(3 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesMy hon. Friend is making an excellent point. Judges know the case and the circumstances of it, so they are better placed to use their discretion, taking into account the particular set of circumstances, which we cannot know about when we are passing something that gives carte blanche on a particular sentence minimum.
Yes, that is very much the case. These organisations all make the same point: we are limiting the judges’ discretion. We are limiting the discretion of the individual who best knows the case, as they have actually heard the case, so it is certainly worrying. In fact, in the sentencing White Paper, the Government note that “concerns have been raised”, and that some repeat offenders are receiving too-lenient sentences, but they fall short of naming a single body that supports that view.
In the same vein, rather than presenting the evidence for change, the White Paper highlights only a single statistic in relation to those convicted of a burglary who receive a sentence lower than the minimum three-year term. I am sure I do not have to remind the Minister that that is as single statistic relating to a single offence out of his list of four. I ask him a very simple question: what evidence has he brought to the Committee today to show that judges have been unduly lenient when sentencing repeat offenders in relation to the importation of class A drugs, possession of a knife or offensive weapon or threatening a person with a blade or offensive weapon in public?
The second of the Opposition’s concerns is how the proposed changes to clause 100 will further entrench the already shameful levels of racial disparity in our criminal justice system. As the Minister is all too aware, since the Lammy review was published in September 2017, racial disparity in the criminal justice system has got considerably worse. The statistics speak for themselves. Black offenders are 26% more likely than white offenders to be remanded in custody, while the figure for black women is 29% more likely. Offenders from black, Asian and minority ethnic backgrounds are 81% more likely than white offenders to be sent to prison for indictable offences, even when factoring in higher not guilty plea rates. Over one quarter—27%—of people in prison are from a minority ethnic group, despite the fact that they make up 14% of the total population of England and Wales. If our prison population reflected the ethnic make-up of England and Wales, we would have over 9,000 fewer people in prison—a truly staggering figure.
That is before we even begin to touch on disproportionality in the youth system, which is even more pronounced. For the first time, young people from a BAME background now make up 51%—over half—of those in custody, despite that group making up only 14% of the population. The proportion of black children who are arrested, cautioned or sentenced is now twice what it was 10 years ago, and the proportion of black children on remand in youth custody has increased to over a third.
When my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) was asked by the then Conservative Government to carry out his review, he did so in the belief that that Government, and successive Governments, would implement the recommendations he made. Sadly, that was not the case. At the last count, fewer than 10 of the 35 recommendations had been fully implemented. Perhaps the Minister will explain whether that is still the case today and, if so, why the Government have made so little progress on that in the last four years.
The picture emerging from this Government is that they do not care about reducing racial disparities in our criminal justice system, which is not an accusation I make lightly. Statement after statement recognising the disparities and promising change appears to be no more than lip service. Worse still, many of the measures in the Bill will further entrench racial inequality in the criminal justice system—one of them being the introduction of clause 100. It is abundantly clear that the clause will have a disproportionate impact on offenders from a black, Asian or minority ethnic background.
We know from a Government report published in 2016 that for drugs offences the odds of receiving a prison sentence were around 240% higher for black, Asian and minority ethnic offenders than for white offenders. Even the equalities impact assessment that accompanies the Bill acknowledges an over-representation of certain ethnic groups and the increased likelihood of their being sentenced to custody and given a longer sentence. It states:
“We recognise that some individuals with protected characteristics are likely to be over-represented in the groups of people this policy will affect, by virtue of the demographics of the existing offender population.”
I beg to move amendment 131, in clause 104, page 89, line 1, leave out “18” and insert “26”.
This amendment would make provision for minimum term reviews for those who are serving a sentence of detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure to continue to take place up to the age of 26.
As has been pointed out, the purpose of the clause is to alter the way in which sentence reviews are conducted for those serving detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure. As the law stands, a child sentenced to detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure may apply to the High Court to seek a review of their sentence once they have reached the halfway point of the sentence. The purpose of the review is to establish whether the offender has made sufficient progress while in prison for their sentence to be reconsidered. If the offender’s application for a review is unsuccessful, he or she may make a further application every two years until the sentence comes to an end.
The effect of the clause is twofold: first, those who have reached the age of 18 at the time of sentencing will no longer be entitled to a review of their sentence. Secondly, those who are entitled to reviews—in other words, those who were sentenced when a child—will be restricted to a single review at the halfway point and, if they have reached the age of 18 by that stage, they will be entitled to no further reviews.
In their White Paper, the Government set out that the intention behind clause 104 was to spare victims’ families the trauma of having to continually revisit the events that led to the loss of their loved one each time an offender applies for a review. Although we sympathise wholeheartedly with that sentiment, we are also mindful of the need to balance it with the right of young offenders to have their sentence reviewed in the light of good behaviour while in prison.
The Opposition’s first major concern with clause 104 is that we believe that those who commit an offence as a child should be treated as a child by the criminal justice system, irrespective of whether they turn 18 by the time they are sentenced. That view is widely held by stakeholders across the justice sector, as well as by Members across the House. As the Minister will be aware, the hon. Member for Aylesbury (Rob Butler) has promoted a ten-minute rule Bill to achieve just that.
The Labour party is clear that no child should be put at a disadvantage by turning 18 before being sentenced, especially if the delay has been caused by the record-breaking court backlog. That concern is shared by the Sentencing Academy, which notes:
“We have grave concerns about the removal of reviews from people simply because they have reached the age of 18 at the time of sentencing—particularly at a time when cases are taking so long to reach court due to the backlog of cases that has been exacerbated by the pandemic.”
Obviously, delays are not particularly satisfactory for anybody, particularly in the criminal justice system. Long delays are not fair for victims, either, or for young people. As the maxim says, justice delayed is justice denied. Does my hon. Friend agree that the criminal justice system needs more investment so that things are speeded up and young people do not end up being sentenced as adults?
I understand exactly what my hon. Friend is saying. However, I know from discussions with the Lord Chancellor that he is very shy about addressing the issue of people receiving an adult sentence for crimes committed under the age of 18 because their case did not get to court until after they had turned 18. He does not appear to have any sympathy for that. I hope that over time we can work with the Government on what happens to children who commit crimes. They should not be disadvantaged by not having their case heard until they become an adult.
The concept of basing minimum term reviews on age at sentencing, rather than on age at the time the crime was committed, has also been rejected by the courts as contrary to the purpose and rationale of the sentence of detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure. As the great Lord Bingham set out in the case of Smith:
“The requirement to impose a sentence of HMP detention is based not on the age of the offender when sentenced but on the age of the offender when the murder was committed, and it reflects the humane principle that an offender deemed by statute to be not fully mature when committing his crime should not be punished as if he were. As he grows into maturity a more reliable judgment may be made, perhaps of what punishment he deserves and certainly of what period of detention will best promote his rehabilitation.”
With that in mind, what guarantees can the Minister provide that no child will be put at a disadvantage because of court delays caused by the huge backlog that has accrued on the Conservative Government’s watch? Similarly, does he agree that it would be hugely unfair for children to be worse off because of something completely out of their control?
The Opposition’s second concern with clause 104 is the cliff edge created by the offender turning 18. As I set out at some length during our discussion of clause 102, the Opposition are very mindful of the significant advances made during the past 20 years relating to the age of maturity. As the Minister is all too aware, it is now widely recognised that young adults are still developing their decision making and impulse control skills well into their mid-20s. As I have said before, that is acknowledged not just by the Opposition but by the Justice Committee, neuroscientists, criminologists and, until recently, this very Government. It is somewhat disappointing, then, that the Government have chosen to create a cliff edge whereby anyone who turns 18 suddenly loses the right to have the High Court review their sentence.
That concern is shared by the Sentencing Academy, which points out:
“The accompanying ‘factsheet’ justifies removing reviews from those aged 18 by the time of sentencing on the grounds that: ‘This is because their age and maturity will have been taken into account at their sentencing’. However, it is an accepted feature of sentencing law that the passing of an offender’s 18th birthday is not a cliff edge in terms of their emotional and developmental maturity.”
I must therefore ask the Minister why, when the Government have previously accepted that
“the system…should presume that up to the age of 25 young adults are typically still maturing”,
they have chosen to create this cliff edge at the age of 18. Not only does this seem unfair; it also seems counterproductive. By removing an offender’s right to a review of their sentence based on good behaviour, the Government are also removing any incentive for that offender to behave well in prison. As the Howard League points out, minimum term reviews are infrequent but important, as they
“offer a rare source of hope and can powerfully motivate young people to make and maintain positive change.”
The Sentencing Academy points out that since 2010 fewer than 10% of offenders serving detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure applied for a second review of their sentence. It says of the proposed change:
“this restriction will merely remove the opportunity of review from a small handful of cases in which exceptional progress has been achieved after the halfway point in the sentence”.
Is the Minister not worried that by removing the right to these reviews, he could be putting overworked prison staff at increased risk of harm?
Although we sympathise with the stated goal that the Government are seeking to achieve through clause 104—to prevent unnecessary distress to the families of victims of crime—in its present form we are unable to support it. Instead, we have tabled amendment 131, which we believe balances the need to protect the families of victims of crime from distress with preserving the rehabilitative benefits of being able to request a sentence review. The mechanics of the amendment are simple. Instead of ending the right to a sentence review at the age of 18, the amendment would make provision for minimum term reviews up to the age of 26, reflecting the widely held view that young adults are still developing in maturity well into their twenties, while also providing a powerful incentive to motivate young offenders to reform and rehabilitate while in custody.
I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this morning, Sir Charles. First, I especially thank Unlock, Transform Justice, and the Centre for Justice Innovation for their considerate and constructive scrutiny of the proposals.
The Opposition are generally supportive of the changes to the statutory framework for out-of-court disposals, and we recognise the work that the Government have done to move in that direction. Three forces took part in a year-long pilot of the two-tier framework in 2014, and the Ministry of Justice commissioned an independent evaluation of that pilot, which was published in 2018. Fourteen police forces—a third of all forces in England and Wales—have already adopted the two-tier framework, and the National Police Chiefs’ Council has endorsed the two-tier framework through its strategy for charging and out-of-court disposals.
We do appreciate the need to simplify the six-option cautions menu, and we recognise the Government’s attempt to streamline the use of out-of-court disposals for police forces. We would like those reforms to go further, however, and I will go on to discuss those areas in speaking to our amendments. We would like much more to be done to incentivise the use of out-of-court disposals in appropriate cases. It is important to note that although the Government hope that the new system will reduce reoffending, current data does not suggest that short-term reoffending rates are likely to go down. The evaluation of the 2014 pilot found no statistically significant difference between the short-term reoffending rates of prisoners who were given out-of-court disposals in two-tier framework areas and those in comparable areas that were not using the new framework.
I understand that the Government also hope that the new system will improve victim satisfaction because more victims will be involved in the process, but it is important to recognise that victim satisfaction with the current out-of-court-disposal framework is already good. In 2019-20, 84% of victims whose offender was issued a caution said that they were satisfied with the police action. That is a similar rate to victims whose offenders were charged, 83% of whom said that they were satisfied with the police.
Although we support the principle of simplification for the purposes of enabling the police to work more effectively, we have to be realistic about the likely impact of that change to the system.
Does my hon. Friend agree that the greater involvement of victims in the process, particularly for out-of-court disposals, is much better for reaching a satisfactory conclusion for everybody concerned?
I most certainly agree: the more that victims are involved, the easier the process is for them. Talking about victims goes well beyond what we are debating today. The Opposition have published a victims’ Bill and hope that one day soon, the Government will finally come up with their victims’ Bill to address some of the issues that need to be addressed if life is to be just a little easier for the people who fall victim to criminals in our society.
Although we support the simplification of the cautions system, we have concerns about the removal of the simple caution, which seems to be an extremely effective and non-resource-intensive disposal for police officers to choose to use. Indeed, the simple caution has the lowest rate of reoffending of any sentence or sanction.
The Bar Council has said that it, too, is concerned about the removal of the simple warning:
“The existence of a simple warning, which the Bill proposes to abolish, is useful in many ways, not least because it requires fewer resources from police forces.”
The Bar Council went on:
“To insist that cautions are imposed in all cases does not give sufficient flexibility to the judiciary. A national framework that is too rigid is likely to be unworkable in a courtroom.”
As the Chair of the Bar Council—Derek Sweeting, QC —said in one of the evidence sessions on the Bill:
“It would be useful to have something that was a more general tool that the police could use, that would not turn up in criminal records later on and so on, and that would give the police the option effectively just to give what is now the simple caution.”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 87, Q141.]
There is a range of low-level offences for which the simple caution is supremely suitable and in response to which it would not necessarily be appropriate to initiate a more formal engagement with the justice system, so how does the Minister envisage this very low-level offending now being dealt with?
Another area on which we would appreciate further reassurance from the Minister is the funding system. The system being proposed is likely to be significantly more costly than the existing system. The evaluation of the 2014 pilot found that the criminal justice system in pilot areas was estimated to have spent around 70% more on administering out-of-court disposals than the system in non-pilot areas. It concluded that the increased spending was the result of using conditional cautions in place of simple cautions, because conditional cautions require more police time to administer and monitor.
The Government estimate that this change will cost around £109 million over 10 years and think the criminal justice system will incur extra operational costs of around £15.58 million every year. They further estimate that the new cautions system will cost the police around £30.7 million to implement over the first two years.
The actual costs are likely to be even higher than those estimates, because the estimates are based on data from a pilot of the current two-tier framework carried out in 2014, which did not include some of the costly features of the proposed system set out in the Bill, such as proposed restrictions on the use of out-of-court disposals for certain offences. That is a significant cost and, as I noted earlier, it does not necessarily come with the offsetting benefit of reduced reoffending rates.
The impact assessment refers to £1.5 million for a three-year programme aimed at supporting police forces to access local intervention services, identify gaps in available provision and help to prioritise what services are needed that are not currently available.
Does my hon. Friend agree that it would be better to use some of the money that will be spent on this change for more community policing and more youth services, which would actually make a difference in diverting young people from crime?
I certainly do agree with my hon. Friend, particularly when it comes to youth services. We have seen youth services being devastated over the last 10 or 11 years, and all manner of other services in the community have also gone, all of which could have contributed to reducing crime, better engaging young people and diverting them from crime. Nevertheless, this three-year programme is welcome all the same, and I am glad that the Government are providing some resource to identify and fill support gaps, which can help to keep people out of the criminal justice system all together.
However, as my hon. Friend has suggested, £1.5 million seems a small amount of money indeed when stretched across our 43 police forces, which all serve different and diverse community needs. I would be grateful if the Minister told us more about how his Department sees that £1.5 million being spent and what criteria he will set for its allocation.
I am interested to know whether there are any plans to boost funding for these types of programme, especially as they might save the Government significant amounts of money by diverting appropriate low-level cases from prosecution altogether.
I would appreciate further information from the Minister on training officers in this particular area. Adrian Crossley, head of the criminal justice policy unit at the Centre for Social Justice, raised that issue at an evidence session:
“Drawing from the 2014 audit, there are some learnings from the two-tier system, most notably the training of officers so that they can refer people to the intervention that is appropriate and useful, better inter-agency communication, and sufficient time for implementation.”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 45, Q63.]
Will the Minister tell us what resources will be made available to train officers in such a way? Or will that also come out of the £1.5 million?
We know that keeping people out of the formal justice system can have a really positive impact, so the Opposition would like to see growing use of out-of-court disposals, but the matter needs to be dealt with across Government—everything from youth services to the development of support services in the community.
Given the energy and time that the Minister’s Department has put into the proposals, I know it recognises the need for greater numbers of out-of-court disposals. However, I have reservations about the fact that the available evidence suggests that the proposals might result in a further decline in the use of out-of-court disposals. In 2019, approximately 192,000 out-of-court disposals were issued in England and Wales. That is the lowest number in a year since 1984 and around 28,000 fewer than in 2018.
The Ministry of Justice evaluation of the 2014 pilot found no change in the volume of out-of-court disposals issued by police forces using the system. It seems that officers in the pilots switched to the disposing of offences with conditional cautions when they would have used a simple caution, so we can assume that police officers will not make significant changes to their use of those disposals as a result of the proposed changes.
Features introduced in the proposals were not in the two-tier framework pilot, which I worry will contribute to an even greater decline in the use of out-of-court disposals. For example, under the new system there will be more restrictions on the use of out-of-court disposals for certain offences, as police officers will need the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions to issue out-of-court disposals for indictable-only offences. They will also be prohibited from disposing of some cases involving repeat offenders by out-of-court disposal.
While data is not available on how many cautions are issued for indictable-only offences or repeat offenders, we cannot estimate exactly how the changes might affect out-of-court disposal volumes, but we do have data to show that 55% of cautions issued in 2019 were for indictable and either-way offences, which suggests that restricting their use for those offences is likely to have some impact on out-of-court disposal volumes.
I am sure the Minister recognises the value of out-of-court disposals and would not want to see a further serious decline in their use, so it would be good to hear of any plans he has to safeguard against any such decline. Perhaps he has other data that we are not aware of that demonstrates the fact that he would expect the decline to be not only halted, but even reversed. I look forward to hearing his thoughts on that.
I will come to other concerns when I speak to the Opposition amendments with respect to other clauses, but there is one other issue that I want to deal with here and now: the admission of guilt. First, this requirement will place a further administrative burden on police officers by preventing them from administering community cautions on-street, which could restrict their use in otherwise suitable cases. It is important that in simplifying the system for the police’s use, we also ensure that the flexibility needed to deal with the range of offending across England and Wales is retained and that we do not cause difficulties for the police by putting in place restrictions that would be unhelpful.
More importantly, many organisations, including EQUAL, have raised concerns about the impact that requiring an admission of guilt will have on disproportionality in our already extremely disproportionate justice system. In the current framework, a person has to make a formal admission of guilt to receive an out-of-court disposal. If someone does not admit guilt, they will be charged and sent to court. Evidence cited in the Lammy review shows that black, Asian and minority ethnic people are more likely to plead not guilty owing to a lack of trust in the criminal justice system among BAME communities, which makes suspects less likely to co-operate with the police.
On that point, does my hon. Friend agree that more needs to be done to engage with the BAME community to ensure that those discrepancies do not occur in the future?
The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point. Yes, if the police believe that they need to proceed to court because someone refuses to take responsibility, the case should be moved on. However, the fact remains that if the person admits responsibility rather than making a formal guilty plea at that stage, they could have an out-of-court disposal rather than having to be dragged through the criminal justice system again. The Victims Commissioner told us that this was one reservation she had about the proposed changes to the caution system, saying that
“something needing a bit of looking at is the obligation to admit guilt in order to get an out-of-court disposal. Sometimes something like a deferred prosecution might be something that a person would be readier to accept, and it should be no more of a problem for a victim.”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 20 May 2021; c. 114, Q180.]
Perhaps the Government might consider out-of-court disposals that do not require a formal admission of guilt, only individuals to accept responsibility. That might encourage the participation of people from groups that tend to have less trust in the criminal justice system, and who might therefore be more reluctant to make a more formal admission of guilt.
On the issue of deferred prosecutions, there is an excellent organisation in Lambeth called Juvenis that gets referrals from people in agreement with the police, via a panel. Those people are referred to Juvenis for help, and if they keep safe, prosecution does not follow. Is that not a good way to divert people from being criminalised and processed in the criminal justice system?
It most certainly is. The Government should be looking at examples of that best practice and rolling it out across the country, because in the longer term, support for organisations such as that will reduce the number of people who end up in the formal criminal justice system. That will mean fewer people in prison, and the cost to society will be all the lower as a result. The Opposition share the serious concerns that have been raised, and would like to hear the Minister’s thoughts on the issue, because I know that tackling inequalities in our justice system and crime outcomes is something he takes very seriously. We would particularly like to hear his thoughts on the possibility of removing the requirement of an admission of guilt from the lower-tier disposal, at the very least.
Let me turn my attention to the amendments standing in my name. These amendments might seem rather cosmetic, but they address an important issue as to how we think about the handling of lower-level offending. Amendments 11 to 15, 18 to 32, and 34 to 45 would change the name of the diversionary caution to the conditional caution, while amendments 47 and 48 are minor consequential amendments that would result from that change. The Opposition are concerned that calling the upper-tier disposal the diversionary caution is potentially and unnecessarily confusing. Diversion is commonly used as a term to describe specific activity moving people away from any contact with the formal justice system altogether, regardless of whether that means diverting them from a prosecution or from a statutory out-of-court disposal. It matters what we call these things, because the diversionary caution is not diversion as the term is currently used across the criminal justice system. A third of police forces are already using the two-tier framework, which includes the conditional caution.
We are concerned that the name change will needlessly confuse police forces, even though the intention is to simplify the framework. It could also cause needless confusion for others who work in, engage with or come into contact with the justice system, but who are not consistently involved with it as police officers are. It is a small change, and I hope the Government can see the sense in it. I would be grateful for the Minister’s thoughts on it. If the Government are set on opposing the measure, I would welcome a further explanation as to why “diversionary” was chosen as the name for the upper-tier statutory out-of-court disposal.
The new diversionary caution that these clauses introduce is extremely similar to the existing conditional caution. The same authorised persons would be able to issue them, issuing officers would have to meet the same requirements before applying them, and the range of conditions that could be attached would be extremely similar. They will still be used only in cases where officers have sufficient evidence and offenders admit guilt—we still have a problem with that—and the consequence of breaching conditions would be the same, in that the offender would be arrested and prosecuted for the initial offence.
However, there are two differences that would be helpful for the Committee to consider. The first is the range of offences for which the diversionary caution can be given. I raised this as a point of concern earlier when discussing whether we might see a further decline in the use of out-of-court disposals in appropriate cases as a result of clause 77, which sets out the restrictions on giving diversionary cautions for indictable-only offences. I will not repeat our concerns, but now that we are looking at the specific clauses, I would be grateful for some further information from the Minister.
Clause 77(3)(a) allows a diversionary caution to be given to an offender for an indictable-only offence
“in exceptional circumstances relating to the person or the offence”.
It would be helpful if the Minister could provide some illustrative examples of what such an exceptional case might be. The restriction for indictable-only offences existed only for the simple caution before, but it did not apply to conditional cautions. Has the Minister made any assessment of what impact the change might have with regards to up-tariffing for disposals given at this level of offending?
The second key difference is a change in the maximum amount that an offender can be fined through a financial penalty condition. For the current conditional caution, fine levels are set by the Secretary of State but cannot be above £250, and this limit is set in primary legislation. However, the Bill will not provide a limit for diversionary caution fines, and the value of any such fine will be set using rules from future secondary legislation made under the powers in the Bill. Although I appreciate that the secondary legislation would require parliamentary approval by a yes/no vote, and so Parliament could reject the fine limit, it would not be able to amend the proposals for the fine value.
The issue of fines disproport- ionately affects younger people, who may not have much money. That also needs to be taken into consideration when assessing the level of the fines.
The summary that my hon. Friend offers is certainly to the point. Young people could find themselves unable to meet a fine and end up in court or with further fines as a result—poverty heaped upon poverty in that situation.
It would be helpful at this stage to hear any more information that the Minister has about what level the Government may intend to set the fines at. Perhaps he could just tell us what the motivation is behind changing the limit.
Again, on the impact on the black and minority ethnic community, I wonder what thoughts my hon. Friend has on the fact that this would appear on their record if they were to be served a community caution.
My colleague is right to raise the issue of disproportionality in the system. Anything that increases that is not good for us as a country and is certainly not good for the young people involved. It is important that the Government bear that in mind as they bring the measure forward. More importantly, as I said, the Government can get into a situation where they recognise that communities—ethnic minority communities, call them what we will—need to have an understanding of the changes that the Government are proposing, so that we do not find more young people, young black men in particular, with criminal records when that is not necessary.
Secondly, the community cautions will now involve financial penalties. Officers will be able to attach a fine to a community caution as a punitive condition. Failure to meet any of the conditions, including a financial penalty condition, could result in a police-issued fine. Again, that would be quite a departure from the community resolution. Offenders might be asked to pay damages to their victims as part of a resolution, but community resolutions are not used to fine individuals.
Will the Minister tell me, therefore, whether the intention is to replace the community resolution entirely with community cautions? I ask, because Transform Justice has rightly called for some clarity in this area:
“The status of community resolutions under the proposed legislation is not clear. Clause 96 ‘Abolition of other cautions and out-of-court disposals’ states that ‘No caution other than a diversionary or community caution may be given to a person aged 18 or over who admits to having committed an offence’. We are unsure what this means for community resolutions, although we understand the intention is that they will remain available to police if they wish to use them.
Given the value of community resolutions, as an out of court disposal that does not require a formal admission of guilt, the legislation and accompanying regulation should make clear in Clause 96 that use of community resolutions will not be prohibited under the new framework.”
I have already discussed our concerns about the need for a formal admission of guilt for the community caution and the potential that has to deepen disproportionality in our criminal justice system. My hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate just raised that issue. We all know that there are benefits to having a light-touch disposal to deal with low-level offending in some cases where appropriate. Keeping people out of the formal justice system at this level can help keep them out of it for good and so I wonder whether the Minister thinks that we might be losing a helpful method of disposal here. Finally, how does he anticipate that the low-level offences that benefited from community resolutions before will now be handled?
I beg to move amendment 117, page 228, line 15, in schedule 10, leave out sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) and insert—
‘(2) In paragraph 1(1)—
(a) for “—“ substitute “at the time the caution is given.”, and
(b) omit sub-sub-paragraphs (a) and (b).”
This amendment would remove the spending period for cautions.
We have discussed a number of important matters over the course of the morning, all of which impact on the lives of young people and older people. They have all been extremely important issues, but for me this amendment is particularly important, because it would make life a lot easier for a lot of people, and probably contribute more than some of the other things that we have discussed to keeping them out of the criminal justice system.
Amendment 117 would remove the spending period for cautions. It would revise the text of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 to the following:
“For the purposes of this Schedule a caution shall be regarded as a spent caution at the time the caution is given.”
Currently the upper-tier disposal of a conditional caution has a spending period that is the earlier of three months or the completion of the caution, and the Bill will maintain that spending period for the diversionary caution. We believe that the spending period associated with diversionary cautions should be removed so that those who receive one are not forced to disclose this record to potential employers. The effect of the spending period attached to cautions is to increase the barriers to employment for those who are diverted from court.
Given the Government’s commitment to reform of rehabilitation periods elsewhere in the Bill—at part 11—we believe that this is a good opportunity to continue the direction of travel that the Government are on, make another positive change in this area and remove the rehabilitation period for cautions as well. The Government may believe that a three-month spending period is required for a diversionary caution in order to support public protection. However, there is strong evidence, of which I am sure the Minister is aware, that employment is one of the most important factors, if not the most important, in enabling people to cease offending. Research has also found that employers discriminate against people with criminal records and that many do not differentiate between a caution and a conviction.
A three-month rehabilitation period is short enough to have little impact on public protection, but its existence requires people in employment to declare the caution and so risk losing their job. It acts as a barrier to those seeking work, education, insurance and volunteering opportunities. It is also important to remember that criminal record disclosure in itself is not really a public protection measure: the general public cannot check a person’s record or require them to disclose it. In any event, under present guidance, if the police or CPS believe that someone is a legitimate risk to others, they would never meet the public interest test for caution instead of charge.
On the issue of accepting a caution, if people think that it might lead to this being on the criminal record, they might be less inclined to accept a caution and might therefore take their chances by going to court. Does my hon. Friend think that it would potentially lead to more cases going to court if this matter stayed on the criminal record?
Indeed. My hon. Friend is correct in saying that it could lead to greater congestion in the courts system, but the most important thing in all this is that it removes the person’s opportunity to move on with their life in an appropriate way. If they are able to have a caution and they do not have to tell their employer that they have had their knuckles rapped in such a way, they will be able to continue in employment, whereas otherwise they may well lose their job.
In some cases, cautions are appropriate for individuals who pose a low level of risk, but only when combined with other supervision measures. In such cases, that often means the sex offenders register. But in these cases, it is the sex offenders register—or other supervision measure—that acts as the public protection measure, not the spending period attached to the caution.
The spending period also introduces unnecessary confusion for those given cautions. The rehabilitation period will be the same as for the conditional caution, so it will be the earlier of three months or when the diversionary caution ceases to have effect. This is quite a perplexing element of the current system, because those who receive conditional cautions often do not understand the disclosure regime and have no way of knowing whether their conditions are judged as completed before three months. Officers often do not explain disclosure related to cautions comprehensively and offenders do not know that there is a link between meeting conditions and their becoming spent. The situation is so confusing that some third sector organisations that support offenders universally tell them that the spending period is three months from caution, because this is the only way for them to be certain that the caution is completely spent and, therefore, that the offender will not unintentionally fall foul of the disclosure process.
We think it would be preferable to have a “cautions are spent when given” standard. Otherwise, we will end up with a situation in which the criminal justice system is giving out more of the new cautions than prison sentences, but Parliament will have given the cautions a more complex disclosure regime. Perhaps the Government think that a spending period is necessary because of the seriousness of the diversionary caution, but we must remember that rehabilitation periods are not part of the punitive aspect of a disposal, and the knock-on effect on someone’s life from having to disclose should not be used as a punishment. Under current guidance, magistrates and judges are specifically precluded from considering disclosure periods when giving sentences, and they must always give the correct disposal, regardless of the criminal record impact.
With all that said, I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts on the need for the spending period for the diversionary caution and other cautions outside the adult regime. We believe that introducing a spending period for the diversionary caution will hamper people’s efforts to gain employment, while doing little for public protection. That is true for the spending period for all cautions. The Government are doing good work in reforming the criminal records disclosure regime and, by extension, helping people to stay out of the offending cycle and rebuild their lives. The amendment has been tabled with the same intention, and I sincerely hope that the Government can support it.
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesClauses 54 to 60 make up one of the most controversial parts of the Bill. We have seen fierce debates in Parliament and in the media, and protests up and down the country. Beneath the hyped-up culture wars is the very real issue that we will debate again today: what is the balance between our democratic right to protest and the rights of those around us? That is a legitimate question for the Government to ask.
How do we ensure that protests are peaceful? How do we balance the rights of others to go about their daily business? How do we, as parliamentarians, set the framework within which the police can do their jobs? The Opposition believe that the Government’s plans do not answer those questions and we reject the attempts to amend the Public Order Act 1986 with this loosely drafted legislation that would restrict democratic rights to peaceful protest.
Clause 54 imposes conditions on public processions, including powers for the Secretary of State to define serious disruption to the life of a community or the activities of an organisation carried out “in the vicinity” of a public procession, as well as powers for the police to impose conditions when they believe that noise might have
“a significant impact on persons in the vicinity”
or may result in
“serious disruption to the activities of an organisation”.
We probably all have our favourite demonstration from our past. Mine was in the 1970s, when I was a student at Darlington College of Technology. It is lamentable that nowadays students do not spend more time on the streets demonstrating. I remember that day well, because we were going down the streets, shouting, “Heath out! Heath out!” That was the day that Heath resigned. We were very pleased with ourselves—a tremendous result from that demonstration. Does my hon. Friend agree that these restrictions could mean that students will feel even more inhibited about demonstrating in future?
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. I remember going on the “grants not loans” demonstrations in the late ’80s. He clearly had incredible persuasion in the demonstration he went on, resulting in the desired outcome, and I congratulate him on bringing about that change.
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. These are operational matters for the police. The police currently have the powers, and they have to be mindful of the impact of their powers on a demonstration and whether they will inflame the situation. Good policing will err on the side of caution on some occasions, but sometimes the police need to deal with a situation that they think will get out of hand. Trying to legislate for what is in the discretion of police officers is wrong, and we should actually trust the police in using their powers of discretion.
The clauses would also widen the types of conditions that the police could place on static protests. The clauses would significantly lower the legal test that must be met for the police to issue conditions on protests. The police would be able to issue conditions on protests where they are noisy enough to cause “intimidation or harassment” or
“serious unease, alarm or distress”
to bystanders. Before using their amended section 12 powers to issue conditions on a protest, the police would have to consider the “likely number of persons” affected by the protest, the “likely duration” of the impact, and the “likely intensity” of the impact. The clauses would also widen the types of conditions that police can issue on static protests to match their powers relating to protest marches. The police would also be able to issue any condition on static protests that they think is necessary
“to prevent…disorder, damage, disruption, impact or intimidation”.
Has my hon. Friend had a chance to see the written evidence submitted by Zoe Everett? She describes herself as
“a member and supporter of ACORN for several years.”
In her written evidence, she said:
“Any peaceful assembly of members of the public, be they large-scale political demonstrations and marches, one-person protests, or local campaign actions by community organisations, are likely to be considered disruptive by those who are the intended object of the protest, be they state actors, private businesses and other organisations, or private individuals.”
The point that she makes in her submission is that these increased powers could drive more and more people directly into the criminal justice system. Does my hon. Friend agree that it would be lamentable if people who simply want to protest about something very close to their heart could find themselves criminalised as a result of this new legislation?
Again, my hon. Friend makes an excellent point. The people who want to impose these conditions are the very people who the protesters are trying to change; they do not like that, which is why they want to impose these conditions upon them. It is a suppression of people’s rights.
Again, I cannot comment on that individual protest, but the issue of climate change is a very important one; it affects us all, irrespective of where we live. The issue of a third runway may have also been about a wider issue that would have affected everybody, irrespective of where they live. As I say, I cannot comment on that individual protest, but we have to appreciate that certain protests have a wider significance than just the locality where they happen.
The right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby makes a really interesting point, because people were demonstrating in his constituency and it came to the notice of the local MP, so he has been directly influenced because of the demonstration that took place in his constituency, and he is the decision maker in relation to this particular issue.
Again, my hon. Friend makes an excellent point, and that demonstration is now going to be in the parliamentary record, so I think the person making the demonstration will have achieved her objective.
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point, which I will come to later. The Bill includes many ambiguous clauses that will no doubt cause lots of legal argument in the effort to define what they mean. That puts the police in an impossible situation.
A good starting point for this debate are the Peelian principles expressed by Sir Robert Peel when he set out ethical policing in the early 19th century:
“To recognise always that the power of the police to fulfil their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect. To recognise always that to secure and maintain the respect and approval of the public means also the securing of the willing co-operation of the public in the task of securing observance of laws. To recognise always that the extent to which the co-operation of the public can be secured diminishes proportionately the necessity of the use of physical force and compulsion for achieving police objectives.”
I do not know what my hon. Friend’s postbag or email account has been like over recent weeks, but I have been inundated by emails from individuals and organisations asking me to oppose these measures proposed by the Government. Not one person or organisation has contacted me in favour of these measures. He talked of the importance of the police having the approval of the public for what they are doing, but the public do not want this change. Surely the Government do not have the approval of the people for this piece of legislation.
My hon. Friend makes a good point: policing is done primarily by consent. If the consent is not there and the police do not have the approval of the people, it is a recipe for more disorder. That tips the balance—
Again, my hon. Friend makes an excellent point. Good policing is done with discretion. What the Bill tries to do is to look at different ways of making the police do certain things that they may not want to do. I think that discretion is a great tool that the police have at their disposal, and they use it very well in what are often very difficult situations.
The Peelian principles are also:
“To seek and preserve public favour, not by pandering to public opinion, but by constantly demonstrating absolutely impartial service to law, in complete independence of policy, and without regard to the justice or injustice of the substance of individual laws, by ready offering of individual service and friendship to all members of the public without regard to their wealth or social standing, by ready exercise of courtesy and friendly good humour, and by ready offering of individual sacrifice in protecting and preserving life. To use physical force only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient to obtain public co-operation to an extent necessary to secure observance of law or to restore order, and to use only the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police objective. To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police, the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full-time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence. To recognise always the need for strict adherence to police-executive functions, and to refrain from even seeming to usurp the powers of the judiciary of avenging individuals or the State, and of authoritatively judging guilt and punishing the guilty. To recognise always that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.”
Every word of the Peelian principles holds true today.
It is our belief that the powers in this Bill threaten the fundamental balance between the police and the people. The most draconian clauses are not actually what the police asked for. We believe that these new broad and vague powers will impede the ability of the police rather than helping them to do their job, that these clauses put way too much power into the hands of the Home Secretary and that the powers threaten our fundamental right to peaceful protest. We know that hundreds of thousands of people are very concerned that their democratic right to protest is threatened by these new provisions on public order.
Has my hon. Friend seen the written evidence submitted by Leeds for Europe? It addresses some of the points that he has just outlined. It says:
“The proposals risk making protests ineffective and…curtail fundamental rights of citizens in a democracy, which allow people to express their concerns about the government of the day or other issues that they feel passionately about.”
I am sure that my hon. Friend agrees that for the Home Secretary to have these new extensive powers proves that this objection is well founded.
Again, my hon. Friend makes an excellent point. This measure puts more power in the hands of the Home Secretary. The Home Secretary may have different views in the future and use the powers in an authoritarian way, which may have a further impact on people’s rights.
That is one way to protest, but elections only come every three or four years. In the intervening period, people have no way to exercise their right to protest via the ballot box and so have other means. The ballot box is also a vote on a whole range of things, while a protest might be for an individual issue not covered by an election.
A few weeks ago, we debated a petition signed by more than 250,000 people. The right to protest is a fundamental freedom and a hard-won democratic tradition that we are deeply proud of. Throughout our history, protests have led to significant changes for the better in this country. Suffragette protests put an end to the discrimination against women in our democracy. Historic trade union protests led to outlawing exploitative employment practices in factories, lifting health and safety standards for workers. Such protests have forced Governments to make the significant changes that we now recognise as fundamental parts of a civilised society.
If the public order provisions in the Bill had been in place when the suffragettes marched for the right to vote, would the women who shouted and screamed noisily for their future have been arrested? Does the Minister think that the marchers for the right to work or those on the anti-apartheid protests should have been stopped for causing annoyance or being too noisy? Do the Government want to stop the children who are shouting loudly for action on climate change or to prevent people across the country from marching to remind people in the establishment that black lives matter?
I support the police 100%; we in the Opposition listen every day to what they tell us. This is a most serious issue, but it is not quite as cut and dried as the Government would have us believe. Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services reported on public order measures in its inspection report, “Getting the balance right?” On public order legislation, the inspectorate called for
“a modest reset of the scales”.
By any measure, this is not a modest reset.
The support for new powers on public order was qualified support for the five Government proposals the inspectorate was asked to respond to. What Matt Parr’s report actually said was that the vast majority of police forces were happy with the existing legislation. It was mainly the Met that wanted new powers to deal with very specific events—mainly large-scale, peaceful, Extinction Rebellion protests. What the police have asked for, they have not been given.
In the evidence session, Matt Parr said:
“We were very clear in what we said that any reset should be modest. We also said that, because of article 10 and article 11 rights, some degree of disruption is not just an inevitable by-product, it is sometimes the whole point of the exercise of protest, and on that basis, it has to be encouraged.”
He went on to say that the proposal—these clauses—
“clearly aims to set a lower bar. Personally, when I reviewed it, I did not think the bar was necessarily the problem. There is just as much of a problem with educating and training the police officers and making sure they understand how article 10 and 11 rights can be properly tempered. It was a question of training and understanding as much as it was of where the bar was for disruption.”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 52-53, Q77.]
I know this makes me a very old person, but I go back to the 1970s again and police and the exercise of their powers. I was a reporter at a sister paper of The Northern Echo, which had a strike that lasted for some 12 months. Eventually, the company managed to start producing a paper. We demonstrated outside every night and attempted to stop them getting the paper out of the building. It was very successful. The police were using existing powers to arrest many people, but there were very few, if any, convictions. Does my hon. Friend share my concern that the new powers here, which we do not really know how the police are going to interpret, could lead to more people being arrested and ending up in the criminal justice system?
My hon. Friend again makes a very good point. The Government clearly have a desire to imprison more people, because they are embarking on a prison-building programme—I do not know whether that is part of the reason why they are introducing these powers. Good policing is using discretion, dealing with each occasion as it arises and policing in a sensitive way. Arresting people should be a last resort, albeit one that the police should use when appropriate.
To quote Matt Parr further:
“I think there are dangers and, as ever, the bar for measuring what was significant or what was serious should be a high one. We all recognise that. It should not be done on the flimsiest of pretexts. Again, it would then be open to challenge, and I think police officers would only wish to use it when they were confident.”—(Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 53, Q77.]
Matt Parr made some important points that should serve as a reminder to Ministers of the problems with clauses 54 to 60. He did not want a lower threshold; he wanted more training for police officers so that they can better understand how articles 10 and 11 might be adhered to. However, the clauses widen the legislation significantly. Does that not make the job of the police in enforcing the legislation more complex?
Lochlinn Parker, the head of civil liberties at ITN Solicitors, said:
“It is going to be down to police officers to try and determine a highly nebulous idea: what is annoying? Everybody is annoyed when a protest takes over the street, but lowering that [threshold] significantly is creating a situation where, if minded to, there will be very little protest that would be lawfully allowed.”
He continued:
“Police will be asked, as they frequently are by the government and the press, why wasn’t more done to stop this protest which caused disruption and problems”.
He also said:
“The political pressure on the police, and potentially their own inclinations in terms of keeping control and order, is going to come to the fore.”
Bob Broadhurst was gold command for the policing of the 2009 G20 protests and now lectures at the London Policing College. Apparently, he choked on his coffee when reading the explanatory notes for the Bill. He said:
“They’re saying protestors are now using new tactics—they’re locking themselves in, they’re gluing themselves down, they’re blocking roads. They were doing that 30 years ago.”
He went on to say:
“None of these tactics are new.”
Clifford Stott, a professor of social psychology at Keele University and expert in protest and police behaviour, argues that, although he vehemently disagrees with the proposals,
“under the Human Rights Act, the police will not be able to enforce any elements of the legislation which interfere with Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights—freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association.”
I acknowledge the huge contribution that the suffragists made, but the suffragettes brought the campaign to prominence. The words displayed by the statue of Millicent Fawcett in Parliament Square are the words that she delivered in a speech about Emily Davison, who threw herself under the King’s horse in 1913, which was another act of protest.
Let me conclude what I was saying about the comments of Clifford Stott, professor of social psychology at Keele University. Professor Stott said:
“If then subsequently this government or a subsequent government scraps the Human Rights Act, then those protections”—
that is articles 10 and 11—
“would no longer exist, and the government and police could interfere with those protected rights.”
Furthermore, Matt Parr was clear in his recommendations. They are about training and resources, which he asked the Government to ensure were in place for policing.
I want to quote again the evidence of Leeds for Europe because there is a real reputational issue here for our country and our Government:
“Such draconian laws seem to align E&W to regimes such as those in Turkey, Hungary and Belarus, rather than those that we were aligned with when part of the EU. The police will have scope to expand their powers against the citizens and to use more active intervention, which might result in more draconian measures… There is a significant risk that the police would be regarded as a hostile agency and individuals seen as enemies of the state rather than people with genuine concerns and causes that they want to promote.”
Surely my hon. Friend agrees that we do not want to be seen as a country that oppresses its people in such a way.
I thank my hon. Friend for his comments. Absolutely, we do not want to be a country that is seen to be oppressing its people. Those rights to protest are at first lost gradually, then quickly, so the transition from what is seen to be a democracy to authoritarian state happens very quickly and we need to be wary of that. We cannot go down that path.
Again, my hon. Friend makes an excellent point. We cannot be seen to be criticising other Governments for the way they suppress the right to protest when we are doing the same here. That weakens our global standing and we should not go down that path.
The College of Policing has authorised professional practice, or APP, that contains 30 tactical options to deal with public disorder and protest. It is out of date. It does not include recent relevant case law or information on certain new and emerging tactical options. The college is planning a review. The inspectorate states:
“By 30 June 2022, the College of Policing, through its planned review, should bring the public order authorised professional practice (APP) up to date and make arrangements to keep it current, with more regular revisions as they become necessary. It would also be beneficial to consolidate the APP, protest operational advice and aide memoire into a single source (or a linked series of documents).”
The inspectorate notes:
“We found that forces do not do enough to share legal opinion or case law on protest policing. And officers and staff rarely use Knowledge Hub’s ‘Specialist Operational Support—Public Order Public Safety’ group… By 31 December 2021, chief constables should make sure that their legal services teams subscribe to the College of Policing Knowledge Hub’s Association of Police Lawyers group.
By 31 December 2021, the College of Policing should ensure that all Public Order Public Safety commander and adviser students attending its licensed training are enrolled in the College of Policing Knowledge Hub’s Specialist Operational Support—Public Order Public Safety group, before they leave the training event…
In making decisions about how to respond to a protest, public order commanders need to consider domestic human rights legislation. And they must also consider a patchwork of European case law. These have established precedents on issues such as how long protests can reasonably go on for, and the level of disruption that protests can reasonably cause.”
The inspectorate stated:
“Examining the gold strategies and silver plans submitted as part of our document review, we found that commanders generally showed a grasp of human rights legislation. However, we did not see evidence that they consistently considered the wider legal picture.”
The inspectorate also recommended:
“By 30 June 2022, the National Police Chiefs’ Council, working with the College of Policing, should provide additional support to gold commanders to improve the quality of gold strategies for protest policing. This support should include the creation and operation of a quality assurance process; and/or the provision of more focused continuous professional development. The additional support should ensure that gold commanders for protest operations include an appropriate level of detail within their gold strategies. This may include the levels of disruption or disorder above which enforcement action will be considered…
By 30 June 2022, the National Police Coordination Centre should revise the national post-event learning review form so that it contains a section to report on the policing operation’s impact on the community…
Forces usually have good protest-related briefing processes and commanders’ decisions generally reach the front line effectively. However, gold strategies often do not set out the limits of acceptable behaviour from the protesters. Better explanations of these limits would help officers to understand what is expected of them and empower them to take appropriate action.
Non-specialist officers receive limited training in protest policing. As a result, they often lack confidence in using police powers. Some officers are anxious about attracting complaints and being filmed in protest situations. It is important that forces provide good-quality training and briefing before deploying officers into these situations.
Forces should make better use of community impact assessments to evaluate the impact of protests on those who live in, work in or visit an area. The process should include regular reviews and updates, so the police can respond to changing circumstances. Only seven of the ten forces we inspected submitted any community impact assessments for examination, and some of those we examined were of a poor standard”.
With the covid legislation, we have seen the difficulty that rushing through new police powers can bring for the police. They have managed to do a brilliant job of enforcing the new laws, but they have faced a number of difficult decisions owing to the loose drafting of the law, and they have received criticism where they have got it wrong. The new protest powers will force the police to make political decisions about which protests they deem unlawful. That is extremely concerning and will put the police and the public in a difficult position.
Why do the Government want to make the police the gatekeepers for public protests? The Government are choosing to ignore the many peaceful protests that go ahead and are attended by police. The public order measures in the Bill risk putting the police in a trying position more often, and they risk creating more disorder and disruption. The Government should be putting the police in a position whereby the rules are not too confusing or too broad. If they do not do so, that will only create more flashpoints.
It is clear that police support for the Bill is not what the Government are saying it is. The Metropolitan police want more clarity on ways to manage very disruptive protests that go on and on, and to make sure that emergency services can get through roads. That is understandable, but the police want more clarity and certainty, which is what they said in the evidence sessions. These provisions bring the opposite. Instead of a modest reset, we have in front of us clauses that significantly widen police powers on public order.
Clauses 54 to 60 mark a substantial change in the approach to policing protest, which has the potential to be applied disproportionately and could curtail article 10 and article 11 rights that the inspectorate of constabulary is keen to protect. The police already have the powers to break up protests that cause harm, serious public disorder, serious damage to property or serious disruption to the life of a community. Many of the country’s best lawyers are telling us that the Public Order Act 1986 and the many other powers on the statute book to police protests are enough.
One of the things that troubles me most about the Bill is the stuff in relation to this place—this Parliament of ours, and this democracy—and the fact that people could be prevented from protesting on our doorstep and disrupting our lives. People should have a right to disrupt the lives of MPs and those who work in this place, in order to get their point across. Does my hon. Friend agree that, for all the things that the Government want to do with the Bill, one thing they should not deny the people is the right to protest at the seat of our democracy?
Again, my hon. Friend makes an excellent point. We are the decision makers in this Parliament. We are the ones who make decisions that impact on people’s lives, so if we do not hear and are not aware of the protests, how will that change be brought about?
My understanding is that the clauses will not affect people’s right to picket, but will the Minister provide reassurance that people’s right to picket or attend demonstrations will not be affected? There is also a penalty for someone who breaches a police-imposed condition on a protest when they ought to have known the condition existed. If someone attends a protest and the police have placed conditions on the number of people allowed to attend, how will the attendee know whether they are the 101st person to join a demonstration that has a limit of 100?
I want to take my hon. Friend back to the issue of noise. Paragraph 546 of the explanatory notes to the Bill states:
“Where a senior police officer reasonably believes, having had regard to various factors, that the noise generated by a one-person protest may have a relevant impact on persons in its vicinity or may result in serious disruption to the activities of an organisation which are carried on in the vicinity of the one-person protest, the senior police officer may give directions imposing on the person organising or carrying on the protest such conditions as appear to them necessary to prevent such disruption or impact.”
The Government give us that explanation, but they still do not define what a disruptive noise is. It would be helpful if the Minister told us.
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. It would be helpful if we had an idea of the definition of “disruptive noise”. If we are to pass the Bill, we should know what we are passing.
There have been problems when the police have not satisfactorily communicated conditions to protesters. Will the Minister provide the Committee with evidence to justify the proposed widening of criminal responsibility in clause 56? The HMICFRS report talked about a slight shift in the legal test on that, but what the Government propose goes way too far. Sir Peter Fahy, former chief constable of Greater Manchester police, said that the legislation includes “some really dodgy definitions” that the police are supposed to make sense of. The point of protest is to capture people’s and the Government’s attention. Sometimes protests are noisy and sometimes annoying, but they are as fundamental to our democracy as Parliament is and as the courts are.
On 6 October last year, I had the pleasure of witnessing an impressive and effective protest outside Parliament, which was organised by the Let Music Live campaign to highlight the plight of freelance musicians who received very little support from the Government during the coronavirus pandemic. The protest involved 400 socially-distanced musicians, all dressed in black, playing 90 seconds, or 20%, of Gustav Holst’s “Mars”. Not only was the demonstration eye-catching, but it used the sound and the loudness of Holst’s piece to convey the message.
The demonstration consisted of 90 seconds of sound building until it came to an abrupt stop. Would such a protest fall foul of clause 54? I fear it might, but who would be qualified to assess whether a 90-second blast of Holst’s “Mars” constituted noise that might have a “significant” or “relevant” impact on “persons in the vicinity”? The phraseology is so vague and devoid of precise meaning that it will be a legal nightmare for the police to determine what the terms “significant”, “relevant” and “impact” mean for the purposes of the Bill.
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. This is going to be subjective. What one person considers noise might not be the same for another person. There may be a different view from different officers in the same force, which will lead to confusion.
My hon. Friend makes an interesting point. There is the potential for the Bill to have unintended consequences. In my Stockton-on-Tees constituency, all the churches come together once a year in the parish gardens, although they have not been able to do that in recent times. They have loud music, guitars, drums and all manner of things going on. Backing on to the parish gardens is the Royal Oak pub. Under this legislation, people in the Royal Oak may think that the people demonstrating their faith in the parish gardens are a public nuisance and are getting on their nerves as they enjoy a pint, and they could complain to the police.
I do not know whether that would be captured by the legislation, but if it would be captured, that would be wrong. I mentioned the Let Music Live protest. Even if such a protest were deemed permissible, it would still cause many problems of interpretation for the police, who would have to use the Bill to define whether the protest had “significant” or “relevant impact.”
Aside from music, what about singing? Singing songs and chanting have been a feature of every protest or demonstration that I have ever been on. Would singing be captured by the clause? The hymn “We Shall Overcome” was adopted as an anthem and sung as a protest song. In 1963, the folk singer Joan Baez led 300,000 protestors in song as they sang “We Shall Overcome” at the Lincoln Memorial as part of the civil rights movement march on Washington. Some 300,000 people singing “We Shall Overcome” must have made a fair bit of noise. Imagine a crowd of 300,000 outside the Houses of Parliament singing “We Shall Overcome.” Who would determine whether that constituted noise having a “significant” or “relevant” impact on “persons in the vicinity”?
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesOne of the problems is that there is less local authority provision for Travellers to go to. That loss of provision, which is partly due to cuts to local government, has caused more problems, meaning that more people are on the road at any given time. However, this issue does not affect just the Traveller community, as the hon. Gentleman will see when I go on to make further points. It also impacts people such as ramblers, birdwatchers and others who want to stay out and sleep in their vehicles while enjoying countryside activities.
My hon. Friend has made the point that there is a failure in our society to provide sufficient facilities for people from the travelling community, be they traditional Gypsies or people who choose to go on the road. Does he agree that the Government, rather than bringing in legislation such as this, should turn their attention to providing local authorities with the resources they need to provide facilities for travelling communities? Does he also agree that that should not be left just to some communities; communities across the country should take a share in providing such facilities so that Travellers can live with them cheek by jowl in a peaceful way?
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. That was highlighted by the representative from the LGA in her evidence to the Committee.
As one of the respondents to the Petition Committee’s survey on the criminalisation of trespass put it:
“The criminalisation of trespass will simply exacerbate an already fraught relationship.”
In Stockton, we have had facilities for travelling communities for many years. I am sure my hon. Friend will agree that this is about having proper facilities. Perhaps I can point him to the example of the Appleby horse fair, which attracts thousands of people every year. We see them travelling up, and they stay on the byways and all sorts of places along the way, but when they get to the site they are properly catered for. There is proper rubbish removal, proper facilities for animals, toilets and all manner of facilities, and they are put in place to provide for that particular need. Perhaps if other local authorities across the country took that approach, we would not have the problems that Government Members have described.
Again, my hon. Friend makes an excellent point. He is right: if more facilities were provided, that would help to solve the problem.
Civil remedies would still be available for people who engage in antisocial behaviour, fly-tipping and so on. All we would be doing is criminalising a particular group of people. In my view, the civil remedies would still be there and the cost to the council would still be there if proper facilities were not provided. To me, just criminalising a particular group of people is wrong.
To continue, the NPCC witness said:
“Really, our point fundamentally as the NPCC group is that the issue here is the lack of provision that theoretically should be made, which means that we have this percentage of Travellers who are on unlawful spaces and you end up in the situations that we end up with. Our view is that the current legislation is sufficient to deal with that issue.”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 15, Q20.]
We have to ask: why are the Government determined to lock up Gypsies and Travellers, even against the advice of their own police? As Martin Hewitt clearly stated, existing legislation on police powers and unauthorised encampments is enough to tackle the problem. The police already have extensive powers to move on unauthorised encampments in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, and as of January 2020, just 3% of Gypsy and Traveller caravans—694—in England were in unauthorised encampments. Of those, 419 were on sites not tolerated and 275 were on tolerated sites. The police and campaigners tell us the evidence is not there that the new powers are necessary and that many more authorised encampment sites should be provided instead.
I sometimes wonder whether the power to discourage Travellers from moving in is in the hands of communities. Travellers move around the country for work—to pick up scrap, to do all manner of gardening work, such as taking down trees for people, and so on. I have had many an argument with people living in communities who say, “We don’t want Travellers here,” but they put out their fridge or their scrap metal for them, they let them cut down their trees. They provide them with work and an incentive to be in the area. So perhaps people have it in their own power. Travellers will not come if there is no incentive for them.
My hon. Friend makes an interesting point, which is worthy of further discussion.
I will run through a series of points the Minister for Crime and Policing made when responding to a Westminster Hall debate on this question. On concerns about the right to roam being threatened, he said the measures will not affect anyone who wants to enjoy the countryside for leisure purposes, but many organisations, such as the Ramblers Association and CPRE the Countryside Charity, are concerned that although the Government might not intend to capture others enjoying the countryside, they could still do so. The legislation is so open to interpretation that it could easily be applied to anyone with a vehicle. For example, how do the Government propose to ensure that the police distinguish between a modified Transit van or Volkswagen camper used at the weekends and one that is lived in? How will they distinguish between a family going on a caravan holiday and a Gypsy or Traveller family with an identical caravan before stopping them and seizing their property because the police suspect that they might stop somewhere they do not have permission to do so?
The Minister for Policing and Crime also said that there is a high threshold to be met before the new powers kick in, but only one vehicle need be involved, whereas section 61 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act requires six vehicles. The bar seems to have been significantly lowered in the Bill. The police currently have discretion to decide whether to use their powers under sections 61, 62 and 62A to 62E, in the latter cases where a suitable alternative pitch is available, but under the proposals in part 4 of the Bill, police will be dutybound to act when they are informed that a criminal offence has taken place.
The term “significant distress” is highly subjective. Given the high levels of prejudice and hatred towards Gypsy and Traveller communities, we are likely to see countless reports of criminal offences being committed, based on someone saying that they are significantly distressed by an encampment. Marc Willers QC, of Garden Court Chambers, said in the evidence sessions:
‘It seems to me that a lot of the language used is vague and uncertain. There is a reference to causing “significant distress” as one of the conditions that could lead to the criminalisation of an individual who refuses to leave a piece of land. That, in itself, brings inherent problems, because a private citizen could very easily invoke the power and leave a police officer with a fait accompli—in other words, they have no option but to arrest an individual who refuses to leave land in circumstances where the occupier says, “I am being caused significant distress by the very fact that this individual is parking on land that I occupy.”’
I am never happier than when I am in my own caravan—always on an official site—travelling around the country and into Europe. I have seen tremendous growth in the number of people driving motor homes, and I see them parked up all over the country, on private land, public land and elsewhere. Those people are also going to get caught up in this particular legislation, are they not?
Again, my hon. Friend makes a very good point. We want to make sure that people are free to enjoy the beautiful countryside we are lucky to have in the UK without fear of being criminalised in such a way.
Marc Willers QC went on to say:
“That distress can be engendered or underpinned by the prejudice that Gypsies and Travellers face in our society today. It is a widespread and long-standing prejudice, dating back to the first time that Romani Gypsies came to these shores in the 1500s… There may well be unwarranted and unjustified concerns on the part of the occupier, which could lead to the criminalisation of an individual who has nowhere else to go.” —[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 72, Q104.]
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesOne of the problems is that there is less local authority provision for Travellers to go to. That loss of provision, which is partly due to cuts to local government, has caused more problems, meaning that more people are on the road at any given time. However, this issue does not affect just the Traveller community, as the hon. Gentleman will see when I go on to make further points. It also impacts people such as ramblers, birdwatchers and others who want to stay out and sleep in their vehicles while enjoying countryside activities.
My hon. Friend has made the point that there is a failure in our society to provide sufficient facilities for people from the travelling community, be they traditional Gypsies or people who choose to go on the road. Does he agree that the Government, rather than bringing in legislation such as this, should turn their attention to providing local authorities with the resources they need to provide facilities for travelling communities? Does he also agree that that should not be left just to some communities; communities across the country should take a share in providing such facilities so that Travellers can live with them cheek by jowl in a peaceful way?
My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. That was highlighted by the representative from the LGA in her evidence to the Committee.
As one of the respondents to the Petition Committee’s survey on the criminalisation of trespass put it:
“The criminalisation of trespass will simply exacerbate an already fraught relationship.”
As I have said, there is no excuse for criminality, and the Gypsy and Traveller community is already overrepresented in the prison population, but I do not think that the two issues are necessarily related to what the clause is trying to achieve. The hon. Gentleman is trying to say that the Gypsy and Traveller community is responsible for crime in Ashfield. I do not know the facts and figures in relation to that, but what the clause does is criminalise communities for being in vehicles on public land. While each Member has a concern about their individual constituents, we need to get back to what the Bill is focusing on, which is criminalising anyone in a vehicle, even on their own. I think that is what we need to focus on.
In Stockton, we have had facilities for travelling communities for many years. I am sure my hon. Friend will agree that this is about having proper facilities. Perhaps I can point him to the example of the Appleby horse fair, which attracts thousands of people every year. We see them travelling up, and they stay on the byways and all sorts of places along the way, but when they get to the site they are properly catered for. There is proper rubbish removal, proper facilities for animals, toilets and all manner of facilities, and they are put in place to provide for that particular need. Perhaps if other local authorities across the country took that approach, we would not have the problems that Government Members have described.
Again, my hon. Friend makes an excellent point. He is right: if more facilities were provided, that would help to solve the problem.
Civil remedies would still be available for people who engage in antisocial behaviour, fly-tipping and so on. All we would be doing is criminalising a particular group of people. In my view, the civil remedies would still be there and the cost to the council would still be there if proper facilities were not provided. To me, just criminalising a particular group of people is wrong.
To continue, the NPCC witness said:
“Really, our point fundamentally as the NPCC group is that the issue here is the lack of provision that theoretically should be made, which means that we have this percentage of Travellers who are on unlawful spaces and you end up in the situations that we end up with. Our view is that the current legislation is sufficient to deal with that issue.”––[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 15, Q20.]
We have to ask: why are the Government determined to lock up Gypsies and Travellers, even against the advice of their own police? As Martin Hewitt clearly stated, existing legislation on police powers and unauthorised encampments is enough to tackle the problem. The police already have extensive powers to move on unauthorised encampments in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, and as of January 2020, just 3% of Gypsy and Traveller caravans—694—in England were in unauthorised encampments. Of those, 419 were on sites not tolerated and 275 were on tolerated sites. The police and campaigners tell us the evidence is not there that the new powers are necessary and that many more authorised encampment sites should be provided instead.
I sometimes wonder whether the power to discourage Travellers from moving in is in the hands of communities. Travellers move around the country for work—to pick up scrap, to do all manner of gardening work, such as taking down trees for people, and so on. I have had many an argument with people living in communities who say, “We don’t want Travellers here,” but they put out their fridge or their scrap metal for them, they let them cut down their trees. They provide them with work and an incentive to be in the area. So perhaps people have it in their own power. Travellers will not come if there is no incentive for them.
My hon. Friend makes an interesting point, which is worthy of further discussion.
I will run through a series of points the Minister for Crime and Policing made when responding to a Westminster Hall debate on this question. On concerns about the right to roam being threatened, he said the measures will not affect anyone who wants to enjoy the countryside for leisure purposes, but many organisations, such as the Ramblers Association and CPRE the Countryside Charity, are concerned that although the Government might not intend to capture others enjoying the countryside, they could still do so. The legislation is so open to interpretation that it could easily be applied to anyone with a vehicle. For example, how do the Government propose to ensure that the police distinguish between a modified Transit van or Volkswagen camper used at the weekends and one that is lived in? How will they distinguish between a family going on a caravan holiday and a Gypsy or Traveller family with an identical caravan before stopping them and seizing their property because the police suspect that they might stop somewhere they do not have permission to do so?
The Minister for Policing and Crime also said that there is a high threshold to be met before the new powers kick in, but only one vehicle need be involved, whereas section 61 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act requires six vehicles. The bar seems to have been significantly lowered in the Bill. The police currently have discretion to decide whether to use their powers under sections 61, 62 and 62A to 62E, in the latter cases where a suitable alternative pitch is available, but under the proposals in part 4 of the Bill, police will be dutybound to act when they are informed that a criminal offence has taken place.
The term “significant distress” is highly subjective. Given the high levels of prejudice and hatred towards Gypsy and Traveller communities, we are likely to see countless reports of criminal offences being committed, based on someone saying that they are significantly distressed by an encampment. Marc Willers QC, of Garden Court Chambers, said in the evidence sessions:
‘It seems to me that a lot of the language used is vague and uncertain. There is a reference to causing “significant distress” as one of the conditions that could lead to the criminalisation of an individual who refuses to leave a piece of land. That, in itself, brings inherent problems, because a private citizen could very easily invoke the power and leave a police officer with a fait accompli—in other words, they have no option but to arrest an individual who refuses to leave land in circumstances where the occupier says, “I am being caused significant distress by the very fact that this individual is parking on land that I occupy.”’
I am never happier than when I am in my own caravan—always on an official site—travelling around the country and into Europe. I have seen tremendous growth in the number of people driving motor homes, and I see them parked up all over the country, on private land, public land and elsewhere. Those people are also going to get caught up in this particular legislation, are they not?
Again, my hon. Friend makes a very good point. We want to make sure that people are free to enjoy the beautiful countryside we are lucky to have in the UK without fear of being criminalised in such a way.
Marc Willers QC went on to say:
“That distress can be engendered or underpinned by the prejudice that Gypsies and Travellers face in our society today. It is a widespread and long-standing prejudice, dating back to the first time that Romani Gypsies came to these shores in the 1500s… There may well be unwarranted and unjustified concerns on the part of the occupier, which could lead to the criminalisation of an individual who has nowhere else to go.” —[Official Report, Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Public Bill Committee, 18 May 2021; c. 72, Q104.]
(4 years, 4 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThese amendments would require the Secretary of State to commission an analysis of the impact of this section of the Bill before it comes into force on people with protected characteristics, as well as the consequences of any disproportionate impact on efforts by the prison authorities to rehabilitate prisoners convicted of terrorism offences. With this amendment, we seek to address the issue that was highlighted by the probing amendment and to clarify whether the same criminal standard of proof would apply to determining a terrorist connection for all offences, as is currently the case for listed offences. In particular, we seek to determine whether the clause may have a disproportionate impact on people from minority faith and BAME communities, including on the numbers who are received into prison and the length of the sentence served.
There are significant risks involved in expanding the number of individuals who fall under the provisions of separate terrorism legislation, particularly if the imposition of additional sanctions is seen as neither fair nor proportionate and is found to have a disproportionate impact on minority faith and BAME communities in particular. As I said during my speech on amendment 35, the equality statement on the Bill acknowledges that
“Asian/British Asian and Muslim individuals within the Criminal Justice System (CJS) have been disproportionately affected by terrorism legislation relative to the total percentage”
of those individuals “in the total population.”
In 2016, a Ministry of Justice study of Crown court decision making found that, under similar criminal circumstances, the odds of imprisonment for offenders from self-reported black, Asian, Chinese or other minority ethnic backgrounds were higher than for offenders from self-reported white backgrounds. My hon. Friend the Member for Coventry North West spelled that out in some detail.
I do not know whether my hon. Friend was in the Chamber to hear the urgent question asked by my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham about the Lammy review, but he pointed out that, when the review was done in 2017, the proportion of BAME people in prison was 41%; it is now 51%. Does my hon. Friend have any thoughts about that?
Unfortunately, I was not in the Chamber for that statement, but I bow to the superior knowledge of my boss and my Whip on this matter. It is absolutely essential that we never lose sight of the facts that my hon. Friend has just outlined.
Unfortunately, when it comes to magistrates courts, systematic scrutiny of magistrates’ decisions is hindered by the absence of reliable data collected on a number of key issues. For example, magistrates courts keep no systematic information about whether defendants plead guilty or not guilty, although there are similar disparities at the Crown court level. Magistrates courts also do not keep proper records of defendants’ legal representation, which means that no one knows whether particular ethnic groups are more or less likely to appear in court facing criminal charges without a lawyer.
The cliché suggests we are all equal under the law, but it would be foolish to deny that our justice system has a certain bias. We must make sure that when we amend or introduce legislation, we do so with our eyes and ears open. Particular attention needs to be paid to the equality impact of the Bill, to ensure that the House is as informed as possible about its impact. We must also ensure that the provisions do not have a disproportionate effect on minority faith or racial groups.
During the oral evidence session, one of my questions was to Peter Dawson from the Prison Reform Trust. We talked about the expansion of sentences for offenders of particular concern and how they would work. Peter Dawson said in written evidence:
“The expansion of SOPCs and the expansion of the number of offences able to be identified as having a ‘terrorist connection’ will need careful monitoring for their impact on prison security and on people from minority faith and ethnic communities”.
I asked:
“How can we improve the Bill to achieve that careful monitoring?”
Mr Dawson replied:
“It may not be something that the Bill can achieve, but I think it is reasonable to ask the Government, after the Bill becomes law, to provide a report on what the impact has been. I entirely take the point that the nature of terrorism at the moment means that certain communities are likely to be more heavily represented, but the point is that all criminal justice agencies need to go beyond that to guard against the unconscious bias that will otherwise creep in.”––[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 38, Q88.]
Other witnesses talked about similar things during the evidence sessions. It is important that we do not lose sight of that.
Along with the expansion of sentences for offenders of particular concern, the clause has the potential to increase significantly the number of individuals in prison who are subject to separate terrorist sentencing. Many of those individuals are vulnerable to radicalisation and they have experienced a steady accumulation of institutional discrimination.
The danger with these provisions is that they could create a significant population of individuals in prison and under supervision in the community who will receive longer sentences and be subject to more onerous and lengthy supervision requirements and forfeiture orders than others who may have received shorter sentences for equivalent offences because the terrorist connection to their offence has not been identified.
That could place those individuals at greater risk from people who would seek to exploit that sense of grievance, in order to radicalise them in support of an extremist ideology. It could also undermine the effective management and supervision of this group in prison, increasing the currently small number of people designated as terrorism offenders to a substantial proportion of the population. This morning, we heard from a representative of the Prison Officers Association, who talked in some detail about the difficulties that prison officers now face in trying to manage particular groups in the prison establishment.
It is right that we commission analysis of the impact of our legislation and if such an analysis proves that there is a disproportionate impact on certain groups, Ministers need to act to correct any discrimination and, if required, change the law. Amendment 42 would require the Secretary of State to commission analysis of the impact of extending sentences for offenders, which is a particular concern regarding people with protected characteristics, and for that analysis to be laid before Parliament before the section comes into force.
Clause 21 replaces schedule 13 of the sentencing code, with the schedule set out in schedule 6 to the Bill. That schedule lists offences that require the imposition of an SOPC where an extended sentence or life sentence is not imposed. This will bring a wider number of offences into the SOPC regime, removing the possibility of those committing such offences from being eligible for a standard determinate sentence. That would mean that only the most minor terrorism offences—those with a maximum sentence of two years or less—would not require an SOPC where an extended determinate sentence is not imposed.
The Bill will also create new sentences—the equivalent of an SOPC for adult offenders in Scotland and Northern Ireland, and for under-18s throughout the UK. Clause 21 addresses a problem created by the TORER Act, which made all terrorist offenders serving a custodial sentence eligible for release two thirds of the way through their sentence, subject to the discretion of the Parole Board. There remained an issue with offenders who were not granted a release until the end of their sentence, and who, as a result, would be released into the community without any form of supervision. The amendment would address this anomaly by requiring that terrorist offenders in the UK would have a minimum period of supervision on licence of 12 months following release, even if they serve the full custodial part of their sentence in custody.
The combined impact of the TORER Act and the provisions of this clause, along with the provisions of clause 1 that allow for the court to determine a terrorist connection for any offence, is to significantly increase the number of individuals subject to separate and more onerous terrorist-sentencing legislation. This includes a longer period in custody, release subject to the discretion of the Parole Board, and a minimum 12 months’ supervision in the community.
There are significant risks involved in increasing the number of individuals who fall under the provisions of a harsher sentencing regime, particularly if the imposition of additional sanctions is seen as being neither fair nor proportionate, and is found, as I have said, to have a disproportionate impact on minority, faith, and BAME communities in particular.
The amendment also seeks to determine the consequences of any disproportionate impact on people with protected characteristics of efforts by the prison authorities to rehabilitate offenders convicted of terrorism offences. Many of those vulnerable to radicalisation have experienced a steady accumulation of institutional discrimination. The danger with the provisions is that they could create a significant population of individuals in prison and under supervision in the community who will receive longer sentences and who will be subject to those more onerous and lengthy supervision requirements than others who receive shorter sentences for equivalent offences. I have already covered that point. That could place them at greater risk from people who seek to exploit that sense of grievance to radicalise them in support of an extremist ideology. It could also undermine the effective management and supervision of this group in prison by increasing a currently small number of people designated as terrorism offenders to a substantial proportion of the prison population.
I am sure that these amendments come as no surprise to the Minister and other members of the Committee, given my interrogation of our witnesses during the oral evidence sessions over the past few days. This area needs particular attention from the Government, and I intend to press the amendment to a vote—unless, of course, the Minister comes up with an appropriate answer. On the basis of all this kindly co-operation and friendliness that we are sharing, and our intention to prove to the public that we can work across parties, perhaps he might surprise me a little.
Amendment 37 would require that when a court considers a serious terrorism sentence for a young adult under the age of 21, the pre-sentence report must take account of the offender’s age and consider options other than a serious terrorism sentence for rehabilitation and reducing harm. It means that the court must also take into account the issues raised in the pre-sentence report and whether it constitutes exceptional circumstances under proposed new section 268B(2).
We need a basic recognition in the Bill’s sentencing framework that, simply put, young adults and adults are inherently different, not only in terms of maturity, but in their potential for rehabilitation. Regarding the level of maturity, numerous organisations, such as the Howard League, have advocated for this proposal. It has been recognised in reviews such as the Lammy review, and by the Justice Committee. Why is it not recognised in the Bill?
As we have said from the outset, serious terrorist offences deserve a serious sentence, but it is still important to consider the age of the offender when other offences of a non-terrorist nature are committed. Although the amendment is specific to under 21s, in line with the Bill, evidence of maturation suggests that young adults up to the age of 25 ought to be considered as a separate group requiring a distinct response from criminal justice agencies.
The work in this area continues apace, and I have no doubt that Ministers may well have to address their approach to all manner of sentences for people up to the age of 25 when we can all be satisfied that the science proves, beyond reasonable doubt, that they ought to be treated differently. We had a considerable amount of evidence on that. I asked Peter Dawson from the Prison Reform Trust for his view on the different factors relating to young people. He said:
“The Bill should have a different sentencing framework for children and for young adults. At the moment, the law defines a young adult as someone aged between 18 and 20. It is not for this Bill to do, but at some point that should change to between 18 and 24.”
I think that is his opinion. He continued:
“At least taking account of the detention in a young offender institution provisions would allow some recognition of the fact that young adults are different from more mature people.”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 34, Q75.]
We also discussed that issue with Jonathan Hall, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, who said that the point he was making was that
“there is recognition that people who are young and immature are probably more susceptible to change than adults.” —[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 10, Q15.]
I asked him whether the bottom line was that with young people, there was perhaps a greater chance of change; he had said that there might be greater opportunity for reform than with those who are considerably older. Mr Hall responded:
“That is what judges are increasingly finding.”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 10, Q16.]
I want to refer to a little more of Jonathan Hall’s evidence. He said that he believed that a younger person dimension needed to be considered in the Bill:
“One of the final points I make in my note about removing the Parole Board’s role is that, again, if it is right that children are more likely to change, and as a matter, perhaps, of fairness, one ought to give them the opportunity, then removing the opportunity to say, at the halfway or two-thirds point, ‘I have now genuinely changed; that was me then and this is me now,’ where it can be shown to the satisfaction of the Parole Board, does seem a little bit—I would not necessarily say ‘unfair’, but it fails to recognise the difference between adults and children.”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 11, Q18.]
The current science and evidence tend to relate to people under 21, some of whom are a long way from full maturity. Analysis from the Royal College of Psychiatrists states that in terms of brain physiology, the development of traits such as maturity and susceptibility to peer pressure appear to continue until at least the mid-20s. That view was supported by the Justice Committee, which reported in 2016 that the growing body of evidence drawing on criminological, neurological and psychological research had led the Committee to conclude that young adults’ characteristics and needs made them distinct from older adults in terms of both their needs and their outcomes. There is no distinction in the Bill that recognises what the Justice Committee had to say.
The “Judging Maturity” report by the Howard League for Penal Reform also cited research that found the following:
“For the purposes of informing sentencing practice, the neurological and psychological evidence that development of the frontal lobes of the brain does not cease until around 25 years old is particularly compelling. It is this area of the brain which helps to regulate decision-making and the control of impulses that underpins criminal behaviour.”
As the Minister knows, I support trusting the experts where there is a significant trend. The trend of opinion from experts seems to be that we need to recognise the differences in maturity and development of young adults. In 2016, the Justice Committee reported:
“Dealing effectively with young adults while the brain is still developing is crucial for them in making successful transitions to a crime-free adulthood.”
Research into the success of interventions aimed at tackling radicalisation suggests that approaches that encourage young people to engage in education and training may be particularly beneficial, and that early interventions to encourage young people to undertake that education and training can be capable of successfully challenging radicalisation.
We talk a lot about rehabilitation, but we do not do enough of it. Labour Members do not want young offenders to be condemned to a life with no opportunity for rehabilitation when it has been reported to be successful in early adulthood. We can reform and rehabilitate, but doing so is a choice.
My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech on this point. On the point about young people’s brains still developing, there is potential for grooming and undue influence by adults. With the Justice Committee, I visited a young offenders institution in Kent, where a young woman who was being held for terrorism offences had been influenced by her mother. Will he comment on that?
Indeed, that is very much the case. I am grateful to my hon. Friend, because he reminds me of some evidence we heard this morning about young people being more susceptible to being radicalised. Another important point raised this morning was that our prison system is not yet properly equipped to deal with young offenders in a suitable environment that prevents radicalisation. They are housed—wherever they are—with people who have committed similar offences, who will be aiming to build on their insecurities and their immaturity to encourage them into further wrongdoing. We must never lose sight of that important point. That is why I will talk about young people throughout our proceedings on the Bill, because young people have to be given a chance.
I will talk about this later, but if a 20-year-old is sentenced to14 years in prison, that will make them 34 on their release. Add another 25 years to that, and they are almost pensioners before they are clear of the shackles of the state. They have not been given the opportunity to reform, because they are constantly looking over their shoulder, perhaps with an attitude of, “Why on earth should I change when the authorities are always on my back?”