Football Governance Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Brady and Lord Markham

Committee stage
Wednesday 15th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 322 would enable scrutiny of backstop decisions through merits-based review by the Competition Appeal Tribunal. I will also speak to my consequential Amendments 324 to 326 and 333 to 335. Let me seek again to give noble Lords a picture of what I believe is at stake.

The Premier League represents a remarkable British success story, yet the Bill introduces a mechanism that could unravel three decades of innovative ecosystem building in a single regulatory decision. Every few years, a regulator will be forced to make a binary choice between two competing visions for English football. One vision, that of the Premier League, seeks to preserve the delicate balance that has made it the best and most compelling league in the world. The other, explicitly stated by the EFL, aims to fundamentally restructure football’s finances and systems, describing key stability measures as “evil” and seeking their “eradication”.

This is not some narrow funding dispute; what the Government may so far have failed to understand is that this is about the very architecture of English football. It could eliminate the financial scaffolding that enables newly promoted clubs to compete. It could destroy the stability mechanisms that give investors confidence to back ambitious Championship clubs. It could force smaller Premier League clubs to abandon investment and aspiration. This is why merit-based reviews matter profoundly.

Under the Bill, even the most extreme regulatory decision could be challenged only on narrow procedural grounds. Let us think about what this means: a panel could select a proposal that devastated relegated clubs, and those clubs would have no meaningful right of appeal even if that decision threatened their very existence. The Competition Appeal Tribunal would offer a better solution. It brings expertise in complex economic matters and an understanding of how regulatory decisions ripple through competitive markets. Its oversight would drive better decision-making, ensure genuine fairness and protect the investment that makes English football thrive.

This speaks to a broader principle: football is not a utility delivering water through pipes. It is a dynamic ecosystem where success depends on calibration of risk and reward, yet the Bill repeatedly treats football like a water company, relying on judicial review as the primary check on regulatory power—and we all know how well water regulation is going. This creates a fundamental mismatch.

We are asking a regulator to make complex commercial decisions that could reshape our national game, yet we deny affected parties any meaningful right to challenge those decisions on their merits. This occurs throughout the Bill on all sorts of matters relating to ownership, financial regulation, licensing and stadia. Almost nothing, including this multi-billion pound decision about the distribution of the Premier League’s own revenue, is subject to merits-based reviews. Let me say again: I do not oppose regulation. These amendments are a limited attempt to ensure that regulation can operate fairly and sustainably.

As I said earlier this evening, the Premier League has consistently demonstrated its commitment to the wider game through solidarity payments, infrastructure funds and community programmes that reach millions, to the tune of £1.6 billion every three years. During Covid, we ensured that no club went to the wall, but good stewardship is a two-way street, and this statutory regulator requires proper safeguards. Without merits-based review, we risk regulatory decisions that could inflict profound damage on the game we love. The backstop could become a weapon for levelling down, rather than building up, replacing aspiration with survival as the pinnacle of a club’s ambition.

English football is at an important juncture with this Bill. Get it wrong and we risk something precious: not just the Premier League’s global success but the entire pyramid’s vitality. This amendment provides one —and only one—essential protection against regulatory overreach. There are plenty more needed, but I urge the Government and other noble Lords to support it.

[Lord Markham (Con)]

My Lords, Clause 84 details the provisions that may be brought before the Competition Appeal Tribunal. However, as drafted the Bill does not include any decisions made under Clauses 62 or 63 for appeals that may be heard before the tribunal. Given the implications of these two clauses, relating as they do to the distribution of revenue, it is wholly inadequate that the determinations made under them are not subject to an external appeals process. Therefore, my Amendment 323, and the amendments in this group tabled by my noble friend Lady Brady, ensure that any decisions made by the committee of the expert panel relating to distribution orders are reviewable under Clause 84.

I do not dispute that the Bill already provides for distribution orders under Clause 62, and for reviewable decisions under Clause 81. The latter clause states that reviewable decisions are any decisions listed in the table in Schedule 10, and Schedule 10 does include decisions made under Clause 62. However, this relates only to internal reviews. Schedule 10 also states that any internal review of distribution orders is to be carried out by a different committee of the expert panel. Therefore, although the composition of the deciding and reviewing committees must be different, the review will still be carried out by the same body.

Therefore, the Bill currently gives competition organisers the right to appeal only to a component of the regulator. This cannot be right. The imposition of a distribution order under Clause 62 is surely the measure that most affects competition; requiring one league to distribute its money to another league will impact its competition ability. Surely, then, any distribution decision should be reviewable by the Competition Appeal Tribunal.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, and the noble Lord, Lord Markham, for tabling these amendments. I recognise that the intent of the amendments in this group is to ensure that decisions related to the distribution backstop are appealable and subject to a merit standard of appeal, rather than being based on judicial review principles. I understand that this comes from a belief that a merit standard of appeal is necessarily preferable because it would allow the Competition Appeal Tribunal to opine on the merits of the case, rather than just on whether the correct procedure was followed, and thereby arguably offers better protections for affected parties. In this instance, I do not believe that this is the right process.

In truth, it means that a tribunal, which most likely has less technical expertise and background knowledge of the specific issues surrounding financial distribution in football than the regulator, will be able to substitute its own decision for that of the regulator’s. For example, if the regulator were to choose one of the two proposals as part of the backstop process, and make an order imposing that distribution arrangement, the Competition Appeal Tribunal could overrule this and choose the other proposal. Indeed, if we consider how this would most likely play out, the aggrieved competition organiser whose proposal is not selected would be very likely to lodge an appeal regardless.

These amendments would be tantamount to making the Competition Appeal Tribunal the ultimate deciding authority on the financial distribution arrangement in football. This would, in effect, mean cutting out the middleman and having the courts decide how much money should flow down the football pyramid. It is unclear to me why noble Lords, or indeed anyone, would think a court making this decision a better option, rather than the expert panel of the independent football regulator, or why this would necessarily lead to a more robust, more favourable or fairer outcome. It is simply the case that there are certain decisions better suited to certain standards of review.

We have engaged with legal experts and senior members of tribunals while developing the Bill. They agreed that the courts are not necessarily well placed to substitute the decisions of expert regulators on matters of technical regulatory judgment, and that a judicial review standard of appeal would be more appropriate for those types of decisions. This is also a common approach taken across other regulators. For example, the majority of decisions made by Ofcom are subject to appeal on judicial review standards.

By contrast, some of the possible enforcement decisions that the regulator can take under the Bill represent highly punitive actions. For these highly punitive, less technical and less market-specific enforcement decisions, a merits appeal is more appropriate. For example, we are of the view that courts are far better placed to opine on whether the severity of a punishment is appropriate to the infringement than on whether a certain distribution of revenue is better for the financial sustainability of English football. Ultimately, an appeals process should provide the appropriate opportunity to challenge whether a regulator is acting fairly and within its statutory remit. It should also be a focused and efficient process that does not excessively delay the final resolution of decisions or hinder the regulator in achieving its objectives.

While providing effective assurance of the regulator’s decision-making process and judgment, the appeals system should not unduly undermine the expert independent regulator. The Bill effectively balances these different considerations, including through the standard of appeal. The amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, would also make every decision under Clauses 62 and 63 reviewable, subject to the statutory route of appeal to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. This includes minor and operational decisions such as the giving of notice or extending the period to submit proposals. For the same reasons I have already outlined—balancing fairness, efficiency and appropriate deference to the regulator—we do not believe this is necessary and it is not the approach we have taken in the Bill.

Amendment 326 would be contrary to Amendments 322, 324 and 325. The Competition Appeal Tribunal could not simultaneously review a decision on judicial review principles and on the merits. On Amendments 333, 334 and 335, as I have set out, we disagree with the intention to make every decision under Clauses 62 and 63 a reviewable decision on the merits. However, if that were the intention, additions to the consequential amendments of other Acts, or the Competition Appeal Tribunal rules, certainly would not be the way to do it. For these reasons, I cannot accept the amendments and I hope that noble Lords will not press them.

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[Baroness Brady (Con)]

I accept the noble Lord’s apology.

The hour is late, but as we debate this idea of a sunset clause, we should pause and reflect on what is truly at stake. We are all here during extra time because all of us—bar one, I think—love football. It is a cultural touchstone, an economic powerhouse and a source of immense national pride. At its best, football connects communities, inspires individuals and projects the best of Britain to the world.

The Premier League is only one part of English football. I operated in the EFL system for many years and know that it is hugely important to our pyramid, as is the National League. But the Premier League is special for our country: with its global reach, this fizzing, vibrant competition has an extraordinary ability to draw interest, investment and innovation into the game. It not only powers the football pyramid but supports £8 billion in gross value added to the economy, contributes over £4 billion annually to the Exchequer and supports more than 90,000 jobs. The Premier League’s influence extends far beyond the pitch, creating an affinity for the UK and showcasing our ability to create a product that the world wants to watch.

We all know the background and the well-made case for some sort of regulatory intervention, but with this particular Bill we are now at a crossroads. I am passionate about this and live it every day, so I can see the risks very clearly. But I also know that this is a well-intentioned piece of legislation with aims that we can all support. The reason we have been so forensic and questioning during Committee is that it genuinely has the potential to inadvertently damage the structures that have made English football the envy of the world. We are not imagining these deficiencies in the Bill, or the risks that could play out. This is why I am interested in the idea of assessing whether this legislation and the IFR have achieved their goals or inadvertently harmed the game we all love.

The Government have rightly made economic growth their overriding priority. In a time of global economic turbulence and domestic fiscal and productivity challenges, it is vital that we protect and nurture the UK’s most successful industries. Football is clearly one of these: a global export that not only generates revenue but enhances Britain’s soft power and investor appetite for the UK on the world stage. It is against this backdrop that I must express surprise at the puzzling reluctance so far of the Government to listen to the concerns we have been expressing.

At a time when the Prime Minister has asked all regulators to focus on growth—and has also apparently asked Ministers to cancel all anti-growth measures—here we are, about to create a regulator that has no growth duties or objectives. We even read in the newspapers that the Chancellor has told regulators this week that they need to go further and faster in stripping back unnecessary rules and creating an environment where companies can take risks.

But this new regulator will be principally charged with risk reduction and, effectively, a new form of taxation on specifically one part of football, the Premier League. This is a mandate that seems inherently restrictive, redistributive and therefore anti-growth. The signal this will send to global investors could be troubling. If we overreach in regulating one of the UK’s greatest success stories, what might that say about our ability to protect and nurture other industries?

Poorly executed regulation would not just chill investment in football; it would ripple out into broader perceptions of the UK as a place to do business. A sunset clause is an interesting idea. It is clearly important that we do not undermine the regulator from the get-go. We all want this to work. But it is important that an appropriate review and accountability mechanism is found, so that a future Government can assess whether this Bill is delivering the sustainability it promises or whether it is in fact creating regulatory uncertainty and systematic risk, and damaging investment—in which case, we would want to see urgent remedial action.

As I have said this evening, the Premier League and its clubs are not opposed to change. What we do ask, though, is for change to be thoughtful, measured and informed by the realities of what makes football so successful. This Bill has the potential to do some good, but it also carries significant risks that, I say to the Minister, deserve to be engaged with seriously and constructively.

Today, the Premier League is competing not only with domestic leagues but international competitions, other global events and new forms of entertainment in what is a rapidly changing media industry. The UK has created something so special in the Premier League. We should not stifle our ability to adapt in order to deal with these new threats. We should not be complacent when it would be so easy to be knocked off course. We should not gamble that the Premier League is now an unstoppable juggernaut, immune to even the unintended consequences of its own Government’s actions. Empires rise, but they also fall.

It has been said that the Premier League has become the goose that is laying English football’s golden egg. I would encourage all noble Lords to think about it that way, rather than as a cow to be milked or a magic money tree to be shaken. Above all, we should look after it. We should nurture it. Dare I say that perhaps we should even think about how we can help it, not hurt it? We should work together to ensures that it continues to be so successful. To do so, it is obvious that we need some sensible changes to this Bill, and I sincerely hope we can achieve them together as we move towards Report.

[Lord Markham (Con)]

It is late, so I am sure that all noble Lords will be pleased to know that I will keep my comments short.

Football Governance Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Brady and Lord Markham

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

I am sorry to intervene, but I want to say again that on the specific issue of parachute payments there was no consultation with either the Premier League officials or the Premier League clubs that attended that meeting before this went into the Bill. I am not saying that there was not consultation on other areas, but this is a significant change to the Bill that had zero consultation with the Premier League or Premier League officials.

[Lord Markham (Con)]

It may be that it should be a matter of fact and we can find out one way or the other. The question is: how much consultation has happened specifically on the parachute payments? Obviously, they have been a recent introduction. My understanding from my noble friend is that there was just that 30-minute meeting, at which this was barely raised. I would be grateful if the Minister could ask her officials directly.

Football Governance Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Brady and Lord Markham

Committee stage
Monday 9th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I refer the Committee to my interests declared in the register. I support Amendment 71 tabled by my noble friend Lord Markham, which raises a crucial point regarding the backstop mechanism. We must be clear at the outset about what this mechanism governs and, critically, what it does not.

First, it is vital to understand that the backstop is categorically not about the fair apportionment of collective football revenues. Each party—the Premier League and the EFL—has its own central broadcast revenues. Indeed, the EFL has just secured a landmark five-year domestic broadcasting deal worth nearly £1 billion, increasing its central revenues by 50% from next season. This is testament to the Championship’s growing competitiveness and appeal.

I will not dwell on the fact that many of its recipients are incredibly wealthy—I believe there are nine billionaire owners in the Championship, along with many other extremely well-funded ownership groups—but I will dwell on the fact that, despite its very healthy income, the EFL does not give any money to the National League. It gives no funding to the leagues directly below it. It is the Premier League that supports the National League. Far from some sort of neutral arbitration to allow all parties to share with each other, the backstop is in fact a mechanism for the forcible redirection of billions of pounds of Premier League revenue only. In other words, this is one set of private businesses handing over money to another competing set, even if they do not want to give more than the £1.6 billion they already do and it damages their ability to compete.

The critical point, therefore, is that this backstop mechanism represents a completely unprecedented and untested intervention in what are the private commercial rights of Premier League clubs only. It impacts uniquely on Premier League clubs. The gravity and novelty of such an intervention demands the most careful consideration. Crucially, the backstop introduces a major and radical change in the Bill: the inclusion of parachute payments. This decision was taken without adequate consultation with Premier League clubs.

I mentioned earlier in Committee that just seven out of 20 clubs were invited to a 30-minute meeting on the Bill with the Secretary of State between the Government taking office in July and the decision, which was taken in October. It is no surprise that this lack of consultation has produced such a reckless decision. There simply cannot have been an appropriate understanding by the Government of its potential consequences.

Parachute payments are not a financial convenience; they are a cornerstone of the Premier League’s competitive balance. Without them, clubs cannot plan for long-term investment, or the stability required to maintain the intense competitiveness that is the hallmark of the Premier League and a significant driver of its global appeal. Parachutes are also—this is an often-overlooked point—a key part of the financial incentives for Championship clubs to invest in that league, knowing that if they reach the promised land, it will not all be undone with one bad year.

To fundamentally alter this system risks undermining the very factors that have made the Premier League such a global success and one of the UK’s greatest soft power assets. Potentially harming the magic ingredient of the Premier League’s competitive balance threatens to destabilise long-term commitments, jeopardising investment in lower-league stadiums, academies and community programmes. I believe it would fundamentally undermine the Championship, too.

We should also consider the concerns raised by UEFA. It has warned that the backstop mechanism could disrupt the balance of power in football governance and negatively affect the competitive equilibrium in both domestic and European competitions. UEFA has urged the Government to carefully reconsider their approach, emphasising that mandating redistribution in this way risks deterring amicable solutions and the very investments that underpin the success of English football.

This unprecedented intervention into private commercial rights must be carefully scrutinised. It very obviously has a differential and disproportionate impact on the clubs within the Premier League. It is also clear that the consequences of this seismic and deeply flawed intervention have not been fully understood. We do, as UEFA has said, need to reconsider this critical issue.

[Lord Markham (Con)]

I rise to speak to my amendment to Clause 71 on financial redistribution, and to add to the very valuable points made by my noble friend Lady Brady.

What the Bill seeks to do—which I have not seen in relation to any other regulator in the UK—is to give the regulator unprecedented powers to take money from one part of the sector or certain companies and give it to another. In any other field, this would be unheard of. Can you imagine the FCA saying, “I think HSBC should give some money to Barclays”? Can you imagine Ofwat saying to Severn Trent, “Thames Water is having a bit of a hard time, can you help it out”? Can you imagine Ofcom saying that Sky should help ITV out where advertising revenues are going down? That is unheard of among regulators.

I value the days in Committee as there is such knowledge around the House, so I would love it if any noble Lord could come up with an example of where a regulator has got the power to take away money from a part of the sector or company and give it to another. I would love to hear it.

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[Lord Markham (Con)]

I hope that this proves to be a quicker debate, because I would hope that what we are talking about here are not controversial measures but measures that go to the heart of the regulatory framework we are trying to establish. It is a shame that the noble Lord, Lord Addington, is not in his place. Although we are supportive of the principles of regulation, as my noble friend Lord Hayward said, we are trying to make sure that that regulation is set up in the right way.

Our debates in Committee stage so far have all been about the first few pages of the Bill, which are about the regulatory framework and objectives; the point of my Amendment 56 is that if you only have an objective of sustainability, it is one-dimensional and that is not good for the game. I will freely admit that I have spoken to a Premier League club which wrote to me about that—Brentford—and I hope that noble Lords would agree that Brentford is exactly the sort of club we should listen to in this sort of debate, because it is a club that has come through the divisions and is seen as a well-run model club—and one definitely not guaranteed its place in the Premier League. So it has an important contribution to make to this debate.

The letter that Brentford wrote to me and to local MPs says: “a regulatory framework that prioritises stability above all else would be disproportionate. It could mean the regulator financially constraining some Premier League clubs more than others. For Brentford, a club that has risen against the odds to the Premier League, such restrictions risk stifling our ability to grow and compete with larger, established clubs”. That is why I tabled this amendment, to expand the regulator objectives. Otherwise, there is the danger exactly as written in the letter, which I am happy to share with all Members here and which has also been sent to local MPs.

The exact concern of Brentford’s chairman is that, if the regulatory framework is just based on financial sustainability, it risks entrenching the closed-shop nature of the top clubs and will restrict the ability of the Brentfords of the world to compete. From its point of view, having an objective that promotes the growth of all English football, protects financial investment in the game and means that you know you can reap the rewards from investing in a club is very important. Amendment 56 seeks to add this, and is, I hope, uncontroversial, because who would not want to promote growth? We know that that is the Government’s number one objective, and it is fundamental to the Bank of England’s remit and a lot of other regulators also have growth objectives.

In the new clause proposed in my Amendment 58, subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) refer to the “financial soundness” and “resilience” of clubs and aim to ensure that the regulator takes into account the whole financial picture of clubs, looking at their assets and liabilities—their whole balance sheet—and their ability to meet any future liabilities. In other words, we want a holistic picture of their sustainability. Funnily enough, that is akin to what the Chancellor announced in the Budget about government spending and so-called “persnuffle”—or PSNFL—which looks at assets and liabilities to make sure you have a rounded picture of the health of the Government’s, or the country’s, finances. Amendment 58 tries to encourage a similar approach to looking at the overall wealth of a club and its overall balance sheet strengths.

Proposed new subsection (1)(c) looks to make sure that the heritage of English football, which we all agree is vital to all this, is rounded out in its definition, while proposed new subsection (1)(d) looks at all the things that are key to the health of the overall game. It would make sure that the regulator, when it looks at how it acts in this space, looks at the overall health of the game—the growth of football in terms of TV viewership, matchday audience, fan engagement, number of clubs and number of fans. I shall not repeat the arguments that we made earlier, but noble Lords will be aware that these are the key things—that media rights go to the heart of the value and TV stations around the world pay to back those media rights, for the health of those sorts of objectives that we would like to see it have.

That is why, in introducing this amendment, I am trying to make sure that we have a much more rounded definition, going to the heart of the framework of what we hope the regulator would look to do and have in place. I hope that noble Lords will be able to support what I hope is a very sensible objective and will take on board the concerns of the Brentford chair—if it was only one-dimensional and looking at financial sustainability alone. I hope that the Minister will be able to take those points away for further consideration. I beg to move.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

I support Amendments 56 and 58, tabled by my noble friend Lord Markham, which together propose critical enhancements to the objectives of the regulator. These amendments seek to establish clear and ambitious goals for the regulator, while ensuring that its powers remain proportionate and carefully defined.

Amendment 56 introduces two new objectives for the regulator: to promote the growth of English football and to promote and protect financial investment in the game. These objectives are not just desirable; they seem to me to be essential, if we are to preserve the vibrancy, competitiveness and international appeal of English football.

The Premier League is the crown jewel of global football. Its growth and success have been driven by significant financial investments, made in good faith and with the legitimate expectation of stable and predictable regulatory conditions. Without that certainty, clubs would not have been able to commit to the infrastructure, youth development or community programmes that are now the pillars of our game. Yet, as currently framed, the regulator’s remit is heavily focused on constraints, restrictions and redistribution. While these may be important, without taking growth into account, they risk creating a chilling effect on the investment that has driven English football to its current heights. To constrain without also providing balance is to risk stagnation or, worse, managed decline.

Amendment 58 complements this by providing detailed definitions of these new objectives. It outlines what growth means in practical terms: increasing TV viewership, matchday attendance, fan engagement, the number of clubs and the number of fans. These are good proxies, in my view, for the growth of football and ensuring that the regulator’s actions are aligned with the long-term health of the game. Although promoting growth and protecting investment are vital, I listened carefully to the Minister’s argument that a growth duty or purpose could in fact be scope-widening. I believe that she indicated that it could place the regulator in conflict with the broader European framework of football governance. This would risk significant repercussions—but only, of course, for those clubs competing in European competitions.

This is one of the tensions at the heart of the Bill. You could have proper balance in the regulatory regime’s design, so that it is de-risked, light-touch, pro-growth and business-friendly and protects this highly successful industry—but, in doing so, you potentially risk the future of a smaller number of clubs which may, one day, be barred from European competition. Alternatively, you could do what the Government have done, and you therefore risk setting up the regulator to be harmful to growth, overly intrusive, risk-averse and dampening to investment—but, in doing so, you are more likely to be compliant with UEFA, although no one has been able to provide a cast-iron guarantee on that.

In supporting these amendments, I urge Ministers to take this opportunity to refine the objectives of the IFR to set it firmly on the path to success. We need to create objectives that support football’s future without overextending the regulator’s reach or compromising the autonomy of competition tools, which must rightly remain the domain of the competitions themselves. I hope that, as we deepen our scrutiny of the Bill, we can find a better balance.

Football Governance Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Brady and Lord Markham

Committee stage
Monday 9th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendments 68, 89, 120 and 121, which focus on ensuring accountability and transparency and are critical to protecting the Premier League and safeguarding its unique role in the football pyramid.

This Bill introduces a radical new framework for the governance of football, one that includes significant regulatory oversight and redistribution mechanisms. We are the first country ever to do this, and I am worried that we may well suffer from first-mover disadvantage. There are profound changes in this Bill that will impact every level of the game, and it is essential that the Government and the regulator are held to account for the consequences of these measures. Regular reporting is not just a bureaucratic necessity; it is a vital safeguard to ensure that the interests of all stakeholders, particularly those of the Premier League, are protected.

If we are to introduce a regulator with such extensive powers, it must be held accountable for the full range of consequences its decisions may have. The competitive balance of the Premier League—its very dynamism and unpredictability—is central to its global appeal. This, in turn, drives its ability to attract world-class players, managers and investment, generating revenues that flow down the football pyramid. Yet, without baselining these measures or requiring the regulator to report on its impact in these areas, we risk implementing a system that could inadvertently undermine the Premier League’s success.

Similarly, international competitiveness is a crucial factor for the Premier League. It is the most watched and admired league in the world, representing a unique soft power asset for the UK. The ability of Premier League clubs to compete at the highest level in Europe has been a driving force behind their commercial success, as well as their capacity to support the wider game through solidarity payments and grass-roots initiatives, all of which are voluntary. However well-meaning, if the regulator’s interventions dampen investment or create uncertainty, this international competitiveness could be severely compromised, and yet somewhat incredibly there is no requirement in the Bill for the regulator to monitor or report on this.

Investment is another area where the absence of reporting requirements is deeply concerning. Premier League clubs operate in a highly competitive global market for players, sponsorship and broadcasting rights. Long-term investment decisions, whether in infrastructure, youth academies or community programs, depend on regulatory certainty and stability. If the regulator’s actions lead to a chilling effect on investment, it would have profound consequences not only for the Premier League but for the whole football ecosystem. Again, there is no provision in the Bill to track or report on this impact, leaving us blind to the unintended consequences that could arise.

The amendments before us, particularly Amendment 68, in the name of my noble friend Lord Maude, seek to address these gaps. They recognise that we cannot introduce such a transformative regulatory framework without ensuring that it is judged against the metrics that matter most: competitive balance, international competitiveness and the ability to attract investment. Unless we retain these qualities, we will end up with a much smaller, less well-funded and far less successful football pyramid. The question of stability in a rapidly declining ecosystem becomes somewhat irrelevant.

We must ensure that we have a clear understanding of whether this legislation is achieving its aims or instead introducing unintended and potentially harmful consequences. For example, if the redistribution mechanisms introduced by the regulator begin to destabilise clubs’ financial planning or deter investment, we must know about it quickly and transparently. If the regulator’s powers are being applied unevenly or disproportionately, we need to be able to challenge and rectify that. If the Premier League’s unique role in funding the pyramid is being undermined by these changes, we surely need a mechanism to address that impact.

I encourage the Minister to consider the spirit of these amendments and, between now and Report, consider ways that the accountability and transparency mechanisms can be considerably strengthened.

[Lord Markham (Con)]

My Lords, in speaking to Amendment 120 and following on from the point that my noble friend Lady Brady made, I hope to put some meat on the bones of what we would be asking the regulator to produce in its annual report.

Right now, all that the Bill says is that we are asking it to produce a summary of the activities undertaken during the year and for any other information that the Secretary of State sees fit. The whole purpose of our debates over the last few days is to make sure the regulator is fit for purpose in its objectives and that its performance is then measured against those objectives. My amendment—non-controversial, I hope—is about trying to hold the regulator to account. It seeks to add that the regulator should look at and report on clubs’ compliance against directed action, regulator finances, enforcement action, their performance against their own objectives, how much time it has taken to grant licences to clubs and any salaries above £100,000. It is quite a simple list that seeks to hold the regulator to account and get clarity on what its performance has been for the year, so it can then improve performance going forward.

Football Governance Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Brady and Lord Markham

Committee stage
Wednesday 4th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I refer the Committee to my interests, which are declared in the register. I defer to other noble Lords who have experience of the technicalities of hybridity and parliamentary procedure, but I hope it is helpful and illuminating in this context to raise the issue of consultation with clubs. We are creating legislation that will profoundly affect 116 unique institutions, from Premier League clubs through to the National League community clubs. But it is important for everyone to understand that the consultation with these affected businesses by the current Government has been remarkably limited—almost unbelievably so.

Just seven Premier League clubs—mine was one of them—were granted a brief half-hour meeting with the Secretary of State over the summer. Following this cursory engagement, significant decisions were made that could fundamentally affect the future of English football, most notably with the inclusion of parachute payments within the backstop mechanism. I say again: seven clubs out of 20 have been seen for just half an hour since the Government took office and before they made that seismic decision.

This is particularly concerning given that fundamental issues still remained unresolved. We still lack any clarity on UEFA’s position regarding state interference, for example. This clearly creates profound uncertainty for clubs competing in, or aspiring to, European competition, as well as our national teams. We do not know what the ownership test will look like. This causes significant uncertainty for potential investors as to whether they are able to own a club.

I have listened with real interest to this debate on hybridity. Can the Minister help my understanding here? Can she confirm that, if my noble friends are correct and hybridity is a live question for the Bill, this would give clubs at all levels a real opportunity to present their specific circumstances to Parliament? For example, would it mean that National League clubs could explain their concerns about the regulatory burden and the concerns of the many that they say “would not survive” this regulation? Would it mean that Premier League clubs could have more than half an hour to detail the very serious implications for them, and the risk that we may harm the competitive balance of the Premier League, which we have all agreed that none of us wants to do?

That would be especially important, given that the impact on Premier League clubs is very different from that on other stakeholders in the Bill, as the Premier League is the only party that provides funding to any other part of the football pyramid. The backstop is clearly designed as a mechanism to gain direct access to, and apportion, Premier League revenue and no one else’s. It would allow the IFR to do this even if it was against the Premier League clubs’ will, or even without the clubs’ agreement, even if it was to have a detrimental effect on the clubs and the overall competition that it removes revenue from.

I have spoken to many of my colleagues across the whole football pyramid. We are all alarmed about, and puzzled by, the lack of discussion on the Bill with Ministers. Does the Minister agree that we all want to get the detail of the Bill right, and can she see any downsides to providing meaningful opportunities to hear from all clubs across the football pyramid affected by the legislation?

[Lord Markham (Con)]

I must admit that, probably like other noble Lords, I am scratching my head over this. As the Minister said earlier, it is very clear that the leagues know who we are talking about here and that a large section of the Bill is talking about the whole arrangement, and in Clause 6 about the distribution agreement, the pyramid, the parachute payments and all that. There are only two instances where that counts, in the payments from the Premier League to the other leagues, so it is very clear that we are referring to Premier League and English Football League clubs. I do not think there is any doubt about that at all. As I was taught as a kid, if it walks like a duck, looks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it is probably a duck.

I am pretty sure that this is a hybrid Bill already. I am not an expert, but I cannot see why it is not a hybrid Bill because, as the Minister just said, it is very clear to everyone which leagues we are referring to. The argument that somehow we could not change things if things changed, or if league structures changed, just does not stand up. Just as we are going to nominate which competitions we are talking about under secondary legislation, we could do exactly the same if there was any change in the format of the leagues. The Minister wrote in her letter about trying to stop people gaming the system, but we have a very easy way to stop them gaming the system. It is set up there already—you can change it in secondary legislation, just as the Government intend to do in defining the competitions involved in the first place.

I cannot see any reason why we would not call it as it is. It is as if we were somehow trying to stop the clubs having the proper amount of consultation. As my noble friend Lady Brady just said, it is clear that there has been very little consultation to date. The clubs themselves have said that there was very little consultation. The people here who are members of those clubs probably know more than anyone else about this.

I believe that we are all united in this Committee in wanting the best for football. That comes through very clearly in every conversation we have had. I know that colleagues from right across the spectrum want what is right for football, and I know that the Minister wants what is right for football—so why not give clubs the opportunity to be properly consulted and have proper input on something that is going to profoundly affect the whole game?

Football Governance Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Brady and Lord Markham

Committee stage
Monday 2nd December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Markham (Con)]

I genuinely thank noble Lords for their interventions. We are trying to unpack and fix a tricky problem. I completely agree with the suggestion from the noble Lord, Lord Birt, about better boards; of course that is a good idea, but how does the regulator make that happen? Will it be given the powers to force people off boards? I have not heard that; I have not seen that anywhere in the Bill. I fully support recommending a stronger board, but how do you make it happen? The only remedy I see for this in the Bill, and which I keep coming back to, is that clubs have to deposit more money as a sort of punishment.

On the visionary business plan at Brighton, which really was visionary, a regulator at the time could have thought, “That looks a bit risky”—and it probably was a bit risky—“so how do I guard against that?” They could have wondered, “How much does this chairman know about football? He is a poker champion; that is brilliant. He believes in the stats. But he is probably not your conventional person, who you would be going to and asking for more money as a deposit”.

This is what we all keep coming back to. If the only remedy is that the clubs put more money aside—

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for allowing me to intervene. My understanding of the Bill is that the ultimate sanction the regulator can have is to withdraw the licence from the football club. If a football club loses its licence, it ceases to be able to play. It is put in a very difficult situation whatever the remedy: it either complies wholeheartedly with whatever remedy it is told by the regulator to put in place, or it loses its licence and cannot play in the league. Surely that cannot be right.

[Lord Markham (Con)]

Again, I hope the Minister will answer this point. This is what the shadow regulator was explaining to us last week. What is the one thing you can do short of that? You can look to de-risk the situation, particularly if your only criterion is sustainability at that club; in other words, it survives by you saying, “You have to put money on deposit”. That is exactly the model they were taking from the financial regulator and the banks; that is what I see as the whole problem.

It is fundamental. As my noble friend Lord Jackson’s amendment suggests, we could make sure that it is aware of the burdens of regulation, or, as some of the earlier amendments proposed, it could be about broadening the definition and objectives of the regulator so that it has other criteria at stake. I truly believe that, unless we widen it out—it is only one-dimensional—we really are going to harm the great game.