Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Baroness Barker Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 22nd June 2026 Grand Committee

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Barker) (LD)]

I have to advise noble Lords that if Amendment 31 is agreed, I cannot call Amendments 32 or 33 because of pre-emption.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 33, 35, 37, 42 and 43 in this group. All these amendments, and my Clause 7 not-stand-part question, relate to the FOS and its regime. I will try very hard not to repeat too much of what the noble Lord, Lord Davies, was saying a moment ago. The proposed reforms of the FOS regime are extensive and fundamental, but there is nowhere a clear and convincing explanation of why such fundamental changes are necessary. In fact, I see no real evidence at all of the need for reform on the scale being proposed here.

What we see, looking at the far-reaching proposals in the Bill, is an assault on the four key pillars designed into the FOS by Parliament: independence, speed and simplicity, time limits on bringing complaints, and the “fair and reasonable” test for determining those complaints. Taken together, Part 2 replaces each of those pillars with subordination to the FCA, a rather undefined change to time limits, and a heavy qualification of the “fair and reasonable” test amounting to its entire abandonment. This raises the question of why such a radical reform can be seen as necessary and/or beneficial. At Second Reading, I asked the Minister what evidence there was of systemic failure in the current operation of the FOS, and for evidence, for example, that the FOS was acting as a quasi-regulator. I have had no reply.

The obvious question in all this is: who benefits? The answer is: not the ordinary consumer. My amendments are aimed at eliminating, or at least reducing, the weakening of consumer protection. To that end, my Amendments 33 and 35, to Clause 6, address the time limits for complaints to the FOS, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has dealt with extensively; I agree with most of what he said. What my amendments offer as an alternative to his is that they are perhaps not quite as strong—that might be their virtue. It is often very difficult to get things written into a Bill; it is sometimes easier to deal with them via secondary legislation, as I do rather obliquely.

In Part 2, the Bill proposes other very substantive changes to the way in which the FOS operates. One of these changes, in Clause 7, sets out the circumstances under which the FOS must notify the FCA of a matter relating to a complaint, under which the FOS must request an opinion from the FCA as to the interpretation of FCA rules. It then sets out in detail how consultation should take place on the matter. There really is detail: five whole pages of the Bill set out in great detail the various stages required in the referral process. It adds complexity for no obvious gain and subordinates the FOS’s judgments to the FCA’s. I have no doubt that the byzantine array of subclauses or qualifications will, overall, introduce greater complexity for no foreseeable benefits and will greatly increase the workload of the FCA. The FCA is already under pressure and is planning to absorb the PSR. The last thing we need is the creation of new systems, rules and powers that show no clear promise of benefit, or at least no benefit to the retail complainant.

On necessity, we have to take into consideration whether the current FOS methods are faulty or unproductive. I have seen no compelling evidence that this is the case, only a rather unconvincing summary of the consultation responses. The FOS received 214,000 new complaints in 2025-26. It is projecting a resolution of 207,000 complaints in the coming year, of which 206,000 concern banking and consumer credit companies. It has a target of 70% of cases being resolved within three months and 90% within six. It does not seem as though it is having difficulty operating, and I am not aware of any significant problems for the average consumer. I hear from the industry that the FOS acts inconsistently and that it has strayed into becoming a quasi-regulator, but I have seen no evidence of that, and I am unconvinced by the simple assertion. Taken as a whole, Clause 7 in effect subordinates the FOS to the FCA, removing yet another foundational pillar: independence. We should remove Clause 7.

I turn now to the proposed amendments to Clause 8. I will speak to Amendments 37, 42 and 43, which deal with how a complaint to the FOS is to be determined. This is a controversial matter; the Bill proposes very significant changes. This has already provoked calls to have the whole clause removed from the Bill, and I recognise the strength of feeling behind that.

How the FOS decides on complaints is absolutely critical to its operations and to their general acceptability. At the moment and historically, the FOS rules on complaints on the basis of what is fair and reasonable under all circumstances. The Bill changes that. It says:

“A complaint may be determined in favour of the complainant only if, in the opinion of the Financial Ombudsman … at the time the disputed act or omission occurred, either … the act or omission did not comply with an FCA rule applying to the respondent, or … there was no FCA rule applying to the respondent that related to the act or omission, and the disputed act or omission was not fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case”.


This adds one of two requirements not present now, in addition to the “fair and reasonable” test. In essence, it removes the FOS’s current and critical independent status and reduces the FOS’s scope to a subset of FCA rules. If you ask who benefits from all this, the answer, it seems to me, is not likely to be the consumer.

The small print of the Bill makes the situation for the complainant even less attractive. The Bill specifies a long list of other requirements to be considered in making a determination, most of them tilting the scales in favour of FCA rule-based compliance. This long list includes

“any other matters specified in regulations made by the Treasury”

and the general principle that consumers should take responsibility for their decisions. Here, we are a very long way from the “fair and reasonable under all circumstances” test.

The net effect for the Bill’s proposals will inevitably be to increase bureaucracy and to increase a remoteness from practical circumstances and a reliance on box-ticking procedures. It will convert the independent FOS into a compliant subsidiary of the FCA. We have not seen spelled out any evidenced justification for such a radical narrowing of the FCA’s reach and independence. I ask the Minister again to provide the evidence that supports these radical changes. By “evidence”, I mean hard data, not simply a headcount of consultees’ opinions, as interpreted by HMT.

As I noted at Second Reading, the UK’s financial sector thrives not merely because it is competitive but because it is trusted. For it to be trusted, consumers must have confidence that, when things go wrong, there is an independent, accessible and effective route to redress. We have one of those already: the FOS. My Amendments 37, 42 and 43 would remove the new bureaucratic and complex restrictions, qualifications and subordinations in the Bill. In their place, the amendments would restore a simple and clear operating framework. They would restore the primacy of the “fair and reasonable” test, and they would update the list of things that the ombudsman must or may take into account.