(13 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the Home Secretary for her assurance that Abu Qatada will be deported in the fastest possible way, and I share her sentiment that the proper place for him is in detention. Does she not agree, however, that one of the major reforms to the European Court of Human Rights must involve addressing the backlog? Will she also assure the House that the Government will show real leadership at the Brighton conference and ensure that we make progress on this matter, once and for all, because it is seriously undermining public confidence in the justice system?
My hon. Friend has made a valid point about people’s confidence in the Court when they see that backlog. That backlog is precisely one of the issues that we have been addressing in discussions with other countries, and I expect the Brighton conference will consider how to deal with it. I hope that my hon. Friend will be able to welcome the outcome of that conference.
(13 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberI have had some opportunity to discuss this issue with ACPO and those representing victims of stalking. Their comments are similar to what victims of domestic violence say to me. If an officer has been trained specifically in the identification of stalking and dealing with a stalking victim, then they, like an officer who has been specifically trained to deal with a domestic violence victim, understand the context and the issues that the victim is facing. Officers who have not had that separate training might not understand these issues. There are certainly matters that need to be addressed in terms of how the police look at stalking. I hope that the creation of stalking offences will be part of the process of ensuring that all officers recognise the importance of the issue.
I welcome the amendment, but does the Secretary of State agree that the public’s severe lack of confidence in the criminal justice system’s ability to deal with stalking is a major problem, and that legislation, while welcome, is not the whole solution? We also need training for officers; that is the only way that we will improve officers’ reactions when victims of stalking come forward, increase public confidence, and increase earlier reporting of stalking.
My hon. Friend makes a valid and important point. As I said in response to the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), I hope that the creation of the legislation and the offences will, in itself, send out a message, but of course that has to be backed up by training. I also hope that we can ensure that the public generally recognise the importance and significance of stalking as an offence, and the distress and problems that it causes to an individual who is being stalked. I remember holding a discussion on the subject with a number of people, and a victim of stalking made the point to me that when she first came forward to say that she was a victim, someone she knew said to her, “Oh, aren’t you lucky?” Nothing could be further from the truth, and we need to change that attitude.
(13 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberI do agree with that.
In Germany and the United States, both of which are first-world countries and in the group of the 20 leading industrialised nations, it can take up to six weeks for routine forensic results to come through, whereas in this country, as the LGC managing director has confirmed, similar results can be obtained in two to three days. That has been the case for years. Opposition Members express concern about the private sector and ask, “What price justice?” I say to them that the private sector has been used in forensic services for years.
To support my hon. Friend’s point, I cite Cellmark Forensic Services, which is based in Abingdon in my constituency. It was established in 1987 as the world’s first commercial DNA fingerprinting service. It was involved in presenting the first DNA evidence at the Old Bailey. It highlights the fact that private companies can establish a reputation for quality and for technical evidence. It has had the ISO quality accreditation since 1990 and is fully accredited to submit crime scene profiles and profiles taken under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to the DNA national database. I am concerned that some of the contributions to this debate will undermine public confidence in forensic evidence that comes to the criminal justice system from private companies. I hope that Members wish to avoid that.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend. The hon. Member for Blackley and Broughton (Graham Stringer) spoke about criminals getting off free. Such scaremongering is not acceptable. One has to juxtapose such suggestions with the fact that the private sector has been involved in forensic science for years and is currently responsible for up to 50% of the work.
I start by paying tribute to the work of forensic scientists, who do a wonderful job, whether on national cases, cold cases or, indeed, on the new activities, such as analysing drugs in people’s blood by the roadside, that we should be encouraging. These are all extremely worthwhile activities. However, despite the Opposition’s protestations of support for private companies, that does not come across in what they say; what comes across is that the FSS is the linchpin and only player in the whole sector.
I mentioned in my intervention that LGC Forensics is based in my constituency. It is the largest private sector provider of forensic science services to UK police forces, and it employs 200 people at the Culham science centre. I visited it, and its scientists are exceptional. They are extremely disciplined and dedicated. I note that my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Nicola Blackwood) mentioned a private sector provider in her constituency. She is my parliamentary neighbour, and it is perhaps fortuitous that we have a little cluster of forensic scientists, given that our constituencies cover the area of Midsomer. Indeed, probably more television forensic scientists than drinkers have crawled over the tables of my local pub. That is an encouragement to people to drink.
I should point out that I am also the Member of Parliament for Inspector Morse and Lewis.
(14 years ago)
Commons ChamberThe Home Affairs Committee report found that one primary reason the problem continued for so long undetected was that the chain of communication from Ministers to senior managers to front-line staff at UKBA had become convoluted and fragmented. Today we hear that the Vine report finds that Border Force senior managers felt themselves unaccountable to Ministers. What does the Home Secretary intend to do to put an end to that culture once and for all?
That is one of the issues with how the UKBA was originally set up—it was one of those so-called arm’s length agencies. Separating the Border Force from UKBA and making it part of the Home Office—the director general will be within the Home Office—means that it will be directly accountable to Ministers.
(14 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt is with regret that I follow the poisonous personal attack that I have just had to listen to. I have to say that I did not come into the House to hear debate at that level.
I am not going to speak for long, because the main issues surrounding this debate have been well rehearsed already, but I would like to cover just a few. The Home Secretary has clearly stated that the approved pilot for an intelligence-led approach to border checks did not put national security at risk and was approved by the security services. It seems to me that pursuing an intelligence-based policy to improve both the efficiency and effectiveness of border checks is a perfectly sensible starting point. Indeed, the recent Select Committee report on the UK Border Agency called for it to improve its use of intelligence, following the report of the independent chief inspector of the UKBA, John Vine—a Labour appointment—which found that the agency’s approach to the use and management of intelligence had been poor.
Dr Julian Huppert (Cambridge) (LD)
I agree with the hon. Lady about the importance of an intelligence-led approach. Does she agree that it would be a great shame if the furore around this incident meant that the UKBA did not go ahead with intelligence-based approaches, because they would make our border more secure by applying resources more efficiently?
I think it is important that we continue to approach intelligence-based processes rationally.
I am not opposed to the principle of giving border officials greater discretion in assessing risk. These border officials are professionals who, for the most part, work in very difficult circumstances, and even the best policy framework cannot allow for every situation and cannot replicate the experience of a border official who has their eyes and ears fixed beadily on the individual in front of them. However, that discretion must be exercised within an evidence-based policy framework that has been set out by Ministers and properly scrutinised by Parliament. As I understand it, that was the intention of the pilot but, as we have been hearing, it was not what John Vine found was actually happening on the ground.
We hear from whistleblowers in the UKBA that border checks were being relaxed at the request of BAA staff when queues were long. We hear from Brodie Clark that controls have been relaxed since 2008, not in favour of queue management but for a reason which he does not state. I look forward to hearing his evidence to the Select Committee. Rob Whiteman insists that Clark confessed that he had been relaxing the controls on a regular basis without ministerial approval. Most worrying from my perspective is that we find that since at least 2007—under the previous Government—agency operational instructions have contained a paragraph that apparently gives border force duty directors the authority to relax checks for health and safety reasons. That might be completely justifiable in certain extreme circumstances, but I do not think it is possible to get a proper picture of what has been going on with border checks without knowing how often these controls were relaxed on the grounds of health and safety, what criteria and processes were used to trigger such a relaxation, what the reporting mechanisms are and whether they have been properly followed. In particular, this raises the question of whether this power has been misused.
Although I am only too aware of the potential implications of the agency’s failure to implement border checks properly, the statistics on how many people have passed through the borders during this time are truly sobering. A measure of comfort can be taken from the fact that the chief executive did take immediate action when this came to light, which has triggered full-scale parliamentary scrutiny and three independent investigations, and I hope that they will take into account ministerial decisions and, in particular, the recent claims that border checks have been relaxed to level 2 without ministerial approval or oversight since 2008. I think it highly unlikely that that would have been the agency’s response previously; I suspect we would have come up against something closer to an attitude of, “Least said, soonest mended.”
However, when I said a “measure of comfort”, I meant a small one. The truth is that even in the relatively short time that I have been a member of the Home Affairs Committee it has become abundantly clear that the UK Border Agency is an organisation with deep-seated problems that date back well into the previous Government’s time in office, and an organisation that seems to have encouraged a culture of deniability. Again and again, the Committee has found that the UKBA has failed to record and account for its responsibilities. For example, when we asked for reasons for the 1,300 outstanding cases of difficulties with deporting foreign national prisoners, the agency could not account for 350 of those—it simply had not recorded the data. The agency was not able to tell the Committee how many individuals had been removed as a result of action taken by intelligence units in 2011, because the data for allegations and removals are kept on two different databases.
Alun Michael (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)
The hon. Lady is quite accurate in what she is saying about the concerns of the Home Affairs Committee, across parties. However, would she not have expected Home Office Ministers, understanding the deep-seated concerns of Members of this House, to be absolutely on top of all the detail and to ensure that they knew everything that was going on in the Department?
I would have hoped that they were trying to get on top of it, just as I would have hoped that Ministers in the last Government were trying to do.
I realise that the picture is not all doom and gloom—the agency has made progress on legacy cases, as we have already heard today. There was a backlog of more than 450,000 asylum cases under the last Government, which has been reduced to 18,000, and there was a significant reduction in foreign national prisoners released without being considered for deportation, from more than 1,000 to just 28. However, those examples show just what a low base the agency was coming from, and how far it still has to go if there is any hope of its being properly capable of protecting our borders and assuring our national security.
What worries me most about this incident as much as the facts, which are worrying in themselves, is that they are indicative of a wider cultural problem within the agency, endorsed by at least some senior officials: that short-cuts and papering over the cracks are a justifiable way of dealing with the work load, and that transparency is a concept more honoured in the breach than in the observance.
The Select Committee will play a part in trying to get to the bottom of contradictory claims coming out of the UKBA. The three investigations will do their bit, but they will only get to the bottom of what happened when. Although we must pursue those issues vigorously, I do not believe that we will stop seeing scandals in the agency until we have genuine reform of both the systems and the culture of an organisation that we need to be able to trust with protecting our borders.
(14 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberEvidence to the Home Affairs Committee showed that while the agency was truly chaotic under the last Government, significant problems remain in respect of its ability to protect our borders properly. It is clear the agency is in need of urgent and real reform. As a start, can the Home Secretary assure me and my constituents that the Government will swiftly press ahead with the creation of a border policing command?
I thank my hon. Friend for her question. We will, indeed, be pressing ahead with the establishment of a border policing command inside the National Crime Agency. I am also pleased to be able to tell the House that the new chief executive of UKBA, Rob Whiteman, who has been in place for five weeks, has already done a lot of work in assessing what changes are required to ensure UKBA staff operate the maximum level of security.
(14 years, 3 months ago)
Commons Chamber6. What steps she is taking to reduce antisocial behaviour.
The Government are committed to tackling the corrosive impact of antisocial behaviour. We are ensuring that the police and other agencies have faster more effective powers, that complaints are dealt with more responsibly and that the public have much clearer information about incidents occurring in their local area.
I thank the Minister for his answer, but constituents and local police have raised with me their frustration at the difficulties that local police have in dispersing groups of antisocial individuals, who cause so much misery for their victims by their actions. The Home Office has consulted on giving front-line police the power to direct antisocial individuals and groups away from specific areas, but will the Minister update the House today on whether those proposals will be implemented and, if so, when?
I thank my hon. Friend for her question. I certainly recognise the issues that many communities face from antisocial behaviour and the fact it perhaps was not previously taken as seriously as it should have been. We propose to combine the most effective elements of the various dispersal powers available to the police into a single simpler police power to direct people away from an area where they are committing or are likely to commit antisocial behaviour. We intend to legislate on the new powers at the earliest opportunity.
(14 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberDoes the right hon. Gentleman accept that, in addition to the number of CCTV cameras, it is important to consider their quality? One problem that police come up against is the fact that many CCTV cameras are not turned on or aimed in the right direction, and do not capture the important data that they should capture. Rather than aiding the police in detecting and preventing crime, such cameras do not achieve what they should achieve. Perhaps a regulatory framework would assist rather than hinder the police. A properly framed regulatory framework could improve the situation for CCTV and surveillance in this country rather than create the problems that the right hon. Gentleman seems to imply it might.
May I helpfully—I hope—agree with the hon. Lady? I believe that we need strong, quality CCTV cameras. In one estate in my constituency, incidents have been seen by CCTV, but no convictions resulted, because the camera quality was insufficient and the pictures were blurred.
I apologise if these matters were covered in Committee, but it is important that we cover them again. I am just testing my worry with the Minister. The code will include consideration of
“the appropriateness of permanent or temporary/mobile cameras…cost benefit analysis…consultation with relevant partners…appropriate consultation with the public, or…specific group”
and
“reviews of the continuing need for, or value of, any system installed.”
Those criteria have been set, and my simple question, which I hope answers the point made by the hon. Member for Dartford, is whether those hoops will help to maintain CCTV, or whether they will say to local authorities, “There is cost, time and aggro. Do you really want it?” Residents of a street in Cambridge might say, “We don’t want CCTV in our street,” but that street might just happen to be the one that Mr Hayes walks down when he takes off his balaclava.
I shall try to find some common ground. I do not necessarily think that the public state sector—the police and local authorities, which is what we are dealing with in the Bill—should be training cameras on people’s private homes. However, the code of practice refers to
“appropriate consultation with the public, or any specific group, most directly affected by any planned surveillance”.
I shall cite a case in Southampton this week. A local paper reported:
“A thug who punched two men in separate unprovoked attacks during a drug and booze fuelled night out in Southampton has been locked up. One of Jamal Farooq’s victims was left needing surgery on a fractured jaw after being ferociously hit in the face in the apparently random attack… The attack…came shortly after CCTV cameras had caught Farooq, of Orchard Lane, Southampton, approaching and punching an unknown victim in another apparently unprovoked attack.”
He was only caught because of CCTV cameras in an area where there were public places as well as private places. He was only convicted because of the CCTV cameras.
Following a match between Luton Town and York last year, the police released CCTV footage to the media in an effort to track down offenders, which led to four convictions of individuals for gross activity and violence at a football match, including for
“taking brooms, mops, pans…outside a DIY store in Bury Park and throwing them at police.”
That happened in a public area where, under these proposals, there might need to be appropriate consultation with the public, which might mean further hoops to jump through. I think that the wider public interest, to which the local authority—elected by the public, let us remember—must have regard, and the police, who will shortly be accountable to police commissioners, can provide sufficient control to manage these issues in a way that does not add hoops. I want the Minister to justify the code to ensure that we are not putting in place something that will roll back what is termed “state intrusion” by the coalition agreement.
In response to my hon. Friend the Member for Dartford (Gareth Johnson), the right hon. Gentleman gave a number of examples, but I do not think that they accurately characterise the problem between public and private areas. An example of a local authority possibly creating a problem of privacy would be a local school wishing to put CCTV cameras in the children’s bathrooms or changing rooms. That could create more problems, which we might want to address in a regulatory way. Similarly, a camera placed on a local authority building might also overlook private housing. Those are the kinds of areas in which the public-private dynamic creates problems, and a regulatory framework would be helpful in resolving them.
Those are interesting ideas to test in the debate, but we have not got the guidance. I confess to the Minister that, in the dying days of the Labour Government, my hon. Friend the Member for Tynemouth (Mr Campbell) and I looked at how we might manage this, and we did not reach any conclusions. The key question is: how do we ensure that CCTV in public places is not discriminated against by the hoops that are being set up by the legislation?
The new clause proposes an independent assessment by the police, through Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary, of the importance of CCTV, to ascertain how it contributes to crime fighting and crime prevention, prior to the code and the guidance being produced. We do not want the code and the guidance to militate against the crime-fighting potential of CCTV.
I want to touch briefly on automatic number plate recognition. This is another area in which “state intrusion”, in the form of examining number plates, could be discriminated against by the proposals in the Bill. The random examination of number plates is an effective crime-fighting tool. I have seen it at work in my own force in north Wales, when I have sat in the back of vans, both as a Policing Minister and as a constituency MP. A code could, however, fail to acknowledge its importance. I want clarification from the Minister on whether automatic number plate recognition will be seen as the “state intrusion” mentioned in the coalition agreement.
Let me give an example from my constituency. Only recently, Mr Laurence Bernard Levey and Mr Gary Warner were convicted of conspiring to secure the robbery of some £140,000 worth of cash and jewellery from the home of one of my constituents. After a long trail was followed between a jewellery store and a well-known criminal with previous convictions, the conviction was achieved only because automatic number plate recognition cameras were able to prove that a car had been in a certain place at a certain time, which tied in with the mobile phone records of another party who said that those involved had never met. The automatic number plate recognition and the mobile phone records tied those individuals to that place at that time.
The Government could argue that having automatic number plate recognition equipment stationed at certain places at certain times constitutes “state intrusion”, because such equipment could capture my car, or those of my hon. Friends the Members for Ashfield and for Ellesmere Port and Neston (Andrew Miller) or my right hon. Friend the Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz), for example, as we drove past that location, but would that be “state intrusion”, or would it simply provide a record, if it were needed, that a certain person had been in a certain place at a certain time? Such undeniable evidence ultimately led to the conviction last week of the two individuals I mentioned: Mr Warner received a sentence of 16 years in prison and Mr Levey one of 10 years. In my view, that “state intrusion” helped to bring justice for my constituent, whose property was stolen by two people who will now have a long time in prison to reflect on the importance of automatic number plate recognition.
I am not alone in saying that; the Local Government Group said in evidence to the Committee that CCTV had been
“instrumental in bringing criminals to justice including in the Jamie Bulger case, the…bombings in London and the murder of Ben Kinsella,”
and other murders—indeed, CCTV was used in 86 investigations into 90 murders in London in one year. Our starting point is that CCTV is a good tool for the police in tackling crime. I do not want confused and piecemeal legislation that could negatively affect the police’s ability to carry out their work. The purpose of our new clause is to ensure that we analyse the police’s assessment of CCTV before finalising the code and guidance. New clause 16 reinforces our other amendments in calling for HMIC to commission a report on the use of CCTV by the police and local authorities for the prevention and detection of crime. It strikes me—although I would say this—that in tabling our amendments, my hon. Friends have some eminently sensible points to make. I hope that I have done them justice today.
If the Government are to continue to “roll back state intrusion”, they should do so on the basis of the available empirical evidence. We know anecdotally, from what the Local Government Group reported to the Committee, that CCTV is making a positive difference. If there are negative or positive repercussions once the voluntary code has kicked in, policy decisions can then be made on the best information available. We know that automatic number plate recognition helps to bring individuals to justice. Some 20,592 individuals have been brought to justice through automatic number plate recognition in the last couple of years alone, including about 52,000 for vehicle document-related offences—no road tax, for example—and about 41,000 vehicles have been seized for lacking insurance.
Will the Minister clarify the parameters of “rolling back state intrusion”? Would it be state intrusion to install an automatic number plate recognition camera at the end of a residential street in an area with a high level of burglaries, for example, or on a main road used every day by people driving to work or to the shops? Having looked at the provisions of the code—only in the last couple of days, I accept—and having seen what my hon. Friends said in Committee and the Government’s general starting point, I worry that the Bill’s proposals on working towards guidance and the code will restrict the use of CCTV and make organisations such as the police and local authorities think even harder before they use it, thereby leading to an increase in crime.
In passing, I ask the Minister to reflect on something that surprised me when I examined the Bill afresh today. Why does it cover police and local authorities? The vast majority of CCTV cameras are in the hands of private individuals or organisations, so why are they not to be covered by the proposed code of practice? It strikes me that some thought should be given to that as part of the overall strategy. In the first example that I gave today—Mr Hayes committing a bank robbery—the first CCTV picture in the Daily Mail was taken from in the bank, and the second, which was used to convict him, was taken from a camera in the street, yet the proposals in the Bill appear to treat each set of CCTV cameras differently. I would welcome an explanation of that from the Minister.
Finally, let me quote colleagues who gave written evidence to the Public Bill Committee. The Information Commissioner said:
“There is also widespread use of CCTV and ANPR…across all sectors including government agencies”.
He thinks that
“further thought should be given to the implications of limiting the application of the code to the police and local government only,”
which indicates the kind of thinking about the private sector generally that I just mentioned. The chief surveillance commissioner said in evidence to the Committee that there is ill informed and wrong criticism of local authorities in relation to covert surveillance, which is the issue that the hon. Member for Cambridge and others raised. Again, I would welcome a response from the Minister on that. The Local Government Group has been
“keen to ensure that CCTV regulation does not overburden councils and we believe that the new Code of Practice for surveillance camera systems could be a useful resource if it is genuinely a single source of guidance… We are concerned however that new data burdens are not placed on councils, and are also concerned at the potential for confusion from having both the Surveillance Camera Commissioner and Information Commissioner regulating CCTV.”
There is a range of issues there.
The right hon. Gentleman will obviously have seen the Home Secretary’s response to the Joint Committee’s report. In relation to legislating for exceptional circumstances, the Committee agrees that it does not make sense to have an exhaustive list. She set out three broad scenarios in which a longer period of pre-charge detention may be necessary in response to a fundamental change in the threat environment: first, when the police and Crown Prosecution Service anticipate that multiple, complex and simultaneous investigations would necessitate 28 days’ detention; secondly, during an investigation or series of investigations—but before arrests—that were so complex or significant that 14 days was not considered sufficient; and thirdly, during an investigation but after arrests had taken place. That was how the Home Secretary framed it, and that is the scenario and the analysis that we would point to in this context—although the Joint Committee did set out some other thoughts on exceptional circumstances, which the Home Secretary and the Government welcome as a helpful guide for supplementing the analysis that she set out in the three points to which I have already alluded. Therefore, I think that it is helpful to Parliament to have the additional points referred to in the Joint Committee’s report available to inform consideration in this regard.
Will my hon. Friend give some indication of the role that operational independence will have in considering when investigations have become so complex and difficult that the police will require the extended period in order to complete their investigations?
I will cover that point in further detail in the latter part of my contribution, but I will say that the distinction between individual cases and legislating for the generality, and the need to make a clear distinction between the two, was something that the Joint Committee rightly scrutinised in that context. We believe that it is possible to draw the distinction between an individual case with individual circumstances, and legislating on a need to extend pre-charge detention from 14 days to 28 days as a principle. In order to plan for such circumstances, the Government have published, but not introduced, draft emergency legislation that would increase the maximum period from 14 days to 28 days, which has been subject to the scrutiny of the Joint Committee.
That point was considered in the counter-terrorism review, and the view clearly expressed was that the debates and consideration would need to be handled carefully, but in our judgment that does not make the process impossible; far from it. Indeed, as I have told the House, Lord Macdonald, in his review of counter-terrorism, said that that was the appropriate way to proceed, reflecting what I have said about telegraphing very clearly the norm: 14 days, rather than 28 days. Therefore, we judge that this measure is the appropriate way forward, but no contingency mechanism will be perfect and meet all the needs of everybody. We do believe, however, that it is workable and practical, and underlines most clearly the norm for pre-charge detention.
In addition to the question of whether it is appropriate for Parliament to be the body that debates the conferring of exceptional powers, is it not also significant that what will be discussed is an exceptional threat to the nation? Is it not appropriate to recall Parliament to discuss that? Should not we be required to confer exceptional powers?
I have already said that on this matter neither I nor the Home Secretary feel that crystal ball-gazing is appropriate, but we are looking at exceptional circumstances, and as I have said the process can be handled and managed by the House. We have seen circumstances in which matters have been handled sensitively, and, although we recognise that that issue is a factor, we think that it can be addressed through the consideration of emergency legislation and the recall of Parliament.
Importantly, we have allowed scrutiny of the draft Bill, its operation and functions, so, if it is necessary to take legislation through the House, such deliberation and consideration will be aided by the scrutiny and exceptional work that the Joint Committee has already undertaken.
I rise to speak as someone who was a member of the Committee scrutinising the Bill. It is the first Bill that I have followed through from beginning to end and the experience has been, in equal measure, a joy, an insight, and, at times, a disappointment.
Starting with DNA, there has been a lot of talk about the need to balance the rights of victims and the civil liberties of the public, but there has not been a lot of balanced rhetoric in those discussions. Nobody doubts that DNA is a crucial investigatory tool for the police, but it is just one of the tools at their discretion. One of the pieces of evidence given to the Home Affairs Committee when it looked into the issue was that an average of 0.67% of convictions rely on DNA evidence. It is important to remember that when the Opposition cite endless cases in which they say that otherwise people would not have been brought to book.
John Robertson (Glasgow North West) (Lab)
I accept the point that the hon. Lady is trying to make, but would it not be fairer to say that in serious crimes the percentage will be a great deal higher than 0.67%? If one takes all crime into consideration, then DNA will not count for much, but when it comes to murder and suchlike, the percentage will be a great deal higher.
I take all issues of crime and the victims of crime extremely seriously, and so must this House. I would not distinguish between them in that way.
I move on to the question of a six-year limit versus a three-year limit. The Opposition have decided to lay the accusation that their choice of six years is based on secure evidence, but one of their pieces of so-called statistical evidence was based on an extremely small sample that was carried out by the Jill Dando Institute for Crime Science. Its director later noted, in September 2009, that that research study
“was probably a mistake with hindsight, we should have just said ‘you might as well just stick your finger in the air and think of a number’”.
Stephen Phillips
Does my hon. Friend agree that there is no magic in six years, as the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) would have us believe? There is no significant or substantial evidence that supports six years; it is a number that has simply been plucked from the air in an opportunistic attempt to attack the Bill.
The decision to go for three years is based on the recommendation of the Home Affairs Committee, which took extensive evidence on the issue. Three years versus six years is merely a matter of judgment. Furthermore, it will be three years plus an extension of two years, to ensure that there would be the option of retaining the DNA for five years. I weigh that against the fact that the Bill will remove the DNA of 1 million innocent people from the database—people who feel that they have been criminalised by the system that was put in place. It was done with the best of intentions, to ensure that victims are protected—that is well understood—but it is important to bring proportion into the system, and that is what the Government’s proposals are designed to do.
I will move on to CCTV, as another colleague wishes to speak.
No one is claiming that CCTV does not have a valuable role to play. The claim that violent criminals will go free because the Government intend to reduce the number of CCTV cameras by introducing a voluntary regulatory code is unimaginably inaccurate. The regulatory code is intended to ensure that it is possible to know where cameras will be placed. There will be consultation with the community so that there can be support from the community. Given that a major concern is the fear of crime and the escalation of the fear of crime, I feel that this is a move in the right direction.
One concern that police have raised is that they struggle to deal with many CCTV cameras being turned in the wrong direction, switched off or not functioning properly. A regulatory framework will give the opportunity to improve quality across the CCTV network and ensure that we improve crime detection by having a CCTV network that is functioning properly across the board.
The concern of everybody in this House is first and foremost the protection of children. There is not one Member of this House who does not want to ensure that children are protected in every possible way. There is no doubt that that is the case, but even with the current vetting and barring system, under which 9.3 million people are routinely monitored, problems of child protection have persisted. I was particularly concerned by evidence given to the Public Bill Committee that the Independent Safeguarding Authority has not been passing on to the police concerns that it has received about individuals or information about individuals who have been barred. People in schools who have had concerns passed to them have also not been passing those concerns on to the police, although that might be because of concerns about children’s privacy or their being upset. I welcome the Government’s move to produce guidance and I urge that that guidance be written in the strongest possible terms, because I find it inexplicable that the ISA has not considered it a primary duty routinely to inform the police of its concerns about child protection.
Of course, I also welcome the reforms of stop and search, the reduction of pre-charge detention periods and the requirement for consent to use biometrics in schools. I cannot imagine why anybody would want to take fingerprints or obtain biometric information from children in schools.
I know that another colleague wishes to speak, so I will conclude by saying that over the past 10 years, the Labour party has given away liberties without evidence, as far as I can see, that doing so would make us safer. Our democracy and our people’s confidence in their country are weaker for that. I am happy to support the Bill.
(14 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberI confirm to the Minister that this is a matter of judgment—a judgment as to whether one is on the side of victims and the prevention of crime. There are very difficult issues that the Minister knows we have wrestled with to do with balancing civil liberties with the protections that my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle (Alan Johnson) has so eloquently spoken about today. I pay tribute to him; he has made a compelling case that Government Members ignore at their peril. I do not say that to the Minister in a threatening way; I am simply saying that I suspect that there will be people who are victims of crime because he rejects my right hon. Friend’s amendment this evening.
The Minister will know that my right hon. Friend and I included the provisions that we are discussing in the Crime and Security Act 2010 after considerable thought and consideration of the European judgments that were brought against us. We tried to balance the civil liberties of the British people with their ability to secure their future, free of murder, rape and crime. The Minister will know that there are balances to be struck; ministerial life is about balances. I accept the point made by the hon. Members for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), for Dartford (Gareth Johnson), and for St Albans (Mrs Main): if the amendment tabled by my right hon. Friend is accepted, there will be people whose DNA is on the database for three years longer than the Government propose. Those people may not commit a further crime, and they may well feel aggrieved, but the purpose of the House is to protect the rights of citizens as far as we can.
When my right hon. Friend and I were in government, and were Ministers in the Department in which the Minister is now privileged to serve, we felt that, within European law and within the rights of protection of those liberties, we should try to extend the window of opportunity so as to protect as many people as possible, by ensuring that DNA was collected. We have to balance the aggrieved feelings that the hon. Member for New Forest East mentioned with the rights of citizens as a whole. There will undoubtedly be people who feel aggrieved, but we have to accept those consequences. Ministerial life is about making not just judgments, but the right judgments. On this occasion, the Minister has got that judgment wrong.
Britain is leading the world in DNA technology, which provides critical investigative leads. The DNA database provides the police with almost 3,300 DNA matches per month. There were 832 positive matches on the DNA database in cases of rape, murder, and manslaughter and other serious crimes in 2009. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Steve McCabe) mentioned his concerns; Chris Sims, the chief constable of the West Midlands police, who leads on the issue not for the West Midlands but for the Association of Chief Police Officers, has said that much more detailed information is important to ensure that we protect the public from serious crime. There is no dispute about the fact that three years should be included in the Bill—both sides have accepted that. We are arguing for the maximum envelope that we introduced in 2010, which will protect future victims of crime.
In the oral evidence given to the Select Committee on Home Affairs by Chris Sims of ACPO on 5 January 2010, it was clear that while DNA evidence is an important tool used by the police, it is just one tool that is used in 0.67% of convictions.
Why make the police’s job harder? There are people who would be on the database because they have been caught—they have not been charged or convicted—whose DNA would be on record for between three and six years. My right hon. Friend eloquently described cases that led to people being arrested who would not otherwise be arrested. Those people have been arrested, and as a result they have not committed more crimes: they have not gone on to rape if they are serial rapists; they have not gone on to kill if they are serial killers; and they have not gone on to commit serious violence if they are individuals who commit serious violence. The public is safer, so I do not understand why the so-called party of law and order can sit back and watch a Minister roll back crime-fighting tools that would save people from becoming victims of crime in future.
Unpublished evidence, which freedom of information requests have dragged out of the Home Office—my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) mentioned this last week—shows that every year, 23,000 people, who under Labour’s system would be on a DNA database, will, under Government plans, go on to commit further offences. In the next eight minutes of this short debate, I urge the Minister to tell us which one of those 23,000 crimes he can explain to future victims of crime? Can he look them in the eye and say, “We could have stopped that and prevented it from happening, but we chose, for the sake of the civil liberties of the few”—and I accept those few do have civil liberties—“to allow 23,000 people to become victims of crime in future.”
Of those 23,000, some 6,000 a year will go on to commit serious crimes, including rape, sexual offences, murder and manslaughter. The Government’s so-called hazard curve supports Labour’s six-year retention plan, rather than three years. Members do not have to believe me or the Home Office: that is independently verified by the House of Commons Library. Changes to DNA evidence will make it harder, not easier, for the police to catch and convict criminals. The Government’s weakening of the DNA database goes against Home Office evidence, and 17,000 people arrested but not charged with rape will, amazingly, be removed from the database, thus putting more women at risk.
I hope that the Minister will reflect on that, and listen to my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle, who has served this country in high office, and who has looked at the issue seriously to protect the public, as we all have. We will not crow in triumph if the Minister supports my right hon. Friend’s amendment: we will cheer his common sense. If he does not support the measure, perhaps he can look at amendment 108, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker), whom I congratulate on his promotion to the shadow Cabinet, where he will serve with distinction. My right hon. Friend’s amendment, which I am pleased to support, suggests that perhaps we could delay the measure for a few years, so that we could consult ACPO on what is going to happen.
At the moment, the Bill allows police forces to apply to the so-called biometric commissioner for provisions on those who are arrested but not charged, which means that police forces can effectively say that they do not want to have someone deleted from the database. There could be an additional 17,000 cases, and how much police time will be devoted to that? The Minister is transferring risk from the Home Office to the chief constable of every force in the country, who will say, “I will not apply for that risk. I will not apply to ensure that that happens.” What will the work load be for the biometric commissioner? What resources will they have? Who is responsible if a chief constable applies for a waiver, it is not dealt with, and the person concerned commits a further offence?
The Minister has not thought through his proposals, and as my right hon. Friend said, this is about people. It is about John Warboys, the black-cab rapist, who was caught because his DNA was stored when he was arrested, but not charged, for a sex assault. [Interruption.] I would love to give way to the Minister, but his programme motion allows us four more minutes of discussion, and my right hon. Friend needs to reply. If he wishes to reconsider his position, I will certainly give way. The black-cab rapist was caught as a result of DNA evidence. [Interruption.] Well, Kensley Larrier, whom we discussed at length in Committee in 2010—officials presented good information then, so it must be correct, as it was the information supplied at the time—was arrested in May 2002 for the possession of an offensive weapon. His DNA would not be retained under Government plans, but he was jailed for five years, and his name added to the sex offenders register for life.
Mark Dixie murdered 18-year-old Sally Anne Bowman close to her home. DNA evidence was retrieved from the murder victim, and within five hours, he was under arrest, and sentenced to life imprisonment. I do not want to see other Mark Dixies wandering the streets in those three years; I do not want crimes to be committed by other individuals who could be caught and stopped. I accept that civil liberties issues are at stake, but our job is to balance those civil liberties, and make a judgment that protects the public. I urge my right hon. and hon. Friends to support the amendment tabled by my right hon. Friend, because this is about judgment. His judgment is right, and I believe that the judgment of Opposition spokespeople is right. I believe that, sadly, if the Minister does not change his mind, the Government’s judgment will be shown to be flawed in due course.
(14 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe work that has been done by the Met, indeed led by Assistant Commissioner John Yates, on counter-terrorism policing has been important. Counter-terrorism policing has improved over the years and extra resources have been put in, which has been beneficial in keeping this country safe. The Metropolitan police have moved quickly to ensure that there is an immediate appointment to replace Assistant Commissioner John Yates in Assistant Commissioner Cressida Dick. I am sure that she will take this work forward every bit as effectively as has been done previously. I assure people that the eye has not been taken off the ball; we are very conscious of the duty to protect the public, be it from criminals or terrorists.
I thank the Home Secretary for her statement and welcome her comments about strengthening the powers of the IPCC. However, given that the circumstances surrounding these resignations will have further undermined public confidence in the police, will she tell the House what steps the Met will be taking to put things right as we await the outcome of the public inquiry?
Indeed. When Tim Godwin takes over as acting commissioner, he will obviously want to consider the steps that the Met can take, as he already has been doing, such as being more transparent about relationships with the press. Crucially, Elizabeth Filkin is being brought in to advise the Met on such matters, so that it can show the public that it has changed the way it deals with these things and increase the public’s confidence. It is also important to have the additional resilience that is brought by somebody coming in from the outside, so Bernard Hogan-Howe will take on the responsibilities of a deputy commissioner to enhance that work.