Victims and Courts Bill

Debate between Baroness Brinton and Lord Garnier

Monday 9th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, this is not the first time I have argued that this jurisdiction does not do enough to ensure that domestic—but more importantly, overseas—victims of economic crime committed by people or organisations based here are adequately compensated for their losses.

If the last Government and the present one have been less than enthusiastic about my proposals, I have received support from, among others, Sam Tate, a partner of the London law firm, Clyde & Co, other legal practitioners who have read my speeches and articles on this subject over the years, and from Sam Hickey, a lawyer qualified in Australia and the United States, in his paper entitled Compensating the Victims of Foreign Bribery: UK Legislation, Practice and Recommended Reforms, published in February 2025 by the International Centre for Asset Recovery, which is part of the Basel Institute on Governance, at Basel University in Switzerland.

Having been the initiator politically of the deferred prosecution agreement—DPA—system in this jurisdiction, and as a vocal advocate for the extension of the failure to prevent economic crime regime, and, I should make clear, also as a barrister whose practice includes economic crime cases, I have taken a long-term interest in this aspect of our justice system. It is, regrettably, my experience from the time I was reappointed as the shadow Attorney-General in 2009, then as Solicitor-General during the early part of the coalition Government in 2010, followed by what is now 14 years on the government and opposition Back Benches, both here and in the other place, that all three parties of government—the Conservative Party, the Liberal Democrats and the Labour Party—have acknowledged with warm words the problems my amendment outlines but have not done enough to make the necessary practical changes.

I do not say that the United Kingdom has done nothing, and there is a reasonable case to suggest that we have been at the forefront of efforts to get a grip on foreign corruption. Several of the DPA cases concluded here have involved admitted allegations of failure to prevent bribery overseas, leading to the imposition of serious financial penalties. But when it comes to compensating the overseas victims of these offences, we have fallen short. It is not right that Crown Court judges—and it will usually be High Court or senior Crown Court judges well able to make the necessary assessments with the right evidence who will be dealing with these cases—should feel inhibited by existing statute law and practice from assessing and awarding compensation to the victims I had in mind because the assessment is or may be thought to be complicated. These judges deal with complex points of law and evidence every day, and victims should not be required to take out separate civil proceedings that are expensive in terms of cost and time in order to get justice.

As I said in your Lordships’ House on 7 February 2024, since the introduction of DPAs in 2014, the courts had by then fined corporations more than £1.5 billion for violations of the Bribery Act, yet only 1.4% of that sum had been given to the citizens of victim countries of the indicted corruption. We are therefore open to charges of hypocrisy, because the United Kingdom has been essentially acting as the world’s policeman while keeping the fines for the Treasury.

Sam Hickey in his paper makes six recommendations on how we can improve our performance as providers of just and appropriate compensation to the victims of overseas corruption. Having overburdened the House only last Thursday evening with my thoughts on the need to reform the criminal law of joint enterprise, I will not go into such depth or detail in arguing for my amendment today. But I recommend that the Minister just takes a few minutes to read Mr Hickey’s paper and the basis for his recommendations, even though he kindly makes several references to things I have already said in your Lordships’ House. If the Minister is really short of sleep, I invite her to read my speeches and published articles on the subject—but in any event, Mr Hickey’s paper should be part of the review I am asking for via Amendment 40.

In essence, Mr Hickey and I, both jointly and severally, urge upon the Government—and I have said as much myself several times in this House and in the articles I have written—that we should no longer simply rely on legal principles relating to compensation orders in favour of identifiable human victims in this jurisdiction when deciding whether to include compensation in the terms of a DPA or when sentencing a corporate defendant following a conviction or plea of guilty by the Crown Court. There should be a rebuttable presumption in favour of including compensation in such agreements or following conviction. Where compensation is included in the terms of a DPA, it should be tailored to the facts of each case.

More specifically, the Serious Fraud Office, as the usual prosecutor in cases of this sort, should actively apply for compensation to be awarded to discrete victims who have suffered quantifiable losses. In the case of Glencore, the SFO did not, despite my prompting when I was acting for the Government of Nigeria, seek to apply for compensation. There were legislative problems that prevented the court dealing with it, but at least the judge had the decency to hear my argument before saying, “Thanks, but no thanks”. However, it does seem to me that there should be a preference for compensation to be put toward the benefit of victim communities or societies in the foreign state through, for example, infrastructure projects such as schools or medical facilities, or towards the reduction of national debt. If none of those is possible, compensation moneys should be put towards the anti-corruption initiatives of governments, NGOs or international organisations—as I have suggested in the past, a United Nations ESCO account might be a suitable destination—as a final resort to ensure that some measure of compensation is paid in every case.

In any event, we should legislate for a rebuttable presumption in favour of real compensation. We should, as I have suggested before, consider a variety of methods for calculating the amount of compensation, including a victim’s losses, the value of the bribe, a percentage of the fines and penalties, or the gross profit of the briber. If there are no discrete victims with quantifiable losses, we should look to whichever measure of compensation is the greatest.

We should devise a formal procedure that victims, states and NGOs could use to request compensation. We need to clarify the concepts underlying compensatory practices, including the kinds of remedies available, the harm that might lead to compensation and the victims who might receive it. We also need, as I have said on several occasions before, to incentivise corporations to pay compensation by, for example, subtracting the compensation from the penalty. I accept that it could be said of my argument that repetition never made a bad point better. But I gently suggest that successive government failures to listen to a reasonable argument, year after year, is not evidence of its successful refutation but of a wilful or negligent refusal to see what is in front of them: that is to say, injustice piled on injustice, and corrupt companies being given license to bribe with impunity and to act without concern for their victims because it is happening out of sight and overseas. Amendment 40 is, if I may say so, a moderate amendment in its ambitions—perhaps too moderate—but it is certainly worthy of the Government’s consideration, and I urge them to do so. I beg to move.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I have tabled Amendment 46 in this group. In the Commons, it was tabled by Sarah Champion MP, who has long argued for supporting victims effectively and has a particular interest in the function of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority. The amendment asks the Secretary of State to amend the criminal injuries compensation scheme to widen eligibility for compensation to all victims of child sex abuse, including online-facilitated sexual abuse, to ensure applicants with unspent convictions are not automatically excluded where offences are linked to the circumstances of their sexual abuse, and to increase the time limit for applications for compensation from victims of child sexual abuse to seven years. I will not give any more detail of that.

The reason for this is that, until the 2012 scheme, a crime was generally considered violent if it involved physical injury, the threat of immediate violence or a non-consensual sexual assault. Those were the ones the compensation scheme could look at. In practice, this means that many cases of online child sexual abuse are excluded, even where the abuse involves sustained coercion, blackmail or domination and the child experiences profound and lasting harm.

We know that victims often face significant barriers in accessing compensation for this reason. There is a problem with the strict time limits that the CICA imposes, because that means that many traumatised victims, who may be navigating complex criminal justice processes and/or are unaware of their eligibility, often struggle to apply in time. The independent inquiry into child sexual abuse report on accountability and reparations recommended extending the time limit for child sexual abuse cases and giving claims officers greater discretion, but these proposals were sadly rejected by the previous Government.

Victims and Prisoners Bill

Debate between Baroness Brinton and Lord Garnier

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I signed this amendment, and it is a rerun for me, as I had similar amendments in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill. Most of the arguments that the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has put forward responded to what the Minister said from the Dispatch Box during the passage of that Bill. These two amendments have been tightened to focus on the real areas of concern. One is not just to inform victims, but also their families; the second is to ensure that the time limit in exceptional circumstances could be extended.

Prior to laying previous amendments, I met Tracey Hanson, whose son Josh Hanson was murdered in 2015. After her son’s killer was sentenced in 2019, no agency made her aware that she was able to appeal the sentence under the ULS scheme. It was only when she approached Claire Waxman, the London Victims’ Commissioner, on the 28th day following the sentencing, that she was made aware of the scheme. Nobody in the system connected with the case contacted her. She was family, obviously not the victim. She submitted her application to the Attorney-General’s Office on the 28th day—that same day—at 8.40 pm. However, this was rejected because it was outside of court hours. At the time, there was no mention of office hours or court hours within the victims’ code or on the Government’s website. Tracey has campaigned for reforms to the unduly lenient sentence scheme, asking for the 28-day time limit to be given flexibility in certain circumstances, such as when the victim or their family is not informed of the scheme. She asked that the scheme be referenced in the judge’s sentencing remarks.

It is worth noting, though, that this still requires statutory responsibility for an agency to communicate those remarks to the victim. Can the Minister respond again—it was not him before; it was his predecessor—to see how we can smooth the journey for victims and families as they go through the judicial process? This particular case is really egregious in having an inflexible time limit for victims and families and yet a flexible one for convicted offenders.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, I do not want to take much time. I understand, and indeed sympathise with, the thrust of the remarks of my noble friend and the intention behind his amendment. I am sure it is a good idea for people to know about the unduly lenient sentence scheme, particularly if they are victims. In my experience as a law officer who had to deal with these when I was in office, there did not seem to be any lack of knowledge among the people affected by what they thought were unduly lenient sentences, and we had plenty of applications to us in the law officers’ department to consider them. I say in brackets that, as often as not, not every crime or offence qualifies to come within the scheme. A degree of education needs to be made available in order that the public should realise that not every offence that they read about in the newspapers comes within the unduly lenient sentence scheme.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

Part of the object of the amendments is to ensure that the scheme is published and explained. That is one of the reasons why there is a reference to making sure that, in the judge’s sentencing, he or she refers to the scheme, and then victims and families can be provided with information as they leave the court, or it can be sent to them if they are not there.

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

I cannot quite see the wording that the noble Baroness refers to, but I am not sure I think it a good idea for a judge, having promulgated a sentence, then to say, “If anyone doesn’t think I’ve given them enough, perhaps you’d like to complain”. The judge must make his or her own mind up, based on the information in front of them, and do justice in that particular case. If the prosecutor, a witness, the victim or a member of the public wishes to say that that is unduly lenient, they can write to the law officers and see what their consideration of the matter is.

I agree with publicity and with educating everybody about what the system is about. However, I do not agree with encouraging everybody to run to their Member of Parliament, the newspapers or the law officers because they wish the sentence had been different. That way leads to disappointment, quite apart from a bureaucratic mess in the law officers’ department—which is a very small department.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Baroness Brinton and Lord Garnier

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Lords Hansard - part one & Report stage
Monday 13th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

I am so glad to have the approbation of the noble Lords opposite, for whom I have the greatest respect—on their negotiated stopping site.

That is what I invite the House and the Minister to consider, and perhaps the Minister will respond in due course, saying why my idea is not quite as wonderful as I think it is.

[Baroness Brinton (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I am a patron of the Traveller Movement. I thank the Minister for reaching out to those of us interested in this issue and I am sorry that the change in date meant that I was unable to attend. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, for her dedicated work in co-ordinating the efforts of those of us who remain very concerned about these clauses in the Bill.

In Committee, we had a full debate on how the clauses on authorised encampments are a breach of the human rights of the Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities to live a nomadic life. I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, because he has tried to propose a compromise regarding stopping sites. It certainly merits listening to, and I hope the Minister will take account of it.

In my contribution today, I wish to focus on just one area. Clause 63 also creates the right for the police to confiscate a vehicle that may be an individual and their family’s main residence. That confiscation would have the most extraordinary consequences, giving the police very strong powers that they do not have in respect of other people’s principal residences. If the police were to confiscate a vehicle under this clause, families would not only become homeless, but because they would be deemed to have become intentionally homeless, there is a possibility that their children would be taken into care, especially if there was no appropriate emergency accommodation locally. By doing that, parents may also not be able to move on to their next planned place of work.

I support Amendment 55ZC from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, which protects individuals by preventing police confiscating their vehicles if it would make the individual owner, and their family, homeless.

The National Police Chiefs’ Council could not be clearer. It said:

“We believe that criminalising unauthorised encampments is not acceptable. Complete criminalisation of trespass would likely lead to legal action in terms of incompatibility with regard to the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Public Sector Equality Duty under the Equality Act 2010, most likely on the grounds of how could such an increase in powers be proportionate and reasonable when there are insufficient pitches and stopping places?”


In Committee, the Minister said that these clauses are not targeted at the Gypsy, Roma and Traveller community, but it certainly looks that way, especially as the Government explicitly referenced Traveller caravans in the background briefing to the Queen’s Speech. The Government have also made it clear that they are not criminalising trespass more generally. Even if the outline of these proposals were in the Government’s manifesto, actions that target one particular community, infringing their human rights and giving the police powers that they have said repeatedly that they do not want, cannot be right. I hope that the Minister will rethink this deplorable legislation.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Baroness Brinton and Lord Garnier

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 8th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Garnier (Con)]

Many things could be added to the Bill and many could be taken away but the general thrust of the law, as my noble friend well understands, being a barrister of considerable experience, is that where a burden is placed upon a defendant in a criminal matter, it is set to the civil standard of proof.

[Baroness Brinton (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, for explaining his amendment in such helpful detail. However, my focus is on suggesting that Clause 63 should not stand part of the Bill. The principal reason—much of which we debated the other day, so I will not go into it in great detail—is the effect on the Gypsy, Roma and Traveller community. It is particularly about the use of the vague and expansive provisions of significant “disruption” and “distress”. “Damage” may be easier to define, but there are perhaps some issues about that as well.

Clearly, a range of provisions is already on the statute book which criminalise committing criminal damage. Section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 allows courts to grant injunctions against people engaging in antisocial behaviour—I could go on. The real concern is that this is clearly targeted at the Gypsy and Traveller community. To repeat a point that I made the other day, the definition of “significant” is not clear in the Bill. The Supreme Court recently characterised “significant” as follows:

“like the skin of a chameleon, the adjective takes a different colour so as to suit a different context.”

However, “disruption” itself has also been controversial in the context of public order legislation and is hugely open to interpretation. Part 4 directs authorities to focus exclusively on disruption caused by roadside camps, rather than inviting this to be balanced against the relative disruption caused by evicting Gypsy and Traveller families, to ensure that the response is proportionate.

“Distress” is also a broad and highly subjective category. The National Police Chiefs’ Council asked, in its evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights,

“whose distress? Is it the landowner’s? Is it a perception?”

This nebulous term may, in this context, also be informed by stereotypes and prejudices against Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities. We heard noble Lords last week making assumptions about the distress that the presence of camps alone may cause—of having an encampment nearby—and that this was also the source of crimes. Most noble Lords who said this also said that they could not prove it, but certainly among the community there is considerable distress already.

As I said, there are existing powers to address this. Section 61 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 gives the police the power to remove people from land where the landowner or occupier takes reasonable steps, and Section 62A allows the police to direct trespassers to remove themselves and their vehicles and property from land where a suitable pitch or relevant caravan site is available within the same local area. This is particularly important in terms of the data that we heard about the other day—that there are fewer authorised encampments available. There are more unofficial ones, but it is a real problem for people travelling from one area to another and intending to carry out their lawful business if they cannot find somewhere to go. The difficulty with Clause 63 is that it heaps further problems upon them but uses terms which are not well defined and are utterly nebulous, and which put this community at further risk of having their way of life criminalised.