Professional Qualifications Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Committee stage
Monday 14th June 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, while I absolutely agree with my noble friend Lord Foulkes that any advice would be better if it was comprehensive and included all the things that everyone would want to know if they were applying either to move here or to go away, the more fundamental question, which I and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, asked, is whether we need Clause 7 at all. As she and others have said, it is not clear why it is necessary to establish a statutory advice centre simply to handle information and provide advice and assistance. It will not make any decisions. It will not have the authority to chide regulators for not doing something; it does not have any authority over them. The statutory requirement is actually on regulators to provide advice to the centre—there is no statutory requirement on the centre to fine them if they do not do it or anything else like that—although, as has been said, there are already other ways of getting that information. In addition, only the UK Government, not the other Governments in the Bill, interestingly enough, are able to enforce this requirement. I do not know whether that is an oversight but, given that there is more than one national authority in the Bill, it would be interesting to know why the requirement on regulators is laid down only by the UK Government.

This is all very strange. It is a very clunky and convoluted way of simply asking statutory regulators to tell a Minister such information as is needed to provide advice to potential applicants on how they go about getting their qualifications recognised here. They have been doing that for years. We heard earlier about a number of regulators, particularly in the health service, veterinary science and other areas, that have been doing this for years without any statutory requirement to provide the advice, so it is unclear why the new law is needed. As has already been said, we know that the assistance centre is already in operation. But I think none of us knows why we need a specific underpinning now, and what it is that could not be done by a couple of civil servants within BEIS.

The Minister said last Wednesday that “new legislative cover” is required, but he did not spell out what it was required to do—why this could not be done on a voluntary basis. We have lots of other advice centres which do not have to have statutory underpinning, so why is legislation needed? He said, as the noble Lord, Lord Fox, just quoted, that the centre

“is basically a focal point—a signposting mechanism that tells people where to go to get more information about professions”

and that

“it employs either two or three people.”

It must be tiny; I was going to say that it received 1,600 queries in a year, but it has now received 1,601—I think our little website here gets far more hits than that. As the Minister had the honesty to confess:

“These queries can be as simple as saying, ‘What is the address of the place I have to write to, to find out how I become a nurse in Great Britain?’”—[Official Report, 9/6/21; col. 1501.]


If you google “nurse vacancies”, you might just find it. The idea that we are employing anybody and paying them money to tell people about the address they need to write to to find out how to become a nurse in Great Britain makes me worried, and why on earth does it have to be a statutory body if it is just signposting?

The impact assessment says that

“the Secretary of State can (through contractual arrangements) require the national assistance centre to support professionals”—

it is unclear what “support” means—

“in getting their UK qualifications recognised overseas by providing reasonable information to their overseas counterparts.”

Again, surely the regulator can do that. If a doctor wants to apply to be a doctor in New Zealand, for example, surely their regulator can supply that information. If it is to be done by the advice centre and by contract, it is really hard to think why, again, it needs two bodies or persons to be statutory if they are simply setting up contracts to be able to exchange information—because it is not a decision-making body.

It is unclear what the relationship will be between the centre and overseas regulators. If it is by contracts, how much will they be bound by data protection to ensure that the overseas regulators will look after people’s data according to normal laws? That is easier in a regulator-to-regulator agreement—we have talked about these elsewhere, so why not here?

I am completely mystified as to why Clause 7 is in the Bill. Perhaps we can just take it out, and then we can all go home.

[Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Con)]

I have to confess that I am still surprised that this is proving such a contentious part of the Bill. For the record, the centre has had 1,602 inquiries—I rang it this morning and it was very helpful, answering the phone within minutes and telling me exactly what to do about what I was asking.

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Foulkes and Lord Fox, and the noble Baroness, Lady Garden of Frognal, for their amendments, which address wide-ranging issues around the operation of the assistance centre, in particular extending the scope of advice provided, readjusting how information-sharing interacts with data protection, and the definition of “corresponding profession”.

Amendment 39 from the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, seeks to place an additional duty on the Secretary of State to make arrangements for the assistance centre to publish advice and information about immigration requirements for entry to the UK for the purposes of practising a regulated profession. I clarify that, under the current arrangements, the assistance centre is part of the UK ENIC, which I had not realised until the noble Lord brought that up. The UK ENIC focuses more broadly on academic qualifications, whereas the assistance centre focuses on professional qualifications.

Placing an additional duty on the assistance centre to publish advice and information about immigration requirements would go beyond the scope of the Bill. Furthermore, under the provisions of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, immigration advice and services can be provided only by qualified persons. To include these additional requirements would increase the asks on the remit of the assistance centre and the qualifications of the staff required to deliver it. It would also increase the costs associated with doing so. I know that others in the Committee, including my noble friend Lady Noakes, wish any service to be as economical and targeted as possible.

The Home Office already provides guides and tools to the public to help them understand immigration requirements and eligibility, including a dedicated visa-checking tool. Adding this to the assistance centre contract would therefore duplicate Home Office services.

Amendment 43 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, would remove Clause 7(4), which clarifies that the disclosure of the information required under Clause 7 does not breach disclosure restrictions, such as any obligations of confidence. The subsection as drafted is both consistent with existing legislation and required to give clarity about the intersection of this clause with data protection legislation. Without it, no direction would be given on which takes precedence.

The noble Lord, Lord Fox, also asked about the information that the Government are asking regulators to provide to the assistance centre. This is very limited in nature and not onerous: it is to ensure that the assistance centre has the necessary information to support the delivery of its functions. It also facilitates transparency on the recognition of professional qualifications in the UK. Regulators are already required to provide this information to the current assistance centre, and, in our engagement, no regulators have raised concerns about continuing to do so. The objective of the service provided by the assistance centre is and always has been to complement and support regulators, not to replace them.

Amendments 44 and 50 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, relate to data protection in Clauses 7 and 10. Similarly to another tabled by him last week, they seek to create a defence if a disclosure made under the duties in either clause contravenes data protection legislation. As my noble friend Lord Lansley reflected on the first day of Committee, the approach in the Bill is consistent with existing legislation such as the Trade (Disclosure of Information) Act 2020 and the European Union (Future Relationship) Act 2020. I return to my earlier point that Clauses 7 and 10 require disclosure only when it does not contravene data protection legislation. Therefore, a defence is not needed.

Professional Qualifications Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Committee stage
Wednesday 9th June 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, I will dwell on Amendment 18 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley. As he said, delays to services may not have anything to do with the workforce, although they may. I put my hands up: I live in a cladded building at the moment, and we feel strongly the lack of specialist fire surveyors to get things going. Therefore, one may have unmet demand for all sorts of reasons. Another one—save I would not want to say it to the ex-Secretary of State for Health—might be that the Government just do not spend enough money on the health service.

The issue that I really wanted to raise is not that one—I just cannot help teasing from time to time, as the Minister will well know—but the other point that the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, raised. In that letter sent by the noble Lord, Lord Grimstone, on 3 June to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which is in its report of Monday, the Minister said—it has already been quoted—that, in ascertaining whether there is an unmet demand for a particular profession, “delay” could be a factor. More surprising to me to hear from a Minister on that side of the House was his reference to “high charges” charged by the profession. Normally, that side of the House in particular would stray away from any government intervention in the setting of fees by professions or indeed any other service. As a consumer representative, I have often gone to the CMA or other regulators, saying, “We’re being ripped off”, and they say, “No; as long as the consumer knows what they’re paying beforehand and has the chance to take themselves out of the contract, we or the Government do not get involved in the fees charged to consumers”. As such, I find this unusual because it sounds like the Government are saying that if they felt that lawyers or surveyors, for example, were charging “high” fees—that was the word that the Minister used in the letter, not “excessive”—they could bring in regulation to open up the profession to outsiders. I hope that I have got that wrong, but it looks to me as if that is what this says, or it could be a way of defining it.

In a later group, we will come back to how we deal with skills shortages, and we will make comments at that point about the Government’s responsibility to fill any such shortages. However, at the moment, I ask for some explanation about whether it really is possible for the Government to put themselves in a position of defining whether a professional is charging excessive fees and, if so, being more sympathetic to bringing in overseas providers. Some clarity on that would be appreciated.

[Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Lansley for Amendments 9 and 18, which bring together two elements of the recognition framework proposed under the Bill. Noble Lords have raised some interesting points about the Bill’s potential impact on professionals and consumers of their services.

I turn first to Amendment 9, tabled by my noble friend Lady Noakes, which seeks to ensure that any cost or burden on UK regulators in helping individuals with overseas qualifications or experience to make up deficiencies in their knowledge or skills is reasonable. The amendment proposes that particular means of addressing these deficiencies should not be available if the costs or other burdens on UK regulators and existing UK professionals, including those who fund professional bodies, are not reasonable.

By way of background, I note that Clause 1 allows the regulator to specify a means for an individual with overseas qualifications or experience to make up for a shortfall in their knowledge and skills, compared to UK requirements. This is typically known as a compensatory measure, which could include aptitude tests, completion of an academic course or further experience. If Ministers in the UK Government or the devolved Administrations make regulations under Clause 1, the regulator will decide the means by which it assesses individuals with overseas qualifications and experience. It is for the regulator to specify any appropriate compensatory measures.

I agree with my noble friend that any compensatory measures to demonstrate that the professional has met this standard should not be unreasonable or burdensome on the regulator or the qualified professionals whom they regulate. This is why there is no requirement for the regulator to have to specify a means to make up shortfalls where it is not appropriate or not available. There is no requirement for the regulator itself to provide particular courses or experience to an individual to help them make up shortfalls.

In some cases, a regulator may, for example, simply specify that the individual must complete certain academic courses or obtain a certain amount of additional work experience. This would not place unreasonable costs on the regulator. I should add that compensatory measures are a commonly used approach in professional qualification recognition; it is not a new concept or practice for many regulators.

For example, if English language proficiency were required in order properly and safely to practise a profession, it would be reasonable for a regulator to require an individual with poor English to take a course and pass exams to show that their English had improved. It would not be necessary for the regulator itself to deliver that course. In conclusion, I hope that regulators would not consider that compensatory measures place unreasonable costs or burdens on them.

Amendment 18, tabled by my noble friend Lord Lansley, who speaks with some authority in this field, seeks to remove “unreasonable delays or charges” to consumers being taken into account under the condition in Clause 2 for making regulations under Clause 1. Instead, the condition would focus solely on whether regulations would enable demand for professional services to be met.

Clause 2 limits the scope of the power in Clause 1 to a specific set of circumstances where the appropriate national authority deems it necessary to enable the demand for services provided by that profession to be met without unreasonable delays or charges. By this, I mean that the consumers of those services in the UK are experiencing unreasonable delays or having to pay high charges. An illustrative example of an unreasonable charge might be where consumers or businesses face unreasonably high fees caused by a shortage of professionals. For example, this could be the NHS—a consumer of professional services—or the general public’s consumption of them, direct from a professional. An unreasonable delay might, for example, occur if a profession was unable to deliver its services quickly enough without more professionals in the workforce. This could include, for example, waiting times for social worker support—so unreasonable delay or cost can be made distinct from demand or shortage. Without this wording, the levers that we have to take action where there is a need are narrowed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

The Minister has not answered my question. She seems to have continued to say that a national authority—that is, the Government or one of the devolved Governments—can decide when a professional is charging high fees. Can she be absolutely clear that she is saying that? I would like to know on what basis that would be and whether they would go to the CMA for advice. Whether it is a farrier or anything else—or an accountant, although I think they are not covered—on what basis is a Minister going to decide that a professional is charging a high fee? Will that be challengeable in court or via the CMA? What would be the mechanism for that decision?

[Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Con)]

I am sorry that I gave that impression, but I do not believe that I did give the impression that the Government would set the fees. There would be a mechanism for oversight, which would be the impact assessment route that I mentioned in my speech.

National Security and Investment Bill

Debate between Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Committee stage
Tuesday 16th March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, this sounds like a “me too” moment, because we also have tremendous sympathy with the amendments, especially after hearing the concerns of stakeholders in the research sector about the uncertainty around the time for notices to be decided by the Government. As we have heard, their concerns reflect others from business and investors.

Could the Minister explain why a default approval should not be included in the Bill if organisations have not heard back within a particular timeframe? She will probably know about the important process for clinical trials involving medical products prescribed in the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations. In that case, where no notice is given or where further information is requested within 60 days, the clinical trial is treated as authorised. I am not suggesting that these are two exact types of decision, but that default authorisation in legislation seems to be one we might look at. I am interested to know whether the Government have looked at a similar default approval to add here. Perhaps the Minister could say what sort of advice the Government have had on whether that would work here.

On Amendment 67, could the Minister indicate whether 30 days is right for such a process? It would be useful to know the Government’s thinking on the expected average turnaround time for a call-in notice.

[Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Con)]

I am grateful to my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts for their amendments, which, I believe with good intention, seek to bring further clarity to the status of acquisitions that have been notified to the Secretary of State after the end of the 30 working- day review period. In particular, they seek to provide that acquisitions notified to the Secretary of State are deemed to be cleared following the review period if the Secretary of State does not issue a call-in notice within that period. Both worry, as other noble Lords have, that such a transaction might be stranded in a so-called no man’s land. Amendment 43, from my noble friend Lady Noakes, would apply to both mandatory and voluntary notifications, whereas Amendment 67 from my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts would apply just to voluntary notifications.

I think we are all agreed it is essential that businesses and investors have the clarity and certainty they need from this regime. That is exactly why we have included statutory timescales for cases—those covered by mandatory notification as well as voluntary notification —to be screened by the investment security unit. That is also why the Secretary of State is already required to give a call-in notice or issue a notification of no further action before the end of the review period in response to both voluntary and mandatory notification. He has no other option, and I hope that noble Lords are reassured by this. The Government consider that this is the right approach as it imposes a legal requirement on the Secretary of State to take a positive action to provide certainty one way or another. I do not believe that the default approval system suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, would add to that certainty.

The Government do not think it would be in anyone’s interest to leave the situation ambiguous as to whether an acquisition has been cleared or requires further scrutiny, so I am pleased to be able to reassure my noble friends of the Bill’s functioning on these matters. Many of the businesses the Government have spoken to about the new regime have emphasised they would not wish to proceed with completing an acquisition without unequivocal confidence that they are cleared to do so. As such, it is not clear to me that my noble friends’ amendments would provide greater confidence in the business and investment communities.

For these reasons, I cannot accept the amendment, and I hope that my noble friend Lady Noakes will withdraw it.

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Debate between Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 2nd November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bloomfield of Hinton Waldrist (Con)]

I start by trying to reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, that we do not wish to see monopolies increasing and choice and quality declining either.

Amendments 136, 139, 140 and 142 aim to give the monitoring and reporting obligations of the office for the internal market a specific focus on the interests of consumers. Clause 31 enables the office for the internal market within the Competition and Markets Authority to operate general and periodic reporting and monitoring to assess the effective operation of the UK internal market and Parts 1 and 3 of the Bill, including how it operates for consumers. These amendments would limit this function to assessing the operation of the market as it affects consumers.

The role of the office for the internal market is to monitor the health of the UK internal market, including specific regulations, sectors and nations. Moving to a narrower definition of the assessment criteria of Clause 31, from the outset, would hinder its effectiveness in fully delivering this function.

To appreciate this, it is worth setting out the breadth of the areas of monitoring that are in scope. They include emerging trends and developments in the UK internal market, cross-border competition, the nature and level of trade between different parts of the UK and access to goods, services and trade. Monitoring may be undertaken independently by the CMA or upon request by other parties such as the UK Government and the devolved Administrations. Proposals can be submitted to review specific sectors relating to the UK internal market.

In doing its work, the office for the internal market will naturally be able to gather information from consumers, businesses and public bodies. Clause 32(4) also specifies that its advice and reporting can involve consideration of the impact of new regulatory proposals on the pricing, quality and choice of goods and on services for consumers. The interests of consumers are therefore an important concern which is already laid out for the office for the internal market when undertaking its monitoring and reporting functions. So, I can assure your Lordships that it will take into account consumer interests in undertaking its wide monitoring and reporting functions and there is no need for a specific reference to this in Clause 31.

Amendment 138 aims to impose an additional requirement in Clause 31 that reporting on reviews which the CMA undertakes of its own initiative or following a request under subsection (1) on matters relevant to the effective working of the UK internal market must be published. Clause 31(4) already requires that all reports the Competition and Markets Authority produces on matters in subsection (1) be published. Clause 32(10), Clause 33(6)(b) and Clause 34(10) also require publication of the reports on the operation of the UK internal market referred to in those clauses as soon as reasonably practicable. In light of this reasoning, I trust that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, will be assured that the amendments are unnecessary and that the amendment moved should be withdrawn. We are already doing a lot of background thinking on consumer protections; it is not a closed issue.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for that reply and particularly for her last few words about ongoing consideration. If these debates feed into that consideration, we will not all have stayed up late for nothing.

I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for her support. I have not looked at the exact wording or at whether what the Minister said is right, but what the noble Baroness said about transparency is important. Because it is very difficult for individual consumers to take up these big questions, transparency is really important for their advocates—that is, consumer representatives—who are often very underrepresented on all these committees. Transparency is particularly important for those who, from the outside, are trying to ask questions about choice, redress, standards, quality and so on. I hope that those who are thinking about that issue will hear some of the arguments we have made. If they influence the sort of questions that are posed, we will put one little tick there, but the proof of the pudding will be in the eating. Will this be better for consumers when we have the market going? For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.