(1 year, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I too strongly support what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, said. I cannot resist telling the House that I am chairman of the Ecclesiastical Committee, and some years ago the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury was discussing a measure that was coming through our hands before going to Parliament, which had a clause that would allow the General Synod to make almost any changes to any law in England. We pointed out gently that it would not get through Parliament. Dear, oh dear, what are we talking about today? I would not have been quite as gung-ho about what could not happen in Parliament if I had come across this Bill and, I have to say, the Illegal Migration Bill.
The point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, was making about delegated powers—I remember that speech very well—is one that I am delighted the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has taken up. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, was saying that there will come a point when we will actually vote against secondary legislation—and maybe the time is just beginning to come. If we end up with having no power in Parliament, in either House, to decide whether laws that are different from those we have can be argued in either Chamber, what is the point of us being here? Consequently, I do feel that the House should support the noble Lord, Lord Anderson.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for the work he has done on Motion B1 with the listing of powers, rights and liabilities. I note that he will not press his amendment because he has got it to the point of getting a pledge from the Government.
Perhaps I might ask the Minister what the timescale is for putting these on the dashboard, because they are not currently on the dashboard. The last time they were searchable on the dashboard, only 28 rights, powers and liabilities were listed. They did not include, for instance, Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which, as all noble Lords know, concerns the right to equal pay for equal work; it goes further than the Equality Act 2010 and is an absolutely crucial instrument for equal pay. They also did not include Article 6.2 of the habitats directive, which imposes an obligation to take appropriate steps to avoid the deterioration of habitats. Those are two examples of key rights and powers that need to be on the dashboard, and there must be many more. Can the Minister tell us how many he thinks will be listed and by when?
(2 years ago)
Lords ChamberTo prevent the noble Lord, Lord Bew, having to get up and sit down again, I ask him again to appreciate and acknowledge that, as the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, said, nobody in the debates we have had, whether at Second Reading, on the first day in Committee or today, is arguing to invoke Article 16. No one is advocating its use, let alone now. All that is being said is that the legal argument of necessity invoked by the Government is undermined by the fact that they have never resorted to the use of Article 16; hence necessity is on very shallow foundations.
My Lords, is there not a very short answer to all of this: not to proceed with the Bill?
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I declare my interests in the register. I was much involved with the Modern Slavery Act and the review led by the noble Lord, Lord Field, so I feel I have some knowledge of this. I do not know whether the Minister, who is not at the Home Office, realises the extent to which all the non-governmental organisations of this country—including the Salvation Army, which works for the Government on modern slavery, together with the anti- slavery commissioner—deplore this part of the Bill without exception. This Minister may not know that but, goodness me, the Home Office does.
I am very concerned about children, but I heard what the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said, so I propose to refer specifically to Clause 58. Again, because he is not at the Home Office, the Minister may not have read the statutory guidance on the Modern Slavery Act. I have it with me—it was published this month. I wonder whether the Home Office’s right hand does not know what the left hand is doing, because the requirement to be timely in providing the information needed is totally contrary to the entire work set out by the statutory guidance.
I do not want to bore the Committee, but I must refer very briefly to one or two points so the Minister can know. Under “Introduction to modern slavery”, the guidance says:
“It is important for professionals to understand the specific vulnerability of victims of modern slavery and utilise practical, trauma-informed methods of working which are based upon fundamental principles of dignity, compassion and respect.”
For goodness’ sake, does Clause 58 have anything to do with that? The guidance sets out how you should deal with identifying potential victims of modern slavery. In particular, paragraph 3.6 on page 35 states:
“In practice it is not easy to identify a potential victim—there are many different physical and psychological elements to be considered as detailed below. For a variety of reasons, potential victims of modern slavery may also … be reluctant to come forward with information … not recognise themselves as having been trafficked or enslaved”
and, most importantly, may
“tell their stories with obvious errors and/or omissions”.
One important aspect—which the Home Office on the one hand states in the statutory guidance and yet is clearly totally unaware of in relation to the Bill—is that a lot of victims who come to this country are given a story by the traffickers. That is the story they tell first, and it will not be the truth. Just think what will happen to them consequently under Clause 58. They will be treated as liars who have not given accurate information. Through the NRM—imperfect though it is—they will probably have got to reasonable grounds, but then they will get this appalling notice and find themselves not treated as victims. This is totally contrary to the Modern Slavery Act. It is totally contrary to the best of all that has happened in this country, in the House of Commons and this House, which will be ruined by this part of the Bill.
Having worked in this sector since about 2006, I am absolutely appalled that the Government think they are doing a good thing in putting this part of the Bill forward. For goodness’ sake, will they for once listen and get rid of it?
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 153 and 155 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. Before I do so, I fully associate myself with the powerful words of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. The only correction I will make to the noble Lord is that the Modern Slavery Act originated in the coalition Government, and we had a Liberal Democrat Minister in the Home Office in the person of my noble friend Lady Featherstone, who was here earlier.
Group 1 covers amendments and proposed deletions to very objectionable clauses, as we have heard. Clause 57 shifts the onus from the state to the potential victim to identify themselves and possess the relevant expertise to know what information is relevant to a slavery and human-trafficking determination. There is no provision for the specified date for supplying the information to be reasonable, or for whether and how an extension could be granted. Can the Minister say whether there will be guidance on these matters? As the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked, will notices be served on all asylum applicants or only on some? There would be potential for these notices to be discriminatory, in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights, if they were served only on certain categories of people. What criteria will be used if only certain people will get these notices?
There is no clarity or guidance as to what might be considered good reasons for why information has arrived late. Vulnerable or traumatised victims might take time opening up; they might well be unfamiliar with the legal process, or they might not realise that a particular detail was relevant until later. There at least needs to be guidance on what constitutes good reasons to improve legal clarity and certainty, otherwise Amendment 154 from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, needs to be accepted.
On Clause 58, the Court of Appeal in a 2008 case said that the word “potentially” should be included if the decision-making authority were required to assess late supply of information as damaging to credibility. Hence, Amendment 153, inspired by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, changes “must take account” to “may take account” as potentially damaging to credibility. Amendment 155 would amend Clause 58 so that it does not apply to child victims or victims of sexual exploitation, similar to Amendments 151D and 152 from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker.
The bottom line is that Clauses 57 and 58 should not be in this Bill and, as has been said, Part 5 as a whole should not be in this Bill. They are arguably in breach of both the European Convention on Human Rights and the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.
I think that my noble friend Lord Paddick will refer to the worries of the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner—we are all very conscious of this matter. Indeed, Dame Sara Thornton has a comment article in the Times today, to which I shall refer in a later group. She has been very active, not least in briefing the JCHR and outlining her extreme worries, and we have heard from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. The whole of the sector believes that this tightening up, to the disadvantage of vulnerable and traumatised victims of human trafficking and slavery, is wholly inappropriate.
(5 years, 12 months ago)
Lords Chamber(9 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the Minister for explaining these welcome amendments. Something is puzzling me and it may simply be my lack of understanding of the field. The test which the court has to determine in the case of prior permission, under Amendment 52, or in the review of urgent TEOs, under Amendment 44, is whether the decisions are “obviously flawed”. I am challenged to understand the position with an in-country statutory judicial review in Amendment 65, which I understand would follow the normal principles of judicial review, including necessity and proportionality. I know that the independent reviewer referred to a test of “obviously flawed” in a commentary that he made, but I do not understand the justification for the difference in the test in Amendments 44 and 52 compared to the statutory judicial review in Amendment 65. The phrase “obviously flawed” seems both a high and a somewhat problematic threshold: obvious to whom? I would have thought that the application of that test would create some difficulties. However, I may be on entirely the wrong track.
My Lords, I want to ask a rather practical question. The whole of Clause 2, together with the amendments, appears to deal with someone over whom the Government assume there will be some degree of control. I take the example of someone who has gone to Syria and comes back through Syria to the airport in Istanbul. He then seeks to fly back to England and is made the subject of a temporary exclusion order. What is to happen to that person in Istanbul? What are the Government of Turkey to do with this person? If you stop them at an airport outside the United Kingdom, is there not a very real danger that they will just go back into Syria or into Iraq? What I have not understood about this temporary exclusion order is what will happen to these people who are not able to come back to this country.