Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Berridge
Main Page: Baroness Berridge (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Berridge's debates with the Home Office
(10 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 20GA, which is tabled in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, and is coupled with this group. It seeks to address concerns that the Bill does not adequately take account of the likely impact which these new provisions will have on people with a learning disability. The amendment says:
“Consideration should be given to people with a learning disability in the issuing of an injunction to ensure they are not discriminated against”.
It may not be the most elegant English, finishing with the word “against”, but I think the gist is generally understood. I should also declare my interest as vice-president of Mencap Wales.
As we heard in the debate on the previous bank of amendments, the Bill introduces civil injunctions to prevent nuisance and annoyance—IPNAs as they are called. These may be imposed if the court considers it “just and convenient” to prevent anti-social behaviour. The Joint Committee on Human Rights, in scrutinising the Bill, highlighted that this is a lower test than the test of necessity, as required by human rights law. Furthermore, it considered that the new IPNA definition of anti-social behaviour is broad and unclear.
This has set alarm bells ringing with Mencap and others who work with people with a learning disability, fearing that this will lead to IPNAs being used inappropriately. As many know, people with a learning disability are disproportionately likely to be victims of anti-social behaviour. Mencap's report Living in Fear found almost nine in 10 people with a learning disability had experienced bullying, harassment or some form of anti-social behaviour.
The root of this, of course, is attitudinal and is based on the value that we as a society place on disabled people. In some people's eyes they are different and sometimes regarded, sadly, as dangerous. This was brought into sharp focus by the recent murder of Bijan Ebrahimi. Bijan was a disabled man picked upon for being different on his estate in Bristol. He suffered from low-level harassment before being accused of being a paedophile. He was questioned by the police, who found him innocent, but unfortunately by this point rumours had begun circulating that he was a child abuser and two days later he was brutally murdered.
My concern is therefore that a lower threshold for IPNAs, together with a murky definition of anti-social behaviour, will result in these new injunctions being used out of misunderstanding, fear and ignorance of people with a learning disability, and of behaviour that might be associated with their impairment. It could also lead to a rise in vigilantism and will do nothing to improve people’s understanding of the needs of disabled people.
There is also a fear that victims may in turn be branded perpetrators. For example, a person with a learning disability might be continually verbally abused by a neighbour. What if that victim is at the end of his tether and snaps, so to speak, at the neighbour? Such behaviour might in turn result in an IPNA being placed on that individual. The Bill sets out examples of certain prohibitions and requirements in Parts 1 and 2, and the amendment would include consideration of learning disability at this juncture. Such a step, if backed by robust guidance, would undoubtedly go some way towards meeting these concerns. I hope that the Government might look at this area further, not least because I understand that no equality impact assessment of the Bill has been carried out to date. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s thoughts on these matters.
My Lords, Amendment 20 was recommended by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its fourth report—a committee on which both my noble friend Lord Faulks and I serve. Amendment 20 is a modest compromise and adds an element of reasonableness or objectivity, giving the test more rigour, and will aid the authorities and other agencies. It will enable them to better explain their refusal to act on behalf of some people who just have different views on what they should have to tolerate from their neighbours and other people in the neighbourhood. I agree with my noble friend Lord Faulks that at this earlier stage, the test should have a reasonableness requirement, as it is at this stage that the officials of the authorities outlined in Clause 4 have to consider that behaviour.
As has already been outlined, reasonableness and proportionality are a requirement that the judiciary has to take into account when granting an injunction. This means that there will be reasonableness applied in the test by the officials and, of course, by the court rather than having a more subjective test by the officials and only later on encountering the reasonableness threshold. I spoke at Second Reading about the inordinate lengths to which witnesses have to go to collect the necessary evidence to get an ASBI or an ASBO. Merely adding after “conduct” the words “that might reasonably be regarded as” does not increase the evidence that has to be gathered and I therefore support this amendment.
My Lords, I will add a brief word to what has just been said in support of Amendment 20. The words “any person” at the end of Clause 1(2) are rather important; I would have thought that they make it all the more important that the words which the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has suggested are put in. Without that, one would have the very difficult task as a judge of having to assess the evidence of one individual and deciding whether that individual is to be believed. If that individual says that he or she has been annoyed or suffered a nuisance, it would be quite difficult to say that the test was not satisfied. The reasonableness test is the one which would soften this and make it more realistic, and I would have thought that it was compatible with the general aim of the measure.
My Lords, I say in response to my noble friend’s point about education and training, “Call me legalistic”. The noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, is very bold in raising these important points. He used the phrase “bona fide” several times in his speech, as well as in the amendment. Followers of paganism would say that their religion was bona fide. As the noble Lord was speaking, it occurred to me that a call to prayer at a very early hour is very annoying to some people, but would one challenge that? He raises bold and brave questions.
My Lords, I refer to the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. The examples raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Harris, all seem to relate to the manifestation of somebody’s religious beliefs. The report states that the holding of religious beliefs by any individual is an absolute right under both the European convention and in international law, under Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is only the manifestation of one’s religious or humanist beliefs that can be restricted by a country on certain grounds, as defined in European and international law. Would the Minister please outline why the Bill, as currently drafted, only allows prohibitions and requirements to,
“so far as is practicable … avoid any conflict with the respondent’s religious beliefs”?
It should, surely, be the manifestation of those religious beliefs that the Bill is aimed at.
My Lords, in standing up and responding I feel like the Jedi knight next to the Jedi master. May the Force be with us all.
Amendments 20F and 22CA raise an important point in respect of the duty on the court to ensure, so far as is practicable, that any prohibitions or requirements attached to an injunction do not conflict with the manifestation—as my noble friend so eloquently put it—of the respondent’s religious beliefs. In line with the Equality Act 2010, reference to religious beliefs should go further than so-called “traditional” religious beliefs. I believe that this can be covered in guidance but I would like to go away and consider further the points made by my noble friend. We can return to the wording of this section if required. I hope my noble friend will accept my assurance that we will further consider this point and those made by the Joint Committee on Human Rights.
I turn to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Harris. I support the words of my noble friend Lady Hamwee: he raised bold and challenging concepts. As I said, in response to an earlier amendment, what may be perceived as perfectly acceptable to one person may not be acceptable to another. The courts are used to considering a person’s religious beliefs and do not need to be told that they can reject beliefs if they are spurious. In addition, to try to second-guess what would, in the words of the amendment, constitute activities “that would normally arise” is very difficult given that two people of the same religion may have different ways of practising their faith. I am a Muslim and there are 73 different denominations within Islam. During Ramadan, the time of your fast can differ depending on where you are. One obviously prefers to be at a place where the fast closes as the sun sets rather than when the sun is set totally. That is a practical illustration from a faith which is widely recognised.
The crucial point here is that, in considering an injunction, the court must avoid, so far as is practicable, any conflict with the manifestation of a respondent’s religious beliefs. If that is not practicable because, for example, avoiding the conflict would result in the respondent engaging in further anti-social behaviour purporting to be religious practice, the court would not be prevented from imposing prohibitions or requirements that it considered appropriate. This is something we can safely leave to the courts; they are more than capable of assessing the bona fide status of a respondent’s religious practice without express provision and, indeed, we have recently seen examples of that.
Amendments 20G and 22CB, tabled by my noble friend Lord Greaves, raise another important point. As we have made clear, the injunction should be available to help turn a troubled person’s life around, especially when they are young and impressionable. As such, it would not be helpful for requirements or prohibitions to unnecessarily stop them engaging in constructive training.
However, what is considered as training by some may not be worthy of special consideration by the court and some will try to use this term to delay the court’s process. Where training is worthy of consideration it is likely to be linked to an educational establishment or even a formalised work placement and, as such, is already provided for in the Bill. My noble friend also raised the issue of different wording in different parts of the Bill. We recognise that Clause 34(3) imports the word “training” whereas Clause 5(1) does not. I will certainly reflect on those two variations and return to them as required.
For the reasons I have given, I hope that my noble friend Lord Greaves will withdraw his amendment and that the noble Lord, Lord Harris—notwithstanding the important issues that he raised—will not press his.