Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill

Debate between Baroness Berridge and Baroness Butler-Sloss

Thursday 19th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for tabling Amendment 159, to which I added my name. It is a probing amendment, so I hope the Minister has not been equipped with various intricacies on the drafting. I believe that His Majesty’s Government intend to consult on child protection.

As the noble Lord outlined, this is a recommendation from IICSA, which envisaged the child protection authority having an inspection function of certain settings within its purposes. However, there was another recommendation from the independent inquiry, which said:

“All religious organisations should have a child protection policy and supporting procedures, which should include advice and guidance on responding to disclosures of abuse and the needs of victims and survivors. The policy and procedures should be updated regularly, with professional child protection advice, and all organisations should have regular compulsory training for those in leadership positions and those who work with children and young people”.


Although the child protection agency will be led by the Home Office and the honourable Member Jess Phillips, this second recommendation sounds like a description not only of charities but of out-of-school settings. I am aware that, since the amendment was laid, a call for evidence went out from the Department for Education on safeguarding for out-of-school settings, but how are they intended to fit together?

In addition to religious organisations, sports clubs, informal educational settings, summer clubs and private tutors seem not to be within a regulatory framework at the moment. Is this not what the independent inquiry envisaged that the work of a child protection authority would be, or could be? Those organisations are outside Ofsted and, despite the excellent work of the Charity Commission—many of them will be charities but not all of them—the threshold for intervention by the Charity Commission on the grounds of safeguarding is statutorily very high. It is not an inspectorate, it seems, or an accreditor of safeguarding training.

If one looks momentarily at the scrutiny function that the Church of England is trying to set up, that function, which should be independent, looks as if it should be inspection, audit, accreditation and an end of complaint process facility. In these informal settings, out-of-school settings or charities, who accredits the safeguarding? Who does the inspecting? Who holds low-level concerns regarding staff and volunteers? Many of those settings will be a single charity under no umbrella organisation—and I thank the safeguarding charity Thirtyone:eight for its excellent work on safeguarding. If you are the trustee of a stand-alone charity and you begin to have concerns about a volunteer or a staff member—the kind of low-level concerns that are that are dealt with in Keeping Children Safe in Education—where is the umbrella organisation that will keep track?

We have to keep one step ahead of people who have this intention to get access to children. They will disappear from one independent stand-alone charity and have the potential to pop up, maybe in a different place—a different church or sports club—but who is keeping track of those concerns? You might informally tell another charity such as thirtyone:eight, but who will be collating that information? Could the Minister consider arranging a meeting for any interested Peers at which we can talk about the scope of the child protection authority and the call for evidence for out of school settings?

The call for evidence is, I believe, like a survey that you fill in. I promise the Minister that I will fill out the survey and go through that facility. But could she also confirm to noble Lords that the child protection authority will go out for consultation? What will the scope be for that and how will it fit together with this large gap—or number of small gaps—we have with out of school settings? This is an important moment to finally cover the many loopholes that still exist in relation to child safeguarding, particularly in out of school settings.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

I find these two amendments extremely interesting, and I very much support the spirit of them. But I am not at all happy, I have to say, about exactly how they are put forward. I think it is important that the Government reflect on Section 17 of the Children Act 1989 and the extent to which it could be updated and improved. I am delighted that the Government are taking steps to find out rather more about it.

I was extremely interested in the issues raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, but I am not sure that they come into either Amendments 159 or 160. It does not mean that it is any less important. This is a wider issue of some real importance. I am not quite sure where it should come, but it certainly needs to be regarded .

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

I am grateful to be able to respond, as this is Committee. With the child protection authority, the question is about what scope that will have. If it is to have an inspectorate function, which is what was recommended by IICSA, will it have a role to inspect out of school settings? That is the way that, I would say, it comes within the scope of the amendment. But I accept it is a probing amendment. We need to make sure that we put the DfE and Home Office together to keep children safe .

Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill

Debate between Baroness Berridge and Baroness Butler-Sloss

Tuesday 17th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 126, in my name, is in this group. This amendment relates to a discreet issue for children who are under a High Court deprivation of liberty order but who are not also looked-after children under the Children Act. Approximately 96% of those children under a High Court deprivation of liberty order are also looked-after children under the Children Act, but then they end up at the High Court, as there is a shortage of Section 25 secure accommodation. Only in Section 25 accommodation under the Children Act can a looked-after child be restricted of their liberty—that currently means a secure children’s home—so they are also put under a High Court DoL so that the local authority can deprive them of their liberty in non-Section-25-type accommodation. It seems that by the move to the phrasing “relevant accommodation” the Bill will regularise in law their situation, which is that 96% of these young people are currently under that inherent jurisdiction deprivation of liberty order. However, there are currently 4% of children under a High Court deprivation of liberty order who are not also looked-after children under the Children Act.

I want to thank the President of the Family Division, Sir Andrew McFarlane. I believe that it was his work that brought in the Nuffield Family Justice Observatory, when High Court DoLS—as we would call them—began to be used as a jurisdiction. It is due only to that work that we know that, within that group, we have this little group—the 4%—who are not also looked-after children. Even an amended Section 25 of the Children Act refers only to looked-after children having their liberty being restricted in what would now be known as “relevant accommodation”. They would still be left under the High Court jurisdiction, with fewer safeguards. The whole purpose of Clause 11 is to bring from the inherent jurisdiction these children under a statutory system of protection, safeguards and reviews.

This 4% of around 1,280 children last year are often children coming out of the mental health estate. They have been taken into hospital for their own protection and for treatment; then they are discharged but, for health reasons, their home is no longer suitable. In my view, they are not going to pass the threshold test under the Children Act 1989 to be a looked-after child, because the threshold test—philosophically and in practice—is about harm by the care or neglect of the adult who should be caring for them or the fact of their being out of control. Neither of those circumstances seem in most cases to apply to a young person who has gone into the mental health estate and then been discharged.

While I recognise the imperfections of the current drafting of Amendment 126—for instance, it might trigger other provisions of the Children Act if we deem these children to be looked after-children—I chose that mechanism to try to bring them under the safeguards that we will have for children under Section 25 who are looked-after children, and not leave them still to be under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. I hope that that serves to be a mechanism for the Minister to explain what the situation is for that small group of children.

I imagine it was envisaged by Sir Andrew McFarlane that he would get the data through the Nuffield work, so that we would come to Parliament, legislate and take this into statute law, out of the inherent jurisdiction. It seems to me, from Amendment 126, that unless we do something for this small group of children, he is going to have to continue needing Nuffield, because there will be a need for this type of deprivation of liberty order under the inherent jurisdiction for the group of children I have just outlined.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, what the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, has just said is entirely sensible, and, if I may, I add my voice to it.

I did not know about this group of children. It seems wrong in principle that they should not be treated in exactly the same way as all other children in this particularly vulnerable group. As the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, pointed out, they are quite obviously the most vulnerable of all the children. I declare my interest as patron of the Atkinson unit in Exeter, which is secure accommodation.

What I am really standing up for on this is not only to understand and support in principle what the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, is saying but to express some concerns. I will just take, as an example, Amendment 120. If this child under the age of 13—and that is a very sad circumstance to have a child under 13—is under an order of the court, the Secretary of State would not be able to deal with it further than suggesting that the court order should be reversed. It is important that, when looking at these amendments, one has to bear in mind that it appears that deprivation of liberty may be able to be made without the introduction of the court. In so far as the court is concerned, I remind the Committee, as a former lawyer and judge, that neither the Home Office, the Department for Education nor any other government department can actually change the law of England other than through the parliamentary process. I have no doubt at all that the Minister knows that perfectly well, but it seems to me we have to be a little careful about the extent of the suggested use of these amendments.

I entirely understand what is intended, and it is entirely laudable, but we just need to be very careful as regards in what circumstances and whether there will be a court order. My recollection is that, in the past, Section 25 orders were also made in the family proceedings court. Not a word has been said about that now, and it may be that that does not happen any longer, but certainly there continue to be orders under the inherent jurisdiction, so I just make that warning to your Lordships.

Mental Health Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Berridge and Baroness Butler-Sloss

Committee stage
Monday 27th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 77, 82 and 84 in this group. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Meston, for mentioning my amendments in advance. I am adding the other choice for His Majesty’s Government, which is the mental health tribunal, on the basis that the Court of Protection deals with the Mental Capacity Act and, obviously, at the moment, the mental health tribunal deals with claims under the Mental Health Act.

However, there are one or two points of clarification on the process on which it would be useful to hear from the Minister. As I understand it, for the county court to take an application to displace the nearest relative involves means-tested legal aid, whereas the mental health tribunal, I believe, has Legal Services Commission funding—I am talking in old money here—so it is non-means-tested. I am not aware of what the situation is with the Court of Protection. However, an important concern of people making these applications is whether their legal representation is funded. I expect they are in a situation similar to that outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, when he spoke of getting one of these applications for the first time; for many people making these applications, it will be their first time not only making such an application but being in front of any kind of court or tribunal, and at a time of great distress with a relative detained under the Mental Health Act.

Given that the policy document disclosed last week references this process as the solution to certain situations, could the Minister please outline, either today or in a letter, how many county court applications there are, how long people wait for such applications and what the rate of success is? How many of those who go to the county court currently get legal aid?

Is the Minister satisfied that the county court can act swiftly enough to remove a nominated person who is a risk to the patient? An example given, I think either in the review or in the response to the White Paper, is that, if you have a coercive, controlling boyfriend of a 17 year-old girl as the nominated person, or someone who is suspected of having trafficked that young person to the UK, then time is of the essence for practitioners to have that person removed—on evidence, obviously—from having such powers as, for instance, to apply to discharge the patient from hospital.

At this stage, it might also be appropriate to ask the Minister what is meant in the policy document by the concept of “temporary” nominated persons? We had interim nominated persons in the review, but there is no concept that I have seen in the Bill of temporary nominated persons.

Finally, Amendment 82, although it may be in the wrong group, talks about parental responsibility. We have had other discussions in Committee about this, and I think it was in the review; we must make sure, at the very least, that appropriate people with parental responsibility have the relevant information. That is a baseline. Whether we go on to consultation or being able to apply to remove a nominated person, I would submit—and Amendment 82 outlines this—that they should have all the relevant information. I have exempted the person with residual parental responsibility under a special guardianship order. This reveals some of the complications of the Children Act. In this type of situation, the child has been removed to live with someone else; it is similar to a care order, in that the people with parental responsibility remain there, unless there is an adoption order. One has to be careful even about the rights to information, and who with parental responsibility receives that.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, if I may, I shall start with the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Meston. I agree with almost everything that the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, has said. I will talk first about which court it should be in. I agree entirely with what the noble Lord, Lord Meston, had said. Oddly, the county court was one of the only courts in which I did not sit, but I have never heard a circuit judge who was very keen on dealing with these particular applications.

Judges of the Family Division sit in the Court of Protection. As I would hope noble Lords would agree, they are somewhat expert in family law, and they do a great deal of mental care and medical cases. As president of the Family Division, I spent probably 50% of my time doing one sort of medical case or other, quite a lot of them mental health cases. The Court of Protection is probably the best court to deal with this. I do not feel very strongly against the mental health tribunal—I just do not think it would be quite as good. Legal aid is an issue, and I assume that it probably would not be automatic in the Court of Protection.

I turn to my Amendment 70. I entirely share what the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, has just said. The law is that, until the age of 18, one is a child, regardless of the Gillick case, regardless of being 17 and very nearly grown up. Until a person is 18 they remain, technically, in law, a child. I am very concerned about a child of any age, living at home with parents, who has a mental health problem sufficiently serious to require attention and a nominated person, who is at odds with the parents or guardian and chooses somebody who is totally unsuitable. The noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, pointed out that this could be someone who might be trafficking, or an unsuitable boyfriend.

The one group of people not included in new Section 30B(2) in Part 1 of Schedule 2 where it says that, to discharge a nominated person,

“An order under this section may be made on the application of…”

is anybody who has parental responsibility for the child. This means that when a child who is at odds with their parents goes into hospital, when those parents know the boyfriend and that he is unsuitable, those parents have no voice whatever in saying that he is not suitable to be a nominated person. Subject to the important points that the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, has made, it seems that there are certain cases where, in what used to be called a custody order or a special guardianship, the parental responsibility of the natural parents is limited.

I would have hoped that the Government would see that, however much they want to empower children, including children under the age of 16, they cannot take away 100% the responsibilities of parents. Under Section 2 or 3 of the Children Act, parental responsibility is defined as having rights as well as responsibilities. I am really talking about the responsibility whereby parents may really want to be able to tell someone, “Look who my daughter is going out with”, but under the Bill they have no right do so, and as far as I am concerned that is utterly wrong.

Mental Health Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Berridge and Baroness Butler-Sloss

Committee stage
Wednesday 22nd January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I entirely agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Meston, just said. The two interjections were very interesting but they do not really affect the guidance. That is crucial. The question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, as to whether you can understand it but cannot make a decision, may well affect how the person applying the guidance does so. That would be one of the issues for whoever has the uncomfortable task of making the decision.

I think the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, is too cautious. If we go back to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, there is clear explanation and guidance in primary legislation as to how anyone who has to judge capacity is to do it. What we are talking about here—incompetence—is quite simply capacity. For some reason, which I find quite difficult, we seem to think that children under 16 have competence or do not, but over-16s have capacity or do not. It would have been far more sensible to use the same word for every person who will, in fact, be judged on whether they do or do not have capacity to make a decision of great importance, as it would be, in relation to mental health issues. I find it very odd.

However, and equally importantly, if it is in primary legislation for over-16s, why on earth would it be in guidance for under-16s? If it is good enough for over-16s, why is it not good enough for under-16s? The way the noble Lord, Lord Meston, has set this out seems admirable. It is very close to the Mental Capacity Act. I take and entirely agree with the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, but the Government seem to have ignored children to a very large extent, although children are a very important part of this Bill. I do not blame the Minister, because she did not draft it, but she has to bring it to us. I tabled a lot of amendments about parents and people with parental responsibility because they are largely ignored; I will speak about that later. But where we are dealing with children aged under 16, it is essential that they are treated in the same way as everybody else and that has to be in the Bill—in primary legislation.

Young people have had to deal with these issues ever since Lord Denning was presiding in the Court of Appeal in Gillick, but he did not help us at that stage as to how actually to deal with it. Like the noble Lord, Lord Meston, I have also had to make decisions as to whether under-16s were giving me advice that I thought was really worthy of listening to. Children of five can give extraordinarily good explanations, though I do not expect them to give them on mental health issues. I urge the Minister: it is crucial that everyone whose capacity is a matter at issue has it treated in exactly the same way. Therefore, to put it into guidance really will not do.

I will also speak on Amendments 55 and 56. I am very concerned about children. Bear in mind, however much we treat children aged over 16 with respect and as having the capacity to make decisions, and however much we listen to them, as we should listen to all children, there are stroppy teenagers—we all know about them—who, for one reason or another, will not do what adults tell or advise them. I am very concerned, and I am not quite sure about this because I am no expert on mental health legislation, that if a 16 year-old has the right to make advance decisions and they just say, “I do not want any injections, I do not want any pills, I absolutely refuse to have any treatment”, then unless there is an ability to override them they will have capacity and cannot be ignored. One has to view advance decisions for 16 to 18 year-olds with some degree of care. I am not saying that they should not happen, but I am not happy about them being universal and without some ability for them to be overridden.

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, I have put my name to Amendment 147. I find myself in agreement with much that has been said. It has been a consistent recommendation to His Majesty’s Government since the independent review that there should be a statutory test of competence or capacity for those aged under 16. Of course, that means it should be in the Bill. This has been supported by the Children’s Commissioner of late and by the Children and Young People’s Mental Health Alliance.

Therefore, I was disappointed to see the code of practice solution outlined in the Minister’s policy paper that we received yesterday. As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, outlined, in the Mental Capacity Act, which applies to over-16s, there is a functional capacity test followed by the secondary mental impairment test. I also agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, that under-16s are presumed to lack capacity, so you start from the opposite premise of the Mental Capacity Act for over-16s, who are presumed to have capacity. That puts them at an advantage: it has to be taken from them, rather than being given to under-16s.

I agree with the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Meston. Great work is being done by clinicians up and down the country to apply Gillick competence tests, but throughout my time on the Joint Committee we did not seem to know whether there was any review or assessment as to how and when it is applied in hospitals and healthcare settings up and down the country. I fail to understand the Government’s reluctance to put this test in the Bill. How is such a reluctance compatible with one of the four guiding principles—to treat the person as an individual? Perhaps the Minister could outline the reasoning for this omission.

I also want to point to the problem of relying on the code of practice made under Section 118 of the Mental Health Act. On page 13 of the code of practice, there is a very clear description of the code and its legislative function:

“Whilst the whole of the Code should be followed, please note that where ‘must’ is used, it reflects legal obligations in legislation, (including other legislation such as the Human Rights Act 1998) or case law, and must be followed. Where the Code uses the term ‘should’ then departures should be documented and recorded”.


It then refers to explanatory paragraphs and continues:

“Where the Code gives guidance using the terms ‘may’, ‘can’ or ‘could’ then the guidance in the Code is to be followed wherever possible”.


In the Minister’s policy statements, there is often the use of “will”, which, as far as I understand, is a “must”. Bearing in mind what I just read, unless something is in the Bill then even putting this test into the Bill will mean that it is only, at the very best, a “should” and can be departed from. Obviously, that applies across all of the places in which the Minister relies on the defence of, “We’re going to put it in a code”. I note that it is a code that we have not seen and will be consulted on only after the passing of the legislation.

Dealing again with the amendment, it is important to determine capacity and, as Mind has said in its excellent briefing, the question of whether a person has capacity or competence to make the relevant decision is fundamental to the operation of key rights and safeguards. To build on the point from the noble Lord, Lord Meston, as I understand it the Bill contains 13 references to competence. It deals with such important matters as the appointment of their nominated person and, if you are under the age of 16, your freedom to choose someone other than the person with parental responsibility depends on your having competence. There is also the ability to refuse medication. To deal with the point made, I think, by the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, who was concerned about leakage across, this is a very particular piece of legislation with such coercive power, as I am sure he is aware, that the case for putting the test in the Bill to open up those safeguards for young people is very important.

The Government’s response to the consultation stated:

“We are committed to ensuring that children and young people benefit from the reforms we plan to introduce”.


Will the Minister therefore explain again how the lack of a statutory test is consistent with maximising that choice and autonomy?

Mental Health Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Berridge and Baroness Butler-Sloss

Committee stage
Tuesday 14th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as an honorary fellow of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, but without any qualifications, unlike the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. For the reasons that have already been given, I entirely agree with the whole group of amendments, which have been proposed so much better than I could do—so I do not propose to say any more.

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

In supporting Amendment 1, I am delighted that the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, began Committee with this focus on the impact of the Mental Health Act on racialised communities, because that is where this whole journey began, with the noble Baroness, Lady May, when she was Prime Minister, announcing it in that context—and then, of course, it became a wider reform of the whole Act.

I served on your Lordships’ Joint Committee with the other place, scrutinising the Bill. In the course of that, I became aware of the relative strengths of civil society among some of the groups. There were excellent civil society groups speaking on behalf of people with learning disabilities and autism; they were highly professional and articulate. We had one evidence session on the effect of the Mental Health Act on racialised communities, but I saw that the strength of civil society and of media coverage in that area was less—so I am sympathetic to Amendment 1, which would give a profile to one of the main issues under the legislation.

On whether the table should be in the Bill to be in the code or in the Bill sitting as primary legislation, I have sympathy for that proposition. We have learned that the code of practice merely reflects primary legislation. I am aware, of course, that the independent review came up with those four principles, and this fifth one was not part of that. I expect to hear the Minister say that it is already in the Equality Act, so we do not need to put it in the Bill—but I am persuaded of the merits of the amendment. During the whole process of an independent review, a White Paper, a response to a White Paper, a draft Bill, a Joint Committee and now the Bill before your Lordships’ Committee, it has become clear to me that many of the changes that ethnic minority communities need to see are in practice. They are in resources and training—people would not look to the Bill and see their needs as the first or an important priority in it. I would be grateful if the Minister would take seriously this consideration of putting this equity principle in the table and putting it in the Bill, full stop, and not within the code.

Illegal Migration Bill

Debate between Baroness Berridge and Baroness Butler-Sloss

Report stage
Monday 3rd July 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I declare that I was President of the Family Division and tried endless care cases involving local authorities. I am extremely concerned about Clauses 15 and 16 and their interrelation with the Children Acts, particularly the Children Act 1989. As the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, has already pointed out, the Secretary of State does not have parental responsibility for children.

I pointed this out to the Minister several times in Committee. So far, and I do not mean to be impolite, I am not sure that either he or—more importantly—the Home Office have put their minds to the implications of parental responsibility. I have not seen a copy of the letter that apparently was sent. It would have been helpful if I had seen it before I came to this House, because since I have been here I am afraid that I have not been looking at my emails.

The local authority is, under the Children Act, the only corporate parent and no one else can be. If the local authority goes to the court and seeks a care order under Section 31 of the Children Act 1989, there will be a court order requiring the local authority to keep the child and place the child in appropriate accommodation. I ask the Minister: has the Home Office has reflected on what Clause 16 is saying—that the Home Secretary can take a child away from local authority accommodation and put that child somewhere else? Is it intended that this Bill is to override the Children Acts and create a new situation where parental responsibility is of no significance if the Home Secretary considers that a child should be dealt with by the Home Office and not a local authority?

This is a very serious legal situation for children. Although there may not be all that number of younger children, there are certainly some. Even a child of 16 is entitled to the care of a local authority. I just wonder whether the Government have thought through the implications of this. I do not believe that this matter will be taken to a vote, which I am rather sad about in a way, because I would like the Government to put their minds to the existing law—which, I have to tell noble Lords, a Conservative Government passed in 1989, and I was one of those who played a part in the legislation. I am extremely sad to see these two clauses.

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 87. Like the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, I do not support the other amendments, which would get rid of these clauses entirely.

I had hoped not to have to put my name to that amendment, particularly as I hoped there would be a government amendment because of the clarification by the Family Division of the High Court during Committee on 9 June, in a case brought by Article 39, which was trying to make missing unaccompanied asylum-seeking children wards of court. It is interesting to note in that case that the lead submissions from the Government were not from my noble friend the Minister’s department but from the Department for Education, which holds the responsibility for the Children Act.

I have a simple question to my noble friend the Minister. As a Conservative, I believe it is important that every child has a parent. While the children are accommodated by the Home Office when they initially come into the country, who has parental responsibility? From my reading of the Bill—I am grateful to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—we are changing a fundamental principle in our law and children may not have a parent, without due consideration of the consequences. It might just be for two days, two weeks or four weeks, but it is really important.

I can foresee, even on my cursory glance at this, at least three cracks in that foundation. First, if a child who is being accommodated in these hotels or hostels ends up at A&E and needs an operation but there is no parent to consent to that surgery—so to do that surgery would be an assault—then precious NHS time would be spent contacting the Home Office and not caring for patients.

The second healthcare situation is that children can be detained under the Mental Health Act. That Act gives important powers, duties and safeguards to the statutory nearest relative—and there is a list of those. Again, if a child is under a care order, under the Mental Health Act the corporate parent is the nearest relative. If the child has no parent and is detained in a secure mental health unit, who will be the nearest relative? Again, precious NHS resources will be, in my view, ill-used.

The most worrying crack—which I hope I am wrong about; I remind noble Lords that I am not a criminal lawyer, and I have done my best when looking at this piece of legislation—is that, when child protection functions under Parts 4 and 5 of the Children Act, such as Section 31, are exercised, there is then a very important exemption for local authorities or public authorities from criminal liability under Section 7 of the corporate manslaughter Act 2007. I would be grateful to hear my noble friend the Minister’s view on that statute. It defines senior management. That perhaps includes the board, civil servants in the department, as well as Ministers and, potentially, the Secretary of State. Giving evidence to public inquiries and appearing before Select Committees is commonplace for civil servants; what is not commonplace is being called as a witness to a Crown Court trial for such a prosecution of the corporate body, the Home Office, which is included under Schedule 1 to the corporate manslaughter Act. If there were to be a change of Government next year, it might be the right honourable Member for Pontefract going to the trial, and it would not be good enough for her to say, “We had only been in office for two weeks before the child fell out of the hotel window”.

Covid-19: Early Years Sector

Debate between Baroness Berridge and Baroness Butler-Sloss

Wednesday 20th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, it is quite clear that with the effects of the pandemic on children and young people, family structure and wider community groups have been essential in providing support, along with our ensuring that children have access to school—when it is possible for them to be in school. As I reiterate, the Secretary of State for Education is prioritising children’s policies.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB) [V]]

My Lords, are the Government giving sufficient financial support to CAMHS—child and adolescent mental health services—for young children, many of whom have urgent mental health problems?

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, as a result of the NHS plan, £2.3 billion is being invested in mental health services, and 345,000 individuals should be additionally supported within CAMHS by 2023-24. In relation to schools, mental health issues have been prioritised within guidance. We are still rolling out mental health support teams in secondary schools and have made specific links between mental health issues in the Keeping Children Safe in Education updated guidance, as it can often be a symptom of a safeguarding issue, not just a mental health problem.