Vehicle Technology and Aviation Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Andy McDonald and Steve Baker

Tuesday 21st March 2017 Public Bill Committees

[Andy McDonald]

Labour is fully supportive of the aims of this clause and welcomes Government action to tackle laser attacks—a crime that could have absolutely catastrophic consequences, and that has unfortunately become increasingly prevalent in recent years as access to lasers has become easier. We have tabled a number of amendments, which would clarify certain definitions, increase the scope of the offence, and grant enforcement officers powers to enable them to tackle effectively the perpetrators of laser attacks.

In amendment 25, we seek to delete subsection 1(b) and in its place insert a new subsection concerning the shining of laser beams at fixed installations involving traffic control. As has been seen in the written evidence provided by the British Airline Pilots’ Association, and as we heard last week in oral evidence from BALPA’s Captain Martin Drake, it is not only drivers of vehicles but those working to control vehicular traffic in fixed installations who are vulnerable to laser attacks. As BALPA’s written evidence puts it,

“a laser attack on an Air Traffic Control Tower could cause substantial disruption and could even result in a major airfield being closed for the duration of an attack. The financial and commercial implications of this type of event would be significant.”

I thought it was important to widen the provision, given the evidence that we heard, because such an installation is of course a ready-made target for any mischievous individual.

It should be noted that the amendment does not restrict the offence to laser attacks on air traffic control towers; fixed installations involving traffic control of modes of transport other than aviation could be subject to a laser attack. Clear examples are the port of London’s vessel traffic service control centres on the River Thames and in the estuary. These two centres—the Thames Barrier navigation centre in Woolwich and the port control at Gravesend—oversee maritime navigation in one of the largest and most diverse vessel traffic service areas in the UK, covering some 600 square miles of waterway, spanning 95 miles, from Teddington to the North sea. A laser attack on one of those fixed installations could have catastrophic consequences for safe navigation on the Thames.

The new paragraph that would replace subsection (1)(b) would ensure that the act of shining a laser at a vehicle in the course of a journey, or at a traffic control installation, was itself an offence, regardless of whether the driver or drivers of the vehicle, or the person or people controlling traffic in the fixed installation, were dazzled by the laser, whereas under the Bill it is a requirement that they be dazzled; Opposition Members think that is restrictive and could cause difficulties. We believe that an attempted laser attack in which a perpetrator shines a laser at a vehicle or traffic control installation but is not successful in dazzling a potential victim should be considered an offence in any event, and that the offence of committing a laser attack ought not to be restricted to those occurrences in which the perpetrator is successful in dazzling a victim.

On amendment 10, tabled by the hon. Member for Wycombe, Labour is satisfied with the current maximum term of imprisonment of five years following conviction for the offence of perpetrating an attack, so we do not agree with the amendment. We do not believe that doubling the maximum term of imprisonment is the correct approach, and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will bear with me as I explain why. In our interpretation—unless we are guided otherwise—the perpetrator of any laser attack that can be proven to be attempted murder or manslaughter will receive a sentence appropriate to the crime. As we set out in new clause 15, which I will speak to shortly, the emphasis should be placed on enforcement and the policing of laser attacks, but I look forward to hearing what the hon. Gentleman has to say.

Through amendment 26, we seek clarification of what constitutes an aircraft’s first movement. It will not have escaped your attention, Ms Ryan, that a person

“commits an offence if…he or she shines or directs a laser beam at a vehicle which is in the course of a journey”.

That is causing us—well, not concern, but we would like clarification. What constitutes the first movement for the purpose of take-off? We want to ensure that a laser attack on an aircraft that is taxiing to take off, or indeed to its position for passenger disembarkation, is covered by the legislation. This is our anxiety. The Bill as it stands could be construed as stating that a laser attack on an aircraft would be an offence only if the laser aimed at an aircraft in the air, or on a runway in the process of taking off, but not if it was taxiing towards a runway or on its post-landing journey to its parked position.

We believe that aircrafts taxiing—that is, in the stage between being in a position of rest and take-off—should be explicitly included in the definition of aircraft that are in flight, as should those on the post-landing journey to the parking position. The amendment was tabled to include that in the definition, and to avoid any confusion or ambiguity, which could be exploited by a defendant; we can imagine a scenario in which they, interpreting the Bill to the letter, say, “I don’t fall within that description.” The amendment would cover a scenario in which someone outwith the airport perimeter, for mischief and mayhem, seeks to cause disruption in this way, because they consider a taxiing aircraft to be the easiest of targets, as it travels at a much slower speed than one in the air.

Amendment 27 is a tidying-up exercise; if amendment 25 is accepted, lines 19 to 23 become superfluous. Finally, new clause 15 would give the police the power to stop and search persons who they believed were carrying lasers that had been, or were intended to be, used to commit an offence of shining or directing a light at a vehicle or fixed installation involved in traffic control. BALPA’s written evidence stated:

“We strongly believe that this new offence”

of laser attacks

“must be accompanied with appropriate stop and search powers for the police. Without it we doubt the deterrent effect will be enough to deter attacks.”

BALPA went on:

“This is the one area that we believe must be addressed to enable law enforcement officers to bring the perpetrators of laser illumination offences before the courts. We would strongly urge the committee to amend the Bill to cover this point.”

Without the insertion of this new clause, a police officer who responds to a report of a laser attack but does not catch an offender in the act of shining a laser will not be in a position to carry out stop and search and, accordingly, will not be able to arrest the offender. We therefore think it is critical that this new clause makes its way into the Bill, so that the police are given these stop and search powers and, crucially, the offence of shining a laser at a vehicle or fixed installation involved in traffic control can be properly enforced.

[Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

In tabling amendment 10, my intention was to probe the Government’s position on the seriousness of this offence, and to ensure that the Committee had an opportunity to discuss the same. Very simply, the amendment doubles the sentence from five to 10 years. In oral evidence, I picked up the issue of the seriousness of the offence, and in replying to me, Richard Goodwin talked about the difficulty of proving a person’s intent:

“if somebody shines a laser and a plane crashes, there is a lot of injury to a lot of people; the consequences at that end are obviously catastrophic.”

I picked that theme up and asked BALPA whether it is possible that an attack with a laser could cause the loss of an aeroplane. Martin Drake replied, “Oh yes, absolutely.” He went on to explain that laser attacks happen during finals for aeroplanes, when pilots are carrying out essential and, in some cases, obvious checks, such as checking whether the wheels are down. He said:

“The vast majority of these strikes happen at night, and you are using all lights. Your instruments are lit up. We have mostly cathode ray tube or LED instrumentation on the flight deck; there are very few aircraft still flying around with the old-fashioned dial-type instruments. The potential for a pilot to confuse whether he is looking at the centre line or a side set of lights—particularly in a crosswind, when you are canted over to deal with that—is huge. It is quite conceivable that if both pilots were affected by the dazzle effect at a critical stage of flight, they could attempt to land down the side of the runway, rather than down the centre of it.”

I asked him to remind us of the maximum capacity of the largest aeroplanes, and he said:

“You could end up with about 520 on an A380.”––[Official Report, Vehicle Technology and Aviation Public Bill Committee, 14 March 2017; c. 74, Q171-173.]

Vehicle Technology and Aviation Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Andy McDonald and Steve Baker

Thursday 16th March 2017 Public Bill Committees

[Andy McDonald]

The Minister is very persuasive. He has made things very clear. Although I feel some disappointment that we are not dealing with the matter now, his unequivocal commitment to bringing forward regulations at some later stage terminates the discussion as far as I am concerned. I am grateful for what the Minister has told us, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4

Accident resulting from unauthorised alterations or failure to update software

[Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 4, page 3, line 12, leave out “operating system” and insert “software”.

This amendment replaces “operating system” which is too narrow a term. A vehicle may have firmware which is software in non-volatile memory, an operating system which is software in volatile memory, and application software.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andy McDonald]

Although we are in the same territory, I will defer my comments, Ms Ryan.

[Mr Baker]

Given that the Minister wishes to consider the issues and return to them, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Andy McDonald]

As we have a software engineer in the room, I bow to his superior knowledge, but I think he has already acknowledged that ours is a bold and perhaps even decent attempt to narrow the definition to the very function—not bad for an old personal injury solicitor. I recognise that we are all trying to be specific about the what the software is intended to do, so I will not detain the Committee long on amendment 20 but rather move on to amendment 21, which is in the same territory but not on the same point. It would add a proviso to exclusions and limitations on an insurance policy, because, as drawn, the policy would simply be void in the event of failure to install the software.

We discussed this subject during our evidence sessions, and I think we were all quite fascinated by how software would ultimately be installed, but we think it proper to oblige the manufacturer to attempt to notify the vehicle’s owner, provide the update and arrange for its installation. If an automated vehicle is to be able to drive itself, it is critical to safety that the software responsible for the driving operation be up to date. No one doubts that.

I do not know whether everyone can say with certainty that their mobile phone or home desktop computer has the latest version of the software installed. If a smartphone or computer is out of date, that is pretty poor, but significant consequences are unlikely; if an automated vehicle’s software is not up to date, the consequences could be catastrophic.

[Mr Baker]

This is a sensible amendment, but I think it suffers from defining in terms of operating systems rather than software. Perhaps the Minister will explain whether the definition needs to be in the Bill, or whether updates could be required under the policy and it should be for insurers to determine how software updates should be installed.

[Andy McDonald]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for pointing out the necessary correction. My concern is that there is nothing in the Bill that requires software to be updated. I find that somewhat difficult to understand. These vehicles will be available for use and there will be several iterations of the software updates, so I am staggered that there is nothing to require that to happen. It is almost an assumption—the nature of the beast is such that of course it will be part of the debate—but there is no obligation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Baker]

I rise to make two points, one at slightly more length than the other. The first is that the amendment mentions application software. At the risk of labouring this point, there is a stack of software in the car: firmware at the low level, the operating system, which makes the low-level devices usable, and application software on top. We have reached the point where we are all agreed that all the software needs to be up to date.

The second point is one that my hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire just made: not all the software is safety-critical. That is an important point, so I will take a moment to consider it. Safety-critical software will almost certainly have been derived from formal specifications, proved safe as it is manufactured and then tested comprehensively before it is deployed. I would hope and expect that any responsible engineer, before putting an automated car out on the road, would have a very high level of confidence that the software was in fact safe to use.

The issue then is that there are often bugs in software, so it is not inconceivable that a safety-critical update might be required, but I would like to think that it would be an edge case. If we were to prevent all cars with an automated function from being on the roads because some software update was required, we might end up defeating our purpose. On one hand, I think it reasonable that all safety-critical software must be up to date; on the other, I think that the amendment probably would not achieve the purpose intended.

[Andy McDonald]

The hon. Gentleman is focusing, quite correctly, on “safety-critical”, but is not the software relating to the automated function by definition safety-critical?

[Mr Baker]

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. I will give way to my hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire in a moment if he wishes, but I think that he put his finger on the point very well, not least because he drives a semi-automated car. Imagine my hon. Friend’s Volvo, which requires him to keep his hands on the wheel when it is in semi-automated mode. There could be a software update that allowed him to take his hands off the wheel for an additional five seconds. That is not safety-critical; it is just a variation on the length of time during which it is not necessary to hold the wheel. The point is that such an update would not be critical to the safety of the car’s ability to drive itself—I am grateful to him for indicating assent—but it would be an update related to the software related to the automated function. That is where the amendment falls down. It is possible to conceive of updates that are related to the safety-critical software but not safety-critical. That is where the issue lies.

The other point is that if I have understood correctly, the overall thrust of the Bill, which I welcome, is to be permissive but absolutely clear where liability lies. Drivers know that they are insured whether or not the vehicle is in automated mode. That is the crucial point.