Commercial Payments Bill [HL]

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st July 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to follow my indefatigable noble friend Lord Holmes and congratulate him on his Amendments 2 and 3. I agree that there is a real risk that 60 days will become the default, whereas 30 days is the market norm. I took the trouble to check with one of the co-directors of my family company—for which I declare an interest along with the others on the register—and he told me that we always pay the week after receipt of invoice, which I did not know. Therefore, one does not want to do anything that encourages companies to pay longer than their current practice is the case. The Government perhaps might have made it clear that the maximum is a maximum, but to say, “Thank you, good luck, and carry on”, for people who were paying earlier.

In respect of Amendment 4, we do need to clarify what is a public authority for these purposes; it is very important. But on the meat of the group, in terms of a company involved in an SAR—a special administration regime—I am grateful for advice and guidance given to us by some suppliers who have been in touch and are affected by this. It is estimated that some £835 million will be written off by those who are Thames Water suppliers, and that is just a direct cost; there will be a ripple effect for subcontractors and others. It does not seem right that, even though a supplier will be paid after an SAR, they may have to write off all their invoices for services provided to Thames Water before an SAR. This could be a disaster for many SMEs. Of course, contractually they have to keep supplying to make sure that, for example, the sewage is not running in the streets, and that the other essential services of Thames Water continue. This is very acute and needs immediate attention on the part of the Government.

I am surprised that the noble Lord, Lord Fox, has not signed our Amendment 100, as he normally likes these sorts of reviews. But I hope he and all others see the merit in having that.

Amendment 51 is a bit of a probing amendment, but it could become very important, as we could see, in the future, large purchasers contractually forcing smaller companies to accept cryptocurrency. It is not specified in the amendment that it is cryptocurrency, but it is clear that is what we mean. Many people would not want to be forced to accept cryptocurrency, but such is the power of a larger company they may find themselves in a position so to do. The amendment is predicting what might happen in the marketplace and asking the Government to think about it now and let us know their view. It would be perfectly reasonable for this to happen if both parties genuinely agreed, but not if one is, frankly, bullied into it.

I am very interested in Amendment 52 from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and look forward to hearing her arguments.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

That was a hint to rise. I will speak to my Amendment 52, but I must first apologise to the Committee that I was unable to speak at Second Reading, my scrutiny hours having been occupied in the passage of another Bill, which also accounts for why this was rather a last-minute—almost literally—amendment, so there was no pre-discussion with anybody, but I would have liked to give it some airing.

I wholeheartedly support the core intention of the Bill, and I will make no secret of the fact that I would have preferred an immediate 45-day limit rather than 60 days. But scanning through the Bill and the amendments once I was released to have the time to do so, it seemed to me that there is a blind spot in that there were no rules to ensure that small businesses could receive stage payments, leaving them at risk of being forced to rely on end-of-contract invoicing. In some instances, way-stage payments may be agreed, but many businesses feel that they cannot take the risk to bid for a contract in the first place. Others are exploited and put dangerously at risk of non-payment in contractor insolvencies, the very issues that the Bill seeks to resolve, so there is a huge loophole.

In the Government’s own consultation phase last year, small business federations and independent suppliers explicitly warned against an invoice-centric blind spot. Yet here we are, with it unsolved. We do not need to look far for a solution. Stage payments have been a standard procedure in construction for 30 years, so why not follow that precedent? If it works for construction, why not for the wider economy?

My amendment proposes a simple entitlement: for contracts exceeding 45 days, small undertakings—which I have defined as having up to 50 employees—must have the right to invoice at intervals of no more than 45 days. If you do the sums on this, under my amendment a small firm must fund its own costs for 45 days before invoicing, but then it still has to wait up to 60 days for payment. That is 105 days, or three and a half months, before a single penny arrives, during which all the salaries and business costs have to be paid. That is still an enormous burden. But without this amendment, that gap is effectively uncapped.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 6th July 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendments 142A and 142C from my colleagues, the noble Lords, Lord Hunt and Lord Ashcombe. As has been said, this can be summed up in one word: proportionality. We have debated these themes on previous days in Committee and they are still as strong as they were when we mentioned them on day one. To “proportionality” I would add “specificity” and “applicability” because, without making this critical distinction—though difficult in some of the marginal cases—we are effectively saying that rules apply across the piece, which inevitably means increased burdens, increased costs, a lack of specificity, inapplicability, and holding firms and the UK economy back.

As the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, rightly said, we have the at least odd situation right now where pet insurance is treated the same as marine or aviation insurance. I can see only one potential case where this would be appropriate: if many people were petting flying fish. As I do not believe we have an increase in flying fish petting, I believe that proportionality, specificity and applicability would be achieved by embracing the principles set out in Amendments 142A and 142C.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I broadly support Amendment 142A, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, for bringing it forward. I also think that the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ashcombe, or something similar would obviously be needed as some kind of companion to it.

Whatever the FCA may have been intended to be, it is now proudly and explicitly a consumer protection body. For much of its work that is good, but some noble Lords will know that it has taken me and others four years to get incorrect cost disclosure descriptions for listed investment companies corrected, simply because consumers like the incorrect versions. Indeed, that saga led to a telling exchange at a meeting of the Financial Services Regulation Committee. The FCA chair insisted that consumer views always took priority, and I replied, “If you ask whether one and one makes two or three, and the consumer says, ‘I like three—it’s a bigger number’, is that what you use?” There was no denial. That is the scale of the problem: a regulatory culture where consumer preference for something factually incorrect overrides market integrity. It is a mindset that has already cost billions in potential investment in productive assets.

That was where it touched consumers; now let us move on to look at the wholesale areas. The trouble is that that mindset gets pasted across too. We do not need to debate whether the FCA went overboard in demanding that wholesale businesses had to proactively prove that they do no consumer harm in transactions that never touched consumers. The admission is there in consultation CP26/23 at paragraph 1.3, acknowledging overreach, as well as acknowledging

“unnecessary cost, complexity and uncertainty, without clear benefits for retail consumers”.

However, having finally identified the cancer, the regulator is merely applying a sticking plaster. All that is being offered is the mildest semantic tweak to guidance—effectively, a guide to guidance. It has no legal effect. It allows the regulator to continue its current trajectory with a slight adjustment to its vocabulary. We all know that this change was extracted only after heavy nudging by the Chancellor and intense parliamentary scrutiny. It is hardly being done with good grace and provides no guarantee of permanence.

The fact is, we must deal with the FCA as it is, not as it might have been. Since the advent of the consumer duty, the retail-first culture is irreversibly embedded into the psyche of staff, and in many instances it is the reason why they joined the regulator in the first place.

Perhaps one of the most telling things is to look at what is said about other regulators. On the Monetary Authority of Singapore, which I found a very enlightened body on my visit there some years ago, the comment is, “Although MAS is a unitary regulator, it splits its internal policy divisions strictly by target market rather than by trying to govern everything under an overarching outcomes-based code like the UK’s consumer duty”, and, “It works because the wholesale division, answerable to the MAS leadership, is judged primarily on market liquidity, innovation and international competitiveness. There is zero risk of a consumer advocacy group hijacking a wholesale policy consultation”. I wonder where they were thinking about. A ring-fenced, structurally separate wholesale unit within our regulator’s architecture must live up to that standard.

Some may argue that all wholesale activity impacts retail eventually, and I agree, but there is a massive, fundamental difference between regulating wholesale markets for the integrity of the system, which protects everyone, and regulating as if they are a high-street retail shopfloor. The former ensures safety, the latter ensures paralysis. For any noble Lord worried about this structural change, nothing being suggested would remove liability for wrongs or harms to consumers, should that occur. Let us be clear: this amendment is not an attempt to escape oversight; it is an attempt to ensure that oversight is competent, technically accurate and focused on the reality of the market being regulated. Let nobody forget that MiFID and other legislation already provides a rigorous framework governing transparency, best execution and conflicts of interest. This is no soft ride: this amendment is a necessary structural correction, and I support it.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group, but I shall confine my remarks to Amendment 165 and the linked Amendment 173 from my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for an FCA operational readiness report presented by the Treasury. Amendment 165 would mean that Parliament has the opportunity to ensure, by a Treasury report, that we have an assessment of the FCA’s operational readiness to exercise any significant new regulatory function conferred by the Act of staffing, resourcing and the capability of the systems in place and of the impact expected on authorisations, supervisions and enforcement timeliness. This will be a formal report to Parliament. Until we have such a report from the Treasury that the FCA is operationally ready, Amendment 173 would ensure that the Act cannot start.

My Amendment 165A proposes that the report must also assess readiness in terms of preparatory training and the interpretation of the application of the Act. Such a requirement should prompt the FCA to deploy and train existing staff with the specific knowledge and understanding of the new powers they will operate under the Bill and to therefore be up to date and competent to regulate firms under the law. It would require the Treasury to report to Parliament and, in this way, there is a measure of accountability.

It might be contended that this requirement is otiose, but the FCA’s workforce is around 5,000, recruited from candidates with a diverse range of skills under different headings. Finance and operations make up 46%; engineering makes up 30% and sales and marketing make up 23%. The median employee tenure is 4.2 years. Regulators come to their post with a diverse range of skills; some are highly experienced and others less so. Today, 17 posts are advertised that cover a wide range of jobs and responsibilities for which different skills are required. For example, there is a senior insurance supervisor job, a financial crime marketing interventions associate, an L&D associate, a lead for global strategy and engagement, a primary markets supervisor, a senior crypto and payment supervisor and a technical specialist in AI—my noble friend Lord Holmes will be pleased to hear that.

The skills range required can include the common skills we would expect or generic skills, for instance, in data systems. The senior crypto asset and payment supervisor responsible for working in this developing sector, who will lead difficult cases, identify risks, deal with crossborder problems and help prevent crime, is also expected to “drive improvements in standards”.

These are important and demanding tasks. They also operate in a rapidly developing area. Given the nature of the system and that the principles still apply, regulators are internally accountable for what will be subject to interpretations and judgments. There should therefore be the requirement of at least general and specific knowledge, and competencies for each role but, as financial products continue to be developed and the framework of law continues to change, there must also be continuous learning and updating in the law and the powers given to the regulators under it, rather than assuming that somehow the regulators will be equipped and operationally ready to do the job.

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Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

142D: After Clause 22, insert the following new Clause—
“Litigation funding as a regulated activityAfter paragraph 24 of Schedule 2 to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (regulated activities), insert—“Litigation funding agreements
24ZA Rights under a litigation funding agreement.24ZB Entering into a litigation funding agreement as funder.24ZC Administering a litigation funding agreement.24ZD Arranging a litigation funding agreement.24ZE Advising on a litigation funding agreement.24ZF (1) For the purposes of this Schedule, a “litigation funding agreement” is an agreement under which—(a) a person (“the funder”)—(i) agrees to fund (in whole or in part) the provision of advocacy or litigation services (by someone other than the funder) to another person (“the litigant”), and(ii) the litigant agrees to pay a sum to the funder in specified circumstances, or(b) a person provides financial support to a firm of solicitors which is involved in contentious matters or to a claims management company.(2) The sum to be paid by the litigant may be—(a) an amount calculated by reference to a multiple (if any) of the amount of the funding provided by the funder,(b) an amount calculated by reference to a percentage (if any) of any specified financial benefit obtained by the litigant in connection with the matter in relation to which the funding is provided,(c) an amount calculated by reference to a rate of interest, or(d) such sum, or method of calculation, as is prescribed by the Treasury pursuant to sub-paragraph (3),provided that in respect of the sum to be paid, howsoever calculated, it must not exceed such sum as may be prescribed by the Treasury pursuant to sub-paragraph (3).(3) The Treasury may by regulations make such consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional or saving provision as it considers appropriate in connection with this paragraph.”” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment brings third-party litigation funding within the FCA regulatory perimeter by creating a new category of regulated activity under FSMA 2000.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, my amendment proposes that the Treasury makes litigation funding a regulated activity, with a list of matters that I propose should be covered in the amendment.

Litigation funding has come into the spotlight for several reasons. There was the 2023 PACCAR decision, which held that litigation funding agreements were a form of damages-based agreement and unenforceable for failing to comply with the DBA regulations 2013. There has also been concern about the source of some litigation funding, especially when a significant proportion of funders who are active in this space are not headquartered in the United Kingdom and may utilise what can be described as dodgy derivatives.

The Conservative Government tried to address the PACCAR decision with a Bill that did not make it through the wash-up. They also proposed a wider review of litigation funding and asked the Civil Justice Council to assess whether the regime was effectively providing access to justice and whether regulation of commercial funders was necessary. An interim report and consultation were launched on 31 October 2024 and the final report was published on 2 June 2025. This was a substantial and diligent review with stakeholders across the spectrum, including litigation funders, welcoming and endorsing its recommendations. In December last year, the Labour Government made clear their intention to reverse the effect of the PACCAR judgment, so that litigation funding agreements would no longer be treated as damages-based agreements. At the same time, the Government said that they would take steps to regulate the third-party litigation funding sector—one of the central purposes of the review and its recommendations.

The issue is not whether there should be regulation but when and by what route. It is urgent. That urgency has been acknowledged by the previous and current Governments in commissioning the review. But a year has passed since the final report and we need fast delivery. At present, the sector is essentially self-regulated, which in practice means that it is unregulated. More than 70 funders operate in the UK, collectively deploying many billions. The Association of Litigation Funders covers only a small proportion of the market and cannot provide assurance about the rest.

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[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and the Minister for their comments in this debate. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, may be interested to know that I am a victim of the PBO too. The reason that “Treasury” appears where I put “Lord Chancellor” is down to the PBO. My intention was correct, but it was one of those things where it was one minute to four—the last moment for getting it in—so I said, “I will make sure it is right if it goes to Report”.

I was inspired, if you like, to put this suggestion forward because I was rather alarmed at the fact of litigation funding becoming an asset class into which speculative and dubious investment was going on in overseas countries. Whichever side of the argument you are on, we do not want that kind of inflated funding meaning that cases are brought that possibly never should be, but the whole thing is just speculative. The more I looked at it, I thought, well, if we need any regulation, as I have explained, it belongs with the FCA. Then I looked further and discovered that Australia and elsewhere, as quite often is the case, have got there first and have already assigned it to being under their financial services regulators. That is my background. I think it has been interesting. I offered it as what I thought would be a faster route, especially if we could do it as a designated activity, but I also admit that, yes, I am stealing a march on what the Government will have to do, taking their time a little more. I hope that the possibility of this route has been noted and for now, I will withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 142D withdrawn.

Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

142E: After Clause 22, insert the following new Clause—
“Building society governance standards(1) The Treasury must, within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, make regulations by statutory instrument requiring the Financial Conduct Authority to make rules establishing minimum governance standards for authorised building societies.(2) Regulations under subsection (1) must require the Financial Conduct Authority to make rules ensuring that—(a) elections of directors are conducted in accordance with minimum democratic standards, including—(i) equal treatment of candidates in election materials and communications;(ii) protection of candidates’ election addresses from alteration except with the candidate’s request or written consent or where alteration is required by law or for production purposes;(iii) minimum statutory duties and reporting requirements for independent scrutineers;(b) voting arrangements prohibit bundled voting instructions and require voting instructions to be determined separately in respect of each candidate and each resolution;(c) members approve, by ordinary resolution at intervals not exceeding three years, the remuneration policy for directors and senior executives; (d) every authorised building society whose total assets exceed £5 billion maintains not fewer than two board positions to be filled by member-nominated directors elected by Members; (e) every annual general meeting is held at a physical place whilst permitting additional participation by electronic means;(f) every question submitted by a member for an annual general meeting, together with the building society’s response or the reasons for not providing a response, is published following the meeting.(3) Before making rules under this section the Financial Conduct Authority must consult—(a) HM Treasury;(b) the Prudential Regulation Authority;(c) representatives of authorised building societies;(d) organisations appearing to represent the interests of members.(4) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires HM Treasury to require the Financial Conduct Authority to establish minimum governance standards for authorised building societies. It applies governance principles already recognised by Parliament in relation to listed companies, occupational pension schemes and statutory democratic elections to member-owned financial institutions.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, building societies occupy a unique place in the United Kingdom’s financial system. Unlike banks, they are not owned by external shareholders; they are owned by their members. That distinction is fundamental. It means that the legitimacy of a building society rests not only upon prudent management and financial soundness but also upon effective member democracy. The Building Societies Act 1986 established the statutory framework for that democracy. It has served the sector well for many years. However, Parliament has not stood still. During the four decades since the Act was passed, this House and the other place have progressively strengthened governance standards in many comparable areas of law—I mean company law, obviously.

For quoted companies, Parliament introduced binding shareholder votes on remuneration policy through the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013. For occupational pension schemes, Parliament has required member representation on trustee boards. For statutory elections in trade unions, Parliament has established detailed protections to ensure that elections are conducted fairly, that candidates are treated equally and that election addresses are not altered without consent. Building societies, however, remain governed largely by a statutory framework dating from 1986 that has not developed in a similar way. My amendment does not seek to transplant those other regimes wholesale, nor to interfere with the independence of boards or with the mutual model itself—quite the opposite. The amendment is intended to strengthen confidence in mutuality by ensuring that members enjoy democratic protections comparable to those that Parliament has already recognised elsewhere.

The amendment is also deliberately framed as an enabling provision. Rather that attempting to prescribe detailed rules in primary legislation, it would require His Majesty’s Treasury to make regulations requiring the Financial Conduct Authority to establish minimum governance standards for authorised building societies. The FCA is plainly the appropriate body to consult on and develop those detailed standards.

This amendment identifies a number of areas where minimum standards should exist. The first is elections. Members should be able to choose between candidates through elections that are demonstrably fair. Candidates should be treated equally and have equal opportunity to communicate with members, and independent scrutineers should operate to consistent statutory standards.

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[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for raising this important issue. Building societies are a key part of the UK’s financial services sector. The Government are committed to supporting the growth and long-term success of the mutual sector, including through our commitment to double the size of the mutual and co-operative economy.

Building societies are already subject to an extensive legislative and regulatory requirement. Building societies must comply with the Building Societies Act 1986, FCA and PRA rules, and the senior managers and certification regime. Of course, there is also wider company law and the financial services regulatory requirements where applicable. The FCA and PRA already have the powers to set and supervise governance standards where they consider it necessary.

However, I do not agree that we should make such detailed rules on things such as board composition, annual general meetings and reporting arrangements. The building society sector is diverse, ranging from small regional societies to large national institutions; this was mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. The rules need adequately to reflect the different governance needs, operational models and challenges faced across the sector, and building societies need to focus their energies on serving members. Such governance matters are generally best determined by individual societies, taking into account their size, complexity and membership, while operating within the existing legislative and regulatory framework and ensuring that boards have the skills, experience and expertise needed to govern effectively.

The Government’s approach has been to modernise the framework for building societies while preserving flexibility. Consistent with feedback from the sector, we believe that governance arrangements should uphold high standards while allowing societies to adopt structures that reflect their individual circumstances, business models and memberships. The Government continue to engage closely with the mutuals sector and regulators to ensure that the framework remains proportionate and supports growth, including through the Mutual and Co-operative Sector Business Council and other stakeholder forums. We have welcomed the recent work undertaken by the FCA and the PRA on the mutuals landscape, which is helping inform future policy development as well.

Although the Government share the objective of strong governance and membership engagement, we do not believe that it should be delivered in this way. Building societies already operate within a robust framework, which we continue to keep under review and modernise where appropriate. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I thank the Minister and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe; I might take the noble Baroness up on her offer to proceed further with something to do with blind voting. I accept that this is the “Full Monty” version, which I put in at this stage because I wanted to draw comments.

I do not think that you can have what is, in essence, a substantial financial institution with a board that can fiddle who gets on to the board and who does not. This is the nub of the issue: it is possible to block in a way that we do not allow for listed companies. Not all listed companies are as big as some of the institutions I am talking about—I accept the proportionality point; maybe one has a threshold—but the situation that has gone on is not acceptable. If we could start with the bundled blind voting point, we might begin to get somewhere. I thank everybody but, obviously, for now, I will withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 142E withdrawn.

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At the end of the day, we are looking to enhance the ability of the existing parliamentary committees, which are, as I have explained, already under some pressure, by finding some way of making parliamentary oversight of the regulators have real meaning in the scheme of FSMA as it was originally set up 26 years ago. I beg to move.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I support these amendments. They almost follow naturally from the debate that we had earlier about the need for a structurally competent wholesale function within the FCA. It is clear that you cannot produce a credible cost-benefit analysis without a credible evaluation capability. The PRA has understood that and already has the beginnings of an evaluation function, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said.

I can understand that in part, because prudential regulation requires modelling, capital assessment and an understanding of how rules transmit through markets. The PRA’s world is balance-sheet solvency, capital modelling and risk transmission, so it already employs actuaries, quants and economists, and the evaluation office therefore fits more naturally into that culture. The FCA is different; its culture, as we have discussed, is overwhelmingly consumer focused. That is appropriate for retail regulation but it means that the FCA has never developed the technical machinery for the evaluation of wholesale market impacts. Consumer protection does not require the modelling of liquidity, pricing dynamics or market structure, but wholesale regulation does.

It occurred to me only when I was thinking about this in the context of this amendment that the need for an evaluation office points again to the different sides of the FCA and why somehow upgrading, or separating the wholesale side, becomes more relevant because functions are missing due to the consumer focus. We have heard that the FCA tends to do the minimum of cost-benefit analysis required by statute and then largely ignores it—again, probably because it thinks that it is not relevant to consumer protection, but I would say it is to the particular detriment of the wholesale side. That is an additional reason for supporting these amendments.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I am sorry that I was not able to be here last Wednesday for the debates on the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, and others that proposed the creation of an office for financial regulatory accountability. I have read the debates in Hansard and there is a remarkable similarity to three years ago when we debated similar amendments. This was a significant error in 2023 during the passage of the last Financial Services and Markets Act. It would have been a significant improvement to the ability of Parliament to hold the regulators to account—a complement rather than a replacement.

I shall touch briefly on the ability to scrutinise the proportionality of specific rules. I shall look closely in Hansard at the Minister’s comments during the second group, when he seemed to agree that the specific scrutiny of the rules is in fact important, contrary to the approach that the Bill now takes. This holding of the regulators to account by Parliament has become only more important and more difficult, I think, as we give yet more responsibilities to the regulators under the Bill with, as we have heard, the move of the PRS, the Consumer Credit Act and so on.

Amendment 142 would provide an alternative way of achieving something similar to the amendments that were discussed on Wednesday that might perhaps be easier for the regulators and the Government to accept. It proposes the creation of offices of regulatory evaluation within both the FCA and the Bank but, unlike the office for financial regulatory accountability proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, it would lie within the regulator, although it would probably have much the same role. Whichever way we do it, I am sure the Minister will have heard loud and clear the concerns that are shared across the Committee about the accountability of the regulators to Parliament, another of the main themes that are emerging as we load ever greater responsibilities upon them.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 1st July 2026 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

117: After Clause 22, insert the following new Clause—
“Section 166 reviews: threshold and proportionality requirements(1) Section 166 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (reports by skilled persons) is amended as follows.(2) After subsection (1) insert— “(1A) The regulator may not require a person to provide a report under this section unless it is satisfied that—(a) there is a material risk of serious detriment to regulatory outcomes, and(b) the use of a skilled person is a proportionate response, having regard to—(i) the scale and nature of the suspected issue,(ii) the expected burden on the firm, and(iii) whether the matter could reasonably be addressed through the regulator’s existing supervisory tools.”(3) After subsection (4) insert—“(4A) The regulator must publish, at least annually—(a) the number of reports commissioned under this section,(b) the sectors to which they relate, and(c) the aggregate cost to firms of such reports.”(4) In subsection (5), after “may” insert “, subject to subsections (1A) and (4A),”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause would introduce a statutory threshold for the use of section 166 skilled persons reviews, requiring the regulator to demonstrate a material risk of serious detriment and to consider proportionality, and would require annual publication of the number, sectoral distribution and aggregate cost of such reviews.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, in moving this amendment, I shall speak also to Amendment 123 in my name. As I have said before in Committee, when we have been talking about proportionality, it is at least possible to look at rules and assess whether they appear proportionate and growth-friendly, but it is far harder to understand what is happening on the ground in supervision and enforcement because that activity is not public and is, therefore, less visible. This is particularly so with Section 166 notices.

I seem to have once again hit on the same subject as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I promise noble Lords that there has been no conferring, as they say on “University Challenge”. There was a time when a Section 166 notice was very rare. It was regarded as a serious matter and something you did not want others to know about, lest it suggest that you were doing something really wrong, you were in real difficulty, or you were in trouble over something. Now, the reaction is much more along the lines of, “Oh, you too?”, and the sense in the industry is that what was once a rare and targeted tool is becoming a routine, general-purpose device—sometimes even a fishing expedition.

These investigations are not small matters. They can go on for a very long time. They are intrusive, expensive and disruptive to normal operations. They require the appointment of external consultants, often at significant cost, and involve a lot of staff time; they even require the hiring of additional staff to deal with keeping day-to-day activity going. In 2023-24, there were 83 Section 166 notices and in 2024-25 a further 47. The cost of them in 2024-25 was £44.7 million, which is not trivial. There is a legitimate concern that the threshold for initiating a Section 166 notice has drifted downwards, and that matters that should be dealt with through the ordinary supervisory channels are now being dealt with through Section 166. They should be dealt with routinely, using the regulator’s own knowledge and expertise wherever possible, but it seems that some of that is now being outsourced through this Section 166 route.

What is needed is a pinning back to serious matters, as well as greater transparency around how and why these notices are used. My amendment aims to restore Section 166 reviews to what they were always understood to be: a tool for investigating issues that pose a serious detriment to regulatory outcomes. It would also introduce a modest reporting requirement for an annual statement setting out the number of notices issued, a breakdown by sector, the reason there was a material risk of serious detriment and the aggregate financial cost to firms. This is not an attempt to remove Section 166 or constrain the regulator’s ability to act; it is simply an attempt to ensure that a powerful and intrusive tool is used proportionately, transparently and for the purposes for which it was originally intended. Too much use is harmful, and a reputation for routine use is itself a deterrent to locating businesses in the UK.

I turn to my Amendment 123, which concerns the information powers under Section 165 of FSMA. It aims to set a framework around the information demands that regulators can make. It is not intended to intrude on anything reasonably necessary for investigatory, supervisory or other statutory functions, or for advancing the regulator’s objectives. However, as the House of Lords Financial Services Regulation Committee heard in evidence, firms are receiving many requests for information that do not appear necessary or are duplicative or made without co-ordination across teams. These requests impose real cost and disruption and are not always proportionate to the matter at hand. This amendment seeks to put some structure and co-ordination around what can reasonably be expected, ensuring that information requests are targeted, necessary and proportionate, and that firms are not repeatedly asked for the same material by different parts of the same regulator. I beg to move.

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[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

The Minister made great play of the importance of proportionality, on which I think there would be considerable agreement. The Bill removes the requirements to have regard to the regulatory principles, including, importantly, the proportionality paragraphs, for anything other than the five-year plan. It is therefore incumbent on the Government to look at all other areas of the Bill to ensure that proportionality, where it is needed, is correctly referenced in the Bill. By taking it away at the outset from the requirement to have regard in areas other than the five-year plan, the Government are leaving the Bill wide open to the non-proportional use of powers by the regulator. This area has not been fully developed by the Government in their thinking on this.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I thank all those who have spoken in this debate, in particular the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, for her last intervention; I presume that the Minister had finished speaking. Perhaps we need 200 amendments on Report saying, “This has to be done proportionately”. That is literally where we are. Anybody who has been near a Section 166 review will know that an awful lot about it seems awfully unfair. For instance, the regulator may not have its own expertise, so it makes you pay to hire it in. Some of these things should be done under the regulators’ ordinary duties. This needs to be looked at and, as the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, said, some kind of proper discipline must be put around it. That is what we are asking for.

I am glad to hear that there is a target of cutting the administrative burden by 25%. We will see how that goes, but I do not think that everything can be left as open as it is now, which is the much-repeated message that we have been delivering. For now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 117 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

121: After Clause 22, insert the following new Clause—
“Periodic independent review of financial regulatorsAfter section 1S of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (reviews) insert—“1SA Periodic independent review of financial regulators(1) The Treasury must appoint a panel of at least three independent persons (“the Review Panel”) to conduct a periodic general review of the effectiveness of—(a) the Financial Conduct Authority,(b) the Prudential Regulation Authority, and (c) the Bank of England in respect of its functions under Parts 1 and 5 of the Banking Act 2009 and Part 2 of the Financial Services Act 2012.(2) A person may be appointed to the Review Panel only if—(a) the Treasury has proposed the appointment, and(b) the appointment has been approved by a resolution of the House of Commons and a resolution of the House of Lords.(3) A person is not eligible for appointment if, within the previous three years, they have held senior office in the Treasury, the FCA, the PRA, the Bank of England, the Payment Systems Regulator, the Financial Ombudsman Service, or in any firm or body materially affected by the review, unless the nature of the interest has been fully disclosed and the appointment has been expressly approved by both Houses.(4) A general review must take place at intervals of every two to three years and must include a review of—(a) internal operations and controls,(b) systems for responding to whistleblowers, parliamentary correspondence and reports, and public interest concerns,(c) regulatory perimeters and customer classifications,(d) the effectiveness of relevant legislation and rules and the regulatory burden,(e) whether statutory and public policy objectives have been met,(f) the operation and effectiveness of engagement practices before and during rule making,(g) the skills base of staff,(h) follow up from previous reviews,(i) access to redress and effective remedies,(j) the operation of the FCA/FOS relationship and systemic complaint escalation, (k) evidence handling, audit trails and responses to parliamentary, whistleblower and public interest concerns,(l) whether statutory rights and remedies transferred into regulator rules remain effective in practice,(m) redress shortfalls, repeat misconduct and deterrence,(n) any other matter the Review Panel considers relevant, and(o) any matter requested by a relevant Committee of the House of Commons or House of Lords.(5) The Review Panel must not determine the merits of any individual complaint, regulatory decision or enforcement case, but may consider individual cases, whether anonymised or otherwise, for the purpose of identifying systemic, procedural, evidential, perimeter, redress or accountability issues.(6) On completion of a review, the Review Panel must make a written report to the Treasury—(a) setting out the results of the review, and(b) making such recommendations as the Panel considers appropriate.(7) A copy of the report must be—(a) laid before Parliament within 30 days of receipt, and(b) published in such manner as the Treasury considers appropriate,subject only to necessary redactions for confidentiality, privilege or enforcement sensitivity.(8) The Treasury must publish a response to the report within 60 days of its publication. (9) The FCA, PRA and the Bank of England must each publish a response to the report within 60 days of its publication, including a statement of actions they will take as a result.(10) The Review Panel has a right of access (at any reasonable time) to all information which it may reasonably require for the purpose of performing its functions under this section.(11) The Review Panel is entitled to require from any person holding or accountable for such information any assistance or explanation which the Panel reasonably considers necessary for that purpose.(12) “Information” includes any document, record, data, correspondence, internal report, or other material held by the FCA, the PRA or the Bank of England.””

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I am moving my Amendment 121, and I support the amendments in this group in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bridges. My proposal is for an independent oversight mechanism for our financial services regulators. It builds on the ideas in Section 1S of FSMA 2000, under which the Treasury can require an independent review. This is usually triggered after a significant event: the most recent review, Gloster’s review published in December 2020, was triggered after the collapse of London Capital & Finance.

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[Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)]

You might get a better response.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

Shortly after my proposal first surfaced, I was contacted by people involved in the Australian royal commission on financial services, because they had noted that I had reached the same conclusion as them: that it was too big a job for Parliament to do by itself, given everything else that national Parliaments have to do.

Australia introduced two-yearly reviews, and it is not the only country to have an independent review. A similar arrangement now exists in New Zealand, and in the US all regulators come under powerful scrutiny by the Government Accountability Office. One advantage of my proposal is that it follows a path we understand from Section 1S reviews, and it could be done quickly—maybe as an interim solution, for example, until an office such as that proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, could be formed. By having regular reviews, oversight of progress would also be possible. After her review, Dame Elizabeth Gloster told the Treasury Committee that we are left to “hope” that the regulator “implements” regulations. Hope is not a system.

Why did I propose this? It was the point at which the Government were looking at the post-Brexit future financial framework. As has already been rehearsed in this Committee, this Parliament does not have the structure and focus that was available in the EU Parliament. Having been chair of the ECON committee dealing with all the post-financial crisis legislation, I can safely say that I know what it takes and that it is not easy. That is another reason why I do not recommend a continuous process.

There will be more to it in the UK, because many issues arise from the execution of supervision post rule-making. Brexit created the first need, which we eventually tried to patch with a new committee. Your Lordships heard from members of that committee and in the report of the Industry and Regulators Committee, Who Regulates the Regulator?, that now the overwhelming conclusion is that significant independent review is needed.

Now we have a new, second need due to the changes in this Bill, which remove the “have regards” away from operational effectiveness and into a five-year strategy. How is that to be monitored? Is there any intention at all for follow-through? The changes make the already difficult acquisition of information even harder. Several things that the Minister has said in his replies ring alarm bells and show the absolute need for scrutiny. We need it because financial services regulation and supervision is too important to allow issues to creep up—all the more so in a higher-risk environment. LCF-type regulator risk needs even more guarding against.

The Minister has said that proportionality will now be tested only at the strategic level. Let us be clear: testing proportionality at only the strategic level is barely a nudge. Rule-level and supervisory-level proportionality is the real test, but that has been put out of reach of accountability, as there is nothing to measure against. Indeed, they are not even looking at it apart from every five years. From that, it is pretty clear that substantial follow-ups on the five-year strategy are necessary. The Minister says that annual reports and remit letters provide accountability. Some substantial upgrading and interrogation of those is needed. What actionable event flows from an annual report? It is judge, jury and public relations all in one place. Does the Minister genuinely believe that an example here and there constitutes accountability?

The Minister argues that principles remain central, yet they are being moved into a document that cannot be enforced by the courts and cannot be used to test a specific rule or supervisory action. They are applied every five years, when the future cannot really be seen. This is not lip service; it is just print service, and as my noble friend Lady Kramer has shown us from the current version of the five-year report, there is little substance. Will we get something detailed for every category and size of financial market business?

The Government’s rhetoric suggests that reducing the burden of accountability will unleash a more dynamic and agile regulator, but that does not demonstrate the stability that is a prerequisite for competitiveness. Stability is the best friend of a competitive financial sector. Whether you cite centuries of institutional experience or the second law of thermodynamics, left to their own devices, systems corrupt or tend to disorder. Someone has to be on their case. But the Government are making the regulators far more insulated from the procedures that keep them on their toes. Avoiding the burden of accountability today is like banking a much larger, more expensive crisis for tomorrow. Additional periodic or permanent oversight has become even more necessary. I beg to move.

[Lord Bridges of Headley (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 133 to 135 and 136 to 139 in my name, but not Amendment 135A, which is in the name of my noble friend Lady Lawlor. I thank my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lady Lawlor and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for putting their names to my amendment. This little clutch of amendments is turning into déjà vu, because the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has just spoken about issues that she raised some years ago. My amendment is one that I raised in this very Room, sitting on the other side, exactly three years ago—so it is déjà vu all over again.

I start from a basic point, which picks up exactly where the noble Baroness left off. I believe that we here in Parliament need more powers and, critically, more independent analysis to hold financial regulators and supervisors to account. In fact, I just mention here that we need to do far more to hold the Bank of England to account, but that was declared out of scope. I had wanted to table an amendment calling for a regular, probably five- or six-yearly, review led by Parliament into the remit and performance of the Bank of England as an entity and as an institution. I believe that that is an enormous democratic deficit that we need to address. I was told that it was out of scope for this piece of legislation, but I very much intend to return to that at a future date. It is much to the Minister’s relief, I am sure, that we are not going to do that now.

We spent Monday debating clauses in the Bill that I see as weakening parliamentary accountability. My amendments and those of the noble Baroness will take us in the opposite direction, towards more accountability. A number of us, on all sides of the Committee, have been asking a very simple question: do we, in this House and in the other place, have sufficient means to hold our financial regulators and supervisors to account without compromising that operational independence? The answer keeps coming back, resoundingly: no, we do not.

It is not as though this is the first time we have said this. As the noble Baroness mentioned, in its excellent 2024 report, Who Watches the Watchdogs?, your Lordships’ Industry and Regulators Committee found that parliamentary scrutiny of regulators remains too fragmented, too reactive and—I stress this—too limited by the resources available to Parliament. It concluded that the balance between regulatory independence and democratic accountability needs to be strengthened. As I said, that report came after all the debates we had in this Room on the previous Financial Services and Markets Bill, now an Act. We warned then that the transfer of extensive rule-making powers from Parliament to the regulators had created an accountability gap. That is why I addressed this very same proposal then. My concerns about accountability have not diminished; if anything, they have grown in the years since I was standing over there, so I am trying again.

Noble Lords will be grateful to hear that I will not go line by line through what each of these amendments would do. I simply say that Amendment 133 would establish an office for financial regulatory accountability, OFRA, as an independent body to support Parliament in scrutinising the work of financial regulators. It is crucial to stress that I do not see this as second-guessing regulatory judgments or interfering with regulatory operational independence. Rather, as set out in Amendment 135, which is pretty key in this clutch of amendments, it would provide Parliament and the outside world with impartial analysis of regulation, the actions of regulators in the round and, crucially, their performance at meeting their objectives, as set by Parliament.

Why do we need this? For a very simple reason—my noble friend Lady Noakes will pay testament to this. The volume and technical complexity of financial regulations are now making this absolutely necessary. If Parliament is to fully and effectively scrutinise the hundreds of pages of regulation that our regulators keep churning out, we need to do more. My concern—I would be grateful if the Minster could put my mind at rest—is that the Government seem to be suggesting that we do not need to have a case-by-case analysis of regulations. That is wrong: it is absolutely critical to have that analysis. We cannot rely on a five-yearly strategic report, or overall impressions and analysis, from regulators. We need to be able to analyse regulation point by point.

If the Minister responds by saying, “Don’t worry. The regulators will reflect their objectives in their actions and decisions, so we have nothing to worry about here”, I will say, “Let’s prove it”. Let us have the independent analysis to make sure that it is indeed the case that our regulators are reflecting the objectives that Parliament has set them in what they do. Greater scrutiny and, with it, greater accountability, will surely strengthen trust, which is critical.

The Minister might go on to argue that my proposal is not needed for two other reasons, the first being the cost-benefit analysis panels that my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe and others talked about when discussing previous amendments. I completely accept that they perform a very important function, but I see their role as being very different. Their role is to improve the quality of individual cost-benefit analyses prepared by the regulators. They are advisory bodies to the regulators themselves. They are not designed to provide Parliament and others with an independent assessment of the overall effectiveness and proportionality of regulation, bit by bit. This amendment would therefore complement rather than replace those panels: the cost-benefit analysis panels improve regulatory decision-making from within; OFRA would strengthen parliamentary accountability from without.

The second reason the Minister might use to oppose my proposal is that the FCA introduced its rule review framework in 2024, with the stated aim of undertaking increasingly rigorous post-implementation analysis of what it does. I stand to be corrected, but my delving into this suggests that the results so far of this new framework are modest. As far as I can see, since its introduction, only one full impact evaluation has been published, and one other has appeared in the past five years—I think that is overall, pre the framework being introduced. I would like to know whether that is the case and how effective the rule review framework has been.

Either way, that underlines the point that Parliament needs access to independent analysis, especially as the Government want to give regulators more discretion. This seems to be the entire drift of the Bill: more discretion for the regulators. If that is the case, surely the quid pro quo for more discretion must be having more mechanisms for accountability. If we are being asked to entrust the regulators with more, we need greater ability to have independent scrutiny of what they are doing.

--- Later in debate ---

I thank noble Lords for this thoughtful debate; it is obvious that it will continue to develop over the coming weeks. I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I sometimes think that a useful thing to do with the Minister would be to sit down with him with the rulebook and go through some scrutiny. Perhaps he might then begin to see the scale of the task.

As I have said, when I chaired the ECON in the European Parliament, the committee there had nearly 100 full and substitute members. All of them were capable of doing work in specialist clusters, doing legislation and scrutinising everything. It was basically a full-time job—they did it all day, every day—and it did not even have anything to do with what was happening in supervision.

This task is not within the capacity of a national Parliament. The Minister was out of the Room when I explained that Australia had a royal commission, as part of its post-financial crisis review, to look at what went wrong with regulation. As royal commissions do, it took a long time. When it finally reported, it came to the consultation that an oversight body was needed; similar has been done in New Zealand and the United States, where they have powerful oversight over all of their regulators.

It is unreasonable to suggest that a committee that sits once a week for three hours could in any way touch this issue. Our committees are really good at doing specific inquiries into problem areas, but they cannot see things across the piece. That is what I described as our first need, when we left the EU. It has perhaps taken some people who do not have my experience a while to gain an understanding of how much it would take, but it happened pretty soon afterwards because, a year later, when the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, came forward with his proposals, the Industry and Regulators Committee had already realised that we needed more.

Then there is, as I said, a second need, following on from the Bill, which has distanced us further away because we do not even have the things we are supposed to measure. We do not have the information. Clause 16 creates the strategy—

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)]

Can the noble Baroness take a seat, please?

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[Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)]

The noble Baroness is absolutely right that this is a self-regulating House, but the other side of the coin is self-discipline.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I am sorry, but I am replying to the Minister, and I have to say some things again because he was out of the Room. I am trying to explain that the Bill introduces a second need, because we will no longer have access to the information. It is going into a strategy and there is no link to operational duties, no reporting or guidance, and the annual report is only about competitiveness and growth. We are short of the basic information on which we are supposed to do this scrutiny: it is not coming to us; it is being rubbed out by the Bill. It is no good saying that a committee of this House—able, competent and hard-working though the committees are—can do it when you have taken the basic information away. That is the point. There is the fundamental size need, and then the removal of the information need. We need this independent body for the first need and, my goodness, we will jolly well need it if the Act ends up being anything like the Bill is now.

I think we will all want to return to this on Report, but for now, I will withdraw my amendment, even though the Minister seems to think that he has the equivalent of a perpetual motion machine and that something will happen with no input.

Amendment 121 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

122: After Clause 22, insert the following new Clause—
“Reducing regulator duplicationIn section 3R of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (arrangements for provision of services), after subsection (3), insert—“(3A) In exercising functions in relation to—(a) a PRA-authorised person within the meaning of section 2B, or(b) a person performing a senior management function in relation to such person,the FCA may rely on analysis, findings, information, or judgments of the PRA, so far as it is reasonable to do so.(3B) In exercising functions in relation to a person falling within subsection (3A), the PRA may rely on analysis, findings, information, or judgments of the FCA, so far as it is reasonable to do so.(3C) Subsections (3A) and (3B) apply in particular in relation to— (a) rule-making,(b) supervisory activity,(c) investigatory functions, and(d) enforcement decisions.(3D) Where a regulator relies on the other regulator under this section, it must have regard to—(a) the need to ensure that its statutory objectives are advanced, and(b) the desirability of avoiding unnecessary duplication of work or inconsistent outcomes.(3E) Nothing in this section prevents either regulator from undertaking its own analysis or reaching its own conclusions where it considers it appropriate to do so.(3F) For the purposes of this section “a senior management function” has the same meaning as Section 59ZA.””

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, the Committee will be pleased to know that this will be very short. I will speak briefly to my Amendment 122, which is quite simple. It is intended to encourage the sharing of analysis, findings, information and judgments between the FCA and the PRA, particularly in relation to senior appointments, regulatory and supervisory activity and enforcement. The amendment would not make this binding in any way; it would apply only in so far as it is reasonable to do so and the regulators want to do so. The objective is to remove duplication and give encouragement to the regulators to rely on one another’s work where that is sensible.

I have not looked recently at their memorandum of understanding; they probably have enabled themselves to do some of this, but I am not sure that that enablement has extended to actually doing it. This meshes with some of the other amendments we have had around not duplicating things. If a person has already been approved as fit and proper by one regulator, why would they not be approved by another regulator to do the same thing?

However, I would not expect this to be done blindly or without review. It goes to what I said: everything should be tried to avoid unnecessary duplication, because duplications are leading to delays. This could help to shorten approval times under the SMCR for tried and tested individuals and to align rules or processes where the underlying purpose is the same. It is a modest, practical amendment aimed at reducing friction and delay in areas where both regulators are already engaged. I look forward to hearing from the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, on Amendment 166, which tilts in the same direction, to some extent. I beg to move.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for bringing forward Amendment 122. I will speak to Amendment 166 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Altrincham. I know that we are all very excited by the result in the football but, as the Minister knows, this is an area of great concern to me, so I will make the case.

In our discussions with firms, we have repeatedly heard that regulation has accumulated over many years in a way that is often overlapping and unnecessarily complex. Firms are required to repeat similar information to different bodies, in slightly different formats, at different times and through different systems. They are expected to absorb new rules and expectations while older requirements remain in place. The result is a regulatory environment that becomes heavier and more expensive over time. This affects not just large institutions but smaller firms, new entrants and challengers, which do not have the same compliance teams, legal budgets or administrative capacity as the largest incumbents.

Amendment 122 raises an important point in this regard. Where both the FCA and the PRA are dealing with the same firm, it is sensible that they should be able to rely on one another’s analysis, findings, information and judgments where it is reasonable to do so. Our Amendment 166 follows the same principle but would apply it more broadly. It would require the Treasury, the FCA and the PRA, when exercising powers under the Bill, to have regard to minimising the overall regulatory burden on regulated persons. That burden is not only the direct cost of complying with a new rule; it includes administrative burdens, reporting requirements, the costs of delay and the disproportionate impact that regulation can have on smaller firms and new entrants. If the Treasury, the FCA or the PRA considered that an increase in burden were necessary, our amendment would require them to publish reasons and an assessment of the expected effects on growth, competition, innovation and market entry.

Regulation should be judged by its practical economic effects. Does it make it harder for firms to grow? Does it reduce competition? Does it deter new entrants? Does it slow innovation? Does it make the UK a less attractive place to do business? Those questions matter because financial services are an internationally competitive sector, as we keep emphasising. If we allow our regulatory environment to become too complex, too expensive and too slow, firms and capital will go elsewhere.

The Bill is presented as part of a wider effort to make our regulatory framework more competitive and more supportive of growth, which we support. Amendment 166 would help make that ambition real. It would require the Government and regulators to keep the burden of regulation in view and to justify increases where they consider them necessary. This sort of provision does not exist in this regulatory area, although we have had amendments of this kind in other areas, in my experience. I hope that the Minister will engage constructively with the amendments in this group.

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[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

I think that, in my amendment, I was trying to talk about when powers are exercised under the Act. Obviously, I appreciate the work that is being done to get the thicket out of the existing regulator. However, we are trying to introduce a system that, when regulations are being made—there will be many as a result of the Bill, because we are extending financial regulation into lots of new areas—that will be done in a way that really looks at the burdens. I am not sure that the cost-benefit panels and their work, which we discussed earlier, quite do that, so I ask the Minister to look at this constructively.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his reply, and everybody else who has spoken in the debate—I do not need to go over any of it again. It was interesting that the Minister elaborated on some of the co-operation that already goes on. I think that it could be interesting for the Committee to ask the regulators to further explain to us how they do that. We hear from industry that if feels there is duplication going on, so maybe we can try to join up that loop. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 122 withdrawn.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 29th June 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I have Amendments 83, 84, 85 and 86 in this group, and I thank my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for adding her name to the first three of them. We are continuing our examination of the role of the regulatory principles, which we debated to some extent on previous Committee days. To recap, Clause 17 proposes to downgrade the regulatory principles in Section 3B of FSMA so that instead of guiding the everyday work of the regulators, they will now feature in only an element of the regulators’ new five-year plans. Some of us have tried, but so far failed, to convince the Minister that this represents a constitutional assault on the effectiveness of your Lordships’ Financial Services and Regulation Committee. I am pleased that a meeting has now been arranged for the committee to discuss this in more detail with the Minister, together with the Financial Secretary, and I hope we can make some progress there.

On the previous day in Committee, I moved an amendment which called for the Treasury to undertake a review of the regulatory principles, because they are a mixture of important things concerning how regulations should be conducted, some duplicated areas and some special interest items. The Government resisted my amendment, with the Minister saying that they had already reviewed them and found them to be fine, which was a completely bizarre judgment.

My Amendments 83, 84 and 85 take a different approach. If Clause 17 is to remain in its present form—that is to say, downgrading the Section 3B principles to abstracts, to be wordsmithed into five-year plans—it is important to rescue the most important element of them: proportionality. Amendment 83 places the proportionality principle, using the rather wordy parent formulation in Section 3B(1)(b), into Section 1B of FSMA, which is about how the FCA should discharge its general functions. This achieves for proportionality the effect of ensuring that when the FCA draws up rules or guidance or does anything else, it will conform to the proportionality principle. That would allow the rest of Section 3B to head into strategic oblivion, but it would preserve proportionality as a matter that should guide the FCA’s work on a daily basis—for example, when drawing up rules or guidance. That, in turn, would allow the Financial Services Regulation Committee to focus on whether the FCA is indeed reflecting the principle of proportionality in its rules. Amendment 84 seeks to do much the same for the PRA. Lastly, Amendment 85 removes proportionality from Section 3B to avoid yet more duplication cluttering up FSMA.

The Financial Services and Regulation Committee received a lot of evidence for its first inquiry into the secondary competitiveness and growth objective. One of the enduring themes was that neither regulator lived out the requirement for proportionality. For example, the confidential round table that we held with mid-market and specialist banks, which are very diverse and very different from the big banks, reported that regulations are substantially similar for all sizes of banks. The confidential round table with insurers and reinsurers found that there were disproportionate responses to consumer issues, failing to differentiate between different business models or different types of firms.

As an aside, the committee had to hold these round tables on a confidential basis because of a widespread fear of regulatory repercussions if attendees articulated views that did not reflect well on the regulators. This is a serious cultural issue that cannot be dealt with directly in this Bill, but it underlines the need for parliamentary accountability mechanisms to be made stronger rather than weaker. We should make these mechanisms as effective as we possibly can.

As well as finding disproportionate regulations and supervision, the committee’s report also highlighted how thresholds, which can aid proportionality, were often used in a way that in practice impacted the willingness and ability of financial services businesses to grow. The proportionality is a very big ongoing issue in financial services regulation and has real-world consequences.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has tabled similar amendments to mine, which also include the regulatory principle currently found in Section 3B(1)(f). My own view is that paragraph (f) is a restatement of proportionality from a different angle. I agree that the things in it are important, but I hope that we can work to get some kind of streamlined definition of proportionality that incorporates both strands.

My other amendment in this group is Amendment 86, which seeks to import the regulatory principles of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 into the regulatory principles in FSMA. I did this in response to a statement in the Explanatory Notes that the Government intended to use secondary legislation to take the financial regulators out of the ambit of the 2006 Act, which I regard as a bad decision.

It is true that some elements of the very succinct expression of regulatory principles set out in the 2006 Act are already found in Section 3B, but not all of them. The 2006 Act requires all regulators to carry out their regulatory activities

“in a way which is transparent, accountable, proportionate and consistent”.

It also says that regulated activities should be taken only for

“cases in which action is needed”.

This goes beyond Section 3B in requiring accountability and consistency, and I cannot find anywhere in FSMA that says that the FCA and the PRA should regulate only when action is needed.

I cannot think that it is right to dilute the FCA’s and the PRA’s regulatory obligations. They are probably the most important regulators in the land; to let them off the regulatory principles in the 2006 Act is just plain wrong. Since Parliament is, in effect, powerless against secondary legislation, the only way to ensure that the FCA and the PRA remain subject to the 2006 Act principles is to hard-wire them into FSMA, which is what Amendment 86 seeks to do. It may well then be downgraded if the Government have their way on the regulatory principles and Clause 17, but it will not disappear completely from the requirements to which the FCA and the PRA will, in some measure, have to have regard.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, before turning directly to proportionality, I will touch briefly on sustainable growth, because its meaning has drifted over time. Sustainable growth was not part of FSMA 2000. It was introduced later, in the post-crisis reforms, as a macroeconomic guardrail. Its purpose was to ensure that regulators did not focus solely on narrow consumer protection or market integrity but had regard to the wider economy. It was intended to counteract over-regulation, pro-cyclical rule-making and, in effect, to avoid killing the golden goose of financial services. It was, in fact, a pro-growth statement. Later, maybe since 2018-19, sustainability has expanded in understanding to include environmental concerns, although, of course, they now have their own place and, as debated earlier, will maybe have some further places in legislation.

I do not want the original macroeconomic point to be lost. It was designed as a counterpart to proportionality, a reminder that regulation must support durable long-term economic stability, not contribute to boom-and-bust cycles. In that sense, both proportionality and macroeconomic sustainable growth sit in the same family of “have regards”. They are deregulatory principles intended to prevent unnecessary burden and to ensure that regulation does not itself become a source of economic harm. Of course, climate change has macroeconomic effects, but they are of a different character and should not obscure the original boom-and-bust prevention purpose of this duty.

I turn to proportionality and Amendments 83 to 84A. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, on Amendments 83 and 84, which would restore the proportionality duties to the regulators’ general functions, and Amendment 86, which would import the principles of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act into FSMA. These are thoughtful and constructive amendments, which would save something, but there is a great deal they cannot save—we will discuss that later. In particular, they do not save the second proportionality duty: the duty to have regard to the nature and objectives of businesses carried on by different persons. That is the proportionality principle that protects smaller firms, sole traders, mutuals, benefit companies and individuals. It is not just about cost-benefit or even size; it is about recognising that different types of firms have different objectives and experience regulation differently. To some extent, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said, this should all be understood within proportionality, but if we leave it out when it is still separately listed in the current regulatory principles, even when they are largely disregarded, that might lead to the wrong conclusions.

That is why I tabled Amendments 83A and 84A, which build on the formulation of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and would restore the smaller and different business protections. As has been explained, these would be inserted into clauses that relate to the discharging of the regulators’ general functions so that they restore these duties to the operational level of rules and supervision. But this limb of proportionality does more than protect smaller firms; it may also protect firms whose objectives legitimately involve taking more risk in the interests of growth and innovation. Parliament’s role is not to eliminate risk but to ensure that it is understood, calibrated and supervised fairly. That is why this proportionality duty matters: it is one of the few operational tools that give Parliament visibility into how regulators weigh those differences in practice.

However, even with these amendments, we still would not save the principle of sustainable growth—growth that is durable, predictable and not a flash in the pan. As I have explained, that was a partner “have regard” to proportionality. I hope that during these proceedings I can persuade noble Lords and the Minister that sustainable growth should also be included. It chimes with competitiveness and growth, but it, too, needs to have a place in the real business part of these clauses, in the general functions. To echo my earlier comment, macroeconomic sustainable growth belongs alongside proportionality, as part of the deregulatory family of “have regards”.

These duties were originally conceived as guardrails to ensure that regulation supports the economy rather than constrains it. That operational balance is worth preserving. All the “have regard” duties were carefully designed and each has a purpose, and some of the others work together, as I have explained.

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[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I understand it, and I think I have demonstrated in the debate today and outside—I am looking forward to the meeting next week—that we remain open-minded. We are trying to achieve the balance between the regulatory oversight that we believe already exists and the feedback that we have had from the committee. I remain open to those conversations. We believe that the framework tries to keep that balance between the oversight that exists in Parliament and the independence of the regulators, but we genuinely look forward to that constructive discussion.

I turn to Amendment 87, which seeks to expand the regulatory principles and make them more detailed and directive. The Government’s view is that FSMA should provide a principled framework within which the regulators exercise expert judgment. This amendment goes far beyond refining the existing principles and would, instead, replace them with a highly prescriptive set of instructions that risks legal complexity, rigidity and dispute over interpretation.

The concepts highlighted in the amendment are important, but the Government do not believe they should be hardwired into primary legislation in this level of detail via the regulatory principles. The issue is not whether compliance costs, innovation, competition or post-implementation review matter—they clearly do—but whether it is right to place these requirements in primary legislation. The Government’s view is that it is not. It is not a sensible approach to grant the regulators significant powers and responsibilities, and to then overprescribe with how they must fulfil them.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

The Minister keeps saying that these things should not be in primary legislation, but they are in primary legislation, and they stay in primary legislation. Even if you try to take the effectiveness away by Clause 17, everything that I referred to in my speech, and that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, referred to in hers, is about the existing regulatory principles that are in the Act already. Therefore, I do not understand saying that they should not be in primary legislation—they are.

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[Baroness Scott of Needham Market (LD)]

I remind the Committee that when a group is led by a clause stand part debate, after the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has spoken, there is no second intervention from me at that point.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, oppose Clause 17 standing part of the Bill. Before turning to the detail, I will explain how Clauses 16, 17 and 18 fit together. They are not independent clauses. They operate as a single, interlocking structural package—an unholy trinity. Clause 16, which we have already debated, starts the move of day-to-day statutory principles out of operational decision-making and into a five-year strategy document. Clause 17 is the moment where it cuts. It removes the operational duty to apply the principles and the duty to explain how they have been applied. The principles remain in the abstract, but the visibility of their application disappears. Clause 18 then seals the trio by removing the remaining statutory mechanisms through which Parliament once saw how those principles were applied.

I said in Committee last week that deregulation of regulators inherently increases the regulation of markets. A regulator’s default setting is caution, not proportionality. That is precisely why Nikhil Rathi asked Parliament for political cover to take on more risk, because he knows that the system will not shift itself.

However, removing the operational “have regards” does not reduce that institutional caution. It simply removes the focus that keeps it directed at the right things. It removes accountability and removes Parliament from the role or possibility of providing support or cover with its eyes open, a direction of travel that Clause 18 then completes. The result is that Parliament loses operational visibility at the very moment when regulators are being asked to take on more risk. This is the context in which Clause 17 must be understood.

By deleting the principles from their operational position, the Government remove the statutory reporting loop. That deletes the audit trail that allows us to test what the regulators have done and why. Crucially, it also removes the only lever of accountability we have. We do not possess direction powers or hold budgetary levers. We do not have judicial review that bites on the substance of expert rules. All Parliament has is the ability to see, to question and, ultimately, to embarrass. An embarrassment card is a fragile card, but it is the final line of democratic accountability in the UK’s financial regulatory system. Clause 17 strips even that card from our hands. This is not simplification. It is a cultural turnabout that systematically switches off operational accountability.

Parliament is not trying to run the regulators. Our role is that of a critical friend: the only body that can speak openly what industry dares not, and test whether the principles that Parliament set are being applied in practice. Under the current framework, regulators must have regard to statutory principles in consultations, rules and supervision. Have they done this perfectly? No. They adopted a tick-box matrix that has become tedious and uninformative, but nothing prevents them shifting to thematic reporting, highlighting where specific principles matter most. Where the system has fallen down most is on the supervisory side, with an explosion of excess communications, overbearing information requests and a proliferation of Section 166 investigations.

Explanations around the “have regards” are the audit trail of how Parliament understands how a regulator weighed proportionality, firm size and sustainability of growth, or where climate change held relevance. A thoughtful narrative is far more informative than a boilerplate matrix, yet Clause 17 removes all requirements to explain or to show the rationale. In its place, the principles are relocated to a five-year strategy document that cannot be specific or enforced by the courts, and cannot be used to test an individual rule or a heavy-handed supervisory decision. This is not simplification; it is opacity. I pose the question: is the role of Parliament wanted?

At the Treasury Committee on 24 March 2026, the FCA’s CEO, Mr Nikhil Rathi, was asked how the system would handle the blistering speed of financial innovation. His answer was striking. He said:

“That is why I asked for a risk appetite from the Government and Ministers and Parliament so that we all know … what guardrails we are operating within, with appropriate democratic input and oversight”.


He also told the committee during the Sexism in the City inquiry that if the FCA were to set thresholds below that which Parliament had established in employment law, it would need a degree of political cover and agreement through Parliament. This is two sides of the same coin. The FCA is actively asking Parliament for guardrails, oversight, democratic accountability and cover because it is being pushed to accept more risk, and with more risk comes more failure or challenge.

However, Parliament cannot share responsibility if we are blinded from seeing how the principles are applied, and we cannot endorse greater risk-taking if we are denied information on where those choices bite in practice. When scandals happen, what angers Parliament most is when the writing was on the wall for a long time. Woodford funds is a textbook example, and London Capital and Finance is another.

The Minister may point to strategies, outcomes reporting, cost-benefit panels and annual reports, but the FCA itself has conceded that these are visibility tools, not accountability tools. Reports describe outcomes after the event, long after the harm has occurred. A strategy document can say all the right, glossy things, while the actual rules produce disastrous outcomes. We have seen before how FCA high-level assurance, even on specific cases, can look immaculate, while operational reality goes badly wrong. We saw that with British Steel pensions, with motor finance and with Woodford. Clause 17 remains the only operational hook that Parliament has to test whether the principles guided the procedure.

Last week, the Minister indicated that perhaps proportionality would be restored. If so, that is welcome, but a verbal concession is not an amendment and patching one leak does not fix a broken hull. If proportionality cannot be functional in a five-year strategy document, how can other principles survive, exiled there? Clause 17 still deletes the operational requirement that regulators must consider the desirability of sustainable growth. Removing this is nonsensical. The Government cannot possibly want unsustainable growth—growth that does not last.

Let us not forget the legal hierarchy. The secondary objective of competitiveness and growth sits higher up the statutory ladder. Precisely because that objective sits higher, there is all the more need to keep the sustainable growth consideration anchored in the operational functions. Right now, we see a political dash to deploy capital productively. If we encourage a reckless sprint when the underlying assets are not yet created, we are building not prosperity but a bubble, creating systemic fragility. So, restoring proportionality but deleting sustainable growth from sight collapses the government logic. It says that an audit trail for a firm’s compliance cost matters but an audit trail for long-term stability of the economy does not.

The consultation spoke about rationalising the number of “have regards”. It did not propose removing them from rule-making. It did not propose isolating them in a five-year strategy. It did not propose weakening the basis on which the courts can test whether regulators have properly considered Parliament’s intent. It did not analyse the interaction with the secondary competitiveness objective. When the Government consult on one minor administrative tweak but legislate for a far-reaching structural overhaul, that raises serious questions of fairness and due process.

I can see what the Government thought they were doing here. They believed that, by removing the operational “have regards”, they would free the regulators from excessive caution and allow the system to move more quickly. But, in practice, this clause disturbs the balance in a way that the Government have not accounted for. It removes not the caution but the focus and visibility that allow Parliament to understand how risk is being taken, to understand where it is being borne and to play its part in the structural balance of the system, which includes giving cover to the regulators when appropriate. That is the constitutional gap at the heart of this clause and why it represents not a simplification but a weakening of the framework of accountability on which our financial regulatory system depends.

This clause, along with Clause 18, has a serious impact on parliamentary scrutiny, as has been raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes—so I will not go further into that. But these things collectively are why I oppose that Clause 17 stands part.

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Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

88: After Clause 17, insert the following new Clause—
“Treasury statement of concern(1) Where the Treasury considers that rules or guidance made by the Financial Conduct Authority or the Prudential Regulation Authority are inconsistent with primary legislation or statutory objectives, the Treasury may publish a statement of concern.(2) Where a statement of concern is published under subsection (1), the Financial Conduct Authority or the Prudential Regulation Authority must, within 60 days, publish a response explaining—(a) whether it agrees with the concern, and(b) what action it proposes to take.(3) The Treasury must lay before Parliament any statement of concern published under this section, together with any response received from the Financial Conduct Authority or the Prudential Regulation Authority.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause would enable the Treasury to publish a statement of concern where regulator rules or guidance appear inconsistent with primary legislation or statutory objectives, requiring a published response and Parliamentary transparency.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

In a way, it is a pity that I tabled this amendment, because it would probably be a whole lot more informative for us to go straight on to Clause 18. However, Amendment 88 would introduce a new mechanism that was suggested to me: a formal Treasury statement of concern. The idea is that it would fill a gap that has always existed—one that becomes all the more glaring alongside the opacity created by the Bill.

The FSMA 2000 settlement imagined a world in which Ministers were hands off and regulators were left to get on with it. That world has long gone. The Government are now highly interventionist in the name of growth. More generally, they signal priorities, express expectations and raise concerns, but almost all of that happens privately or through speeches and press releases that are approximate and not subject to parliamentary scrutiny.

My amendment would formally put the record straight. If the Treasury considers that

“rules or guidance … are inconsistent with primary legislation or statutory objectives, the Treasury may publish a statement of concern”

and the regulators must respond publicly within 60 days. That is all. It is not a direction, and it is not interference; it is a constitutional signalling mechanism. It would simply show that the Government have taken action on a concern, which otherwise might be unknown. The Government may say that they do not wish for such a mechanism—they do not have to use it—but legislation is not written for the preferences of a particular Minister at a particular moment in time; it is written for the system. The truth is that the Government already intervene with regulators, only informally, privately and without transparency. Why not have a formal system as part of escalation or as a pre-legislative tool?

There is also a practical point. Parliamentary time is limited, and correcting regulatory inconsistencies through statutory instruments can take months, if it happens at all. A statement of concern is a stage earlier. It would allow the Treasury to flag a potential inconsistency without immediately reaching for legislation. It would also allow the regulators to respond and, where appropriate, adjust course. It could also help resolve issues that arise when different things are said or interpreted differently in different places.

In that sense, this mechanism’s greatest strength may lie in its quiet deterrent effect: it would rarely need to be used because its existence would encourage early correction and avoid the need for statutory intervention later. A statement of concern provides exactly that. It would allow the elected arm of government to say transparently, on the record, “We see a potential inconsistency. We are not directing you, but we expect a reasoned response, and we think that this needs to be done publicly”. It would also have the benefit to the Government of them showing formally that they have taken a concern forward.

As I say, this was proposed to me, and I think that there is a point to it. There is a missing link. The Treasury often says that it does not interfere, but there has been an awful lot of correspondence and hugger-mugger between regulators and the Treasury recently in order to come forward with the growth strategy. This is a missing link. The power of Parliament has been eroded. I did not recognise a lot of the things that the noble Baroness, Lady Bi, said about how the system works. There is a missing link in terms of what the Treasury is able to do. I beg to move.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of Amendment 88 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. It would be a useful addition to FSMA to have a specific power for the Treasury to issue a statement of concern; I particularly like the fact that it could be used without the full parliamentary process of regulations. As the noble Baroness may recall, when we debated the then Bill in 2023, the Treasury took a power to tell regulators to make rules. However, that power has to be exercised via regulation, so it needs to go through the whole statutory instrument procedure. It has not yet been used, as far as I am aware, but it is a useful backstop that the Treasury has if it wants to direct the work of the regulators, which is a perfectly reasonable thing for it to do in certain important areas.

The existence of the Treasury’s ability to issue a statement of concern would be particularly useful when interested parties were trying to get a point about things that were not working heard by the regulators. The ability to engage the Treasury in that would be very helpful, although I am sure that it would be used more as a background factor in the relationship than as an active part of the Treasury’s relationship with the regulators. I applaud the noble Baroness on her ingenuity in bringing this amendment forward.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, the accountability of our financial regulators is a serious matter, and Parliament rightly takes a close interest in how the FCA and PRA exercise their powers. We have extensively discussed the FSMA model of regulation today. It is the foundation of a system of regulation under which Parliament sets the regulators’ objectives, invests them with the powers that they need to further those objectives and sets out a clear system of governance and accountability under which the regulators are required to account for their actions and effectiveness in furthering the objectives that Parliament has set for them. As I said before, the Government remain of the view that this is the most appropriate and effective model of regulation available. It has served us well and is internationally respected.

The difficulty with this amendment, therefore, is that it would cut across the foundational principle of our regulatory architecture. The FCA and PRA are operationally independent bodies. That independence is not incidental; it is the source of their authority and credibility and, ultimately, their value to the consumers and markets they serve. Under the FSMA model, it is the responsibility of the regulators to interpret their statutory objectives. It is not the role of HM Treasury to do so. This amendment would, over time, erode precisely the independence that makes those regulators effective. Markets, firms and consumers need to know that regulatory decisions are made on the merits, free from political pressure. This amendment, however well-intentioned, risks compromising that assurance.

Of course, Parliament can and does challenge the regulators where it thinks they have done something wrong. Given that their authority ultimately flows from Parliament, the regulators take that incredibly seriously. Parliament can and does make its views known to the regulators on key issues. For example, after a highly critical report from the House of Lords’ Financial Services Regulation Committee, and in recognising the lack of consensus among the stakeholders, in 2024 the FCA dropped plans to change the way that it publicised ongoing enforcement cases.

The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, asked whether the Government are satisfied with the current framework. There is an appropriate requirement already set out in FSMA that is designed to support scrutiny and oversight and, in certain circumstances, to allow the Government to give the regulators some level of direction. For example, the Government can require a regulator to review one of its rules or to appoint an independent person to review those rules where they consider this would be in the public interest. The Government can also require the regulators to make rules but cannot direct their content or purpose.

The regulators have a statutory duty to keep their existing rules under active review. This is contained in Section 3RA of FSMA. Furthermore, the Treasury has an ability to direct regulators to launch an independent review of specified rules, with the outcome laid before Parliament. The regulators are also subject to robust wider parliamentary accountability, including through the information they are required to provide to relevant committees and the vital role those committees play in questioning the regulators and critiquing their work. Those are the appropriate channels for testing the consistency of regulators’ actions with legislation or statutory objectives, not a ministerial statement of concern, which starts to undermine the principles of independent regulation. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I still think that there is a missing link here, but I heard what the Minister said and it is what I was expecting: the Government are frightened that this would look as if they were going to undermine independence in some way. I fully understand that. There are other regulatory interventions that Ministers make with other regulators, so it is not an entirely off-the-wall idea. It certainly was not meant to be part of the routine kind of application of day-to-day accountability. A “very rare or never” kind of application is what was envisaged, but we have given it an airing. It is not going anywhere. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 88 withdrawn.

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[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)]

My Lords, before we continue the debate, we have started group 6 and we have one more complete group to do. We are going to finish at 8.45 pm and I would hate to think that we would finish mid-group, but I am in your Lordships’ hands as to whether we do that.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, this is the third of the trio. Clause 18 is a deletion clause, the final clause in the trio that removes consideration of the regulatory principles from the context of actual rule-making. It strips out the guidance duties, reporting duties and consultation hooks that once gave Parliament visibility into how the regulators applied their objectives and principles. Let us look at what is being systematically dismantled here. There is some overlap here with some of the things that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has addressed.

Clauses 18(1) and (2) delete the FCA’s and PRA’s guidance about their objectives—the very provisions which, as the Explanatory Notes admit, required the regulators to explain how they advanced those objectives. It is not a question that they still have to explain now; that has gone. Clauses 18(3) and (4) remove the explanations required on directions on consolidated supervision and authorised decisions. Clause 18(7) removes the FCA’s obligation to notify, consult or explain when issuing guidance relating to its objectives. Clauses 18(9) and (10) delete large parts of the FCA’s and PRA’s annual reporting requirements, one of the most sensible and accessible ways for Parliament to understand how objectives were dealt with in practice and would ideally be built upon. Clauses 18(12) to (14) remove linkages to other Acts of Parliament, including the auditor engagement duties that once provided an additional source of supervisory insight.

What is left? Guidance? Gone. Explanations? Gone. Participation? Gone. Annual reporting? Gone. Audit? Gone. These were the exact mechanisms through which Parliament and others scrutinised how the regulators applied their objectives and principles. Clause 18 removes them all. It is the inevitable consequence of the Clause 16 and 17 shift: the practical reality of decoupling principles from operational effectiveness and removing Parliament’s line of sight. It leaves us with no checks and absolutely no balances. For these reasons, I oppose Clause 18 standing part of the Bill.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 93 and 94. I have not audited a bank or sat on a bank board, but I was a member of the Sharman committee that looked at the problems with auditing following the global financial crisis. I sat on the board of one of the big four auditors, chairing its public interest committee, and I talked to a number of partners who audited the banks.

I think that we agree that audit is absolutely a foundation stone for the integrity of the capital markets. For those who are interested, it was part of the settlement following the collapse of the City of Glasgow Bank in 1878 that we would have audits of limited liability banks. It is particularly critical where entities are highly geared or where there is a considerable element of judgment in determining their value. If we look at the banks, they are hugely geared. People like to talk about the common equity tier 1 ratio, but if we look at the gearing that most companies use, it is the equity versus the liabilities. For a typical bank, equity is about 6%: on the back of that, you can borrow £94 and lend £100. That means that, if you have overvalued your assets by 3% and undervalued your liabilities by 3%, you end up with no equity whatever.

This is a really sensitive calculation and, historically, it would have been made with a degree of prudence and conservatism. Prudence and conservatism have now gone as guiding principles, and valuations are done neutrally. For example, this would allow a bank to declare a profit on a zero-interest credit card, on the grounds that it can bring forward the profits it thinks it will make in future. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has been great in raising these issues for some time.

There are of course huge temptations to optimism. Indeed, it is surely testament to the professionalism of our bankers, and the independent agents we employ to monitor and control bank behaviour, that banks have not got into greater trouble. There are four such agents: the independent non-executive directors; the auditors; the investors and the regulators. Many more resources are devoted to auditing banks than to regulating them, and vastly more than fund managers devote to their role as stewards. The auditors have inside knowledge and huge expertise, and it is precisely that insight, given independently, that regulators need in order to play their role.

I think that that was recognised by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, when she suggested that the PRA “may” ask to speak to the auditors. The problem is that the auditors have a delicate job: they are referees. The report is done for the investors, but they need the trust of the audited entity. Indeed, they are, in effect, appointed by the audited entity, and they even sometimes describe the audited entity as a client. They are unlikely to go to the regulator without having profound concerns.

Regulators may find it helpful to call in the auditors because of problems that are visible to them: the known knowns. Under those circumstances, this amendment would of course work. However, what the regulator really needs to know is the unknown knowns: something that is known by the auditor, who has gone inside, but not known by the regulator. That is why it makes sense to mandate that the regulator “must” talk to the auditor to hear their concerns, to pick up potential emerging problems before they become critical, and to understand how the auditor judged the numbers to be true and fair.

The audit is the foundation of the integrity of our capital markets. For auditors to have material knowledge of a bank’s position that is relevant to the stability of the system and for that not to be known by the regulator seems to be completely perverse and potentially very dangerous. With that perspective, I wonder whether the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, might be content with Clause 18, on audit reporting, to remain as it stands.

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[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I will have to come back to the noble Baroness. The broader requirement is that we are trying to streamline the process to take the regulatory burdens away. We recognise that we need to give a precise answer on that.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

The Minister mentioned taking away regulatory burdens, but the Government are actually taking away regulator burdens. They are not the same thing.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

They are not the same thing. The approach we are trying to take is to streamline duplication while not in any way detracting from the overall process. That is the principle we are trying to follow here.

Amendment 89 would preserve the statutory requirements on the FCA and the PRA to give guidance about how they intend to advance their objectives. This requirement was introduced by the Financial Services Act 2012, and since it came into force, both the FCA and the PRA have published guidance fulfilling this requirement, which is updated when necessary. For example, most recently the PRA updated this approach to policy statements in February 2025. Removing these statutory requirements will not prevent the regulators giving such guidance where they consider it beneficial to do so. These requirements would also be duplicative with the new long-term strategies, which will set out the regulators’ approach and priorities for advancing their objectives, as well as other statutory publications, such as the regulators’ annual reports.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th June 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendment 48. It addresses a simple but important point: the quality of regulation depends on the quality of consultation. At present, consultation periods vary unpredictably. Some run for many weeks; others, even on significant policy shifts, have been compressed into days. That inconsistency makes a system difficult for firms to plan around, inaccessible for consumer groups and individuals, and challenging for Parliament to scrutinise. I am a serial responder to consultations—I have been for over 20 years, not just on financial services—and I have experienced this difficulty myself.

The Lords Financial Services Regulation Committee, on which I serve, along with several other Members who are present in this Committee, heard extensive evidence on this. In our report Growing Pains, we concluded that the FCA and PRA need a better understanding of the lived experience of regulated firms in coping with consultations, policy statements, “Dear CEO” letters and the plethora of regulatory tools now used. That is a polite way of saying that the system is overloaded and fragmented.

My amendment would introduce proportionate, predictable windows: four to six weeks for minor changes and six to eight weeks for material ones. I seem to recall that, in Brussels, the time allowed was two months and for more complicated things an extension was available of three months. It would also be in line with that, so not out of line with international thinking. The amendment also sets out the factors that regulators must consider when deciding whether a proposal is minor or material. That embeds proportionality but without rigidity. I envisage that there could be, again, the opportunity for extensions in difficult cases. The FCA quite often does that, but usually quite late, after you have had a panic. Crucially, regulators may depart from these windows in exceptional circumstances, as I have said, but they must explain why. That is transparency, not constraint. It ensures that urgency can be accommodated but not used as a blanket justification for compressed consultation.

Predictable consultation matters because it is the only point where Parliament, industry, consumer groups, individuals and civil society generally can influence policy and rule-making. If windows are unpredictable or too short, smaller firms and resource-constrained consumer bodies are effectively excluded. Trade associations cannot consult their members, but their responses are important, as we know that many firms are reluctant to respond directly, for fear of being seen as criticising regulators and suffering supervisory consequences.

The various advisory panels have their place, of course, but they are not a substitute for open consultation. They rely on the knowledge of individuals, not the pooled experience of the market or the public. Industry has asked for this amendment, which tells us something important: the current system is not working as it should. Consultation should not be a matter of luck or timing; it should be predictable, fair and transparent. This amendment would support better engagement and better outcomes. It is a modest but essential part of the culture change that the Lords committee called for, and I hope that the Government will look on it favourably.

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In conclusion, I should also say that I support Amendments 72 and 76 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 72 and 75 and to my opposition to Clause 16 standing part of the Bill. I also support the other amendments in this group and their intentions: I think we could talk quite a lot longer about them all.

My Amendments 72 and 75 would require the regulators’ long-term strategies to include a review of their rulebooks, with the aim of identifying outdated or unnecessary requirements. That is a sensible and uncontroversial idea. No one disputes that the regulatory rulebook should be kept under review or that unnecessary or duplicative requirements should not be removed. Indeed, the FCA’s own handbook review consultation acknowledges that parts of the rulebook are outdated, unclear or internally inconsistent. I hope that this review idea can be taken up.

However, these amendments presently sit within Clause 16, which is where the problem lies. Clause 16 creates a statutory duty for the FCA and the PRA to produce long-term strategies. In principle, that is not objectionable; regulators have produced strategy documents before, and it is entirely proper that Ministers should be able to input as long as it is transparent, but there are other problems that have been elaborated on by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, which I do not need to repeat. In practice, however, Clause 16 is the delegation engine for Clause 17. It is part of a process of downgrading the day-to-day requirements, the regulatory principles on rule-making, into a commentary in a five-year strategy document. This is a profound change in the constitutional architecture of financial regulation. What were once operational regulatory principles, enforceable by judicial review—even if that route is rarely pursued—become strategic aspirations, influenced by Ministers, unchallengeable by others and reviewed only every five years. The long-term strategy is being used as a vehicle to downgrade regulatory principles and apply them in a minimalist, non-operational way—just talk, no walk. If Clause 16 is to remain, it must be made significantly better and not simply operate as a Trojan horse.

The key thing about regulatory principles is how to make them sensibly relate to operational matters— I say sensibly because that has not happened. That is the problem. It may work for some of them to be dealt with more thematically and rather more regularly than five-year intervals, but others need consideration at the rule-making and supervisory level. While Ministers are meant to stay clear of day-to-day operational interference, like the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, I query whether Clause 16 overly restricts ministerial input. FSMA 2000 has always had a difficult settlement to keep government away from day-to-day decisions, but—as the financial crisis showed—it is inescapable that the buck stops with government. Clause 16 does not strike the right balance there.

My Amendments 72 and 75 point to rulebook review. As I said in a previous group, and as noted by the Lords Financial Services Regulation Committee, it is effectively the regulators’ system that is cluttered, fragmented and difficult to navigate. It is a lot harder to navigate than a few regulatory principles that the regulators complain about, but which are the only way to challenge that regulatory clutter. In the Lords committee report, a central finding was that culture change, not structural tinkering, is what is needed. Regulators must be clearer, more predictable and more proportionate in how they exercise their powers. The Clause 16 regulatory strategy does not deliver that; it substitutes what were enforceable operational requirements about proportionality with unenforceable talk.

It rather looks as though the regulators will avoid having to step up to the mark. They did not much like the committee’s report or its suggestions of culture change, and, as we will discuss when we get to Clause 17, in the words of one City commentator, it looks like the regulators have done a job on Parliament. Clause 16 is not about transparency, nor is it new in suggesting a strategy document. It is just a vehicle to diminish the accountability and effectiveness of the regulatory principles, and I oppose it.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I have added my name to three of the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, in this group. To be honest, I am not quite sure why I did not add my name to her other two; I should have done, so I apologise. The noble Baroness has already explained those with her usual clarity, so I will try hard not to repeat what she said.

Briefly, on Amendment 70, I was going to say that I assumed that the omission from the FCA’s strategic priorities of its secondary objective was an oversight. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has kindly shared with me an email she has received from the Minister that effectively confirms that, and that it will be sorted out at a later stage. Can I very gently say to the Minister that when he writes to noble Lords, it should be copied to all who have signed an amendment? On Amendments 73 and 76, I will listen with interest as to why the Treasury should be able to make recommendations to the FCA and the PRA only in relation to the long-term strategies—that is, every five years. I suspect that the Treasury will come to regret that restriction.

I have also added my support to Amendments 72 and 75 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, both of which would require the FCA and PRA to carry out a review of their regulations as part of the five-year strategy process, with a view to eliminating any unnecessary regulations. Rulebooks have a habit of growing—being added to—and scope has a tendency to creep, so a five-year spring clean must be a good thing and would be a good discipline that I would wholeheartedly support. I finish by saying that I share the reservations that have already been raised about the whole of Clause 16.

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[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

I will write to the noble Baroness to clarify that.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I do not understand what happens when the strategy is right but the rules are wrong. What happens then? That does happen. We have, as I have called it before, the example that keeps on giving: when the FCA got the motor finance rules wrong. What happens then, when there is no way to correct that? The strategy, to treat customers fairly, might be right, but the rules produce something that is patently unfair. How can that be changed? There is nothing to measure against that now —the principles have gone.

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[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I am sorry, but if you change something in primary legislation and rub out what is happening in existing processes, you have changed it. You cannot change something at a higher level than primary legislation.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

We will have to come back to these points at a later date. This is a broader conversation on oversight, and points have been made on this subject outside the Room. I hope noble Lords will allow me to come back to these points, as I think this will come up in further debates both during and after Committee.

Turning to Amendments 72 and 75, the Government agree that regulation should be proportionate and support the objectives behind these amendments. Indeed, the Bill forms part of the Government’s broader effort to reduce the burden of regulation on businesses, ensuring that the UK has a regulatory environment that supports growth while maintaining high standards. The Government have made a commitment to cutting the administrative burden of regulation by 25% by the end of this Parliament. The financial services regulators are actively contributing to this agenda. For example, the PRA is implementing new insurance reporting requirements that will cut paperwork by one-third, contributing to savings for firms of £66 million per year, and the FCA has proposed removing some transaction reporting that would save firms over £100 million per year.

However, the Government do not think it would be appropriate to impose a requirement that every long-term strategy must include a full review of all regulations and a plan for eliminating them. A universal rule review exercise each time a strategy is prepared or revised would not be proportionate and would reduce the regulator’s capacity to focus on other priorities. There are existing requirements in FSMA which require the regulators to keep their rules under review and to publish statements on policy and on their approaches to reviewing the rules. The Government consider that this is a proportionate approach.

Amendments 71 and 74 seek to require the FCA and the PRA, when preparing and revising their long-term strategies, to consult persons they consider would be affected, including those they regulate. I understand the intention behind these amendments. If the regulators are to produce long-term strategies that are meaningful and credible, it is clearly important that they are informed by engagement with those who are affected by them. The Government have a clear expectation that the regulator’s strategies will be informed by that engagement.

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[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

On that point, it seems to me that nothing is being done to challenge the burden of regulation on firms—instead, the obligations on the regulator are being reduced. When you reduce the obligations on the regulator—for example, to be proportionate—the corollary of that is that they are unrestricted in the way that they can then increase the burdens on firms. That may not be the talk, but that is the consequence of the legal construct that we are now looking at.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

There is a broad philosophical point being made about trusting the FCA and the regulators. Again, we will come back to this in further debates. It is a view that I understand, and we need to develop this through the process of the debate, but it is definitely not the intention to give them free rein to make laws randomly. I think we will have to come back to that later in Committee, if that is okay.

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[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

That is correct.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

Why not?

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

The sense is that it creates an administrative burden. We are trying to cut down on regulation as part of trying to accelerate growth, and we believe that that is the right balance.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 22nd June 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Blackwell (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as a significant shareholder in Lloyd’s Banking Group, of which I was formerly chairman.

Although I recognise the concerns raised by my noble friends, it is important that we tackle the confusion caused by the dual roles of the courts and the regulator in the regulation of consumer credit. The regulation of consumer credit is not a black and white issue. A balance has to be made all the time between the level of protection offered to consumers and the costs of compliance borne by the institutions, and the risk that, if the courts are unpredictable in the way they interpret the Consumer Credit Act, suppliers will either withhold products or build an insurance premium into the costs.

We have had too many incidents over the past few years where what financial institutions thought was a settled issue, as determined by the regulator, has been altered retrospectively by decisions in the courts. We can have a choice one way or the other, but it is important that we tackle the confusion caused by the dual responsibility. As I see it, the Consumer Credit Act is an outdated piece of legislation, as the Government have set out. It was based on conditions that have changed radically. We have since set up the financial services regulator, with devolved responsibilities for regulation. We may or may not think that the regulator is doing well or want to increase supervision of it, but the Government should try to make it clear through these amendments to the Consumer Credit Act whether the result will be, as I hope, to make it clear that there is a single definitive source of regulation for the Consumer Credit Act, which is the balance struck by the Financial Conduct Authority, and that the courts, so far as possible, no longer have a role.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, this and the following group dwell on the same territory; I will make my main intervention in the next group alongside my detailed amendments. I am sorry that I had to separate them out, but that was only because of the Chief Whip’s speaking-time restrictions on non-movers, which ironically mean that the debate will take longer overall. I have both general points and points on the substantive amendments. I agree very much with many other speakers, and in particular the noble Baronesses, Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lady Noakes. Overall, the Bill is extraordinary for the manner in which it does and undoes many things with questionable process.

My general approach on the point about the Consumer Credit Act is straightforward: I do not object to using the FCA to modernise and speed up redress mechanisms. We are already seeing that in practice with the motor finance commission cases, but that experience also contains a very clear warning. Here I depart from what the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, would wish to have. In the first instance, the FCA made rules that were not in line with statute. It said that commission did not have to be disclosed unless asked about. We have ended up with a situation where firms which thought they were following the rules have been caught out because the statute said something different.

The moral lesson is simple: if you find yourself thinking, “Oh good, I don’t have to tell them about this nice little earner”, something is already unfair. In practice, some car salesmen discussed bonuses, quotas and commissions with customers, sometimes linking them to discounts. I have personal experience of that. But if the statute had not existed, what would have happened? The logic is that the old way, non-disclosure, might have continued because the FCA rules permitted it and it had not spotted the unfairness. For all that we have some very capable regulators, we have been shown that they are not infallible and they are not legislators—a point we will return to repeatedly as we go through the Bill. From time to time, they hit the barriers of their remits, perimeters and institutional roles.

Our system is not to delegate unconstrained power to regulators. Parliament sets the framework, regulators operate within it and, when necessary, the court interprets. Yet here, we are being asked to legislate for an automated substitution to set in train an unseen process that Parliament can no longer influence, that has no predetermined scope and whereby courts lose jurisdiction. That is constitutionally unsound and unsupportable. I will return to the detail in the next group but the principle is clear. As the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, said, Parliament should not sign away rights and protections without knowing what will replace them.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

It is a great privilege to wind up for the Lib Dems. People will know from Second Reading that I am very strongly of the same mind as the noble Baronesses, Lady Noakes and Lady Bowles, and I think the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, takes a very similar view on this first clause. The others speak with some sense of diplomacy; I will be slightly more direct, because, from my perspective, the Bill, by repealing the CCA, basically removes consumer credit protection from law and moves it to the FCA rulebook with no meaningful accountability and, frankly, little visibility.

Peers will remember that in 2021, many of us in this House and the other place were getting very frustrated with the FCA. It had some very good people but it was definitely neglecting consumer protection, and this House consequently passed an amendment to instruct the FCA to consult on a duty of care. The FCA chose not to consult on a duty of care, despite that direct instruction. It consulted instead on what it said was the equivalent, which was a consumer duty, the key difference being that a duty of care has a meaning in law, with a private right to action. In other words, an individual can turn to the courts if he or she believes that they have been wronged. This is a right that, as we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, the FCA, at the behest of the industry, did not want the consumer to have, despite it being a long and very well-established tradition in English law.

The Bill now achieves the wholesale removal of credit protection from the law and into the rulebook of the FCA, and it is obviously an extension of that deliberate process to remove paths to redress for consumers. The Committee will be aware that consumers cannot take civil action against the FCA: it is immune. It is correct that it should be immune from action by those whom it regulates in the market, but it is also immune from action by consumers. As we go on through the Bill, will see that same process of undermining redress in future groups of amendments—very much so when we are dealing with the FOS.

When I have talked to members of the Government on this issue, they seem surprised at my comments because they see the FCA as a real champion of the consumer. Indeed, the industry will say the same thing. However, perhaps I have a longer memory, as does this Committee.

Do Members here remember the issue of payday lenders—the very widespread abuse of individuals who were entering into incredibly high-priced credit and were finding themselves continuously in debt trouble? When the issues were put to the FCA by Members of Parliament, by complainants and by whistleblowers, the only action that the FCA agreed to take was to make some minor adjustments to the rules on rollover. It argued that payday lenders had an important part to play within our credit system. It took action in this House in 2015, when a Minister broke with the Government’s perspective and decided to support a move that had been made from the Labour Benches by the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell. It was the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, who spoke for the Government, and he decided that enough was enough and that the only way to deal with payday lenders was to shut them down. That action was put into law, and it improved the whole credit environment that we live in today and eliminated a really serious abuse. As I read the Bill, people will lose that opportunity. When people claim that the FCA is a champion of credit, and they cite the consumer duty, they do not realise that it does not incorporate that very traditional English right to turn to the courts.

Even if today one accepted that the FCA, in its currents design and with the relevant people in place, was indeed a consumer champion, that could easily change, because we are relying totally on FCA culture. In the 1990s—I often go back to that decade—the financial regulators demonstrated the most extraordinary degree of deference to the financial sector. Frankly, the 2007 crash could not have happened without that deference. Many of the lessons of that crash are being undermined by this Bill, throughout which there is a return to deference—this time in the name of growth.

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This opposition to Clause 1, together with my opposition to Schedule 1, would remove the changes to the Consumer Credit Act 1974.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I oppose Clause 1 and Schedule 1 standing part of the Bill. I shall speak also to my detailed amendments to the schedule, which appear as Amendments 4 to 17.

We all know how consumer agreements work, whether for credit or anything else. There is always an asymmetry of power between the provider and the consumer. Nowadays, it is often impossible to speak to a person rather than a bot. If you do get a person, it is a call centre with scripted questions and answers, often including a recital of terms and conditions faster than it is possible to understand. You cannot get to the next stage without saying, “Yes, I have understood and agreed”, when, in truth, you have not. You do not even see the terms and conditions until after you have clicked “Yes”, then you are given a time-limited right to withdraw. This back-to-front impatience to get boxes ticked first is now a feature of the modern consumer environment—one that I fear we have now replicated in the legislative procedures in the Bill, only here, once Parliament ticks the box, there is no cooling-off period and no right to withdraw.

The Bill repeals parts of the Consumer Credit Act. It gives the Government open-ended regulation-making powers before there has been any consultation and before we have seen the shape or operation of any FCA rules. I cannot support that. It goes too far, too fast and too unseen. That is not the way to make irrevocable changes. So I will not tick the box. I want to know what I am signing up to, just as the consumer must. I want to know that what are presented as rights are, in fact, rights.

Clause 1 repeals statutory rights before replacements exist. The Government take powers to make regulations before consultation. At the very least, that is a reason to take a great deal of notice of what is being said by Parliament. I also question whether this approach meets the Government’s own statutory duties under the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006, which requires regulation to be proportionate, accountable and transparent. Repealing rights before replacements exist does not seem to meet those tests. This is a fundamental change from the status quo, where rights are in statute and rules are made to assist in negotiating the statute.

Clause 1 reverses that. It removes statutory protections now and offers only a possibility of regulatory rules later. Rules are not rights. Rules can be changed by the rule-maker, whereas rights bind everyone, including the regulator. The Government’s approach is, therefore, constitutionally backwards. Parliament is being asked to repeal rights without knowing what will replace them. It is like signing a credit agreement without knowing the terms, and we are being asked to sign it on behalf of the public.

My solution would be to preserve a statutory floor, both now and in future, and not a temporary one that could be slowly eroded at the whim of the Government or a regulator. My amendments to Schedule 1 are intended to show how this can be done; I thank Which? for its assistance in preparing them. They aim to preserve important provisions in relation to notices of arrears and default sums, as well as the unenforceability sanctions attached to them in the Consumer Credit Act. These are the legal backstops—the protections that ensure that rights are real.

I shall explain what my amendments do and why they matter. First, they would preserve the requirement to serve notices of arrears and default sums and the statutory consequences of failing to do so. These provisions apply, for example, where a borrower has fallen behind on payments. A default notice must be served before a creditor can take certain drastic steps such as terminating the agreement, demanding early repayment or recovering goods and land. Default notices also play an important part in determining when debts become statute barred, because, once served, lenders have six years to take court action. Secondly, they would keep these protections in legislation but allow the FCA to modernise the form and content of the notices. That is the right balance. Technology changes, as does the way in which information is presented, but the underlying rights do not and should not.

The Government’s approach is to repeal the majority of the CCA provisions with the suggestion that they could be recast into FCA rules at some future point, subject to consultation. That means there will be no parliamentary scrutiny of what these protections might look like once they are repealed. My amendments would guarantee that the core protections remained mandatory legal requirements while allowing the FCA to update the way in which information is provided. That is what the legislation should have done from the start—modernise the form, not abolish the substance.

I turn to sanctions, which is where the Consumer Credit Act is at its strongest and where the Bill is at its weakest. The sanctions in the CCA were included in 1974 because Parliament recognised the significant imbalance of power between a consumer and a creditor. Parliament wanted proactive compliance with the law, not a system where an individual consumer must detect a breach, voice a complaint, and then pursue slow and time-consuming legal or ombudsman remedies, particularly when those consumers are likely to be vulnerable, stressed or in financial difficulty.

The sanctions ensure that a creditor cannot take steps against a debtor while the creditor is non-compliant with the law. They are automatic. They work because they require compliance up front, not after the harm has occurred, and they cannot be replicated in FCA rules. Without those sanctions, consumers may face new threats from being pursued for debts, particularly when debts are sold to unauthorised debt purchasers. The burden shifts on to the consumer to detect breaches and seek redress. Vulnerable consumers are disproportionately harmed, and the automatic reprieve that Parliament deliberately created is lost.

My amendments would ensure that those sanctions on arrears and default notices remained in legislation while allowing the FCA to modernise the way information was presented. That would preserve vital individual rights while recognising that flexibility is needed in a digital age. That is not an unusual approach. The CCA and the FCA’s existing consumer credit rules already operate in a complementary way.

The amendments I have tabled focus on arrears and default notices because that is where the greatest harm would arise if protections were removed, but they are only exemplary. They show the balanced approach that should have been taken across the whole reform of the Consumer Credit Act: move form and content to the FCA rules where appropriate but keep the substantive protections in legislation. I am looking for that complete reform.

There are other areas, such as the form and content of credit agreements, the duty to provide information under fixed-sum and running-account agreements, and the sanctions for improperly executed agreements, where the same balanced approach could and should be taken. I would be happy to meet to discuss those. The Government’s own consultation on CCA reform was meant to have two phases. Phase 1, on information requirements and sanctions, took place, but phase 2, on key consumer rights, was scrapped. That is not a sound basis for repealing rights now and promising rules later.

The CCA was ground-breaking for creating automatic protections, even if at times those protections have been bitten for trivialities. That is a reason for modification, not cancellation. Their purpose is still relevant: ensuring active compliance, preventing regulatory creep and protecting vulnerable consumers. They cannot be replaced with certainty in FCA rules. Their removal shifts the burden on to consumers. This is a regression in consumer protection at a time when modern communications already curtail the time for circumspection.

If the Government were bringing forward a coherent replacement for the Consumer Credit Act, it would look something like this: statutory principles of fairness, transparency, good faith and protection against unequal bargaining power. Those are not exotic ideas; they exist in other jurisdictions. Australia’s unconscionable conduct regime is one example. At the end of the day, businesses must think and exert conscience and play fair, but that is not what Clause 1 does. It removes rights without replacing them. Modernisation is possible but I will not tick the box on behalf of the public until I have seen the replacement and until I know that it preserves rights now and in the statute. I beg to move.

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I must apologise: I was not in the country for Second Reading, so this is my first intervention on the Bill.

I support wholeheartedly the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the rationale that she has just explained. I thank Which? for the work that it has been doing on the Bill and to try to help consumers.

I cannot support this leap in the dark for parliamentary scrutiny and I cannot support imposing this leap in the dark on consumers. At the end of the day, that is what the provisions in Schedule 1 are at risk of doing. I believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, with her amendments, and the amendments that we have seen from other noble Lords in the first group, are seeking to help the Government to achieve their aims more safely for consumers. I believe that what the Government are trying to do has the right motive; it is about whether the manner in which this is being done is safe for us to agree to—and I do not believe that it is.

If we think one step ahead, what protection will consumers have against the FCA making a significant error in its regulation? What protection will consumers have if the asymmetry of information and power that we know already exists in the financial services industry, especially for retail customers, continues along its current lines? I hope that the Government and the Committee will recognise that leaving consumer protection to the regulators is not a safe thing to do if you want to improve consumer protection—and, as I say, I believe that is what the Government would like to do.

The FCA has a peculiar regulatory style. For example, if it has discovered or suspected wrongdoing, it does not, as you might expect, do mystery shopping on behalf of consumers. It will ask firms generally to investigate how they behave and then to report to the FCA. That may work but it will not always work, and there is no fallback protection such as we have in the Consumer Credit Act if the consumer experience is not as it has been portrayed or as the FCA might have expected. There is a consumer panel as part of the FCA, but, in my experience with a number of financial scandals or problems that have arisen for consumers, the FCA consumer panel has little or no power. It is not listened to and does not form part of the FCA regulatory decision-making process that perhaps one would need to be confident that it represents in the case of passing on this protection to the FCA.

I hope that the Minister and the Government will listen carefully to the arguments that have been made so far in the first two groups and recognise the damage that could be done by pursuing the proposed actions.

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[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for the opportunity to set out the Government’s position on this important set of issues. I start by addressing why Clause 1 and Schedule 1 should stand part of the Bill. However, I do not want to duplicate what I said on the previous group, where I set out at length the Government’s policy for the CCA. Suffice it to say that the case for reform is straightforward. The Consumer Credit Act is more than 50 years old and was enacted long before the creation of the FCA. It no longer delivers as it should for today’s consumers, who engage with modern products in an increasingly digital world. That is why the Bill continues the work that began in 2012 of repealing this outdated legislation, such that it can be replaced with updated rules that better meet the needs of consumers and are fit for this digital age.

I understand the strength of feeling on the question of delegation, but I note that the noble Lord, Lord Blackwell, said that this is not a consensus. As I have said, this is entirely consistent with the model of regulation established by Parliament in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The Government strongly believe that those replacement rules should, in the main, reside in the FCA rulebook, not in primary legislation.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, expressed concern about how the FCA will replace some key protections, including information requirements. In the last group, I already explained the process that the FCA will follow. As I said, in practice, Parliament, the sector and consumer groups will see the FCA’s detailed proposals at the consultation stage, before the new regime takes place. I am happy to assure the noble Baroness that the FCA’s recent public statement confirmed that it aims to consult on key information requirements, rights and protections, including cancellation and withdrawal, the termination of agreements, including early settlement, and on looking across the consumer credit journey, with this approach being underpinned by the consumer duty. This will be supported by consultation and cost-benefit analysis, consumer research and stakeholder feedback.

Amendments 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 16 would retain information requirements and related sanctions in legislation or limit the FCA to prescribing only the form and content of notices. That would preserve the rigidity we are seeking to address. I cannot accept these amendments, as the provisions are not fit for the digital age. The Bill repeals these rigid statutory requirements so that the FCA can develop a more effective, rules-based regime. This is not about reducing information but about improving its timing, its quality and its clarity. The aim of the regime is that it provides consumers with better information in a clearer form and at a time that is most useful to them.

The consequence of repealing these information requirements is that certain related sanctions will fall away. These sanctions were designed for a different era. The Office of Fair Trading had limited powers for supervision and enforcement, so the regime was designed to be draconian to act as a robust deterrent. The sanctions apply automatically, regardless of the seriousness of any breach or whether any consumer harm has arisen. For example, a lender that used the incorrect wording in an arrears notice is required to refund any interest and fees charged from the point at which that breach was originally made, even if the error was in no way harmful to the borrower. Much has changed over the years since these sanctions were designed, and this approach is poorly suited to the modern approach to regulation. The FCA has strong supervisory and enforcement powers, and under consumer duties firms must deliver good outcomes. Unlike when the CCA was enacted, any consumer who suffers harm can straightforwardly access redress through the Financial Ombudsman Service, the FOS.

I recognise the concern behind Amendment 2, which seeks to ensure that FCA rules can supplement but not replace or diminish rights and remedies in the CCA. However, the Bill already preserves statutory rights that need to remain in legislation. Because FCA rules are not capable of eroding such rights, the amendment is not necessary.

I have already set out, in the last group, several examples of protections that remain in primary legislation, including Section 75 and provisions connected to criminal offences, which must of course remain in legislation. Amendments 6 and 15 would retain withdrawal, cancellation and early settlement rights in the CCA rather than allowing them to be recast into FCA rules. These rights are an important feature of consumer credit products that ought to be preserved. However, the current framework is complex and outdated and, as a result, not always well understood by consumers. The purpose of reform is to ensure that these protections work better for consumers, which is why the FCA has committed to consider cancellation rights alongside other rights including withdrawal, termination of agreements and early settlement, as part of its future framework. The amendments would prevent the FCA taking forward this vital work.

Lastly, Amendment 17 covers certain important rights, such as time orders, and seeks to retain these provisions within legislation without changes. However, changes to these provisions are necessary to ensure that they work together with the new information requirements recast into FCA rules.

I hope that I have been able to reassure noble Lords that the Government are taking forward these changes for the benefit of consumers, and convince them that the changes the Bill makes are necessary to modernise our protections and ensure that they are serving their intended purpose of protecting consumers. I acknowledge that we will come to the scrutiny of the regulators, especially the FCA, in future groups. I therefore propose that Clause 1 and Schedule 1 stand part of the Bill and respectfully ask the noble Baroness not to press her opposition to them.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister and all who have spoken in this debate. I am sorry that, to some extent, having it in two separate bits has made it more awkward. We are at a kind of impasse here. The Minister replies as though we are saying that nothing in the Consumer Credit Act can be changed and it will all have to stay there. In fact, all I am saying is that there are some basic core rights in statute, similar to the sorts of core rights that exist in many other Commonwealth countries, that should remain, because you do not have rights with the regulator. As my noble friend Lord Sharkey explained, the consumer duty does not give you any rights. It is about the opinion of the FCA, and it can change how it will apply it.

The main thing that we are objecting to is that the Bill is shoot first, ask questions later: “Give us all the power now and we’ll consult and tell you what we’re actually going to do later”. That is not the way to make legislation right—it is not how you would hire a telly, for heaven’s sake. We are being asked to tick the box on behalf of the public for something that is fundamentally unseen. The Bill does not retain core rights. It says that some things will change and gives an open-ended power to change everything else automatically when the Government want to. The fact that the Government are not taking rights away now does not mean that they cannot take them away later.

That is the impasse that we are at. We need some core rights that stay. The rest can all be simplified, streamlined and handled by the FCA and made more modern. The two should be able to work together, but it is not a simple fix. This has been pushed through without that second consultation, and that is why it is now falling apart as unsatisfactory. I will return to this when we come to Report, but, for now, I will not press my opposition to Clause 1 standing part of the Bill.

Clause 1 agreed.

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These amendments are all directed at the same underlying concern. Consumers need a system that is fair, timely and capable of delivering redress where it is properly due. Firms need a system that is clear, predictable and not retrospective in effect. The wider market needs confidence that regulatory powers will be exercised within defined and proportionate limits. I hope that the Minister will be able to provide the clarity that we seek. This is very much a Committee-style discussion, and I beg to move.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I would like to join in this discussion because it is probing thoughts. I shall make a few comments on Amendment 17A, because the issue overlaps with an amendment of mine that comes later in the main FOS group.

Amendment 17A raises an important point about limitation periods and the concept of when a relationship ends. It seeks to preserve the six-year limitation period for unfair relationship claims, running from the end of the creditor-debtor relationship. I understand the intention, but it exposes a deeper difficulty. The end of a relationship is not, or may not be, the same as the end of rights and it is certainly not the same as the end of enforcement powers. In many cases, firms retain continuing benefits or enforcement rights long after the consumer’s remedies have expired. Debts can be sold, pursued, securitised or enforced years after the practical relationship has ended, yet the consumer’s ability to challenge an unfair relationship may already have fallen away. That is an asymmetry.

As I said at Second Reading, while I understand the industry’s desire to get a grip on long-tail risk and liabilities, especially where regulators are interested in it, that cannot be done off the back of consumers. If we are to move parts of the Consumer Credit Act into the FCA rules, at the very least those rules must be required to secure, as far as reasonably practicable, symmetry between the duration of rights, remedies and redress available to consumers and the duration of rights, remedies, enforcement powers or continuing benefits to firms arising from the same act, omission or relationship. Without that symmetry, we risk creating a regime where firms retain long-tail powers but consumers lose long-tail protections. Limitation periods cannot be considered in isolation from the underlying rights. The two must move together or we distort the balance that Parliament intended. That is why the statutory framework has a place.

The FCA has already announced, a year or so back, a shift in emphasis to allow more risk in the interests of growth, which is a recurring theme. That was an important statement by the FCA and it feeds into the need for proportionate regulation and acceptance that there may be more failures, which Parliament must accept, but it cannot mean a bias advantage towards business in ways where firms retain recourse against consumers while consumers lose recourse against firms.

Under that process, companies may enjoy growth by escaping the consequences of some bad actions, but that gain is extracted from consumers and effectively added to the cost of living. Fleecing consumers is not growth, but I fear that this may be the consequence of the asymmetry in rights that could arise under Amendment 17A. I may return to this issue with my own amendment on Report.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords—

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

It is very nice to be back to do another Financial Services and Markets Bill. As it is the first time I have spoken, I should declare a registered interest in Fidelity National Information Services, Inc., which is a large American company that provides services and software to a wide range of financial services companies around the world.

I have tabled Amendment 26 and given notice of my intention to oppose that Clause 3 stand part of the Bill. I have also added my name to a number of amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes.

I have another interest to declare. I lost my local bank branch in my village some years ago, and I have just been informed that the last remaining bank in my nearest town is also about to close. To visit a bank branch for me will now involve a 100-mile round trip, so I am sympathetic to the idea that we need to do something to ensure continuation of access to banking services, especially in rural areas such as mine. At the same time, I am conscious that I probably visit a bank branch less than a couple of times a year, so I understand why banks feel it necessary to close them. They are not economic. We need to find a sensible balance to this. I accept that we may need to do something, but what?

There is the old joke: “We need to do something; this is something, so let’s do it”, but Clause 3 is not even something. It is just a vague—I was going to say promise, but it is not even that—intention to do something completely unspecified at an unspecified time, or indeed times, in the future. This Government have an unfortunate track record of putting sweeping powers into legislation before deciding what they actually intend to do with them, and this is yet another example. As the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee pointed out really strongly, this is a very sweeping power with no meaningful limitations at all other than, as we have heard, the need to have regard, and only to have regard, to the independent review currently being undertaken by Richard Lloyd.

Clause 3(3), which has only examples rather than limitations, is one of the widest I have seen. It includes the express ability to make changes to any Act of Parliament, a really strong Henry VIII power. It starts by saying:

“Regulations under subsection (1) may (among other things)”


do the things listed below that. Will the Minister explain what these other things might be? Am I being old-fashioned to suggest that this is not the right way to create law? It would surely be better to wait until after the review has been undertaken, decide what is needed and then legislate—if legislation is actually necessary, since, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, says, we got these banking hubs without legislation—and have the legislation subject to proper scrutiny by Parliament, which it will not be if we go down this route.

The Minister will no doubt try to reassure us about how this power will be used. Of course I—and, I am sure, everybody else in this Room—will have complete faith that the Minister would not try to misuse the power, but he will not always be the Minister. That may be a comment that has particular resonance today. Who knows? It is even possible that this Government may not always be the Government, but this power is unlimited and will be the law for the foreseeable future. Who knows what a future Government might wish to do with such an unlimited power? Indeed, as written, they could even use it to reduce the rights of access to banking.

I have a few specific questions for the Minister. First, will he explain in more detail how the Government currently expect, subject of course to the review, to use this power? What do they expect to do with it and when? Secondly, will he explain which Acts of Parliament he has in mind that might be changed under Clause 3(3)(b) and what changes he would expect to make to them? I put on record now that if I do not get a very convincing answer as to why this wide Henry VIII power is required, I will push Amendment 26, which would remove the power to amend primary legislation, to a Division on Report.

Finally, the Explanatory Memorandum recognises that this is a broad power. It says it is “necessarily broad”. At the same time, and in contrast to that, it also seems to recognise that it is broader than really needed, as it goes on to say,

“the Government would expect to narrow it once the review has concluded”.

I am somewhat baffled by that. We are in Grand Committee now, and the timetable for the Bill seems pretty tight. Will the Minister explain how it would be possible to narrow it, given that the Bill is likely to have completed all its stages before the review is completed and they have worked out what they want to do with it? Once the Bill has become law, the power cannot be narrowed.

This is another example of the Government trying to show they are doing something before they have decided what they want to do, and therefore giving themselves inappropriately broad powers that avoid proper scrutiny when they do finally decide. It is not the right way to make laws that will outlast this Government, and I do not believe this clause should stand part of the Bill without at least very significant narrowing and safeguards.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendments 24 and 27 in my name. I support what has just been said by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. To some extent, we are again fishing in the same constitutional pond that regulators are not Parliament. Parliament should not give away powers it cannot get back, and it should not make decisions before we know what we are deciding about.

Amendment 24 would ensure that any regulations made under this clause can only make provision that arises directly from the statutory review. A review is not a blank cheque. If Parliament asks for a review of access to banking services, the regulation-making power should be, if not confined to, at least in some way related to what the review identifies and not what a future Minister or regulator might wish to do. That is my real target. It may be that I have drafted he amendment a little too tightly but, as has been explained, this is a very open-ended power to do anything. Looked at constitutionally, the fact that the consultation has not yet been completed and assessed more than stretches proper procedure.

Amendment 27 addresses a different but related concern. As drafted, the Bill creates machinery in which FCA rules effectively drive changes to legislation, including primary legislation. The FCA pulls the lever, the Treasury presses the button and the law moves to reflect the regulator’s rulebook. The Government will no doubt say that Parliament can always reject the regulations, but we all know how that plays out: Parliament is presented with take-it-or-leave-it unamendable statutory instruments, and if it dares to reject them, we are told we are precipitating a constitutional crisis. That is not meaningful parliamentary control.

I am not opposed to the FCA modernising rules or streamlining processes—far from it—but where those rules have the effect of altering rights or obligations that were created by Parliament, the change must meaningfully come back to Parliament. Otherwise, we risk creating a system where the regulator can, in substance, rewrite Acts of Parliament by changing its rulebook. That is not proportionate regulation; it is law-making without accountability. Again, this seems not to be the sort of thing expected under the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act. These amendments do not prevent modernisation; they simply ensure that modernisation happens within a statutory framework, with Parliament retaining oversight of the rights it has created. It does not mean going into the detail, but it does mean monitoring the rights. I hope the Minister will recognise that these are modest but important constitutional guardrails.

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 22 in my name. I apologise for not being able to speak at Second Reading, as I was overseas on a parliamentary delegation. I declare an interest as a member of the Financial Inclusion Commission and president of the Money Advice Trust.

My amendment is specifically about banking hubs, a subject I have been very interested in ever since they came on the scene. There is a need, as I see it, for a far clearer definition of what constitutes a banking hub. Looking at the range of other amendments in this group, I am pleased that we are having a broader and much-needed debate on access to banking and, in particular, in-person services than we managed to have on the 2023 Act, despite my best efforts, which did not really get us anywhere.

To explain why a definition of “banking hubs” is so important, I will briefly look at the context. As we all know, over the past decade banking in the UK has changed profoundly. More than 6,700 high street bank branches have closed since 2015. Of course, at the same time, the way that people pay for goods and services has shifted dramatically: 10 years ago, more than half of all payments were made in cash, and today that figure is closer to one in 10.

For many people, that transition has been quite manageable, and indeed welcome, if they like the convenience of digital banking online, apps or card payments. But, for others, the shift away from local branches and cash-based services has created real barriers. For someone who cannot use online banking, the closure of a local bank branch can mean losing independent access to their own money. For someone who is blind or partially sighted, inaccessible digital systems can make everyday banking difficult or, frankly, impossible. For an older person without reliable transport, the nearest banking services may simply be out of reach. For those who use cash to budget—a proportion of people still do—or to pay carers, support relatives and retain control over household spending, the disappearance of in-person banking is not just a minor inconvenience; it can affect that feeling of control, autonomy and financial security.

Banking hubs emerged as a response to this new reality, providing shared in-person access to basic banking services, including cash withdrawals and deposits, as well as a limited amount of face-to-face support. I welcome banking hubs, as I have throughout this debate. I have been pleased to visit one and see what it involved. The Government have committed to rolling out 350 hubs by 2029. For me, the questions around banking hubs are: what do they actually do? Are they doing enough and being rolled out quickly enough? Are they addressing the needs of the people who need them most? These questions are ever more pressing following the announcement, which I very much welcome, of an independent review into the impact of bank branch closures, looking at what further interventions might be needed to protect access to in-person banking services.

The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, raised whether this is all about nostalgia and looking back to how it was in the old days—a sort of “Dad’s Army” view of banking—but we really need to recognise that it is not a question of nostalgia for traditional banking. Banking services have and will continue to evolve, and digital services will remain central, in my view, to the future of financial services, but inclusion has to be built into that transition. At the moment, we have not seen quite enough emphasis on inclusion. That key gap remained and was baked into the 2023 legislation, which is why it is so important that the independent review looks at this and comes up with good recommendations, so that the FCA can specify what a banking hub is and what qualifies as one.

Frankly, at the moment, the industry could meet all the terms of regulation without a single banking hub. It can offer services virtually, in theory—namely, through video conferencing—which might have some merit in setting out the minimum requirements for a hub and holding the industry to them in the long term. The FCA might also choose to define hubs to suit rural areas. It might be a lighter-touch model. We have to make sure that this does not impact on the Post Office and that it allows further rollout. All the evidence I have seen so far has pointed to the importance of sustainability for the Post Office and the basic banking services that it provides under the framework agreement.

Moving forward, there are big challenges. At a recent meeting of the All-Party Group on Fair Banking, there were strong calls for the FCA to prevent closures of banks—the last branch in town—until replacement access is in place. There was a feeling that the current approach is frankly too reactive, with a response often coming only after the closure occurs, and there were questions of whether communities losing their final branch should automatically receive a hub, so that there should not have to be a review. The Post Office was very much recognised as a key national asset in supporting access to cash and basic banking services.

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[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly to Amendment 30 in my name, which would introduce a fiduciary-style duty on firms in their dealings with consumers and small businesses.

This group is about affordable credit and consumer protection. The problem that we see time and again is not that firms set out to behave badly but that good intentions drift under pressure to increase revenue, under pressure from internal incentives and, sometimes, under pressure from government to deliver growth. When that drift occurs, the cost is pushed on to consumers and, as I said earlier, passing costs on to the people is not growth in any meaningful, national sense.

Motor finance, the example that keeps on giving, shows this clearly. The FCA did not intend to create misalignment, firms did not intend to breach the law, but because the rules were not anchored in a well-understood legal framework, the system drifted. The FCA’s rules permitted the non-disclosure of commission unless asked. The statute required disclosure. The gap widened over time and nobody noticed until the consequences were enormous.

We see similar patterns in insurance add-ons and premium finance arrangements. These products did not begin as bad faith practices, they began as convenience, but over time, margins accumulated, incentives shifted and the products drifted into a place where the consumer’s interests were no longer the anchor. That is not malice but drift, the same drift that we saw in motor finance, and it happens when rules are not anchored in well-understood legal principles. This is what happens in a rules-based system—that is what we have, however we may pretend—rather than a principles-based system.

Parliament has been here before. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has already explained, when this House supported my noble friend Lord Sharkey’s proposal of a duty of care, the intention was to create a principle, a relationship-based obligation, that firms must not exploit unequal bargaining power or information asymmetry. What emerged instead was the FCA’s consumer duty. Is it valuable? I suppose so, but fundamentally it is a rules-based construct, shaped in part by industry pressure for something that their compliance departments could tick. Rules can be changed, narrowed or reinterpreted. Principles such as duty of care and fiduciary duty are legally understood, durable and resistant to drift.

My amendment does not attempt to rewrite the consumer duty. It would simply provide a well-understood statutory anchor—a benchmark against which to assess products and detect the kinds that end up exploiting imbalance. The test becomes, “Is it fair?”, and not merely, “Is it the next step on a path that might already have drifted?” In other words, it is about fairness versus incrementalism.

[Lord Massey of Hampstead (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as a shareholder and a director of financial services companies in asset management and wealth management.

I have considerable sympathy with the objectives that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, is seeking to advance. Access to affordable credit is a genuine problem in this country, as in many others, and the Committee is right to view financial exclusion as a problem. However, I am unable to support Amendments 28 and 29 on the grounds that the proposed solution will not solve the problem and may in fact exacerbate the issue that the Bill is partly designed to alleviate: excessive and complex regulatory demands on our financial institutions, which are making us less competitive.

My first concern is one of basic commercial economics. Banks and building societies are not lending to certain sections of the community, however deserving they might be, not because of a lack of understanding of the opportunity or a lack of data; they are not serving those clients at scale because the risk-adjusted returns of lending to higher-risk borrowers at affordable interest rates, and indeed the compliance risk of so doing, do not work commercially. A rating framework published by the FCA will not change that calculus, but it creates yet another compliance exercise, another box to be ticked and another issue to be managed without addressing the underlying economic reality that makes such lending unworkable.

My second concern is the risk of unintended consequences. A rule that would rate banks on their willingness to provide credit to financially-excluded populations—in some cases, very high-risk borrowers—could create an implicit incentive to lend more to people and companies who cannot really afford the loan. The amendment contains no credit quality safeguard and no minimum standard of affordability assessment, yet banks could be incentivised to lend just to improve their ratings. The pressure to improve ratings would not be cost free, of course. In practice, banks will not be carrying out this lending for solid financial reasons, so if they feel forced to extend credits into markets with reduced or zero margins, they will seek to restore those margins elsewhere, through higher charges on other products, reduced rates on savings or increased lending spreads in other parts of the business. The cost will not disappear; it will be redistributed invisibly to existing clients, who also deserve protection.

Moreover, I draw noble Lords’ attention to the stated purpose of the Bill, which is to reduce regulatory burden, not add to it. Yet here we are, being invited to add a new mandatory framework, new data collection requirements, new publication obligations and new performance ratings, all enshrined in primary legislation. This is precisely the regulatory ratchet: the cumulative, seemingly endless new measures that damage our competitiveness. The Financial Services Regulation Committee of this House, chaired by my noble friend Lady Noakes, concluded in its report last June that:

“The cumulative burden of regulatory compliance in the UK is perceived to be disproportionately high, diverting resources that could otherwise support … growth”.


As a serving practitioner in the sector, I strongly agree with this finding. Diverting lending from growing businesses to those effectively in financial need is not going to improve our economy. If anything, it will lead to loan losses for the banks and encourage excessive borrowing from those who cannot afford it, while piling even more costs and regulatory obligations on financial firms. We should resist the urge to reach for intervention every time a market imperfection is identified. Not every problem has a regulatory solution. Indeed, those solutions can often have unintended consequences that increase bureaucracy and undermine growth, so I cannot support the amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 33, 35, 37, 42 and 43 in this group. All these amendments, and my Clause 7 not-stand-part question, relate to the FOS and its regime. I will try very hard not to repeat too much of what the noble Lord, Lord Davies, was saying a moment ago. The proposed reforms of the FOS regime are extensive and fundamental, but there is nowhere a clear and convincing explanation of why such fundamental changes are necessary. In fact, I see no real evidence at all of the need for reform on the scale being proposed here.

What we see, looking at the far-reaching proposals in the Bill, is an assault on the four key pillars designed into the FOS by Parliament: independence, speed and simplicity, time limits on bringing complaints, and the “fair and reasonable” test for determining those complaints. Taken together, Part 2 replaces each of those pillars with subordination to the FCA, a rather undefined change to time limits, and a heavy qualification of the “fair and reasonable” test amounting to its entire abandonment. This raises the question of why such a radical reform can be seen as necessary and/or beneficial. At Second Reading, I asked the Minister what evidence there was of systemic failure in the current operation of the FOS, and for evidence, for example, that the FOS was acting as a quasi-regulator. I have had no reply.

The obvious question in all this is: who benefits? The answer is: not the ordinary consumer. My amendments are aimed at eliminating, or at least reducing, the weakening of consumer protection. To that end, my Amendments 33 and 35, to Clause 6, address the time limits for complaints to the FOS, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has dealt with extensively; I agree with most of what he said. What my amendments offer as an alternative to his is that they are perhaps not quite as strong—that might be their virtue. It is often very difficult to get things written into a Bill; it is sometimes easier to deal with them via secondary legislation, as I do rather obliquely.

In Part 2, the Bill proposes other very substantive changes to the way in which the FOS operates. One of these changes, in Clause 7, sets out the circumstances under which the FOS must notify the FCA of a matter relating to a complaint, under which the FOS must request an opinion from the FCA as to the interpretation of FCA rules. It then sets out in detail how consultation should take place on the matter. There really is detail: five whole pages of the Bill set out in great detail the various stages required in the referral process. It adds complexity for no obvious gain and subordinates the FOS’s judgments to the FCA’s. I have no doubt that the byzantine array of subclauses or qualifications will, overall, introduce greater complexity for no foreseeable benefits and will greatly increase the workload of the FCA. The FCA is already under pressure and is planning to absorb the PSR. The last thing we need is the creation of new systems, rules and powers that show no clear promise of benefit, or at least no benefit to the retail complainant.

On necessity, we have to take into consideration whether the current FOS methods are faulty or unproductive. I have seen no compelling evidence that this is the case, only a rather unconvincing summary of the consultation responses. The FOS received 214,000 new complaints in 2025-26. It is projecting a resolution of 207,000 complaints in the coming year, of which 206,000 concern banking and consumer credit companies. It has a target of 70% of cases being resolved within three months and 90% within six. It does not seem as though it is having difficulty operating, and I am not aware of any significant problems for the average consumer. I hear from the industry that the FOS acts inconsistently and that it has strayed into becoming a quasi-regulator, but I have seen no evidence of that, and I am unconvinced by the simple assertion. Taken as a whole, Clause 7 in effect subordinates the FOS to the FCA, removing yet another foundational pillar: independence. We should remove Clause 7.

I turn now to the proposed amendments to Clause 8. I will speak to Amendments 37, 42 and 43, which deal with how a complaint to the FOS is to be determined. This is a controversial matter; the Bill proposes very significant changes. This has already provoked calls to have the whole clause removed from the Bill, and I recognise the strength of feeling behind that.

How the FOS decides on complaints is absolutely critical to its operations and to their general acceptability. At the moment and historically, the FOS rules on complaints on the basis of what is fair and reasonable under all circumstances. The Bill changes that. It says:

“A complaint may be determined in favour of the complainant only if, in the opinion of the Financial Ombudsman … at the time the disputed act or omission occurred, either … the act or omission did not comply with an FCA rule applying to the respondent, or … there was no FCA rule applying to the respondent that related to the act or omission, and the disputed act or omission was not fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case”.


This adds one of two requirements not present now, in addition to the “fair and reasonable” test. In essence, it removes the FOS’s current and critical independent status and reduces the FOS’s scope to a subset of FCA rules. If you ask who benefits from all this, the answer, it seems to me, is not likely to be the consumer.

The small print of the Bill makes the situation for the complainant even less attractive. The Bill specifies a long list of other requirements to be considered in making a determination, most of them tilting the scales in favour of FCA rule-based compliance. This long list includes

“any other matters specified in regulations made by the Treasury”

and the general principle that consumers should take responsibility for their decisions. Here, we are a very long way from the “fair and reasonable under all circumstances” test.

The net effect for the Bill’s proposals will inevitably be to increase bureaucracy and to increase a remoteness from practical circumstances and a reliance on box-ticking procedures. It will convert the independent FOS into a compliant subsidiary of the FCA. We have not seen spelled out any evidenced justification for such a radical narrowing of the FCA’s reach and independence. I ask the Minister again to provide the evidence that supports these radical changes. By “evidence”, I mean hard data, not simply a headcount of consultees’ opinions, as interpreted by HMT.

As I noted at Second Reading, the UK’s financial sector thrives not merely because it is competitive but because it is trusted. For it to be trusted, consumers must have confidence that, when things go wrong, there is an independent, accessible and effective route to redress. We have one of those already: the FOS. My Amendments 37, 42 and 43 would remove the new bureaucratic and complex restrictions, qualifications and subordinations in the Bill. In their place, the amendments would restore a simple and clear operating framework. They would restore the primacy of the “fair and reasonable” test, and they would update the list of things that the ombudsman must or may take into account.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, my Amendment 34 again concerns symmetry of enforcement and redress periods. The Bill introduces a 10-year hard stop on complaints to the Financial Ombudsman Service, but the problem is that the 10-year figure is already riddled with exemptions: for long-dated instruments, for latent harms, for products with extended maturities and for situations where the consumer could not reasonably have known they had a claim. The Government have already conceded that the 10-year period cannot sensibly apply in a wide range of cases. I have a concern that, once Parliament writes “10 years” into statute, that becomes the headline. Consumers may assume they have 10 years, even when they are in one of the many categories where the long stop does not apply. That creates a real risk that people will time themselves out because they believe the headline rather than the detail.

Then there is the deeper structural issue that I have referenced before: firms’ enforcement rights do not end at 10 years. They can enforce debts, pursue arrears, securitise portfolios and benefit from long-tail revenue streams well beyond that period. Yet the consumer’s ability to challenge an unfair relationship or to bring a complaint may fall away far earlier. That is the same kind of asymmetry that I raised before. My solution is that at least the starting point should be that the duration of rights, remedies and enforcement powers for firms must be aligned with the duration of rights and remedies for consumers arising from the same act or relationship.

I have addressed only that aspect of asymmetry in my amendment; I have not attacked the 10-year hard stop and the impact that that might have on consumer perception. My amendment would not interfere with the exemptions that the Government have already accepted. It would simply ensure that, where a firm retains enforcement rights beyond 10 years, in various circumstances, the consumer retains the corresponding right to challenge the fairness of that relationship for the same period—in other words, symmetry. I need not say any more, as we have been around this loop, but it is the same argument in a different place.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 8th June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as a director of Valloop Impact Captive.

The Bill is a chunky addition to the impenetrable forest of financial services legislation, relocating key issues into the even larger forest of regulator rules. Who is it for? It cannot be only for business; it must also be for people, and that is how I will interrogate it. How are people affected when primary legislation is repealed and their rights are transferred to regulators? How will they feel when their MP says, “It’s out of the hands of Parliament, in fact it is often out of the hands of the Treasury and out of the hands of the courts”. That is what Clauses 1 and 17 do.

Fair for people means anchored in law, not left to discretion, not left to drift and not left to five-year strategies. Which? warns that the Bill removes vital protections without clarity on how or whether they will be replaced. Uncertainty for people is also uncertainty for business. While I understand well the pressures on firms and regulators to achieve more certainty over long-tail risks, that cannot justify Parliament removing statutory rights before we know what will replace them.

I share the aim for growth, investment and competitiveness, but growth cannot be built on taking advantage of people. Stripping primary legislation of fundamental protections—both rights and remedies—replacing them with yet-to-be-seen secondary legislation and removing Parliament from its past and future influence is not the route to stable, responsible growth. Three areas illustrate this: consumer credit; access to banking; and the removal of the “have regard” principles.

On consumer credit, the unfair relationship provisions, Section 75, unenforceability rules and protections for vulnerable borrowers are core statutory rights and remedies, not conveniences. The FCA’s conflicting provisions on motor finance, where it originally said there was no need to disclose commission arrangements unless asked, shows that the legislative line set by Parliament was not followed. The FCA did not get that right—will it get it right in future? Before the Consumer Credit Act is hollowed out, will the Government define in the Bill a core of statutory protections—the rights and the associated remedies that make those rights effective—that will remain in primary legislation?

Clause 3, on access to banking, raises a fundamental question about the balance between consultation, ministerial discretion and parliamentary scrutiny. The Government want to consult on access to banking services and then implement the outcome through regulations that amend primary legislation, including with FCA rules as they change over time. Parliament’s role becomes a take-it-or-leave-it vote on an unamendable instrument. Clause 3 could be more tightly framed—for example, linking it expressly to matters already consulted on or by avoiding automatic changes to the law when FCA rules are updated. Access to banking is vital. Members of the other place will not want to tell their constituents, “We have no influence”.

The consistent pattern is that this Government want to do without Parliament in future and eradicate its past. The next eradication of Parliament’s voice is the removal of the “have regard” principles that anchor regulators to law, proportionality and Parliament’s intent. In practice, regulators trivialised them. Then, in their consultation response, they said that these duties were burdensome. The Government did their bidding, removing them from operational decision-making and, fundamentally, the basis on which courts can test that delivery.

Administrative inconvenience is not a constitutional principle. If the issue is frequent or laboured reasoning, that can be solved without removing the duties. British Steel pensions showed why the “have regard” principles must stay. The FCA had full perimeter responsibility, yet the principles—vulnerability, transparency and proportionality—were treated as a box-ticking exercise. Parliament had to drag the issue into the open before the regulator acted. The answer is not to remove the principles on which we were able to drag but to insist that they are applied properly.

Dame Elizabeth Gloster’s report into LCF found the same pattern. The FCA failed to apply the statutory principles that Parliament had set, treated them as peripheral and did not understand the framework in which they were meant to operate. Its response was mechanistic “have regard” tables, which was defensive paperwork, not culture change. If anything, that shows why these duties must remain in law, be effective and not be removed at the regulator’s request.

Before anybody says that the consumer duty does it all, it does not. It does not replace statutory duties or bind the regulator in any way that Parliament can, and it certainly does not give courts the tools they need to test regulatory decisions. It is an FCA rule, changeable by the FCA, not a fair substitute for a statutory duty.

Proportionality, transparency and respect for the size and nature of firms must apply to regulators’ rule-making and operational decisions, not be pushed to high-level strategy with no legal bite. The same is very much true for addressing climate change.

This is not just the view of consumer groups. TheCityUK warns that Clauses 16 to 18 weaken Parliament’s ability to hold regulators to account. The London Market Group is equally clear that downgrading proportionality is a step backwards. When consumer groups, industry and parliamentarians all say the same thing, the Government should listen. I do not know how the Treasury has been suckered into suggesting that this is merely administrative, but I am not buying it. These are protections for people—the fiduciary bargain.

To conclude, this Bill has ambition but it removes safeguards, hands too much to regulators, disfranchises Parliament and leaves people without rights and without the remedies that make those rights enforceable and effective, grounded in law. That same uncertainty hurts responsible business, and I will submit amendments on which I hope we can work together.

Listed Investment Companies (Classification etc) Bill [HL]

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 15th November 2024 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

That the Bill be now read a second time.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, for the record, I declare my interest as a non-executive director of the London Stock Exchange.

My Bill requires regulators to recognise the inherent characteristics of listed investment companies, and has been inspired by two things. First, the problem currently happening is that legislation and industry standards have forced misleading disclosures to be presented to investors in closed-end listed investment companies. The format imposed tells investors that they will themselves incur the cost of the fund management fees of listed investment companies when, in truth, those fees are paid by the company and are already reflected in the market share price. This suggestion of additional costs has frightened investors away, leading to the loss of tens of billions of pounds of potential investments with resulting economic damage to the country.

Secondly, in conversation with Treasury officials about the statutory instrument to replace PRIIPs some time ago, I mentioned flagging the inherent characteristics of closed-end listed investment companies. They said that they did not know how to define them, so I set myself that task. In honing the formulation, I am grateful for the assistance of market participants involved in listed investment companies: the London Stock Exchange; the Association of Investment Companies; and Nigel Farr and his legal team at HSF, who have given their time generously and voluntarily. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, who has joined me on this issue since the summer of 2023 and whose Private Member’s Bill on similar issues was passed by this House in the previous Session but lost due to the election.

I thank the staff of the Public Bill Office for their time this summer in assisting with the structure and organisation of the Bill into proper parliamentary form. They really are quite remarkable.

My dialogue with the Government and HMT was interrupted by the election, departmental purdah, the change of Government and the Budget preparations. I sent a draft to officials and raised it in our debate on the King’s Speech. I was promised a meeting but, due to the circumstances, it did not happen—although the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, has stated more than once that I made a compelling case on the wider topic.

In September, the Government tabled draft statutory instruments for exemption from PRIIPs and for consumer composite investments to replace PRIIPs. The FCA issued a forbearance statement. However, the remedial changes expected by those actions have been resisted by the open-ended fund sector and some investment platforms insisting that there must be the same format of disclosure for closed-end listed investment companies as for open-end funds, despite their different structure.

Comparison is sought because portfolios held in the different structures sometimes consist of similar selections of listed equities, and they want to compare the fund management charges. However, other portfolios of listed investment companies bear more resemblance to listed conglomerates or listed companies holding property, and still others are more like the portfolios of venture capital companies. In fact nowadays the majority of the sector by number are the alternate portfolios investing in infrastructure, clean energy, social buildings and growth companies.

The economic effect of blocked investment in the alternate portfolios is substantial and the investment is truly lost, whereas equities can still be traded by other means. Nevertheless, that does not negate the fact that investors holding equities via listed investment companies have not enjoyed the shared performance that they would have done without the current market disruption, causing discounts at record levels.

The wisdom of the way in which comparisons are to be done is passing into the hands of the FCA and its consultation procedures. However, the clear fact now is that investors buy and hold shares of listed investment companies. Shares are traded on the London Stock Exchange as for any other listed company, subject to all the regulation, reporting and transparency requirements of listing. That is the undeniable starting point.

When investors want to cash their investment, they sell their shares on the market. There is no buying or selling of the underlying investments that the company holds, be that other equities or wind farms. That is the brilliance of the structure: liquid, tradable shares for the investor while enabling the long-term underlying investment necessary for illiquid things such as infrastructure and growth companies. The closed-endedness and listed structure enables that, and it is defined under listing rules, yet presently the very characteristics that bring this about are ignored. My Bill would correct that.

The meat of the Bill is Clause 2, requiring regulators’ rules, guidance, policy and interpretation to take account of this already regulated closed-end listed structure, most notably that, first, the shares are publicly traded capital market instruments. That may seem obvious but it has consequences, one of which is that it does not qualify for the Financial Services Compensation Scheme because it is different from a fund.

Secondly, the value of the investment is the price at which the company’s shares are traded on the relevant market. Again, that is different from a fund, and as true and obvious as for any other listed share, yet investors are being told something else.

Thirdly, shareholders have no individual right to a proportional share of the net asset value of the underlying assets, nor the right to have their shares repurchased or redeemed at a time of their choosing. This is another big difference from owning units in an open-ended fund. Indeed, this characteristic means that they were never properly included in the PRIIPs legislation, as evidenced by the new SI for consumer composite investments, which has changed the definition to additionally reference shares. I am not sure whether it is intentional, but they seem to have covered all listed shares.

Fourthly, management expenses and all recurring and non-recurring operating expenses are deductions from the net asset value of the company, and are not charges paid directly by the shareholder. Again, that is true and obvious if you think of holding shares in AstraZeneca, BP or Tesco, yet shareholders of listed investment trusts have been told that these costs will be taken again from the value of their investment—that is, off their shares—because of this wrong comparison with funds. Given that even regulators have previously fallen into mistaken statements, not heeding the inherent characteristics that I have explained, and that the eventual corrective actions by the Government and the FCA are still being resisted by the main competing industry, elaborating these facts is by no means redundant.

Clause 3 contains amendments to the legislation which is the root of the misleading information. This clause is largely redundant because of similar changes made by the Government in the PRIIPs SI. However, the points in Clause 3 are slightly different, are not contradictory and add more clarity to what the Government have done. I beg to move.

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[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I thank those noble Lords who have spoken in favour of the Bill. I welcome the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson: that I phone up the Chancellor and explain how much money has been missing.

Actually, it is quite interesting looking at the numbers, because there has been much celebration of the fact that the investment forum garnered £62 billion of investment. Well, £40 billion and counting has been lost because of this problem. If we wait until the FCA has come out with its rules and they have all been looked at, commented on, implemented and phased in—because it is going to take that long before they actually have hard effect—we are into 2027. That £62 billion will have been long overtaken by what has not been invested through listed investment companies. It is a question of, you can take a horse to water, but you cannot force it to drink.

Strangely—or not so strangely, as the case may be—the competing industry of open-ended funds is swaying platforms and others to say that they have to continue with the old way and ignore the forbearance or exemption, because the consumer duty requires them to have those numbers on the front page, which is where you go to on the platform. That is their interpretation of consumer duty, so they delist them. If the listed investment company tells the truth and says, “Dear investor, you don’t have to pay these fees—they are already embedded in the company costs”, it is barred from the market.

I am sorry to tell the Minister, and the Treasury officials who maybe helped with some notes, that they are behind the times. It has not worked. They can say it is a matter for the FCA and the industry, but the FCA will say that it is a matter for the industry. I really did not think that the conduct and stability of our markets had been handed to the industry. I thought it was up there as the No. 1 priority of the regulator, and that if the regulator did not do it, the Government had the right to investigate and launch an inquiry. It is not good enough.

I know they have tried. It took us the best part of two years to get there, and yes, something has happened, but there is a competitive aspect to this that is distorting. If that continues, this Bill is a vehicle that might prove useful. I wish it were redundant, but it would be useful if it hung around for a while, for officials to draw inspiration from—which is where it actually originated. For now, it would be a good move to retain its availability and see if it becomes useful. Therefore, I beg to move.

Bill read a second time and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th April 2023 Grand Committee

The Government intend to determine via secondary regulations how much of the data collected should be published, and we will settle on a way forward only after comprehensive engagement with business. Companies House and the Department for Business and Trade will continue to consider and engage stakeholders on these risks as secondary legislation develops. There is a broad existing power in Section 468 of the Act that enables changes to be made to Part 15 of the Act through regulations, subject to the affirmative procedure. I therefore ask my noble friend Lord Sarfraz not to oppose this clause.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

Regarding the position of micro-entities, I spent a great deal of my time as a micro-entity in a partnership. I did not avail myself of limited liability provisions but, when people do avail themselves of the privilege of limited liability, they must recognise that there is an extra public interest requirement upon them because they have been freed from the prospect of personal ruin. Nowadays, we tend to forget about that balance—that bargain—and I just put in a plea that that is not forgotten. There is a bit of a quid pro quo for limited liability when it comes to transparency because you have to protect the public from otherwise unscrupulous people who just willy-nilly go easily bankrupt.

[Lord Johnson of Lainston (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her intervention. In discussions about the Bill, that philosophy has been raised. I may have mentioned on our previous day in Committee—I certainly mentioned it in private—that, given the very large number of companies registered in this country, one has to ask whether they are all necessary for the function that they purport to perform. Many individuals may be better off as sole traders or in other forms of partnership that do not need to go through these registration processes.

I am also aware of the privileges that limited liability offers, as a result of which there is a fair exchange in terms of the amount of information to be released. I absolutely agree with these principles that we have discussed. However, in this specific instance, it is absolutely right to have a thorough and deep consultation to make sure that through our actions we are not prohibiting people from running legitimate businesses and at the same time compromising their personal privacy or security. That is a sensible debate to have. The point, which is not necessarily specific to this amendment, is about the information that we collect. The Government are absolutely committed to ensuring that we collect the right amount of information so that we can increase fundamental corporate transparency and reduce abuse of the system.

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[Lord Agnew of Oulton (Con)]

My Lords, I apologise; I should have dealt with my amendments when I stood up originally. I will deal with the three that I think are relevant now: Amendments 49, 51 and 63.

I want to stress to noble Lords just how broken the system is at the moment. The ACSPs are not being supervised adequately. A 2021 review found that 81% of professional body supervisors were not supervising their members effectively; just to add to the confusion, there are more than 20 supervising bodies. Half of these supervisors were found not to be ensuring that their members take timely action to improve their money laundering procedures. A third of those procedures still do not have an effective separation between advocacy and regulatory functions.

Let me drop into some details here. Essentially, HMRC marks its own homework on this once a year. In its report last year, it owned up to at least six problems. Regulation 58 of the MLR—the money laundering regulations—requires HMRC to carry out fit and proper testing. This year’s assessment revealed HMRC’s failure to keep pace with the requirement to register a business within 45 days, with its performance worsening over the year, down from 78% in 2021 to 70% in 2021-22. In practice, this means that more businesses—in fact, nearly a third of them—are operating outside the scope of the supervision for longer than in previous years.

There is an issue with recruitment and staff training; I will quote from its report in a minute. There also continue to be delays in publishing sectoral guidance for businesses under supervision. The volume of face-to-face visits in its investigations has collapsed. Yes, we have had Covid, but we are beyond Covid now. There were 1,265 face-to-face visits in 2018-19 but last year, in 2021-22, that was down to 289. Lastly, HMRC has censuring and injunction powers that it is not using. These things just are not happening.

Just read the report that it has written, which I think is a master of the English language. It states:

“The AMLS team largely has effective managers”.


What is that saying? It also states:

“However, it is clear that performance is not consistent across the team, which has made it harder at times to make improvements to supervision”.


Those are its own words. It goes on to announce a case study, which happens to be on TCSPs. It had a concentrated week—one week—in which it suddenly found that it could issue 12 warnings and one penalty. Also, 23 compliant businesses were identified as needing regulation and 14 cases were identified as requiring further investigation—and that is in just one week.

Let us look at who is keeping an eye on HMRC: the Treasury. Every year, it produces a supervision report entitled Anti-money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism. In it, the Treasury says that, despite some improvements, improvement is required in several areas. It stated:

“Many PBSs had not implemented a risk-based approach that effectively prioritised their AML supervisory and enforcement work”


and highlighted

“Gaps and inconsistencies in many PBSs’ approaches to information sharing”

and

“Gaps in most PBSs’ enforcement frameworks”.

It continued by saying that

“the prioritisation of supervisory activity in high-risk areas, such as Trust and Company Service Provider … supervision”

is weak, so on and on we go. I know that my noble friend the Minister will pour balm on my words and say that everything will be all right, but this is a once-in-a-decade opportunity to deal with these things.

The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, touched on some of the bad things coming out of this. I will give a couple of examples. In 2020, TCSPs played a crucial role in something called the FinCEN files. There was one example of a single formation agent setting up 385 companies. An analysis of these companies showed that just nine of them were linked to $4 billion-worth of missing income.

We then come to the Pandora papers, which came out only two years ago. Owners of more than 1,500 UK companies were using 716 offshore firms, including individuals accused of corruption. Offshore companies could be traced to a variety of jurisdictions. Most of these—678 of the 716—were registered in the BVI. All these companies were set up by just 14 offshore TCSPs, five of them owned by Russian citizens.

On and on we go, which is why my amendment tries to say, “Stop. Do not let this legislation take effect until we have cleaned up this sector”. I would be keen to hear from my noble friend the Minister why the Government are taking such a complacent approach to this. It is really not difficult or expensive. As the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, said, we are a laughing stock around the world, being called Londonistan, Londongrad or whatever else anyone chooses to use. We have this huge conduit of these offshore entities, which are feeding all this stuff in because they all want to use English law. We are a wonderful place for them, but they have to play by the rules as well. It is a whole ecosystem and this Bill is the opportunity to clean it up. I beg to move.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I agree with an awful lot of what the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, said—in fact, with all of it. He laid out in some detail the fact that anyone could be one of these verification agencies, because there are 20 supervisors of all kinds of businesses where there could potentially be money laundering. It might be an accountant, a company formation agent or an estate agent. All kinds of people could become an authorised corporate service provider.

It is then quite important to be able to do the analysis to find out whether some are shadier than others, and whether there is a connection between businesses discovered to be less than spick and span and, perhaps, the precise identity—or maybe just the nature—of the type of verification agent. What on earth is the reason for keeping this secret? Who wants to keep it secret? Maybe it is HMRC, because it does not want us to know how bad it is, following on from the disclosure of the noble Lord, Lord Agnew. That is about the only explanation I can come up with, because it is such a vital piece of information. It makes me suspicious as to why it has to be secret. The other side of that is: who will be privy to the information? Presumably it will be Companies House. Will special checks be going on that it does not want us to know about? It is hard to imagine a reason, so the mood of the Committee on this is quite clear.

Most of the rest follows: I have added my name to some of these amendments but could have added it to them all. I would be curious to know the likelihood of the types of organisations that will be verifying identities getting penalties for when they get it wrong. If landlords get it wrong and rent out to illegal immigrants there are quite severe penalties, so what are the penalties for people who have a quick flick of the passport, think that is okay and register the company? If we do not know who they are, what are the penalties? Do they face penalties similar to those that landlords face, for example, when they have to do checks? It is very important. Most of us have had PEP checks, unfortunately. We have probably been to all kinds of places and had all kinds of documents looked through. I cannot say that it has been really thorough, even within banks. How thorough will this be and what happens when it is got wrong?

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To the question from the noble Lord, Lord Browne, on the consultation, we consulted widely with the ACSPs and numerous stakeholders; I think we had more than 1,000 consultation pieces to consider for this Bill. So we have been closely engaged with them and I am contented to go back and continue engaging with them on this single point. I would be delighted to return to the Committee with any specific reasons that are raised so that we can debate them and decide whether they are legitimate. I hope noble Lords hear the principle on which I am committed.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

On that same point, following on from what the Minister said about the vast majority of these organisations being good, trustworthy and so on, is it that the risk of one mistake being associated with them, because their name would be available, means that people would not want to do it? I asked this associated question: what is the consequence or penalty for getting an identification verification wrong? I made the parallel with the rental side of things, where landlords are expected to be able to know whether they are looking at forged documents and that kind of thing. Are we trying to protect the reputations of organisations in case they make the odd mistake but it blows them out of the water? I am still grasping for reasons but I wondered whether that was part of the response. It is the inverse of what the Minister was referencing.

[Lord Johnson of Lainston (Con)]

I appreciate the noble Baroness’s intervention. I do not have an answer to the question as to whether there was concern over reputational damage but I personally do not see that as a particularly significant reason to withhold one’s identity. If you are an auditor of a corporate account, your name is public. As I am sure we have found with some auditors relating to some national political parties, their embarrassment will be palpable but at least it will be public for us all to see.

To answer the noble Baroness’s other point on penalties, just so she is aware, it is an offence falsely to confirm the identity of an individual. I am unable to make comparisons with the private landlord sector but it is very clear that falsely identifying an individual would be a serious offence. That is part of the legislation we are providing for.

On Amendment 50A, I consider that the measures included in and added to the Bill provide a significant amount of transparency. I will come on to discuss that in a moment. To look at the process that allows an individual to become an authorised corporate service provider, they have to be supervised under the money laundering regulations. They are already required under those regulations to take appropriate steps to identify and assess the risk that their customers would have on their business. Although I understand the noble Lord’s intention, I do not think that this is the right place to consider publishing information about risk assessment processes. In our view, it is beyond the role of the registrar to gather and store this information, or to question it.

The right place to consider the quality of risk assessments is through money laundering supervision. Supervisors are already empowered to compel this information and take enforcement action against firms found to be non-compliant. I have well heard the comments around the money laundering process and whether the supervision regime is adequate. A review is being undertaken at the moment, which is raised in one of the amendments we are about to cover. It makes sense to include discussion of how ACSPs are monitored in that review.

I turn to the suggestions from the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, around standard industrial classification, or SIC, codes and the publication of this information. SIC codes allow Companies House to track what a business does and are used primarily to indicate emerging trends and the strength of the UK economy. I support the noble Lord’s intention to have clear information about the activities that companies are undertaking. Through the Bill, the Government are extending the requirement to provide a SIC code to limited partnerships. As my noble friend Lord Leigh rightly pointed out, such provision is already obligatory for companies. Companies House already runs reports on how SIC codes are being used and will be capable of filtering these to show only the SIC codes of companies that were registered by ACSPs, for example. I therefore consider that requiring ACSPs to provide this information as well would be duplicative.

I also consider it disproportionate to require ACSPs to provide annual reports to the registrar on the SIC codes associated with the companies that they have registered. It is possible that thousands of ACSPs will be registered and it would not be possible for these reports to be regularly monitored. This is a concern in terms of the cost and burden to Companies House.

Furthermore—this is a very relevant point for me that has been made; it does not negate the necessity to assess the process of SICs but it is important in the context of this debate—a company’s SIC code can and often does change. There is a great deal of—I do not necessarily know the right word—greyness about how people classify their business activities. In my investment career, I looked at a tank company that was classified as a consumer discretionary and I saw a military defence business that had a lingerie subsidiary. I am still trying to work out whether that was related to distracting the enemy but the point is that, in many cases, it is very difficult to be absolutely certain about the occupation or classification of a business.

On noble Lords’ comments about companies obfuscating their actions, this amendment does not necessarily provide a solution. It is not necessarily the role of ACSPs or Companies House to determine the specific validity of every claim made; that would be extremely difficult, particularly where there are grey areas around activities. That change may or may not be presented by an ACSP; it would be unreasonable to expect an ACSP to be responsible for monitoring this.

I am therefore not clear what benefits this amendment would bring and request that the noble Lord does not press it, but I am happy to have a further discussion about SIC codes if they fall within the Department for Business and Trade, which they probably do. At the same time, I am happy to have further discussions with noble Lords about the review of money laundering processes and the supervision environment.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 53; I hope to be fairly brief. It is related, in a way, to Amendment 48A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, which we spoke about earlier. In effect, it attacks the issue of unique identifiers from the opposite direction.

Clause 67(3) ensures that the unique identifiers allocated to companies and others, including ACSPs, are not available on the public register. I was rather surprised to find this. My amendment is really a probing amendment to find out the rationale for hiding unique identifiers and discuss whether that is the right thing to do. It seems to me that the unique identifier would be a helpful tool to assist civil society organisations, journalists, analysts and, indeed, AML regulators to discover trends and connections in the information held on companies on the register.

One person can easily have a number of versions of their name—A Jones, Andrew Jones, AJ Jones and so on. It is not necessarily dishonest. I have two names myself: my title and my real name. I hope that that is not dishonest. My amendment would make it much easier to search using the unique identifier and would avoid the problems of potentially having multiple names or versions of names and people being missed off. It would allow an AML regulator quickly to search for all situations where a particular ACSP has acted, or a journalist to identify ACSPs that act regularly for companies in particular industries, and to be sure that they have caught all the instances.

When I met the Minister previously, for which I thank him again, he explained that the unique identifier is used as the login for the relevant entity. If that is the case, I understand why it should not be public, but I strongly question whether that is sensible. Very few organisations would use a number such as a unique identifier for login purposes; it would go against commonly accepted security practices. The Government do not do it in other systems, as far as I am aware. Would it not make more sense for the unique identifier to be public, and therefore useful, to allow the greatest transparency that I have described and to have a more secure method of logging into Companies House accounts? I beg to move.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I will speak briefly on this amendment because key to it is: what is the purpose of the unique identifier? Perhaps like the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, I thought that it was like the resource identifier that you use for searching. I know that if you search on my name, you do not find all my directorships. I keep amending my name to try to make sure that they are all the same, but you still cannot find them in Companies House, so I was thinking that it was a better way than names of finding out all the companies that people were involved in, and so on.

I can see that, if it is more of a login approach, that might be different, but that then begs the question: is there not a better way of identifying companies and individuals that works on the searches? If you are searching to see whether somebody is doing something in a different company, or how many directorships they have, simply going by name means that too often there are minor variations, and it will not flag up what you are looking for. Like the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, I am curious about what the purpose of this identifier is, and therefore why it is confidential.

[Lord Johnson of Lainston (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for his Amendment 53. Unique identifiers are unique codes allocated on an individual basis. The Bill will allow unique identifiers to support the effective operation of identity verification, such as allowing Companies House to link an individual’s verified identity across multiple roles and companies. I like to look at it as operating as a username. That is important; it is not a public but a private number that the individual will have allocated to them.

I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, that this amendment is not necessary to achieve the objectives that they have described—although I am concerned about the noble Baroness’s difficulty in tracing herself in the records of Companies House. This will be a good test as to whether the systems work. Companies House will be making changes to how members of the public view the register so that, although the unique identifiers themselves will not be public, it will be possible to see accurately connections between individuals and entities. That is the central point of the reforms being made to Companies House. This includes how many companies for which an individual is a director or person with significant control.

From my own experience of using the Companies House database, I come up under the various different forms of my name: D Johnson, Dominic Johnson, DRA Johnson or whatever it may be. It works in that instance, but it is absolutely right for noble Lords to be concerned about whether the system will work. We have undertaken to make sure that it does. It is the cornerstone of our activities and everything that the Bill points towards.

Regulations made under Section 1082 will govern the use of unique identifiers. We intend to prevent individuals from having more than one unique identifier, as the name denotes, and anyone submitting a statement with an incorrect unique identifier will commit a false filing offence. Furthermore, the primary purpose of a unique identifier is to allow its owner to communicate securely and privately with Companies House; as I said, it should be looked upon as a username. Unique identifiers can be considered personal data so making them public could expose the registrar to data protection breach risks, in the same way that it would be inappropriate to publish individuals’ national insurance numbers.

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[Lord Garnier (Con)]

My Lords, I, too, have put my name to my noble friend’s Amendment 72. He is quite right: in business, what gets measured gets done. That is also true of politics: one has only to set down a requirement and have it followed up and measured to see an improvement in the performance of a government department or a public authority such as Companies House. I entirely agree with the thoughts put forward by my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, in support of this amendment, and by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, in addressing his amendment.

For my own part, I do not necessarily think that we need to see the terms of these amendments set out in legislation, but we do need a public recognition that the elements that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and my noble friend Lord Agnew spoke about are publicly recognised as goals and things that will be measured and reported on annually.

Nowadays, annual reports are made not only by company chairmen. The Lord Chief Justice makes an annual report, as do various other public figures dotted about our constitution, so we should not run shy of requiring that. Indeed, Clause 187 makes clear that the Secretary of State will make a report. The main thing to do is to get the information out there regularly and publicly so that the public know what is being done in their name.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I support what others have said. If we take these amendments as essentially saying that Clause 187 needs to be amplified, I, like the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, do not see the reason for sunsetting in 2030. It is not that far away given that, although this might commence immediately on Royal Assent, there are quite a lot of regulations and other things—and I do not know what the timescale of those will be—before everything is up and running.

As I see it, Clause 187 is about monitoring progress, getting everything up and running and seeing that it is okay, then just saying “that is fine”, but I think there is a case for ongoing monitoring to see what is changing and whether there is a need for any further update. The annual report seems to be a vehicle for that and, like others, I say that that is a good reason for it to continue, rather than being sunsetted, and if need be, perhaps to list a few more things that it will cover. Clause 187 could stay silent on that as it is quite broad, talking about

“the implementation and operation of Parts 1 to 3”.

If you took away the sunset clause, I could probably be quite satisfied.

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

I briefly thank my noble friend for Clause 187. It is a valid attempt to achieve some of the aims of these amendments, although I wholeheartedly agree that the sunset clause is puzzling. I ask my noble friend to bear in mind that the expertise being offered by this Committee and Amendment 65 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, as well as the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Agnew, are attempting to assist the Government in achieving the objectives that we all wish to see by injecting the difference between theory and practice. The Government want these measures to succeed. The Committee is trying to suggest that there are, in practice, a number of measures identified in each of these amendments—which, of course, could be combined—to guide those overseeing or producing the reports about what the important elements will be if we want to make this work well.

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[Lord Johnson of Lainston (Con)]

As always, I offer my thanks to noble Lords for their participation and to the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Ponsonby, and the noble Baroness, Lady Blake, for their Amendment 64. I also thank my noble friend Lord Agnew, my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier and the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, as well as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for their Amendment 72—if I have got that correct. These amendments address reporting requirements in similar ways and are very relevant and important.

I agree that it is important that Parliament is informed about the implementation and delivery of these reforms. That is why the other place agreed to add an amendment to this effect on Report, which noble Lords have discussed. Companies House already reports on many of the items set out in these new amendments and, in many cases, actually goes much further, either through its annual report or via quarterly and annual statistical releases. Legislating to duplicate this, given the new reporting duty at Clause 187, seems unnecessary.

It is important that any report is holistic and of use to Parliament and the wider public. It should provide the necessary context to facilitate an informed view of performance, which would be difficult based solely on the raw data that these amendments propose. However, I agree that some of the new items of data identified in these amendments could be of interest. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, raised some specific points, which I believe are already covered in part in some of the quarterly filings. In any event, if they are not, they are certainly worthy of discussion. I am happy to explore with Companies House officials how they might incorporate these into their reporting without the need for this statutory requirement.

It may be worth returning to some of the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, to cover some of the key points raised. Under Amendment 72, each report must

“provide annual data on … the number of cases referred by the registrar to law enforcement bodies and anti-money-laundering supervisors”.

As I understand it, this is already enabled via the Commons amendment and is expected to be included. Also in Amendment 72, each report must provide annual data on

“the total number of company incorporations to the registrar, and the number of company incorporations by authorised corporate service providers to the registrar”.

These incorporations are published quarterly via the statistical release. The amendment says that each report must

“detail all instances in which exemption powers have been used by the Secretary of State”—

which is also covered by the government amendment—and

“confirm that the registrar has sufficient financial resources to meet its objectives”.

The registrar’s resources will continue to come from fees, which will be set according to how much activity Ministers want to be undertaken. Also, each report must

“provide annual data on … the number of companies that have been struck off by the registrar”

and

“the number and value of fines”.

Removals from the register are already reported on quarterly. The number and value of late-filing penalties are published in annual management information tables.

That just gives the Committee reassurance that there is already a great deal of detail published, and we will be looking to publish more. I look forward to a discussion with noble Lords on specific areas that we can cover; I am sure that my officials are looking forward to those discussions. This is all about the sort of data we provide that allows us to run an effective and transparent company system in this country. But I am very reluctant to legislate specifically, according to these amendments, given what I have said and our commitment to making sure that we are publishing useful information.

I will cover the comments from some of your Lordships relating to the supposed sunsetting of requirements to report. As I understand it—I may have misunderstood, but I hope I have not—the purpose of the clauses on six-month and annual reporting relates to the implementation of changes in Companies House that will bring it up to the standards at which we wish to see it operating. At that point, the reports will be included in annual and/or regular reports. It is not that reporting ends, but that it becomes commonplace to report on the data rather than necessarily on the changes that we are instigating to Companies House. I am happy to clarify that further, if my description was not accurate enough.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

Clause 187 says

“on the implementation and operation”.

Therefore, I hoped there would be ongoing commentary and reporting on the operation. I accept that the sunset clause implies that it is about transient stuff, but if the operation—it must be the ongoing operation because it might break down; we do not know—is included in other reports, I would be satisfied. If it is not, I suggest that we need to keep Clause 187 going.

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[Lord Johnson of Lainston (Con)]

I believe we will have further discussions on that point, yes.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

When the Minister replied to me he used the word “data” rather than “operation”. There is a difference between data and operation. This might not be something that he can instantly resolve, but the ongoing concern is about not just the data but the operation of Companies House. Those are two different things.

[Lord Johnson of Lainston (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for that point. There are two separate components to that, one of which is the data and/or requirements tabled in these amendments, which are relevant to understanding the activities of Companies House and ensuring that we have a comprehensive assessment of what they are. The second point is that there is the assumption that, over the next six or seven years, Companies House will have reached its operational capability to deliver on providing the relevant data, so we have a good deal of time to assess whether that has been achieved. There is a potential for Companies House to achieve its ambitions before 2030, at which point it would settle into business as usual reporting.

--- Later in debate ---

I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Browne, who mentioned the Prime Minister’s five objectives. I am delighted when a Member of the Opposition refers to the Prime Minister in such complimentary terms. There are four objectives in this Bill, in Clause 1. Let us get them right. Let us fund them and ensure that the way in which we create and enact this Bill enables Companies House and our law enforcement authorities to do a real job—and do it properly and quickly.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I signed the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Agnew. I am generally in favour of what has been said already regarding the need to increase the funding for Companies House. I was a member of the fraud committee. When we were looking at Companies House, we were astonished that we still had this ridiculously small registration fee. We thought that Companies House needed more to upgrade in the way now envisaged in this Bill; we did recommend an increase.

We were also taken to some extent with the notion of hypothecation of funds. One might say that nobody likes that idea because they think that they are getting perverse incentives and things are going wrong from that perspective, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, elaborated. However, the fact is that our prosecutors are underresourced. When recommending these hypothecations, some us may feel that it is a last resort. Well, that is what it is; there is no other way to get the sort of money that will allow adequate prosecutions into the system.

From my point of view, it does not matter how you get the money in. We have to accept that we need better-funded regulators and better-funded prosecutors in general. It is no coincidence that, whenever there is any kind of scandal, as happens a lot in financial services—about which I know rather more—it is always in the United States that they manage to prosecute them. That is because they have this hypothecation of fines, they have lots of money and they can pin them down. We cannot do that for all kinds of reasons. We cannot keep on being the poor, weak cousins where you will never be for the high jump, you will never be prosecuted and we are still the financial laundromat.

Hypothecation may not be ideal; the Treasury would lose the money, of course, so it would still come from the public purse. Well, why not put it there adequately from the public purse in the first place? I do not see the raising of Companies House fees to £100 as money for legal enforcement; I see it as raising money so that Companies House can be much better and much more advanced and do all the things it needs to do, perhaps more quickly, because a lot of expenditure will be required on technology. It is ridiculous to have this £10; it could be £100, and we could deal with the issue of getting decent enforcement separately.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, to take up the noble Baroness’s final point on technology, in the very helpful session we had yesterday—unfortunately the Minister could not be there—we were provided with some written information about the use of technology that was going to develop. I asked about artificial intelligence. Either in the course of answering these amendments or generally, could the Minister assist us as to how, with this increasing amount of information that Companies House will now have, artificial intelligence will allow it and the prosecuting authorities to have a great deal more information to put two and two together, which will assist with this legislation’s overall objectives?

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 27th March 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)]

When my noble friend the Minister replies to this debate, I wonder whether he would consider accepting the amendment in due course with a de minimis size qualification. This would be quite onerous for a large number of private companies, such as family businesses, where ownership changes quite regularly, and small businesses that have enough to do without worrying about perfectly innocent share transfers. For larger companies—public companies in particular—this may not be too onerous. I remind the House of my comments at Second Reading that the Quoted Companies Alliance had calculated that the average public company accounts now comprise 95,000 words—no one is keen to add any more words to that. I would certainly not wish to see this apply to private and SME businesses.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I support these amendments. I have listened to what the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, has said and will perhaps think about that. I should declare my interest as a director of the London Stock Exchange. At 5% ownership, there are significant things that can be done: if it is a public company, at 5% you can apply to the court to prevent it going private. That is a significant power, and we ought to know that it is applied properly. I guess the court would find out if you were not who you said you were; nevertheless, you might be masquerading as such and could still have influence—you could call general meetings and propose resolutions. These are all events that could have a significant effect on companies of all sizes. I tend to feel, therefore, that other shareholders need to know that things have been properly verified.

I have sympathy for the SME angle and will think about it further. However, just because you are small does not mean that you do not need to know some of these things, including who might have an exercisable right which you know has been verified. I would probably follow suit in the decision on persons with significant control: if you are going to exempt SMEs, they should be exempted for both; if they are going to be included, they should be included in both. I am still veering towards including them, simply because it is a substantial power. There are plenty of private SMEs in which people have significant sums invested, and I do not really see that they should be protected any less from not having full awareness of who really holds these powers to do things or of whether they are sheltering a nominee.

At the moment, my tendency is to support both of these amendments as they stand, with the caveat that I will go away and think a bit about whether this would be too onerous for SMEs. We have to remember, however, that the “M”s of SMEs can be quite big.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

I am not wholly convinced that what you would be required to do under this amendment is very onerous. I remember looking at this when we were examining the desirability of transparency in relation to ownership of shares. Presuming bad actors—although this is, I hope, infrequently the case—it is very easy for someone to, as it were, redistribute their shares to smaller packages if they wanted to conceal their identity. I am not saying that that is what people do most of the time, but it would be more difficult if there were an obligation to disclose of the sort contained in this amendment.

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[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, to add to the point that has been made, if the burden of proof is going to be changed so the defendant has to prove his innocence, it is essential that the clause be carefully drafted to make that clear. Otherwise a judge who is trying to direct a jury really does not know how to do it.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I am struggling, as are others, with the wording in subsection (2) about

“every officer of the entity who is in default”

because I do not know what “default” means. In most of these circumstances, this may be something that is filled in by the company secretary and they do not necessarily get the approval of everybody who might end up being in default. I would like to know more about that.

In his introduction, the Minister said this was bringing the Bill into line with what was in the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022. I am afraid I have been rather busy on other Bills so maybe I have not read everything that I should have about this one. I did the last economic crime Bill but I am not sure what is being referenced there, will the Minister elaborate on what this is being brought into line with because I am a bit confused? If what is said here is exactly the same as what has been said in that Act then we also have a mistake there that we need to correct if its wording is as ambiguous as this.