emergency services communicate with each other in times of difficulty. It is an absolute priority for the Home Office to get this right, and I hope that we will do so in the course of the next few years.
My Lords, I keep hearing that the Government want us to be leaders in AI, but it is very difficult to work out how this can be when the Government have not dealt with the fact that the police are being run as an analogue operation in a digital age. It almost beggars belief that all 43 police forces in the UK use different IT systems, the majority of which do not even speak to each other.
We have just heard about the 51 year-old police national computer; that is never going to be sorted in the next, goodness knows, five to 10 years, and it stores only very basic biometric data. Many of the drones the police are using are clapped out and need to be replaced. When are the Government going to wake up to the major problem the police have got with technology and actually provide the funds to deal with this once and for all?
The noble Baroness makes an extremely valid point. There are 44 police forces in total—43 plus the British Transport Police—and they have a range of different technological methods of gathering information and working. Obviously, from a taxpayer efficiency and a security point of view, we want to make sure that we get the best deal. Part of the Government’s efficiency drive will be to look at how we can work with police forces, which are independent, to do that downstream. The change we have made from the previous Government’s position will save the taxpayer £200 million per year when up and running. That is a more efficient way of getting a better service for the taxpayer.
(2 weeks, 4 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am responding to this Statement on behalf of His Majesty’s loyal Opposition with deep sadness. Sir David Amess was not just a colleague and friend of mine in the other place; he was a true servant of the people. His warmth, kindness, keen sense of humour and unwavering commitment to his constituents set an example to all parliamentarians. His murder was an attack on democracy itself and it is incumbent on us all to do everything in our power to ensure that such a tragedy never happens again.
The Government are right to publish the Prevent Learning Review into this case. Transparency is crucial in restoring trust in our counterextremism strategies. It is only by learning from past failures that we can strengthen our national security. The findings of the review are concerning. It is clear that the vulnerabilities of the perpetrator were not adequately assessed, that record-keeping was inadequate and that a miscommunication led to an incomplete intervention. Most concerningly, the case was closed too soon, allowing a dangerous individual to slip through the cracks. These are not minor administrative errors but systematic failings that demand urgent attention.
I welcome the fact that all four recommendations of the review have been implemented, but we must go further. The introduction of a new independent Prevent commissioner is an important step, but this role must have real teeth to scrutinise the system and hold authorities to account. The Prevent programme must be laser-focused on countering Islamist extremism—the ideology that led to the murder of Sir David. The independent review of Prevent by William Shawcross made it clear that, too often, the programme has been distracted by vague and politically correct priorities, rather than focusing on the clear and present threat posed by radical Islamism. This must change.
The Government must also address the broader weaknesses in our counterterrorism approach. The British people expect that those who pose a clear danger to our country are properly monitored and, where necessary, detained. We must ask whether current powers are sufficient. Whole-life sentences for terrorists are welcome, but we should also consider greater use of terrorism prevention investigation measures and enhanced surveillance for those who leave Prevent but remain a risk.
Additionally, this review has highlighted the crucial issue of MPs’ security. Public service should not come with a threat of violence. The Government must continue working with the parliamentary security department to ensure that MPs can serve their constituents without fear.
More must be done to clamp down on online radicalisation, which played a role in this case. Social media companies must take greater responsibility for tackling extremist content.
Finally, let us never lose sight of what this debate is truly about. Sir David’s light remains. His service, optimism and belief in his community live on. It is in his memory that we must commit to doing everything possible to prevent another tragedy of this kind. I support the Government’s effort to strengthen Prevent, but I urge Ministers to ensure that this programme never again fails, as it did in this case. We must be ruthless in our commitment to national security and unwavering in our resolve to protect the values that Sir David embodied.
What specific measures will the new independent Prevent commissioner have at their disposal to ensure greater accountability and effectiveness in countering radicalisation?
Secondly, given the concerns raised in the Shawcross review, how will the Government ensure that Prevent remains focused on the most pressing threats, particularly from Islamist extremism, rather than being diluted by other priorities?
What steps are the Government taking to enhance the monitoring of individuals who leave the Prevent programme but may still pose a risk? Should stronger legal powers, such as TPIMs, be considered?
How will the Government work with social media companies to crack down on online radicalisation? What consequences will there be for platforms that fail to remove extremist content?
Lastly, what further reforms are being considered to improve MPs’ security? How will the Speaker’s Conference ensure that lessons from Sir David Amess’s murder are fully implemented?
My Lords, the murder of Sir David Amess highlights the urgent need to strengthen our counterterrorism strategy if we are to prevent similar tragedies in future. The terrorist threat is continually evolving. More extremists now follow multiple ideologies, or none at all, with the internet and social media fuelling self-radicalisation. Conspiracy theories, personal grievances, misogyny and anti-Government sentiment further blur the picture, making credible threats harder and harder to predict. To stay effective, our approach must adapt to this increasingly fragmented and unpredictable landscape.
The review that was made public yesterday highlights that Sir David Amess’s killer had his Prevent file closed too soon in 2016—a failure the Home Office and counterterrorism police have known about since at least February 2022. Yet, as we heard last week, less than three years on, a similar pattern of failure has been identified in the review following the Southport stabbings. This suggests that, while much may have been done to improve the workings of Prevent in the last decade, some critical lessons have still not been learned. We therefore echo the sentiments of Sir David’s family in welcoming the fact that light has finally been shone on those failings, following yesterday’s retrospective publication of the 2022 report.
The Liberal Democrats have consistently raised concerns about whether the Prevent strategy is the most effective mechanism for addressing radicalisation. Unfortunately, recent events confirm that its shortcomings are not isolated incidents, and I therefore welcome the Government’s decision to task the new Prevent commissioner with reviewing the handling of Sir David’s case. Can the Minister confirm that the commissioner will have a broad and independent mandate to conduct a thorough assessment of Prevent? Will the Government commit to placing this role on a statutory footing to ensure accountability and effectiveness?
Any comprehensive review must also examine how Prevent collaborates with stakeholders, including police and crime commissioners and elected mayors. Community engagement is central to an effective counterterrorism strategy. Can the Minister outline how local communities will be consulted in the development of future counterextremism policies?
The current system is simply not equipped to manage emerging risks effectively. We live in a world where counterterrorism casework involving young people is increasing, and more referrals are now for individuals with a vulnerability rather than an apparent ideology. To tackle both emerging and traditional forms of radicalisation, we urgently need a system that is built for the reality of modern extremism.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for their comments and contributions and I will try to answer the questions accordingly. I begin with the praise given to the late Sir David Amess by the noble Lord. Like him, I served in Parliament with Sir David—in my case, for 28 years. I shared with him a role on the Panel of Chairs, chairing debates in committee and in the House. I found him to be an honest, open colleague who stood up for his constituency with immense passion, and I am very pleased that Southend is now a city as a result of Sir David’s campaign. I also want to remember that primarily, Sir David was a father and a husband, and his family grieve much more than we will ever know. Our thoughts are with them today.
The noble Lord and the noble Baroness talked about the failures of the Prevent system in the case of the convicted killer of Sir David. There were a number of recommendations, and six findings were highlighted in the report. The Government wanted to publish those findings to ensure that they were open and transparent, and that the concerns raised would not be hidden behind a secret report. It is right that we did that this week, and it is also important that we look at the four recommendations in the report. To date, the Government have completed all four recommendations on key issues. I hope that that will give some comfort to those who have been the victims of previous attacks.
Having said that, we recognise that there are a number of considerations. The Shawcross report, which the noble Lord mentioned, made a number of recommendations; again, the Government have accepted those. They are in the process of implementing, I think, 31 of the 32 recommendations and will complete those in due course.
The noble Lord asked whether we need to look at other forms of monitoring. The terrorism prevention measures, which are in place to monitor people who are on the radar or who have had convictions, are extremely important and the Government keep them under regular review. The noble Lord also mentioned the Prevent commissioner, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. We have given the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, a temporary position for the moment, and have asked him to do three things, in effect: a sprint review of what happened in the specific case of Southport and the murders that took place there; a sprint review of what happened in relation to the murder of Sir David Amess, now that this document has been published; and a long-term review—which may well be taken forward with the full-time commissioner, who is shortly to be appointed—of the Prevent legislation as a whole. That review will look at legislation and the operation of Prevent; examine any specific lessons learned from those two horrific incidents—Southport and the murder of Sir David; and examine whether there are any recommendations to bring back to Ministers to continue to improve the position and help ensure that we stop future murders.
The noble Lord, Lord Davies, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, mentioned that there is considerable focus on potential Islamist and neo-Nazi terrorism, and that that is considerably fuelled by online activity. We are committed to looking at the implementation of the Online Safety Act, which will come into real effect on 17 March this year. But my right honourable friend the Home Secretary has also written to tech companies, asking them to be very wary of what I would term illegal criminal terrorist content and to remove it, pending the Government’s own review of whether there needs to be further action downstream through the Prevent review as a whole. Online radicalisation is extremely important and is the driver of many of these sole individuals who commit horrific crimes without any organisation behind them. They learn and they mirror, and the Government are extremely cognisant of that self-radicalisation online.
I turn to some of the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, made. It is extremely important that we look at the whole question of internet regulation and at the six failings that were identified and the four recommendations that we have now implemented. I recognise the concerns that have been raised, but there is still a very positive story to tell about much of what is happening in Prevent. Since Prevent was put on a statutory footing by the previous Government in 2014, and onwards since 2015, some 5,000 individuals have been referred and have successfully gone through what I will term de-radicalisation programmes, having been identified as vulnerable individuals with a range of tendencies that are driving them to potential activity. That success has been positive, even though there are terrible failings, of which the murders of Sir David and the three young girls in Southport are critical examples.
In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, the role of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, will be to look at Prevent legislation and policy; to oversee and ensure implementation of recommendations from previous reports and reviews, including the one on Sir David; to look at the coronial process; and to look at general Prevent learning reviews. It will be independent of government: no one who knows the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, will doubt that he will be independent of government. His job is to make recommendations, raise critical issues and, along with the general political process of the House of Commons and House of Lords, hold Ministers to account on the delivery of these recommendations.
I shall end where I started. Sir David Amess was a good man. He did not deserve the death that he had. He served his constituents well, and we need to be cognisant of the fact, particularly those of us who hold public office as elected Members of Parliament or Members of this House, that what happened to Sir David could have happened to any of us, at a surgery or at a public meeting. I am extremely cognisant of the fact that we need to address this.
Going back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, the Speaker’s Conference is looking at security. Operation Bridger, the police-Home Office response for Members of Parliament in particular, is looking at security requirements generally. On a case-by-case basis, Members of this House can be examined and supported by Operation Bridger. That is extremely important, because the key thing is that the murder of Sir David Amess was an attack on democracy in this society. It was an attack on all of us, and on all the values that bring us to this House and to the House of Commons. So, I praise his work and I mourn his loss, but our lesson from this event must be to ensure that we improve the Prevent strategy to prevent radicalisation of further individuals downstream.
(2 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberThe Independent Office for Police Conduct is accountable to Ministers, as it was when the Opposition were in Government. There has been a recommendation from a review of the Cabinet Office’s public bodies review programme. That review was published in March 2024, when the noble Lord’s Government were in office. It looked at the whole question of the IOPC’s governance, accountability, efficiency and efficacy. There were 93 recommendations in that report, 73 of which have been accepted by the IOPC. The remaining recommendations were in his Government’s in-tray. They are now being reviewed and will be implemented shortly by this Government. Included in them is the method by which the IOPC is accountable to Ministers and therefore to this House and the House of Commons.
We will hear from the Lib Dem Benches next.
My Lords, over the last year, the IOPC has made a range of recommendations to the police about things such as strip-searching children and suspicionless stop and search. All the recommendations have been accepted by the police. Who is responsible for making sure that the recommendations that were accepted will be implemented? Will the Government publish the information so that we can all be sure that when recommendations are accepted, they are carried out in practice? As the Minister will know, this is not always the case. A lot of recommendations are accepted and then totally ignored.
It is the responsibility of police chiefs, police and crime commissioners, and mayors in areas where the mayors are responsible, such as the Mayor of Greater Manchester, the Mayor of London and others, to implement recommendations made by the IOPC. I assure the noble Baroness that, ultimately, the buck stops here.
(2 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberAs always, shoplifting takes place for a range of reasons. But I will not excuse shoplifting and shop theft under any circumstances, because they are still crimes. I grew up on a very poor estate in Liverpool and in Cheshire. It was not acceptable to shoplift then and it is not acceptable now. We need to ensure that we tackle that by having neighbourhood policing, a greater emphasis and focus for the police on shop theft and greater support to retailers. I appreciate the noble Earl’s view on poverty: we look at poverty in the round and put measures in for a range of reasons to lift people out of poverty, to ensure that they can live reasonable, productive and effective lives.
My Lords, the Minister has said that, before introducing respect orders, the Government will run a number of pilots, which is a very good idea. But current laws on anti-social behaviour have never been thoroughly reviewed and the Home Office does not even keep records on how they are being used at the moment. So, before the Government introduce these new respect orders, will they agree to review the current laws and how they are working, so that lessons learned could be used to inform the pilots?
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for that comment. We will keep all legislation under review. Again, after 14 years out of office, we want to review some of the measures: how they have been utilised and what can be done to improve community resilience. The most important thing we can do is certainly pilot the respect orders, but a really important issue will be the 13,000 neighbourhood police and community support officers, who can embed themselves more in the community, can look at what responses are required, can work with people such as shopkeepers in relation to the shop theft that my noble friend Lady Hazarika mentioned, and can work with the community to look at what could best be utilised to gain the support of the community in reducing crime.
(2 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I, too, thank the noble Baroness for securing this debate. The Prime Minster has pledged to halve violence against women and girls within 10 years. At the moment, police receive one call every minute about domestic abuse. If the Government achieve their aim of cutting this by half within 10 years, that means the police will receive one call every two minutes about domestic violence. This is not going to give comfort to the 2 million women who, every year, are victims of male violence, because this scourge on our society accounts for around one-fifth of all murders, as well as a rising number of suspected victim suicides.
Yet, the scale of this problem is still not widely understood, and exposure to extreme porn and misogyny is pushing violence against women to epidemic proportions. Criminal justice is not the whole answer; our justice system must step up and do much better for victims.
Domestic abuse happens in relationships and is often complex, yet too many police first responders are still failing to identify what offences have occurred and to respond appropriately. Too many still minimise the risk and harm experienced, failing to understand why a woman might have little choice but to stay with her abuser.
We welcome the Government’s new protection orders, but if the police do not get that first call right, opportunities to impose them will continue to be missed. Currently, orders are rarely used and poorly enforced. This must change, with specialists embedded with front-line officers to build victims’ trust and identify what type of order, if any, is appropriate.
Then, there is the absolute scandal of court backlogs. Domestic abuse hearings are currently being listed more than two years ahead, but most victims do not remain in the process for two months, let alone two years. Almost half withdraw within five days of reporting an incident, and the majority drop out before a charge is even filed. Recognising this, one police force recently piloted a programme to get all domestic abuse cases before court within two weeks, many within 72 hours. Women were turning up with black eyes, and the early guilty plea rate was remarkable. But without enough court space, sadly, the pilot was cut short.
It is also critical that sentencing levels for domestic abuse-related incidents do not dip in the face of prison capacity concerns. Unfortunately, a number of domestic abusers have been freed under the Government’s early release scheme, largely because England and Wales do not have a specific offence of domestic abuse. Instead, these cases are prosecuted under general offences such as actual bodily harm or common assault. So the Liberal Democrats this week have tabled a Bill which would put into law a specific set of domestic abuse-aggravated offences, and I hope the Government will support it.
Having a 10-year plan is not the answer. We need a repeat of the swift justice that we saw following the summer riots. The rioters were stopped in their tracks because they knew that there was a will to identify, charge and prosecute them immediately. If it could be done then, it can be done now.
(2 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberI am grateful to the noble Lord for his helpful intervention. I say quite simply again that 3D-printed firearms are captured by existing firearms legislation. If a 3D-printed firearm is made, it is treated in exactly the same way as any other type of illegal firearm. So they are covered by the legislation, but the suggestions he made are worthy of consideration. We keep those matters under review. Again, there will be opportunities in this Session to look at those issues as a potential police and crime Bill goes through this House.
My Lords, the barrier for acquiring these weapons has been lowered by advancing technology, with criminals, extremists and everyone else being capable of making these guns in a shed or in their own home. Does the Minister accept that it is not good enough to rely on a Private Member’s Bill to tighten the law in this area, and that the Government really need to act as a matter of urgency on this?
I am not aware that the Government are relying on a Private Member’s Bill. There is a Private Member’s Bill coming forward, but it is not a Government-sponsored Bill; it is being undertaken by a Back-Bencher in the House of Commons. We will reflect on that legislation, look at what is needed and make sure that, if there are loopholes, we tie them up. Ultimately, legislation is there to say that firearms are illegal, and there are severe penalties for the ownership and distribution of those illegal firearms. If there are gaps in the legislation along the lines that noble Lords have mentioned, we will review that in due course next year.
(2 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, there is no doubt that our laws need to be kept updated to reflect the evolving security threat, the speed at which technology is developing, and the increasingly unstable global situation. So, on balance, we accept that both these instruments are proportionate and will support them.
Our concerns around the National Security Act regulations relate to the knowledge test for these offences, given the steep penalties involved. Does the Minister recognise that the sensitivity of a site might not always be obvious, and that a site’s sensitivity can be fluid, particularly in the case of military vehicles? Could he provide some clarity around the kinds of restricted areas the legislation will apply to, and give assurances that a reasonable person—for example, innocently flying a drone in the countryside—will be protected?
In relation to the Police Act regulations, my understanding is that these allow the police to use counter-drone measures against an unmanned aircraft flying over sensitive military sites, and I have a number of questions in this area. Who has responsibility to deal with unidentified drones around these sites? The military already has its own counter-drone capability; will the police powers run alongside that?
Last year, there were almost 400 police drones operating, of which more than two-thirds were made by DJI, a Chinese firm that the US has linked to the Chinese military—although the company denies this. The previous year, the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner warned that the UK police estate was “shot through” with Chinese-made surveillance drones, used by 23 of the 31 police forces operating drone cameras. At that time, the National Police Chiefs’ Council said it would carry out the necessary review to ensure that national security standards were being met. Perhaps the Minister could say whether that review was carried out.
Just five months ago, West Midlands Police told a magazine that its current drone fleet included 12 DJIs, as well as two made by Autel, another Chinese-based company. Autel was also supplying drones to Nottinghamshire Police and Wiltshire Police, before it was sanctioned by the British Government last month for arming Russia to fight in Ukraine. In light of this, is the Minister satisfied that the police are working with drone providers which can be trusted and whether there are measures in place to ensure that these drones cannot be used to monitor or collect information on critical UK infrastructure?
The drone industry is booming, with estimates that there could be over 76,000 commercial drones in UK skies by 2030—so these security concerns will not go away. China is currently way ahead of everyone else in this area, with DJI the world’s largest commercial drone manufacturer. So it is vital the Government do all they can to support the UK drone industry, which is already responsible for several world firsts.
We support the legislation, but our focus must be on ensuring that our police have the right tools and expertise to counter these threats, wherever they arise. We should heed the lesson of the Trojan horse and ensure that any “spy in the sky” is not already in our midst, starting with the security of our own police drones.
(2 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Met is not the only police force that is struggling; most police forces are struggling. This is a legacy of a decade of expecting the police to cover the work of other public services, which are underfunded and overwhelmed by demand—for example, mental health, child protection and youth services—because there is nobody else to pick this up. The previous Government knew the pressure the police were under but failed to fund them to deal with it. Does the Minister agree that only full-scale police reform will deliver the type of neighbourhood policing that local communities are crying out for?