Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th June 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, this is very much a probing amendment, but I thought that we ought to raise this issue; the Bill seemed an appropriate place to do so. Frankly, it is an issue on which we have hardly touched in Parliament.

Private credit markets are a phenomenon that has surged since the crash of 2008. Market-based finance accounts for around half of the UK and global financial sector assets, according to the Bank of England. Global private market assets were estimated at $18 trillion in 2025. As Sarah Breeden, a deputy Governor of the Bank of England, said in a speech made this year:

“They have not yet been tested, at that scale and complexity, by a broad based macroeconomic shock in a higher rate environment”.


At the same time, public debt is close to post-war highs, not just in the UK but globally, making it more difficult to respond to any financial shocks.

People sometimes see the private credit sector as distinct from other parts of finance. In the UK, the banking sector has lent to private credit funds at a scale to provide them with liquidity, with pretty much no transparency to evaluate the quality of funds. There is clearly co-investing and interconnections through derivatives. I cannot find good data to work out where the exposure lies, but there have been enough articles raising warning signs to convince me that there is something serious here that must be looked at.

UK pension funds have invested heavily in private assets. The Universities Superannuation Scheme has £7.8 billion in private credit exposure. Institutional providers such as TPT Investment Management have launched schemes specially for the use of UK pension schemes, and the Mansion House Accord encourages even more investment into these private markets. As I listened to the Pensions Minister during the passage of the then Pension Schemes Bill, I heard what sounded like claims that these private assets are high-return, low-risk assets and perfect for pensioners with very little savings. It is because of such a naive understanding of private credit, among other things, that that Bill was so important. That is why protecting the fiduciary duty of pension trustees dominated its passage; the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and my noble friend Lady Bowles were instrumental in making sure that that fiduciary duty remained primary.

The insurance companies are deep into this, too. According to the Bank of England, in evidence given to the Lords Financial Services Regulation Committee:

“The interconnections between private markets and the life insurance sector have grown considerably, with analysis by the IMF … showing that approximately 35% of assets held by US life insurers and approximately 23% of those held by UK life insurers were allocated to private credit”.


It is clear that if the private credit market goes wrong, it goes wrong for the whole financial sector. It is not an exaggerated fear: the sector has serious liquidity issues. Anyone who picks up a newspaper can see that firms such as Blackstone, Oaktree, Apollo and Morgan Stanley, to name but a few, are now limiting or refusing redemptions. We cannot ignore the canary in the coal mine.

The Lords FSR Committee published a report on this sector in January, entitled Private Markets: Unknown Unknowns. At the end of that process—I give some credit to the committee—the Bank of England announced that it would conduct a system-wide exploratory scenario that will involve the banks, insurers, private equity companies and pension fund investors, but on a voluntary basis. It will report in 2027. The committee is to be commended for focusing on the issues in this sector, but I do not think that this satisfies a reasonable standard of parliamentary scrutiny or reflects a parliamentary responsibility to the public to make sure that we avoid another major financial crash. Therefore, my amendment is designed simply to put pressure on the Bank of England in order to get proper answers. I am still disturbed that it thinks it will do so only on a voluntary basis. I hope that the Bill as a whole can be amended to restore proper democratic oversight, and then Parliament could engage with finding a solution. One of the reasons so few people in both Houses are aware of the concerns about the issue is that there is virtually no vehicle for a debate, for consideration and for action.

The second part of my Amendment 78 addresses a problem that I have never heard widely discussed. If the private credit market goes bad—and the banks, because they are entangled with that market, begin to divest loans—what happens to small businesses dependent on bank credit? We saw this behaviour in 2008. After the crash, banks continued to fund the big companies but found every way possible—many of them legal but I would consider unethical—to call in loans to small companies. In loan agreements that were being paid in full and on time, there would be a covenant somewhere in the documents that said that if loan-to-property values fell below a certain level, the loan could be called. I am pretty sure that the small business never really thought that that was a significant paragraph in its loan agreement, but it proved the trigger and we saw basically every major bank exercise it.

The FCA refused to act and has always held the line that the regulatory perimeter means that it cannot offer protection to small businesses and that, instead, caveat emptor applies. To me, this is untenable in the complex world of finance that we have today. I want the regulators to take a proper look at the whole issue of the regulatory perimeter, if we are to go into a cycle of financial shocks.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, on what may be the most important amendment that we will discuss in Committee, and I hope we might discuss it on Report as well. As she said, there is a huge lack of discussion of this issue in Parliament, whereas if you go to the pages of the Financial Times, for example, you will see, pretty well every day, alarming reports and strong headlines expressing concern about the issue. I am aware that we are operating under heatwave conditions, as is the rest of the nation. As with our credit system, we have all been puffed up by a lot of hot air, much of which has indeed been financed by our financial system, so I will be quite brief, but I want to pick up a couple of points that the noble Baroness made.

The powerful argument about a voluntary engagement with the stress test is just laughable—with a sick kind of laugh. We know what voluntary regulation has done in so many different areas of our business sectors, and that is not the way to go forward. The noble Baroness also talked about pension funds, particularly about investing in private credit and the grave concerns that it raises. There is quite a bit of research that indicates that the people profiting from this are the managers and companies, and pension funds are getting the same or lower returns as they are from other investments.

The most useful way I thought I could add to this was to go through the Financial Times private credit headlines for this month alone. I will give a representative selection of them. The first is:

“Are insurers becoming dangerously addicted to private credit ratings?”


It is a question-mark headline, to which the answer is clearly given as “yes” in the article. Here are some of the others:

“Apollo’s flagship private credit fund hit by 17% redemption requests”,


“BlackRock private credit fund honours less than 40% of redemption requests”,


“Partners Group limits withdrawals at private equity fund for wealthy individuals”,


and

“Cliffwater’s flagship private credit fund redemption requests hit 17%”.


Rather than expound at length, I refer noble Lords to a single book: This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff.

There is no reason to think that what we are doing now will be different from where we have been before. Private credit is a new structure of a very familiar form, and we have seen what happens with these new financial-engineering structures. The noble Baroness is doing an important job here of at least starting a discussion on this. That discussion should be held at much greater length in the main Chamber, and its subject should worry us all.