Trade Bill

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th October 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judd (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, this is an important amendment. On matters of the environment, there has been a lot of rhetoric and aspirational thought. There are international agreements to which we are, I hope, firmly signed up. However, the point about moving forward on the environment is that we need muscle. We should be talking far more about how our trade policy can assist in fulfilling our obligations under existing environmental policy. It is too easy to begin a process of erosion whereby, for reasons of rationalisation or whatever, we begin to backslide. The amendment is a step towards ensuring that that cannot happen.

Part of our obligation in environmental policy is to ensure that the burdens that fall and the challenges that come to third-world countries are given pride of place. For that reason, we must regard fulfilling our obligations towards third-world countries as very much part of fulfilling our environmental obligations. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, for having introduced this amendment and it will certainly have my support.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I apologise for being a late newcomer to Trade Bill proceedings, but other Bills and committees have conspired against my taking part thus far. I want to speak in favour of both these amendments and to explain Amendment 83A, in the name of my noble friend Lady Kramer and to which my name is added in the latest Marshalled List.

Whereas Amendment 77 relates to TRA advice, Amendment 83A relates to the economic interest test used as part of determining the final level of trade remedy measures. In the test, there is analysis of a range of socioeconomic matters in order to conclude whether the application of a trade remedy that is otherwise justified by virtue of dumping, subsidy or a surge in imports and that is causing harm to UK industry is also in the UK’s overall interest. Although the test broadly follows the EU’s Union interest test, as commented in the Brick Court Chambers blog on 24 September, it

“has the potential to play a strengthened and more prominent role than has been the case to date with the EU”.

I would add that, perhaps obviously, it can be more granular when applied to an individual country.

Under the economic interest test, the remedy can be diminished or set aside if stakeholder interests harmed by the remedy disproportionately outweigh those of the industry harmed, along with its related stakeholder effects. Amendment 83A requires that environmental obligations be part of that analysis. It is a probing amendment, not least because it would need to be put into Schedule 5, as well as Schedule 4, to the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act in order to cover safeguarding measures as well, but I am sure that noble Lords understand the point.

Paragraph 25 of Schedule 4 to that Act lists the things that must be taken into account in the economic interest test. These are: industry, consumers, geographic areas, particular groups, the competitive environment and the structure of markets. Although there is a sweep-up provision enabling the TRA to consider anything that it considers relevant, the environment, with its unique importance—one could say for the future of everything—should surely have a place among the compulsory considerations.

By way of example, I recall discussions some time ago about solar panels and whether it is better to have cheap ones that everyone can afford, and hence greater deployment, or to have ones that protect an industry and jobs, and which will last better for the longer term, especially if the domestic industry goes. Added to that is the question of how you take account of carbon-dumping in the manufacture. Such socioeconomic wrangles are no simple matter, and there might not always be an environmental angle, but if this kind of weighing-up is to be done then environmental aspects should be in the mandatory checklist.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, at this late hour, I draw noble Lords’ attention to the debate on the predecessor Bill on 4 February 2019, in which I made similar points to those that are reflected in the three amendments in my name in this group. Regarding what the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said, I do not think Amendments 104A and 108A are tidying up. They are there to delete the possibility that the chief executive of the Trade Remedies Authority might be appointed by the Secretary of State in the first instance where the chair of the Trade Remedies Authority has not been appointed.

We are in a situation where, if the Bill were to pass into law before the end of the year and if it were to be commenced rapidly, we already have a chair designate of the Trade Remedies Authority. We happen not to have a chief executive designate. We are in the unhappy position where the Trade Remedies Authority has been legislated for for a couple of years but has not actually existed because this Bill was supposed to have become law alongside the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act. In that time, it has had a chair designate, who then stood down to be replaced in February this year, and a chief executive designate, who stood down in April this year and has not been replaced, so it is not a happy story so far. We cannot have a situation where the first chief executive of the body proper is not appointed by the chair designate who is in place, and I see no reason why that provision of Schedule 4(2) should not now be taken out and, as a consequence of that, paragraphs 17 to 23 of Schedule 4 can be removed since they all relate to that possibility.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said, what is more important is the issue of the appointment of the chair and that, in order to reflect the importance of the role and the impact it can have in the public domain —including, obviously, from a business point of view, the economic domain in particular—and because of the requirement for independence, this should be an appointment where, before it is made, the Secretary of State should seek the views of the International Trade Select Committee in the other place.

Interestingly, I have asked the chair of the International Trade Select Committee in the Commons whether it has seen the chair designate of the Trade Remedies Authority and, as of last week, it had not. It seems to me that the department has been somewhat remiss not to put the chair designate in front of the Select Committee and to seek its views, and, not least because we had this debate back in 2019, it could easily have done it when it came to appoint a new chair designate in 2020. However, it has chosen not to do so. I think that the time has now come for Ministers to agree that this role should be one where the Secretary of State takes the views of the Select Committee before making the appointment.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I will speak in favour of Amendments 78, 79, 104 and 114, in the name of my noble friend Lady Kramer and in my name.

Amendments 78 and 114 would amend similar wording in Clause 6 and Schedule 4, where in both places the Bill has the provision that the Secretary of State must

“have regard to the expertise of the TRA and to the need to protect … its operational independence, and … its ability to make impartial assessments when performing its functions.”

We have heard several times in this House, including from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, that “have regard” has no force, so these amendments are intended to get the operational independence and impartial assessments out from governance by the weak words “have regard”. I will not labour the point any further save to say that the independence of the TRA is very important for international credibility, and indeed not only with regard to the Secretary of State.

Amendment 104 also goes to the matter of independence, as my noble friend Lady Kramer has already explained. It would explicitly put into legislation things that have been said, understood or only indirectly recited. I believe that in the other place the Minister, Greg Hands, said that if there was no recommendation, that was the end of the matter. However, it would be good to see it in the Bill. Likewise, I am curious about whether there could be an order for an instant reopening in the event of no recommendation. It seems a good idea to clarify that the end means the end unless circumstances change.

Amendment 79 is a little different in that it relates to funding and inserts into Clause 6 that when the Secretary of State seeks advice, there must also be regard to the capacity and funding of the TRA. Although I regret the omnipresent “regard”, that is important, because TRA funding is determined by the Secretary of State, as is stated in paragraph 29 of Schedule 4. We wanted to probe a little to make sure that the TRA will have sufficient funding.

With trade matters coming under UK control, success and funding are linked. It will be no good if the TRA finds itself in the situation that it cannot do things for fear of cost or the cost of litigation, which has hampered other regulators and authorities. That might please some if they think they come under less scrutiny from a supervisor, but this is not a supervisor but batting for the UK. Will there be a formula that relates to workload, and is it appreciated that workload is not under the control of the TRA? Workload happens because of actions in other countries, and what the TRA does or does not do can be hauled up before the Upper Tribunal as well as the WTO.

I understand that the Secretary of State has shied away from having the arrangements of the CMA, which are seen as much more costly, and I have to say the salaries on offer in the advertisements for TRA posts are low by international standards. Will that be reflected in lack of experience and possibly in staff retention once staff are trained up and the private sector beckons? Will these matters be seriously kept under review or will the TRA just be told to suffer the squeeze? Would the TRA be allowed to raise funds of its own? I have some concerns there around the issue of independence, but I think we ought to know. I appreciate that these probing questions go further than the amendment, but the last thing we want is the TRA explaining to Select Committees or the Upper Tribunal how it has funding for only half the job.

I also agree with the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, and although he does not seek a committee approval of a nominee for chair, I have personal experience of holding the power of approval over appointments and reappointments of chairs and chief executives for all the European financial services authorities, and pre and post-appointment hearings for potential candidates for the board of the European Central Bank. Although those powers were resisted in the first instance and my committee had to wring them out of the Commission, the European Council and Eurogroup, almost immediately those bodies decided that these were rather constructive things to have. They were always phoning me up to ask more about what the Parliament thought, and the UK should be brave enough to follow suit.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)]

The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has withdrawn, so I now call the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton.

Energy White Paper

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Monday 28th September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

The noble Lord is right to point out that intensive work is going on in all those areas. I cannot confirm that those documents will be published at exactly the same time.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

With the continuing pull-out from nuclear new builds, do the Government consider it strategically important to invest in the pre-commercial development of the marine energy sector, which is also well aligned with areas where development is needed?

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

I agree with the noble Baroness. The Government have a long history of supporting the development and deployment of wave and tidal stream technologies in the UK. To date, we have provided sustained and targeted support enabling the wave and tidal stream sectors to move from initial concept to prototypes and now on to the first arrays in practice.

Trade: Trans-Pacific Partnership

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)]

My Lords, the UK will ensure that any future accession talks with the CPTPP are consistent with our interests and our stated policies and priorities. We are clear that our future investment policy will continue to protect our right to regulate in the public interest and we will ensure that UK investors abroad receive the same high standard of treatment that foreign investors receive in the United Kingdom.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, there are some incompatibilities between the withdrawal agreement and the principles of the CPTPP, such as protection of traditional names for wine under Article 58.2. Those would require a carve-out. Has an assessment been made of how many carve-outs might be necessary to fit UK law into such areas as food safety and how many could be tolerated by CPTPP members?

[Lord Grimstone of Boscobel (Con)]

My Lords, because we have not entered into negotiations on this agreement yet, it is hard to predict exactly how they will progress, but we are clear that more trade will not compromise our high environmental protection, animal welfare and food standards.

REACH and CE

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Thursday 17th September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

No. We intend the system in the UK to be as safe and as effective as the EU REACH system.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

Under the Northern Ireland protocol, the process for Northern Ireland businesses moving goods to and from the EU under EU REACH will not change. What does that mean for goods going from Britain to Northern Ireland? Will Northern Ireland businesses have to grandfather their EU registrations into UK REACH?

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

Under the terms of the Northern Ireland protocol, Northern Ireland will remain aligned with all relevant EU rules relating to the placing on the market of manufactured goods and with the EU REACH system.

European Structural and Investment Funds Common Provisions and Common Provision Rules etc. (Amendment) (EU Exit) (Revocation) Regulations 2020

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Wednesday 16th September 2020 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing the instrument. I have no disagreement with the redundancy of the revoked legislation, given that the funding has been agreed and is to be paid out for parts of the programmes that are yet to be completed—at least, that is the agreement, although, given that the UK may go back on the backstop details of the withdrawal agreement, I feel I should point out that one of the Commission’s general retaliations for misbehaviour is the retention of structural funds from an erring member state.

Leaving that aside, we are coming to the end of the EU structural funds and, as the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, said, there is great anxiety about the replacement fund, the UK shared prosperity fund, and how closely it will replicate not just the EU funding but the matching national funding, and the method of calculation and distribution. It has often been a criticism that structural funds were cumbersome and expensive in their distribution mechanisms. I do not dispute that, but wherever I asked questions about it in the UK—that is the sort of thing that MEPs got up to—the answer I got back from the regions was that they preferred to have the funds allocated by the EU, because otherwise they could not guarantee getting the money from a Government of any stripe. That was probably true, and if getting the maximum bang for your buck is applied, as the Treasury has in the past, it does not favour the less developed areas. But that is potentially not how it is to be in the future. I believe I heard the Chancellor say that the methodology of funding more generally was to be looked at as part of levelling up. If that is the case, can the Minister categorically reassure us that the basis of need will be retained as the key feature?

My other question is: how granularly will the areas be looked at? I am very conscious of conflicting pulls here: when large areas are deprived, there can be cumulative effects, but it is also the case that highly deprived pockets within rich regions also suffer exaggerated effects. Can the Minister shed any light on that?

Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes (Extension of Time Limits for Legal Proceedings) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Wednesday 16th September 2020 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, the UK had a tradition of alternative dispute resolution before the EU ADR directive. As has been indicated by the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, UK MEPs played a significant part in achieving the passage of the EU legislation. It was not just an extension of the applicable territory that the UK gained through the directive. As I understood it, there was an extension of timing possibilities for factions so that, if ADR was unsuccessful, the matter could still be taken to the courts. That was a useful addition to the law and I am glad that it is being kept, although it appears it is now being reduced, so that it is applicable to UK residents only, as a consequence of Brexit.

UK-based ADR organisations will also no longer be required to act in cross-border disputes, and the UK competent authorities that approve ADR providers will no longer be required to report to the European Commission on the state of ADR activity. I note that result with sadness, for both UK consumers who will—as indicated by the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope—lose some access, and ADR organisations, which would appear to be losing work. The reciprocal effect will happen, so EU residents will no longer be able to exercise cross-border ADR rights in the UK. I wonder whether this will promote a change in online trading patterns and possibly the reintroduction of liable inter- mediaries and higher costs, or influence trade to go elsewhere, with less cross-border trade.

Given that statistics have been collected in the past, it would be interesting to know how many ADR claims UK residents have made relating to the remaining EU member states and, conversely, what volume of ADR cases EU residents have pursued in the UK.

Online dispute resolution is also being lost and is not really covered by this instrument. That platform is run by the Commission and I understand that, at the end of the implementation period, access to it will be lost. It is disappointing that there appears to be no UK substitute. I have read that the dispute resolution provisions tend not to have been as widely displayed as they should in the UK, but that is not really an excuse to abandon them, never to be returned. Therefore, can the Minister say whether this is a long-term abandonment or if there are plans for replacement?

Coronavirus has increased the amount of online trading and much of that trend is likely to be permanent, being just an acceleration of a trend that was already under way. It makes sense, in a modern digital world, to have a modern digital way for consumer redress mechanisms. Similarly, as I asked before about statistics, does the Minister have any numbers for the volume of online disputes relating to UK consumers?

Electricity and Gas (Internal Markets and Network Codes) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Thursday 10th September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his introduction of this statutory instrument. I am venturing into new subject territory and will take this opportunity to try to understand a little more about what is happening in this important sector.

This instrument follows the normal format of “Brexifying” that we have seen many times in various sectors, whereby although the legislation will continue to apply—in this instance, through the technical network codes—going forward the UK will have its own unilateral regulators making decisions and will be cut off from the EU bodies. That is the theory, although I am not sure how it will work in practice.

What will happen in the future if the EU makes changes? Will the EU-located interconnectors automatically follow the changes, so that any changes that the EU makes will effectively be imposed on the UK companies via licensing? Will the licences to UK industry have expiry terms that will automatically bring that about?

Somewhat interestingly, paragraph 7.2 of the Explanatory Memorandum says that the most significant amendments are updating definitions to work in a non-EU context—for example, replacing euros with sterling in the definition of “small enterprise”. I am sure that noble Lords can all agree that that is not earth-shaking as a most significant amendment. But then the Explanatory Memorandum goes on to refer to

“revoking articles relating to the cross-European coordination body … and removing obligations in the Connection Codes for GB bodies to provide information to EU institutions or to take account of their recommendations.”

That latter part leaves me wondering again. We might not provide information or have to follow recommendations, but will not changes creep into interconnection licences over time?

For example, we have withdrawn from the EU bodies that establish the capacity allocation codes, but as we have interconnectors with various EU member states—Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium—will not EU changes to capacity codes be used for dealing with the UK, or rather, in this context, merely GB? What is the effect of data not being given to the EU bodies about the UK when changes are made? Will we be left following rules made absent any information about the UK side of things? Do we care about that or is it inconsequential, or is it up to commercial organisations to work it out?

Returning to the present rather than future changes, on the BEIS website is a very helpful list of all the things that companies need to do. As guidance for stakeholders, it is meant for businesses, but these matters will greatly affect the public if they go wrong, and we are only a few months away from the end of the implementation period.

Therefore, can the Minister advise us of the level of fulfilment of these requirements by industry? Is a smooth transition already ensured, and what are the risks if things are not completed? It is not much comfort being informed that deficiencies in our law have been fixed; I expect that the public will be a lot more concerned about deficiencies in gas and electricity provision not being fixed. For example, how are the arrangements progressing for how operators engage with relevant EU operators to ensure that their transmission system operator certifications remain valid? How are the registrations under REMIT progressing? How are the parties importing or exporting gas to or from the UK proceeding with ensuring that they understand the customs procedures that are in place in both jurisdictions? And how are disputes to be resolved, as the rules on those have also been removed?

I realise that I have asked a lot of questions, but I have done so to make the point that the Explanatory Memorandums explain nothing in terms of comprehension of the practical consequences that the public, and indeed noble Lords, might wish to know. After all, the purpose of EMs is to make legislation, including its effects, clear for the public. I hope that my questions give the Minister an opportunity to provide more information on both commercial progress and the legislative consequences.

Science Research Funding in Universities (Science and Technology Committee Report)

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Wednesday 9th September 2020 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I will start by declaring not so much an interest as a prejudice, which is in favour of research in STEM subjects —given that I am a physicist and former university researcher myself.

In my subsequent career as a patent attorney, I came face to face with the inability of our universities to build on technical developments that came from their research. In a country that prides itself on financial services and capital markets—something that has occupied me for the last 15 years of my career—we are still broadly incapable of finding the domestic investment that means innovation can get much beyond start-up before it is sold on to foreign companies. That is not just my sentiment—it was said by the head of Cambridge Enterprise, and similarly just now by the noble Baroness, Lady Young.

No doubt such buyout counts as “foreign direct investment”, just as takeover of our companies does, but it does not retain control of profits or allow the scale-up in British industry that is so desired in numerous policy statements.

We rightly flatter ourselves on our university research but, until we transfer the 15% of most highly cited papers into 15% of the world’s most productive technology, we are failing. We can reap only what we sow, which means that until the industrial strategy White Paper target of 2.4% of GDP being spent on R&D happens, we waste potential economic benefit and end up paying to buy back our own innovation. It certainly flows in the wrong direction not to have quality-related funding that reliably keeps up so that the true economic costs of research are covered. The various impacts of Brexit will also need addressing.

Right now, our universities are under the threat of reduced income as the number of international students falls. As the committee’s report explains, it would be very damaging if the Augar review were cherry-picked for a headline of reducing the cap on student loans without correspondingly increasing the government teaching grant, the full package of which is not Treasury-friendly.

The Economic Affairs Committee, of which I am a member, had a jolly good stab at unravelling the intricacies of student loan financing in its 2018 report, Treating Students Fairly: The Economics of Post-School Education. Giving students value for money and not treating tuition fees as cash cows was a primary concern. A squeeze on university finances would push that in the wrong direction and away from the more expensive STEM subjects that the economy requires.

The committee also proposed removing the various fictions and anxieties surrounding student loans—my paraphrase—by lowering interest rates and removing the deferred recognition of loan losses used in the national accounts, which differs from international corporate norms—a correction which has now been made. So, if a headline student debt cut is needed, go for the interest rate: it causes alarm and is unfair, yet significantly adds to the amount that is not eventually repaid, serving little purpose now other than appearing as a loan loss in the national accounts.

Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Wednesday 29th July 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

I know the noble Lord feels strongly about these matters, and we discussed this during the passage of the legislation. We strengthened the monitor’s role to include a requirement in guidance that the monitor should ensure that the directors of a company have informed all employees that a moratorium has come into force. However, it is too early to see how this will work in practice.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, due to coronavirus and various related measures, there is the potential for a large backlog when the courts and tribunals fully reopen, financial assistance to companies stops, and the whole process of winding-up petitions is removed. What is the capacity of courts, tribunals and practitioners to handle that surge, and how will it be monitored, especially for how it influences choices about and during moratoriums?

[Lord Callanan]

The latest official statistics show that the number of corporate insolvencies decreased by half in June 2020 compared to the same month last year. However, the noble Baroness is right to say that we may well face a large increase in the months to come. We have been working with the courts and have provided the resources to make sure that they can satisfy that demand.

Enterprise Act 2002 (Specification of Additional Section 58 Consideration) Order 2020

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Wednesday 15th July 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I give a “better late than never” welcome to these statutory instruments, because protection of national interests, such as security of critical supply, critical infrastructure and defence of our science, technology and intellectual property base, has for too long been neglected and sacrificed on the altar of “We can buy it in” or, worse, takeovers have been celebrated as “evidence that Britain’s low-tax economy could attract major foreign investment”, which I believe is what some said of Pfizer’s proposed takeover of AstraZeneca in 2014.

It is a good thing that Vince Cable did not see it that way, and I recall that the present Prime Minister did not see it that way either. It is a pity that the Government’s public interest powers to cover the pharmaceutical and science sectors were not extended then, as was mooted. After the financial crisis, the financial sector was added for public interest protection. After a health crisis,

“public health and crisis mitigation capabilities”

have been added, and the farrago of Huawei and Hong Kong alerts us to reasons to have threshold-lowering measures for sensitive technology.

I see the creep towards a more comprehensive policy, but we are too slow. Other countries took faster measures to stop the buy-up of companies while they were cheap, a measure more needed in the UK as takeover is easier. I understand the concern not to overstep, but I share the broad sentiments expressed in the Motion in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, that having good time and opportunity to scrutinise the national security and investment Bill would assist in finding the right balance for strategic economic security, preserving international reputation and even reducing risk of retaliation.

We have had a White Paper consultation already, and reports abound that further changes may be in train. However, there are opponents, especially in those business quarters that make significant money out of the UK’s easy takeover regimes. Do not listen to them: being a global investment and business centre does not have to be on a “UK for sale” basis. Many countries are sprucing up their FDI requirements in the light of experience, and they do not all have minimum turnover requirements, which I also challenge, as did the noble Lord, Lord McCrea. Having a broader set of FDI requirements does not undermine the key words from the Enterprise Act that there should be transparent and predictable decision-making. It is important to retain that, and the comments of the noble Lords, Lord Moynihan, Lord Adonis and Lord Liddle, are relevant to that.

I like the headlines from the new Dutch FDI proposals: ensuring continuity of vital processes; integrity and exclusivity of data and know-how; and avoiding the creation of strategic dependency. We have already ended up with strategic dependency in our energy sector— a matter that has exercised minds in several Lords committees, including the Economic Affairs Committee, of which I am a member, in its 2017 report on electricity. I welcome the inclusion of intellectual property in the additional share of supply order. However, like the Dutch, I would have included know-how, which has all too easily been lost in the past. I agree with the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, about IP held in separate small entities. It is of course a subject dear to my heart, as a patent attorney, and I have also had the dubious pleasure of coping with the vagaries of MoD secrecy orders on intellectual property, making me well aware of the difficulty that there can be in assessing relevance—which will be reflected in any government team trying to assess strategic issues.

Although couched in terms of security and investment, these are matters of competition policy, which is a sensitive issue on the international stage. Even for a body as strong, well-established and independent as the EU Commission competition body, it works best when there is political consensus. While I was ECON chair in the European Parliament, I was deeply involved in competition policy, bringing about procedural changes and new legislation. That happened largely because the Commissioner recognised the advantages of parliamentary support, not least in its external representation. Now, as the UK forges an independent competition policy—notwithstanding what may or may not be in a Brexit agreement—and hones foreign direct investment policy, I hope that the Government will draw on support from consensus. Competition disputes can last longer than Governments, and the undermining of strategic interests certainly does.