(8 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I think, with respect to the noble and learned Baroness, that that point has been canvassed extensively on previous occasions.
As we set out on Monday, the legislation required for Rwanda to ratify the treaty passed that country’s lower house on 28 February, and it will now go to that country’s upper house. Once ratified, the treaty will become law in Rwanda. It follows that the Government of Rwanda would then be required to give effect to the terms of the treaty in accordance with its domestic law, as well as international law. As my noble friend Lord Lilley set out on Monday, it is inconceivable that Rwanda will not implement carefully and considerately, and we continue to work at pace with the Government of Rwanda on implementation.
We therefore do not consider it necessary to make the proposed changes to Clause 4 to permit decision-makers or courts and tribunals to consider claims on the basis of Rwanda’s safety generally, or that Rwanda will or may remove persons to another state in contravention of its international obligations or permit the courts and tribunals to grant interim relief, other than where there is a real, imminent and foreseeable risk of serious and irreversible harm. There are ample safeguards in the Bill, and these amendments would be contrary to the Bill’s whole purpose.
To conclude, we have made it clear that we cannot continue to allow relocations to Rwanda to be frustrated and delayed as a result of systemic challenges on its general safety. In this context, the safety of a particular country is a matter for Parliament and one in which Parliament’s view should be sovereign. The evidence that we have provided and the commitments made by the United Kingdom and the Government of Rwanda through this internationally binding treaty enable Rwanda to be deemed a safe country. The Bill will allow Parliament to confirm that it considers that it has sufficient material before it to judge that Rwanda is in general safe and makes it clear that the finding cannot be disturbed by the courts.
Before I sit down, I return in a bit more detail to the matter which the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, started with his comment and which was answered by others. As we have set out previously, the constitution of Rwanda includes a broad prohibition of discrimination and does not criminalise or discriminate against sexual orientation in law or policy. As part of the published evidence pack, the updated country information note gave careful consideration to evidence relating to the treatment of LGBT individuals in Rwanda. Rwandan legal protection for LGBT rights is, as we have heard, generally considered more progressive than that of neighbouring countries.
I will conclude my submissions with reference to the point raised earlier by my noble friend Lord Lilley when he spoke about the precedent set by the 2004 legislation and referred to the views of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, in relation to parliamentary supremacy. As my noble friend correctly quoted, it is a matter of this country enjoying parliamentary supremacy. Parliamentary supremacy is at the heart of accountability to Parliament and, through Parliament, accountability to the people about whom my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne has spoken so eloquently during the debate on this Bill.
In conclusion, I submit that the noble Baroness should not press her amendment for the reasons I have given. Were she to do so, I have no hesitation in inviting the House to reject it.
As always, I am grateful to all noble Lords, particularly those who spoke briefly. I am grateful to my supporters, not least the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. Defending our constitution and the rule of law runs very deep in his family, and he has brought such honour to his family, your Lordships’ House and our country with his contributions on this Bill. To the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, I say simply that, in this case, the Supreme Court did not attack the policy; it made a finding of fact, as it is entitled to do.
I am grateful to all Members of your Lordships’ House who participated in such good faith on the trip to Rwanda, as part of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. As we have heard, even in good faith there can be a dispute of fact between parliamentarians, let alone people on different sides of your Lordships’ House. Forgive me, but the man of the match in answering that predicament was the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, who said that this is what courts are for. I am grateful, as always, for the support of my noble friend Lord Coaker.
The Minister kindly apologised for the lack of concision, but a psychiatrist would always find the magic words hidden in the many. On a previous occasion, he told us that Rwanda was to become safe by decree. Today, he told us that this is about special circumstances. The road to hell is not just paved with good intentions; it is paved with special circumstances as well. He speaks rightly of parliamentary sovereignty. We are part of Parliament, and parliamentary sovereignty is not executive domination.
I am particularly sad that parts of today’s debate contrasted with what we heard yesterday in the debate on foreign affairs, when so many noble Lords, including those from the Government Front Bench, spoke about the importance of the international rule of law. Today, the Home Office is on parade and we hear exactly the opposite. It is time to trust the courts, and it is time to test the opinion of the House.
(8 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberI think a closer reading of Amendment 18 will demonstrate that it is not ensuring that the Government respond in a certain way. They can respond favourably or negatively to the declaration; they just need to come to Parliament and have the debate.
In her address today and I think at an earlier stage, the noble Baroness described the functioning of declarations of incompatibility in Section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 as an elegant compromise. I freely agree that it is an elegant constitutional compromise, which ultimately reflects parliamentary sovereignty, which lies at the very heart of our processes and constitution.
As detailed in Committee, Section 4 of the Human Rights Act in relation to the system of declarations of incompatibility is designed to strike an appropriate compromise between scrutiny of human rights and parliamentary sovereignty. Section 4 does not oblige the Government to take any specific action as a result of a declaration of incompatibility, and Section 4(6) expressly does not allow a judicial ruling to prevent the operation and enforcement of legislation passed by Parliament.
The operation of the section is to afford the Government the opportunity to reflect on matters, to listen to concerns brought by the courts and to act upon them as they see fit. I do not consider it necessary to adopt the amendment which the noble Baroness has tabled and argued for. I do so purely on the basis that the history of the application of this section, in my view, respectfully, shows it to be working.
The noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, tabled Amendment 47, seeking to undermine Section 4(6) of the Act by providing that a declaration of incompatibility results automatically in the legislation ceasing to have effect. It seeks to give such declarations a binding character, and, as I said a moment ago in relation to the noble Baroness’s point, that is contrary to what those provisions were designed to be and removes discretion or oversight as is currently afforded to the Government and Parliament as to what action would be most appropriate to take in the circumstances.
It has been the accepted practice since the introduction of the Human Rights Act for the Government to address such declarations either through primary legislation or by way of a remedial order. Again, given how well the declaration of incompatibility procedure is working and has worked in the past, I respectfully submit that there is no reason for us to innovate on that basis. These amendments are therefore not only unnecessary but inappropriate in their attempt to legislate for parliamentary procedure in this manner. The declaration of incompatibility procedure works well to strike the right balance, and there is no reason to upset it.
I was addressed on the subject of the remarks made by the Lord Chancellor to the Joint Committee on Human Rights. As your Lordships have said—it was predicted that I would refer to this again, and I will—the Lord Chancellor recently set out in his letter to the Joint Committee that while
“it is a fundamental tenet of modern human rights that they are universal and indivisible … it is legitimate to treat people differently in different circumstances”.
For example,
“a citizen may legitimately be treated differently, and have different legal rights from, a non-national”,
recognising that there is a difference between a citizen and a non-national. The convention,
“as interpreted by the case law of the ECtHR … recognises this principle”
in full.
“There is nothing in the … Bill that deprives any person of any of their human rights: in accordance with Article 1 of the ECHR, we shall continue to secure to everyone within our jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention. What we can legitimately do, and what we are doing, is to draw legal distinctions between those with a legitimate right to be in this country, and those who have come to this country illegally”.
(9 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberWhy, then, does the Victims and Prisoners Bill, as presented by the Government, require the Secretary of State to consult the Attorney-General before amending the victims’ code, if there is this long-standing convention that the Government are indivisible and the Attorney-General will always be consulted on important matters? Also, why is this significant decision potentially to ignore interim relief from the Strasbourg court for Ministers and not Parliament, given that the Government’s central argument in this Bill is about parliamentary sovereignty?
I think the answer to the first point is that the Victims and Prisoners Bill relates to victims, a matter on which the Attorney-General, exercising her supervision over aspects of the criminal legal system, would be in a good position to answer. That distinguishes it from this measure. However, that is only my instinctive answer. So as not to mislead the Committee, if the noble Baroness is content then I will write to her on the topic. I am grateful for her nod of agreement. As to whether this should be for Parliament as opposed to the Executive, in the form of the Minister, I can only repeat that the scheme of the Bill and the Government’s intention is that this decision should lie with the Minister responsible.
The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, made two points, the second of which echoed the question anent judicial review posed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. Our position is that the decision on the part of a Minister to comply with an interim measure is not amenable to judicial review. His other question related to the views expressed by my honourable friend in the other place the Minister for Immigration about flights taking off as soon as the Bill passes. While this Committee is engaged in detailed legal scrutiny, my honourable friend is speaking in public about the Bill’s policy: to see to it that these flights take off as quickly as possible and the deterrent effect of which my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom and I have spoken should take effect.
I undertake to correspond with the noble and learned Lord on that.
Amendments 58, 60 and 61 would bind the United Kingdom Government, preventing a Minister of the Crown or discouraging domestic courts from considering the individual facts of the case or the determination of the domestic courts as to whether a person would face a risk of serious and irreversible harm if returned to Rwanda.
The amendments would also require the United Kingdom courts to take account of an interim measure issued by the Strasbourg court, potentially supplementing the ECHR’s decision, rather than making their own independent finding about whether a person would face a real risk of serious and irreversible harm.
Finally, the disapplication of Section 55 of the Illegal Migration Act would lead to a conflict between the duty to remove established by the Act and the effect of an interim measure issued by the Strasbourg court. That would create uncertainty as to which will prevail.
Clause 4 includes a specific provision enabling the United Kingdom courts to grant an interim remedy preventing removal to Rwanda where it is satisfied that a person would face a real, imminent and foreseeable risk of serious and irreversible harm. Those measures have been designed to ensure that our courts are not out of step with the Strasbourg court; the serious and irreversible harm test is broadly the same that the Strasbourg court applies. Clause 4 would have our courts apply the same test as the Strasbourg court when considering the position of a person who might be sent to Rwanda. There is no reason why the United Kingdom courts, which we would expect to be in possession of all the evidence and facts in the case when making such a decision, cannot be relied upon to reach their own decision rather than being required to have regard to another court which may not have complete information on the case.
The Government submit that these amendments risk hampering or thwarting our efforts to stop the boats and to remove people with no right to remain in the United Kingdom.
There have been references from various quarters about the absence of my noble friend Lord Hailsham today. I indicate to the Committee that he was courteous enough to contact me directly and let me know what the position was. He has tabled Amendment 63, which relates to rules governing Rule 39 procedures. In support of that, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, was the first to make inquiries of the Government as to what the position is in relation to the changes in the procedures. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, who also discussed this. On 13 November 2023, the Strasbourg Court announced proposed amendments to its rules and practice concerning interim measures, including the naming of judges who make the decisions on interim measure requests, interim measures communicated as formal decisions, considering state representations before interim measures are indicated, and parties being able to request reconsideration of an interim measure.
The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, referred to his observations at Second Reading, expressed again today, concerning the differences between procedures when interim remedies are sought in our domestic courts and the case that is hitherto applied in the European court. I do not intend to repeat in any detail the points the noble Lord made. The point was that in relation to that case, as the noble Lord described, there was what amounted to a breach of natural justice, as it would be identified in a domestic court, as the United Kingdom was unable to put its case. As the noble Lord pointed out, in the domestic sphere, a person is able to seek and be granted an interim remedy.
I am grateful that the Minister was kind enough to inform the Committee about the November reforms from the Strasbourg court, so surely all these natural justice concerns have now been met.
I gave the noble Baroness a list of the recommendations, or the proposed amendments to the rules, but I do not see them as answering all of the concerns which the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, expressed, and with which I agree. The question of the ability to go to court directly after an indication has been made, or an interim interdict or injunction in our jurisdictions has been granted, and to argue the point with the court, does not form part of the reforms to the direct ability to challenge which the Strasbourg court has announced.
(9 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Government are working with the Government of Rwanda to implement new protections to the Rwandan asylum system, including the introduction of new legislation. I am reverting to a point that was taken earlier, but I give the same answer that I gave to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. Protections offered by the treaty will prevent refoulement from Rwanda to elsewhere.
I am grateful to the Minister, who has been very patient with so many concerned Members of the Committee, but everything that he says very honestly in relation to each question suggests that the safeguards are not yet in place. Therefore, Rwanda is not yet safe, because that was the whole point of the treaty: to offer additional protections and to attempt to assuage the concerns of the Supreme Court. How can all of this be academic? This is not a bathroom that has been plumbed in and we are now just painting the tiles; we do not have the plumbing yet.
My Lords, the treaty guarantees that anyone relocated to Rwanda will be given safety and support and will not be returned to a country where their life or freedom will be threatened. That directly addresses the Supreme Court’s concerns about refoulement. As to the matter of the use I made of the word “academic”, I was using that in answer to points raised by noble Lords in relation to why the Bill bars the taking of general points of academic interest, which was referring to a point once the Bill and the treaty are in place. Once they are in place, there is no possibility of refoulement from Rwanda without contravention of an international instrument. The point is that, at that stage, argument before the domestic courts would be academic. I give way to the noble Lord.
I cannot go beyond the terms of the clause to which the noble and learned Lord refers. Clause 9(1) states:
“This Act comes into force on the day on which the Rwanda Treaty enters into force”.
As always, I am grateful to the Committee for its deliberations, but on this occasion I am particularly happy to welcome the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale of Richmond, to those deliberations, and indeed to what I hope will be a long and happy role as a legislator in your Lordships’ House. I think the Committee will agree that she dealt with this important group of amendments with the expertise and clarity that we would have expected. She pointed out the dangers of the “for ever” conclusion that Rwanda is safe and therefore the inability of our domestic courts to ever look at that issue—something that I think every speaker other than the Minister found unsatisfactory and said so more than once.
The noble and learned Baroness pointed out the oddity of a situation where there would be at least the possibility of jurisdiction in the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg in circumstances where our domestic courts had been stripped of jurisdiction. For those concerned about sovereignty, that seems to be a very odd state of affairs. The one thing that the Bill does not purport to oust is the final jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg—although it attempts to allow Ministers to ignore interim relief from Strasbourg—but it completely ousts all serious jurisdiction of our domestic courts, particularly in relation to the issue of the general safety of Rwanda. That is a very odd and unsatisfactory state of affairs and, again, no one in the Committee other than the Minister appeared to say otherwise.
I am grateful to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chichester and my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett for reminding the Committee what the UNHCR said just today about the Government of the UK attempting to shield themselves from judicial oversight. My goodness me—what would we be saying about any other country or jurisdiction in the world that that was said about by the main refugee monitor at the UN? Furthermore, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, for pointing out the significance of this in places such as the UN Human Rights Council, and how shameful it is that an examination of the UK should now be threatening to eclipse the situations in the Middle East and Ukraine. There are almost no words.
When there are almost no words, thank goodness for the noble Lord, Lord Deben. I refer the Committee to Hansard last Wednesday, when he spoke about the “nature of truth” and how we should always be seeking after it and never trying to end that exploration. I say to the Minister that rather more important than any references to John Donne today was the allusion to Al Gore; it is the inconvenient truth that the Government are constantly seeking to avoid with this Bill. It is the inconvenient truth that Rwanda is not yet safe, hence the need for the treaty in the first place and all the mechanisms that need to be brought in and operated under it. This was put so well, repeatedly, by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton. There is also the inconvenient truth that we still believe in the rule of law in this country. We still believe in anxious scrutiny of individual cases before people’s rights are put in jeopardy. There is the inconvenient truth that, even if Rwanda became generally safe tomorrow, things could change quickly, as they do in countries all over the world, as was pointed out once more by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale of Richmond.
I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Whitaker for pointing out very real concerns about journalists currently detained in Rwanda. We wait for responses “in due course” from the Government about reports of torture of the journalists currently incarcerated there. I was grateful for the support of my noble friend Lord Coaker on the Opposition Front Bench. I thought, if I may say so, that the courtesy and deference he gave to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, and the mutuality of respect between them, boded well for the attitude of a future Labour Government. I will hold him to that in due course, I hope.
(9 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberFirst, I remind the noble Lord of some of the constitutional truths that were adverted to in the debate on Monday. No Parliament can bind its successor. Parliament can always come back and revisit matters in future. On the specific point of how Parliament will come to learn of any matters that are of concern, I will refer to this in greater detail in the course of my submission, but I can refer the noble Lord to the independent monitoring committee which the treaty and the Bill establish, and to the work that that will do, feeding back to the joint committee of the two Governments.
I am fascinated by this new “court of Parliament” concept. Anyone who thinks that the Age of Reason ended in 1800 will need to read Hansard tomorrow because, if I may say so, the Conservative Privy Council Benches have perhaps delivered some of the finest contributions to this Committee today. I, for one, will be rereading the noble Lord, Lord Deben, because enlightenment is clearly not a single moment but something that has to be fought for again and again so as not to end up where the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, warned us. If there is now to be a court of Parliament that is examining the safety of Rwanda on an ongoing basis, I do think the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, should have an answer on what procedures there are, under the Bill as currently drafted, for these monitoring committees to report not just to the Government but to the court of Parliament that is being so elegantly expounded by the noble and learned Lord.
I just remind the noble and learned Lord that he said he would return to the temporal issue of how Parliament would be able to reassess the safety of Rwanda, if facts changed—if there were a sudden change of government or a coup, or if the monitoring committee found that people had been refouled, which was the fear of the Supreme Court, of course. What processes, under the Bill as currently crafted, are there for the court of Parliament to take an application to reconsider its safety, so that it is not determined as safe for all time?
My Lords, the noble Baroness’s point echoes the one made by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed. I had a brief communication on it with my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom as the noble Baroness was speaking. I think the temporal point that the noble Baroness referred to and the noble Lord raised is to be dealt with in a subsequent group. Perhaps noble Lords will be content if we treat that matter in detail in that subsequent group. I have no doubt that the noble Baroness and the noble Lord will bear in mind the burden of their questions and will come back to us if we have not answered them to their satisfaction. I am obliged to them.
I move on to consider Clause 4, which preserves the ability of individuals to challenge removal due to their particular circumstances where there is compelling evidence that Rwanda is not a safe country for them, other than where that allegation relates to onward refoulement, in relation to which the treaty is very clear. That is the appropriate mechanism to ensure that an individual’s circumstances have been considered.
In response, therefore, to Amendments 37 and 42, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord German, we maintain that it is right that the scope for individualised claims remains limited to prevent persistent legal challenges covering the same ground and to enable us to remove individuals who have entered the United Kingdom illegally.
The noble Lord, Lord Scriven, raised, quite appropriately, the constitutional implications of our response to the Supreme Court’s decision. I underscore my submission to the Committee: no constitutional violence has been done in referring this matter to Parliament, and in taking it into the international, diplomatic and political sphere, as opposed to the civil courts. Ultimately, returning to a remark made by my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne, who is in his place, this Committee must be concerned with the question of accountability for decisions.
The noble Lord, Lord Scriven, also made the point that evidence must be of an holistic nature. The rules of evidence are based on the principle of exclusion of that which has nothing to do with matters of fact and law with which a particular case is concerned. I wholly accept the point that the noble Lord was trying to make, which was that all individual circumstances must be borne and considered in the round. Although referring to individual reasons is appropriate for considering individual cases, I dispute his submission that it is appropriate for the systemic general claim. I do not accept that.
The noble and learned Lord’s noble friend is just trying to speed up parliamentary consideration after a declaration of incompatibility. As the nature of the noble and learned Lord’s argument throughout the Committee has been about parliamentary sovereignty, not executive diktat—“we do not need the courts”—what would be wrong with the idea that Parliament should be seized of these issues a little quicker than usual?
Given how well the declaration of compatibility procedure is working and has worked in the past, there is no reason to innovate on that basis.
As the Minister of State for Illegal Migration set out in the other place, the United Kingdom has a long-standing tradition of ensuring that rights and liberties are protected domestically and that we are fulfilling our international human rights obligations. We remain committed to that position and will ensure that our laws continue to be fit for purpose and work for the people of the United Kingdom.
The noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, raised the matter of refoulement, the sending back of people to dangerous places from whence they came. I refer again to the debate of Monday night about the extent of the treaty. Although some of the provisions in the Bill are novel, the Government are satisfied that it can be implemented in line with convention rights. We know that people will seek to frustrate their removal from this country, and the Bill prevents the misuse of the courts to that effect. As such, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
(9 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have participated in this debate, which has been a far-ranging one given the nature of the amendments. Clause 1(4)(a) and (b) states that it is recognised
“that the Parliament of the United Kingdom is sovereign”
and that
“the validity of an Act is unaffected by international law”.
That is a statement in conventional terms of constitutional reality. My noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth expressed it with his characteristic clarity and concision. We have heard nothing in this debate—not from my noble friend Lord Hailsham, not from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, not from the noble Lord, Lord German, on the Liberal Democrat Benches—to disturb that reality.
I will take matters out of the order in which they were presented, to deal with them conveniently. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, replying a moment ago from the Opposition Front Bench, asked for a word about the status of the instruments enumerated in Clause 1(6). Following on from what I said, it is not the case that the Bill jettisons those commitments. It says—as my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth said—that this provision exemplifies what is meant by international law. When it lists these provisions, it does so for the purpose of stating what is, again, the constitutional reality—that the validity of an Act is unaffected by international law. That includes those provisions. That is and always has been the case. I appreciate that not all Members of the Committee think that it should be the case. We have heard cogent submissions from Members of the Committee to that effect. However, the point is that it is the case until such time as Parliament decides otherwise.
I shall be brief. Why did the Minister put that on the face of the Bill, when all the lawyers in the Committee agree that, as a matter of domestic law, unless a treaty is incorporated directly, it is not justiciable in the UK courts? None the less, as a matter of international law, our word is binding. My noble friend Lord Coaker made it very clear why it is so important in this dangerous world that our word should be binding. If this is just a statement of domestic law, why was there the need to put it in the Bill? Is it because the Minister wants to show a bit of ankle to his friends who are pushing even further to the right with their amendment? What on earth are the Government trying to signal with this kind of statement in primary legislation?
There are a number of points that I could address there. As for the matter of me as a Minister showing ankle—the noble Baroness of course speaks metaphorically—I found it as difficult to comprehend as I found the references to a “Braverman wing” of the Conservative Party.
I go back to the submission of the noble Baroness earlier on. International law, as she is well aware, operates on the international plane, not on the domestic plane. There could be no greater restraint on state action than a treaty, and that is what the Government propose to deliver. She gave a submission earlier about the implications for Ministers and indeed for civil servants. To reassure her, I say that this does not bear on the actions of civil servants fulfilling their duties to assist the Government.
The noble Lord, Lord Hannay of Chiswick, referred to Section 19(1)(b) of the Human Rights Act. He was, I think, disparaging about the use of that provision, as opposed to Section 19(1)(a), which more familiarly is a statement given by the promoter of a Bill that, in his or her view, it is lawful. Of course, there is nothing unusual about the use of Section 19(1)(b) in these circumstances; it is entirely appropriate, which is why it appears in the Bill. It was used, for example, by the last Labour Government in, I think, the Communications Act 2003—I might be corrected on that, but it has been used by Labour when in government in those circumstances.
(9 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have already spoken on the nature of baptism, and I hope that what I said corresponds with the views of the right reverend Prelate on the matter. All asylum claims are considered carefully on their individual merits, including issues relating to the freedom of religion and belief and the credibility of a conversion. Indeed, on that last point, additional training is being rolled out to officials who assess matters of credibility in this context. I invite the House to reflect on the fact that the Home Office has for many years worked closely with the All-Party Parliamentary Group for International Freedom of Religion or Belief and the asylum advocacy group, and engaged with a wide range of faith groups to assist in training caseworkers.
My Lords, I am sure that I am being charitable in assuming that the Question from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, was motivated by his deep concern about violence against women in this country. With that in mind, can the Minister say any more about the Government’s strategy for dealing with the terrible acid and alkali attacks perpetrated by all sorts of people of different nationalities, including our own citizens?
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for her comment. It is important for us all to reflect on the fact that, wicked and despicable though this action was, it is not unprecedented. Indeed, I note that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, who is in his place today, chaired the Appeal Court of the High Court of Justiciary in Edinburgh in the case of Modiak in 1992, where a sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment was upheld. He approved the wording of the trial judge, who described that act, of extremely similar circumstances to the one with which the House is concerned, as being of “unprecedented gravity”.
(1 year, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of (1) the effectiveness of Operation Soteria, and (2) last year’s statistics on the (a) attrition rates, and (b) waiting times, in cases of reported rape in England and Wales.
My Lords, there are early signs of improvement. In the pioneering Soteria force, Avon and Somerset, the number of cases charged has more than tripled; the number of victims who withdrew at the police stage and post charge remains high, as does the time it takes for cases to pass through each stage of the system. There is further to go to improve the response to rape, but I am pleased to report that all 43 forces are now implementing the Soteria approach.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord the Minister, who is of course a law officer and a criminal lawyer of some distinction. But prosecution volumes are lower now than 10 years ago, despite reported rapes being up by 30,000. He will know that this is a particularly complex and sensitive offence, and it requires resources. Is it not time to experiment with specialist rape courts to give this grave offence the priority and the resources it needs?
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for her Question and for giving me of her time yesterday at our informal engagement so that she could outline the thinking behind this Question on an exceptionally important topic. She asked about introducing specialist courts for sexual violence; we have already completed a national rollout of pre-recorded evidence, which spares victims the ordeal of having to appear in a live courtroom and assists them in giving their evidence to the best effect. We will update the victims’ code so that CPS prosecution teams must meet with rape victims ahead of court cases to answer their questions and allay any concerns that they may have. In the next phase of our specialist sexual violence support project, we will ensure that participating Crown Courts have the option to remotely observe a sentencing hearing by videolink, and that will be available to any victim of crime who seeks it, subject to the agreement of the judge.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberIf the noble Baroness will bear with me, I will seek to get an answer to that question that I can deliver in the course of the debate—doubtless the Committee will remind me if I have not reverted to the noble Baroness by the time I sit down.
Amendments 160 and 162 do not define “exceptional circumstances” or “serious and ongoing” threat in relation to withholding protection from removal. As such, our view is that they would risk undermining the clarity which this clause seeks to provide and would make the power very difficult to use, meaning that potentially dangerous individuals would continue to receive the generous protections afforded by the NRM.
On Amendment 160A, Clause 62 specifies that disqualification applies when in the interests of national security, but it is right that the Government should also be able to withhold protections from individuals who pose a threat to public order more broadly, including where they have been convicted of serious criminal offences or have made a claim in bad faith, to use the expression that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, referred me to. I say that “bad faith” is appropriate in these circumstances because it is so broad and because it comprises so many aspects.
I want to intervene briefly on the “good faith” and “bad faith” point, in case it is of assistance to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and others. Concepts such as “good faith” and bad faith” are commonly used in civil and commercial matters; we understand that. In contracting matters, it is incumbent on parties to act in good faith, subject to the deal they have done with each other. Why I think the Committee is so concerned about what the Minister called the protean nature of the phrase here is that this is human rights protection, and we cannot afford to be protean or vague in the same way that we can when we are talking about how we enter into a contract. This is life and death.
The point I was seeking to make by that expression is, I think, the same one that my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar made earlier, when he spoke about this—it is as familiar to the noble Baroness as a practising barrister as it is to me, and I think it was referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. If we have a list that sets out heads A to E, and then counsel attempts to rely on point F which is not otherwise comprehended, or not specifically enumerated but which may be comprehended within the expression “or any other circumstance”, that always—as my noble friend Lord Wolfson said—places counsel at a disadvantage.
On the threats, or potential threats, and the potential scope for abuse which lie within the power of a person seeking to exploit and make a false application under these circumstances, what we are seeking to do is to identify a phrase or term which is sufficiently wide to encompass all those potential points. Noble Lords in the Committee have identified, under reference to the traffickers and criminals whom it is the intention of the entire Committee to thwart, their cunning, resilience and resourcefulness in finding ways to slip between the cracks of aspects of legislation.
Amendment 169 does not provide a definition of “public order”. I reassure the Committee that we adhere to relevant provisions in our international obligations but it is unnecessary to specify that in legislation, and we are satisfied that the current definition of public order complies with ECAT.
My noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering proposes that we replace the “bad faith” provision with one of “improper claims”. That proposal can be addressed in conjunction with Amendment 163, which seeks to remove the bad faith provision entirely. Another reason for the expression “bad faith”, and its breadth, is to avoid inadvertently excluding administrative mistakes made when submitting claims, which may be interpreted as falling under “improper claims”. We believe that “bad faith” is the appropriate language.
In answer to submissions made by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, under Amendments 169, 161 and 164, which seek to exclude children from this clause, ECAT does not specify an age limit. We deem it important that the United Kingdom maintains the full scope while ensuring that all decisions to withhold the protections of the NRM are balanced against our priority to safeguard children. The proposal set out in these amendments would create, in effect, a two-tiered system that could encourage those looking to misuse the NRM protections to provide falsified information regarding their age. We all sat late enough the other night in relation to the age amendment provisions elsewhere in the Bill for me not to wish to go into that area again, but we are concerned lest the proposals in the amendment provide an opportunity for persons to provide falsified information.
In relation to Amendment 168, the Government are aware that potential and confirmed victims of modern slavery may already have been convicted of serious offences or be involved in terrorism-related activity. I make it clear that neither the additional recovery period nor the public order disqualifications can be taken as being a blanket disqualification. Any decisions relating to disqualifications will be taken on an individual basis, taking into account the individual’s circumstances and vulnerabilities. This includes consideration as to the nature of any criminal exploitation that may have been made of them and the need to safeguard individuals. We think it is right that further details of how to apply this discretionary element should be set out in guidance for decision-makers rather than being placed in the Bill. That will give the Government the flexibility to meet the needs of victims and respond to changing patterns of criminal activity that may seek opportunities to misuse the NRM.
We do not consider that Clause 62 will present a barrier to people who have had convictions and prevent them coming forward, because of that discretionary approach and because there will not be a blanket disqualification on the basis of public order. All of us—the whole Committee, I am sure—want victims of modern slavery to continue to come forward for identification and support, irrespective of their personal circumstances or the circumstances in which they came to be exploited. However, we maintain that it is right that the Government can remove individuals who pose a threat to public order from the protections and support that the NRM affords.
Together with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, was concerned lest such victims did not come forward if they had criminal convictions. First responders should still always refer victims into the national referral mechanism, in line with modern slavery statutory guidance, even where the individual has had a previous recovery period or has a criminal conviction. Decision-makers trained in the field will then carefully consider each individual case and take into account specific vulnerabilities and the needs of each individual, again on a case-by-case basis.
The recovery period may be withheld following a reasonable grounds decision, and the rights that flow from a conclusive grounds decision may also be withheld at that stage if relevant disqualifications apply. I emphasise that we will carefully consider each individual case to ensure that people who genuinely need protection and support will receive it. I reiterate that it is right that we should be able to withhold rights from individuals where appropriate—for example, from those who pose a national security risk to the United Kingdom.
I return to the matter raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, in relation to compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights. The protections of the NRM will be withheld in accordance with Clause 61 only when so to do would be compliant with our international obligations—
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this Government are indeed serious about addressing the matters that the noble Baroness has placed before the House. I am able to give the noble Baroness some assurances in relation to figures. We are on track to recruit a further 20,000 police officers by the end of this Parliament. Over 100 prosecutors have undertaken induction training on rape and serious sexual offences—RASSO as it is known—while 674 prosecutors have been trained in a suspect-centred approach; that means focusing the investigation on the suspect and shifting away from the idea that it is the function of the police somehow to challenge the complainer’s account of events. Furthermore, by the end of this financial year, 176 prosecutors will have been trained and skilled in the assessment of the impact of trauma on memory. All these measures will enhance the ability of the system to address these extremely serious crimes.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for acknowledging the issue of resources in relation to sexual offences, in particular, and for the other commitments that he has made, but does he agree that the culture of misogyny in our police service is leading women not to have the confidence they need to come forward? I refer noble Lords to reporting overnight of the case of the Nottingham academic who was strip-searched in police custody in circumstances that can be described only as a sexual assault.
My Lords, the expression “misogyny”, and the extent, meaning and parameters of that expression, are currently under consideration. Beyond that I do not intend to provide any further answer.
(3 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am sorry to find myself intervening at this point but there is no bigger policy than the right to a fair trial. Of course that goes for complainants—and I agree with much of the thrust of what my noble and learned friend says—but there must also be justice for someone accused of any matter, but particularly such a serious one as a sexual offence. The example given by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, warranted more of an answer, and one could conceive of others.
I say that while acknowledging that for decades, too much sexual history has been admitted; there is no doubt in my mind about that. That was why Section 41 had to be enacted in the first place. Scholars in this area will be able to look back at the Hansard of the passage of Section 41 and its various iterations at the time. The section was actually more tightly drafted to begin with but noble Lords in this place, including on the Benches behind me, came up with compelling exceptional circumstances where it would do a grave injustice to a defendant for startling similar fact-type evidence not to be admitted.
I understand that even since the passage and enactment of Section 41, a lot of complainants—and, with all respect to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, quite possibly women in particular—have felt that there has still not been enough sensitivity on the part of certain judges. However, it cannot be right that if I as a complainant, of whatever sex, assert that a particular type of sexual activity is something I would never and could never consent to and have never consented to, and yet I did the day before—how can it be anything but an injustice to the defendant for that not to be admitted? If I am a man and I say I have been raped by another man because I would never have consented to sex with a man, and yet there is ample evidence of a third party saying that there has been consensual sex —that cannot be fair to the man in the dock who says, “Yes, we had consensual sex” and then the complainant, because he is embarrassed due to his family, his faith or whatever reason, now says that it was non-consensual. That cannot be right.
I agree that we must do more so that juries, judges and indeed society do not assume that past sexual history is determinative of consent, but in my view to say that it is always absolutely irrelevant would not comply with Article 6 of the convention and therefore the Human Rights Act. I do not mean to be difficult but I could not possibly have potential injustices of that magnitude on my conscience, and I do not think this Committee could either.
My Lords, in replying, I preface my remarks by commenting on points made by noble Lords. The first was made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, at the outset, while the Benches opposite were still thrashing out the batting order. If I may summarise the noble Lord’s position, I think it emphasised the importance of judicial discretion. A judge seized fully of the law and of the particular facts and circumstances applying to any case will most often be best placed to decide what should be done. I know that the noble Lord will recognise that my remarks cut both ways, and that he will hold me to them in the course of today’s debate. However, I fully accept what he had to say about the importance of judicial discretion.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving the Committee the benefit of his experience. Perhaps it is that experience which informed, or helped to inform, the remarks of the Chief Coroner, his honour Justice Thomas Teague, who has said publicly that one of his key objectives in his role is to ensure that the inquisitorial ethos of the inquest process is maintained. I hope that demonstrates a resolve within the system to address the failings or, at best, the over-eagerness, of counsel whose conduct the noble Lord described.
The amendment to increase the scope of legal aid at inquests would run counter to the approach of retaining their inquisitorial character. There is a risk that additional lawyers present at an inquest would not provide an overall improvement for the bereaved, that being something which ought to be a primary consideration, for the reasons expressed by my noble friend Lady Newlove. It is foreseeable—I think this is the point raised by my noble friend Lord Sandhurst—that the presence of additional lawyers could have the unintended consequence of turning an inquisitorial process into a complex exercise—
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I do not doubt the sincerity of his concerns about trying to maintain informality in inquisitorial process. However, can it ever be conscionable for an inquest to involve a totally unrepresented core participant or bereaved family in circumstances where those whom the bereaved family suspect of being responsible for their loved one’s death are represented by professional lawyers, counsel and QCs? Can that basic inequality ever be conscionable, not least when we are dealing with lay people, with public concern and with public money that is all going to some parties and not to the bereaved?
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her intervention.
I was going on to say that, for bereaved families who need legal help, advice and assistance are always available under the legal aid scheme, subject to the means and merits test. This can help preparation—
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of Cradley, for her amendment.
For the victim of a crime to be told that the culprit cannot be prosecuted because a time limit has elapsed would doubtless be the cause of, at the very least, dissatisfaction and, at the very worst, anguish, and may very well lead to a loss of confidence in the criminal justice system. That is why, in respect of offences that are serious enough to be capable of being tried in the Crown Court, such time limits are virtually unknown in our system of criminal law in England and Wales. That differentiates England and Wales from many other jurisdictions, where time limits apply even to the most serious offences.
In England and Wales, the only exceptions are certain customs offences and offences of unlawful but consensual sexual intercourse, which I shall refer to as USI, with a girl aged 13 to 15 years committed before 1 May 2004, when the Sexual Offences Act 2003 came into force. The statute which that Act replaced, the 1956 Act—I extend apologies to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, for yet further legal history here—included a requirement that a prosecution for USI with a girl aged between 13 and 15 must be commenced within 12 months of the offence. That requirement was highly unusual even when it was enacted, and it was duly removed by the 2003 Act. I am sure that members of the Committee will echo the words of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, in relation to the 1956 Act.
That was an anomaly, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and other noble Lords have described it in our discussion today. However, when it was removed in 2003 it was done so only prospectively, from the point when the Act came into force; in relation to offences that would fall to be charged under the 1956 Act, the time limit remained.
As your Lordships are aware and have heard again today, Parliament usually acts on the principle of non-retroactivity. Removing the time limit in circumstances where a prosecution was already time-barred, while it would not have amounted to substantive retroactivity in the sense of criminalising conduct that was not previously unlawful, would have exposed a person to criminal liability where there had been none before. Thus, Parliament’s aversion to retroactive legislation also applies to fundamental procedural preconditions for the bringing of charges against an individual. In relation to that—the point was canvassed by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti—I make reference to the case before the European Court of Human Rights called Antia and Khupenia v Georgia. Oh, for a Lord Russell of Georgia, that I might be corrected for any mispronunciation of the names of any plaintiffs in that matter.
For that reason, we do not consider it would be right to disregard the time limit in the increasingly rare cases in which it would apply. Since the changes in the 2003 Act were not made retrospective at that time, I submit that it would be difficult to justify now extending them to cases in which prosecution has been time-barred for at least the intervening 17 years—even allowing for the development in our understanding of sexual crime, as referred to by Members of this Committee who contributed to the debate.
I join the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and others in acknowledging the skill and humanity with which the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of Cradley, presented her amendment to the Committee. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for expressing a willingness to meet. I would be delighted to meet her at any time, but I think it would be more convenient for her, for the purposes purely of this amendment, to meet with my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, the Minister in charge. I have taken steps by electronic means during the discussion in the Committee to arrange that my noble friend is made aware of her desire to meet, and an appointment will be fixed.
Obviously I will go and read the Georgian case—I will call it “the Georgian case” so as not to repeat my earlier offence in relation to my noble friend—but, before any meeting, I will just say one thing. The Georgian case is now being cited as the reason why the Government will not move in my noble friend’s direction. I repeat my concern that we are currently in breach of the convention on human rights, not in relation to an Article 7 point but in relation to an Article 3 violation in relation to any woman, of whatever age, who now says “My statutory rapist will not be dealt with”. The Georgian case is up against cases such as X in the Netherlands and all the other cases where people were barred from getting redress in the criminal courts. That needs to be considered by the Minister as a senior law officer in Her Majesty’s Government.
If our positions were reversed and I had to face these two potential challenges in the European Court of Human Rights—a man who says “I had the opportunity to run Lord Pannick’s arguments about delay but none the less I was convicted of a historic statutory rape and I say that is a violation of my Article 7 rights” versus a woman who says “My rapist was not dealt with because of this time limitation”—I know which of those challenges I would rather defend as Her Majesty’s Government.
(3 years, 12 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Lord clearly heard what I said about the view that we have lost intelligence and failed to recruit CHIS, and that failing to introduce a power in these terms is likely to impair the recruitment and retention of CHIS. I do not have to hand the figures that he seeks, but I undertake to write to him.
On the “brown envelope” scenario, when it is drawn to the attention of a presiding judge passing sentence that a member of a criminal organisation—a gang, a conspiracy or whatever—has actively assisted the police and the investigating authorities in bringing the prosecution, it is important that we maintain a proper boundary. A person becoming aware that the police are aware of criminal activity, who elects to go to the police in their own interests in order to assist them, and by so doing earns a degree of mitigation, is very different from a person becoming a CHIS in the course of criminal activity, or one who is associated with criminal organisations for that direct and specific purpose. The noble Lord shakes his head, but I insist that we must maintain boundaries. A person who, during or prior to a prosecution, assists the prosecution and the police, is different from a person inserted into an organisation with the purpose of deriving intelligence about its activities.
The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, spoke about the appointment of a committee to look into these matters; as he said himself, this was a matter which occurred to him shortly before this debate. I will look into the implications and communicate further with him.
This Committee has made it a privilege to be a Member of your Lordships’ House, which today I have heard at its best, expressing with great care and detail the sheer strength, depth and wisdom of noble Lords’ concerns about the Bill in its current form. Many other noble Lords have similar concerns, but for various reasons were unable to participate. The noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, rightly pointed up the Northern Ireland experience, and with all matters of human rights and the rule of law, we ignore that voice and that particular experience at our peril.
The noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, rightly pointed out that supporters of these amendments come from all sides of the House. That should give the Minister pause for thought. So much has been said in these polarised times in our nations about extremism versus moderation. Sometimes I do not even know what these words mean any more, save that the ultimate moderation that holds our nations together is the rule of law. My friend—if not my noble friend—the noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, rightly describes this as a very conservative principle and tradition. However, equally for liberals and progressives, there can be no human rights or even democracy without the preservation of the rule of law.
The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, pointed to our legal traditions, but also made a particular point about successful work of his own at the Bar deconstructing the mens rea of someone who had no criminal intent because they were acting in the public interest; that ties in with my amendment very well indeed. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, may have used colourful language which offended the Minister, but it is how many members of the public will feel about what is being provided for here without the safeguard of the amendments that I have put forward.
My noble friend Lady Bryan was right to point up the excellent briefing from Justice. I neglected to declare an interest as a member of Justice, but I hope that noble Lords will forgive me, because I suspect that many of them, particularly noble and learned Lords, are members of that wonderful law reform organisation. My noble friend Lady Bryan made the crucial point: where are the hard cases of undercover operatives who are just doing their work and doing no more than necessary being prosecuted by rogue prosecutors against the public interest and common sense, because we have not seen them?
Of course, there is only one thing better than one Lord Thomas, and that is two Lords Thomas contributing so eloquently to a debate, particularly when one of them is the former Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales. I will let that hang in the air for a moment, because I know that the Minister will not have ignored that very powerful intervention from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. What is wrong with the current law? Where is the evidence? How can we do our duty without the ability to examine the case for moving from the status quo that has served our nations so well in this difficult and grey area and held the ring for so long?
My noble friend Lord Hendy was absolutely right to bring up the ongoing Mitting inquiry, in which he represents some of those who have been subject to abuse of power. There have been abuses under the current law; how much greater will the possibility of abuse be if we cross this Rubicon into granting blanket advance immunities to so many agents of the state, including from the criminal fraternity?
What of the victims, as my noble friend Lady Blower so rightly pointed out? She reminded us of perhaps the greatest jurist of my lifetime: Lord Bingham, who articulated equality before the law as a vital rule of law principle. She also reminded us that Article 13 of the ECHR requires an “effective remedy” for victims of crime. I know that the Minister attempted to address this, but how can “lawful for all purposes” possibly square with giving an appropriate remedy to a victim of a crime that is suddenly rendered no longer a crime?
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has been a police officer for 30 years, and, as my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer suggested, that gives his practical experience in the field particular weight. I imagine that noble Lords listening and those who will read his intervention tomorrow will be very careful to consider his wholesale dismantling of the argument against maintaining the so-called tension, which operates as a safeguard against the abuse of power. It is good for operating on the mind and ethical framework of any CHIS or undercover operative, particularly one who is not even an officer of the state but is a mere agent and, I repeat, quite possibly from the criminal fraternity.
My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer also rightly took us to the very powerful report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which expresses so many concerns about the Bill in its current form. There is so much potential for violations of human rights and abuse if the Bill is unamended. I have tried to engage constructively by way of this amendment, which does minimal violation to the scheme of the Bill and addresses the problem posed by the ongoing litigation but, none the less, preserves the status quo that has served us so well and is about preserving the rule of law.
It is said to be a breach of the rules of theatre to break the fourth wall, but, for all its beauty and glory, your Lordships’ House is not a theatre; it is a legislature. I want to be fair to the Minister, who is new to your Lordships’ House and to this Bill and who cannot possibly have been involved in the earlier stages of the policy formulation that led to its precise drafting. It is very difficult to be in the Chamber for one of these Committees, to listen to all the arguments—particularly when they are so powerful and come from all sides—and to respond on the spot, on your feet and immediately, as he has had to do. None the less, I hope that he will listen to the sheer breadth and depth of concern, which might well be addressed by way of my amendments or something like them.
The noble and learned Lord takes issue with my analogy about other citizens and passers-by. He says that these agents of the state are not mere passers-by, but that argument cuts both ways. The mere passer-by is mostly not from the criminal fraternity and normally does not have a vested interest, of whatever kind, in getting a particular outcome, quite possibly, even as an agent provocateur, as we have seen in the past. Why should an undercover operative, a CHIS, quite possibly a civilian or even someone from the criminal fraternity, have a protection in law that even a uniformed police officer does not have when he or she puts themselves in harm’s way on a daily basis? The so-called tension is a healthy one, and it should not be resolved by way of the absolute immunity that is the ultimate evil in this Bill.
Finally, I am beginning to suspect that the “lawful for all purposes” formulation was not adopted with a great deal of deliberation. I am beginning to suspect that it was used because it was used before and is in the framework of RIPA, where it is, pretty much, appropriate because that is about surveillance. As the Minister has said, it has been used in certain narrow confines before, but this Bill authorises unlimited criminal conduct and, potentially, very serious crimes, as the Joint Committee on Human Rights has pointed out. Therefore, a “lawful for all purposes” advance immunity that is appropriate for bugging, surveillance and minor criminal damage is simply not acceptable or conscionable in this case.