Written Statements

Tuesday 9th December 2025 Written Statements

Tuesday 9 December 2025

Covid Counter-Fraud Commissioner: Independent Review

Tuesday 9th December 2025 Written Statements

[The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Rachel Reeves)]

I am pleased to inform the House that the Covid Counter-Fraud Commissioner’s independent review, “Pursuing Recoveries and Preventing Reoccurrence”, CP 1462, has been laid in Parliament today.

The commissioner, Tom Hayhoe, was appointed in December 2024 to lead this important work over the course of this year. During his time in post, the commissioner has worked across Government, drawing on expertise in the Public Sector Fraud Authority, the Government Commercial Function, the Government Debt Management Function, the Department of Health and Social Care, the Department for Business and Trade and others, to ensure that the Government are recouping public money lost in pandemic-related fraud and from contracts which have not been delivered. The commissioner collaborated with a wide range of experts across sectors to test his hypotheses and findings, and considered lessons learnt and the experiences of key international partners.

The commissioner’s report sets out that £10.91 billion^[1] was lost to fraud and error from covid-19 spending, of which £1.79 billion has been recovered. Failed pandemic-era PPE contracts cost the British taxpayer £1.4 billion, and over £1.9 billion^[2] of bounce back loans have been flagged as suspected fraud to the British Business Bank.

The commissioner finds that the previous Government’s over-ordering of personal protective equipment and delays in quality checking mean that £762 million is unlikely to ever be recovered, with substandard PPE—gowns, masks and visors—remaining uninspected for up to two years, preventing recovery of public money. Litigation remains active or in prospect for eight contracts. DHSC was successful in action against PPE MedPro and efforts continue to recover the £122 million settlement ordered by the High Court.

Covid fraud under the previous Government was not confined to the procurement of PPE but included the exploitation of inadequate checks for loans and grants. Following the commissioner’s recommendations, the Government launched a three-month voluntary repayment window for ineligible support scheme funds^[3] and the covid fraud reporting site for anonymous fraud reporting. This voluntary scheme encourages repayments ahead of the Government exercising comprehensive powers under the Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Act 2025 to investigate and recover fraud, which extends the limitation period for covid cases for a further six years.

The Government are estimated to have delivered nearly £400 million of covid fraud benefits to date and will relentlessly pursue more cases through the new Public Authorities Fraud Investigation and Enforcement Service and further action on fraudulent covid loans, including bounce back loans, confirmed in the recent Budget.^[4]

The commissioner finds there is more to do to recover fraud and error from the previous Government’s covid-19 spending, with recommendations for eight Government Departments, including DHSC, DBT and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government. The Government will now carefully consider all recommendations made in the report, working at pace to provide a full response early next year.

Covid fraud and corruption is an appalling financial scandal which has cost UK taxpayers dearly. I would like to thank Tom Hayhoe for his tireless efforts to chase down fraud, so that public money can be used as intended on public services like hospitals and schools. This Government will continue to relentlessly pursue covid-19 fraud to retrieve taxpayers’ money, hold those responsible to account and ensure such failures can never be repeated.

The report is published on gov.uk: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/final-report-of-the-covid-counter-fraud-commissioner

^[1] Public Sector Fraud Authority estimate of fraud and error in covid schemes.

^[2] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/covid-19-loan-guarantee-schemes-repayment-data-september-2025/covid-19-loan-guarantee-schemes-repayment-data-september-2025

^[3] https://www.gov.uk/guidance/make-a-voluntary-repayment-of-covid-19-funding

^[4] https://www.gov.uk/guidance/report-covid-19-fraud

[HCWS1144]

Defence Export Controls Agreement

Tuesday 9th December 2025 Written Statements

[The Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry (Luke Pollard)]

I am pleased to set out that the UK has acceded to the agreement on defence export controls, to which France, Germany and Spain are existing parties. This represents another step forward in our support for the vital role played by UK’s defence industry in UK growth and defence and wider European security.

The UK’s accession to the agreement will reduce the administrative burden of granting export licences between our nations, open opportunities for UK businesses and help boost economic growth across the country. UK sovereignty and robust export controls on defence equipment exports will be maintained under the agreement. The agreement does not affect the UK’s export control regime or its obligations under international law, including the arms trade treaty, on the conditions for exporting of military equipment. The UK’s licensing authority will therefore continue to assess each licence application against the strategic export licensing criteria. Accession to the agreement will not change this approach.

The agreement establishes a framework between the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Spain to facilitate the licensing of defence exports within collaborative industrial programs. It creates an expectation that signatories consider joint exports favourably and aims to reduce the likelihood of signatories objecting to the export of joint Government projects and industrial joint ventures, subject to compliance with existing national and international legal obligations. This will mean more certainty for UK firms involved in multinational defence programmes and supply chains, while preserving UK sovereignty.

The strategic defence review and the defence industrial strategy include an aspiration to see the UK becoming Europe’s leading defence exporter. UK accession to the agreement aligns with this intent and supports Government work to facilitate the UK defence industry’s role as an engine for skilled UK jobs and growth. The SDR also recognises that support for secure, interoperable and agile defence supply chains is central to sustaining the UK’s industrial capability and resilience, including through international partnerships. This agreement underlines the Government’s commitment to supporting industry through exports and comes on the back of our £10 billion frigate agreement with Norway and £8 billion Typhoon deal with Türkiye.

The UK is committed to reinforcing its leading role in NATO and Euro-Atlantic security in an increasingly volatile world. Strengthening our defence and industrial partnerships with European allies is central to the endeavour. By joining the agreement, the UK reinforces its commitment to responsible defence trade and strengthens co-operation with NATO and European allies on shared security priorities, making a positive contribution to UK national security and NATO, while maintaining robust standards under the UK’s strategic export control framework.

[HCWS1140]

Franchising in Higher Education Consultation: Government Response

Tuesday 9th December 2025 Written Statements

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Education (Josh MacAlister)]

Today I am announcing the publication of the Government response https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/franchising-in-higher-education to the consultation on franchising in higher education, as announced in the “Post-16 Education and Skills White Paper”. This response sets out the steps we will take to lock in stronger long-term oversight of provision and ensure accountability where it matters most.

Alongside this, the Secretary of State has written to all registered providers https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/letter-to-higher-education-providers-9-december-2025 to reaffirm the shared responsibility for protecting public money from exploitation and asking them to assure themselves that practices are being managed appropriately within their institution and within organisations delivering on their behalf.

There has been a significant expansion in franchised provision in higher education since 2019. The Higher Education and Research Act 2017 and other regulatory changes created the conditions for this expansion. Between 2018-19 and 2022-23, the number of franchised students more than doubled, from 50,430 to 135,850, representing 5.7% of all students in the higher education sector. A majority—62%—of franchised students study business and management. This expansion has given rise to concerns regarding quality, governance and the integrity of higher education provision, and recent reports from the National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee have highlighted serious issues, including poor-quality provision and the misuse of public funds.

Students invest heavily in their future and deserve world-class teaching, robust support and genuine value for money. Taxpayers expect absolute assurance that public funds are safeguarded against fraud and deliberate misuse. We will deliver that assurance.

We are tightening the regulatory net. Any franchised provider with 300 or more students will now be subject to direct regulation by the Office for Students as a condition for access to student loan funding. This requirement will be brought in for academic year 2028-29, with the first decisions on designation being made in September 2027.

The requirement on unregistered franchised providers with 300 or more students to register with the OfS will not apply to franchised providers in the following categories: state-funded schools, the statutory further education sector—further education corporations, sixth-form colleges corporations and designated institutions—providers of National Health Service services, including an NHS trust as defined in section 25 of the National Health Service Act 2006, police and crime commissioners, local authorities, Government Departments, the armed forces and mayoral combined authorities.

This latest action forms part of a comprehensive strategy to stamp out malpractice and raise standards. It builds on recommendations from the National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee and complements cross-Government action to prevent fraud and misuse of public funds.

As set out in the written statement in March, the Public Sector Fraud Authority is taking action to ensure cross-Government data sharing is in place to detect and to stamp out fraudulent behaviour where bad actors are targeting several sources of Government funding. These measures will be further enabled by the Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill, which has now completed its passage through both Houses of Parliament and will give Government the powers required to act quickly and decisively.

The Office for Students has already introduced a new initial registration condition requiring providers to have robust and comprehensive arrangements in place to prevent, detect and address fraud and the inappropriate use of public funds. If they have previously received public funds, providers must also demonstrate a track record of managing public money responsibly before gaining registration.

The OfS has also published student outcomes data for all sub-contractual partnerships, which underlines the responsibility lead providers have to ensure that where franchising occurs it is in students’ interest. It has consulted on additional proposals for the oversight of all sub-contractual arrangements in English higher education, and I look forward to the outcome of that consultation early next year.

As set out in the “Post-16 Education and Skills White Paper”, we will be taking legislative powers at the next available opportunity to further strengthen the OfS powers to intervene decisively to tackle poor-quality provision and prevent abuse of public money at registered providers as well as safeguard against provision with poor outcomes for students. This will ensure there is tighter oversight for all franchise arrangements and all other third-party relationships in future, as well as a higher bar for their market entry and expansion.

We want to ensure that higher education continues to be a source of opportunity, excellence and national pride. It should support learners to succeed, drive economic growth and deliver this Government’s mission to break down barriers to opportunity. This Government are taking the action needed to end the poor practice of the past and ensure that access to public funding is earned through quality and strong governance.

A copy of the Government response will be deposited in the Libraries of both Houses.

[HCWS1141]

National Maternity and Neonatal Investigation: Progress Update

Tuesday 9th December 2025 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Health and Social Care (Wes Streeting)]

This statement updates Members on the national maternity and neonatal investigation. In June 2025, I launched a rapid national investigation into NHS maternity and neonatal services. Baroness Amos was appointed to lead this investigation to examine the systemic causes of unacceptable care affecting women, babies, and families.

She and her team have made significant progress since then, having met with over 170 individual family members, including site visits where they have met further families and NHS staff to gather evidence and hear about their experiences of maternity and neonatal care. These local visits have included in Barking, Oxford, East Kent, Kings Lynn, Somerset and Bradford, and Gloucestershire.

Today is the first of three publications that are expected from the investigation. Baroness Amos’ update today sets out reflections and initial impressions since the investigation was launched of the work done and the picture that is starting to emerge. I want to recognise the extraordinary courage that bereaved and harmed families have shown in coming forward to share their experiences. What they have described is deeply distressing, and I cannot imagine how difficult it must be for them to relive these moments.

Baroness Amos highlights the significant challenges faced by women and families within maternity and neonatal care. She has also heard how fathers and non-birthing partners frequently feel unsupported, and how discrimination against women of colour, younger parents, and those with mental health challenges leads to poorer outcomes. Her reflections provide a valuable perspective of the issues and barriers that prevent the delivery of high-quality maternity and neonatal care.

We know that there is a diversity of views among families on the immediate action that needs to be taken. Families do not all agree, and we have a responsibility to listen to all of them. For example, some families want a full statutory public inquiry. Others are focused on systemic change that will prevent future harm. Some want individual case reviews and accountability. Others prioritise learning lessons quickly. I am absolutely committed to recognising this diversity of views and finding a way forward that delivers both accountability and urgent action.

As the investigation progresses, an eight-week call for evidence will begin in January 2026, and engagement will continue with national organisations and seldom-heard voices from communities facing health inequalities. This will be brought together by the investigation to build one set of national recommendations to improve the safety and experience of maternity and neonatal care.

Baroness Amos will deliver two further publications next year. The initial findings will come in February 2026, and a final report and recommendations are expected in spring 2026.

While there is still much to be done, today’s update is a key step forward in improving maternity and neonatal care, and families’ experiences. We are setting up the national maternity and neonatal taskforce early next year, which I will chair. It will develop and oversee the implementation of a new national action plan, based on the recommendations made in the national investigation’s final report. In the meantime, we are pressing on with important improvements to maternity safety, including a new early warning system to spot and tackle emerging safety concerns, and the roll-out of a programme to avoid brain injury in childbirth.

I would like to express my gratitude to Baroness Amos and her team for their dedication to the investigation and their work to date. The Government recognise the urgency of the concerns raised, and I would like to thank the bereaved and harmed families for their courage and bravery in sharing their experiences with the investigation.

[HCWS1148]

Tackling Sexual Misconduct in the NHS

Tuesday 9th December 2025 Written Statements

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Care (Dr Zubir Ahmed)]

Any instance of sexual violence, harassment or abuse in the NHS is unacceptable and will not be tolerated. On 5 December 2025, NHS England set out further actions for all trusts and integrated care boards, so that they can redouble their efforts and take swift and robust action to tackle sexual misconduct in the health service. This builds on action already taken to address sexual violence, harassment or abuse in the NHS.

In September 2023, the sexual safety charter was published by NHS England, and every trust and integrated care board has signed up to the charter now. In October 2024, NHS England produced a sexual misconduct policy framework, which it urged trusts and ICBs to adopt or adapt. E-learning was also introduced to support awareness of sexual safety in the NHS. In August 2025, NHS England set out further actions for all trusts and ICBs to take to identify and act against potential perpetrators of sexual misconduct in the NHS:

Complete an audit on their sexual misconduct policies.

Review policies, such as information sharing and chaperoning policies, to ensure that they are up to date.

Staff to complete training modules on sexual misconduct.

Keep electronic staff records up to date, with ongoing and complete investigations into staff.

The most recent letter went further still, by setting out new actions for trusts and ICBs:

Take part in national training on sexual misconduct investigations.

Ensure a pool of doctors or dentists have received specialist training in sexual misconduct.

Ask all primary care providers to sign up to the sexual safety charter, self-assess themselves, and confirm with their ICB that they have done so.

Principles to be reflected in chaperoning policies to ensure that chaperones are being used correctly and in an auditable way by providers.

Review groups to be adopted for sexual misconduct cases.

Issued a further audit on sexual misconduct policies for all trusts and ICBs to complete.

The Department of Health and Social Care fully endorses the actions taken by NHS England, and expects them to be rigorously implemented. The Department will require ongoing updates from NHS England on implementation on a quarterly basis. You can find further detail of the actions in the NHS England letters.

The August 2025 letter: https://www.england.nhs.uk/long-read/actions-to-tackle-sexual-misconduct-in-the-nhs/

The December 2025 letter: https://www.england.nhs.uk/long-read/an-update-on-actions-to-prevent-sexual-misconduct-in-the-nhs/

The NHS operates a robust approach to sexual misconduct. The Department of Health and Social Care stands with NHS England to take all necessary action to identify sexual perpetrators, and prevent them having access to our NHS. Together, we will continue to monitor and take all necessary action to help ensure the sexual safety of everyone accessing the NHS.

[HCWS1147]

Forensic Information Databases Strategy Board: Annual Report

Tuesday 9th December 2025 Written Statements

[The Minister for Policing and Crime (Sarah Jones)]

I am pleased to announce that I am, today, publishing the annual report of the Forensic Information Databases Strategy Board for 2024-25. This report covers the national DNA database and the national fingerprints database.

The strategy board chair, Assistant Chief Constable Simon Wilson, has presented the annual report to the Home Secretary under section 63AB(7) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Publication of the report is a statutory requirement under section 63AB(8) of the 1984 Act, as inserted by section 24 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.

The report highlights the continued, fundamental value of DNA and fingerprints in the provision of vital evidence and intelligence to support police investigations and the criminal justice system in bringing offenders to justice, protecting and supporting victims, and preventing harm to potential future victims.

I am grateful to the strategy board for their commitment to fulfilling their statutory functions.

The report has been laid before the House and copies will be available from the Vote Office and also on gov.uk.

[HCWS1142]

Changes in Immigration Rules: Nauru

Tuesday 9th December 2025 Written Statements

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mike Tapp)]

My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary is today laying before the House a statement of changes in immigration rules.

Introduction of a visit visa requirement for Nauru

We are today introducing a visa requirement on all visitors from Nauru. This will come into force at 15:00 GMT today. Nationals of Nauru will also be required to obtain a direct airside transit visa if they intend to transit via the UK having booked travel to another country.

Nationals of Nauru will no longer be eligible to apply for an electronic travel authorisation for travel to the UK. There will be a six-week, visa-free transition period for those who already hold an ETA and have a confirmed booking to the UK obtained on or before 15:00 GMT on 9 December 2025, where arrival in the UK is no later than 15:00 GMT on 20 January 2026.

Arrangements are in place so that nationals of Nauru can apply for visas. We are publicising the changes so that travellers are aware and can plan accordingly.

We are taking this action in response to the country’s decision to introduce a new citizenship by investment programme. The practice of granting citizenship through investment is inherently high-risk and allows individuals access to a new identity with minimal ties to the issuing jurisdiction. Careful consideration of Nauru’s programme has highlighted significant risks to UK border and national security. Its design is particularly vulnerable to misuse and, in its current form, poses an unsustainable risk of exploitation by criminal actors or individuals seeking to circumvent UK immigration controls without genuine intent to comply with UK law. Due to the programme set-up, we also lack confidence in the legitimacy of any vetting and due diligence processes. This model cannot operate without rapidly escalating the level of risk to the UK border. The Government therefore consider it necessary to take action through this rules change.

The decision to introduce a visa requirement has been taken solely for national and border security reasons. This does not change the importance of our relationship with Nauru, a Commonwealth partner. Any decision to change a visa requirement status is not taken lightly. We keep the border and immigration system under regular review to ensure that it continues to work in the UK’s national interest.

All other changes will come into effect on 30 December 2025 and 1 January 2026, as detailed in the statement of changes.

[HCWS1143]

Prison Capacity Review: Government Response

Tuesday 9th December 2025 Written Statements

[The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice (Mr David Lammy)]

On Tuesday 5 August, Dame Anne Owers published the findings of her independent review into the handling of prison capacity. The review was commissioned in February 2025 by my predecessor, my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Ladywood (Shabana Mahmood), to examine the decisions that led to the prison capacity crisis between 2022 and 2024, and to make recommendations to help future Governments avoid repeated crises. I am grateful to Dame Anne for her thorough and candid analysis, and I will ensure a copy of the review is deposited in the Libraries of both Houses.

This statement sets out the Government’s response, but first it is important to place this review in its proper context.

This Government inherited a prison system on the brink of collapse. Aside from a two-week period at the start of covid, the last time the total prison estate occupancy was under 95% was more than 12 years ago. At one point in 2024, there were fewer than 100 spaces in adult male prisons. If our prisons reach capacity, courts would be forced to suspend trials, and the police would be forced to stop making arrests. The consequences would be dire, and we would face a breakdown of law and order in this country.

The causes were clear—the last Government added just 500 net places to our prison estate in 14 years, while at the same time sentence lengths rose.

That is why this Government have acted decisively. We have committed to the largest expansion of the estate since the Victorians, committing £7 billion to building prison places between 2024-25 and 2029-30. We are delivering 14,000 new prison places, including four new prisons, and are on track to do so by 2031. We have already opened HMP Millsike, a 1,500-place prison, in March 2025, and broke ground on HMP Welland Oaks, a new 1,700-place prison in November 2025. We have delivered around 2,900 new places since taking office.

We have also recently introduced the Sentencing Bill to Parliament in order to implement many of the recommendations in the sentencing review as soon as possible and put prisons on a more sustainable footing.

We need to lift the prison system out of crisis and start improving it, raising standards to keep the public safe while tackling reoffending. Our actions will increase capacity and are the turning point for us to improve prisons’ performance.

We welcome the review’s findings, which shine a light on the flawed decision-making structures and missed opportunities. We acknowledge the need to address prison capacity within the context of wider criminal justice reform and have accepted in principle the majority of Dame Anne Owers’ recommendations. Work is already under way to address these.

For instance, we are increasing investment in probation services by up to £700 million by the final year of the spending review period. This enhanced funding will allow us to tag and monitor tens of thousands more offenders, enabling close supervision in the community and reducing pressure on the prison estate. Alongside this, we are deepening our collaboration with the third sector—through the Our Future Probation Service stakeholder engagement forum and other established channels—to ensure that community services are designed and delivered in ways that reflect frontline expertise and meet the needs of those we support.

We are also committed to improving transparency across the criminal justice system. In December 2024, the Ministry of Justice published the first annual statement on prison capacity, which set out population projections, supply plans and information on probation capacity.

These steps, alongside other planned and ongoing activity, reflect our commitment to building a more resilient, transparent and forward-looking criminal justice system. Dame Anne’s review will help inform our strategic approach to prison capacity and ensure the mistakes of the past are never repeated and that prison places are always available for those who pose a risk to public safety.

[HCWS1139]

Independent Reporting Commission: Eighth Substantive Report

Tuesday 9th December 2025 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (Hilary Benn)]

I have received the eighth substantive report from the Independent Reporting Commission, and have laid a copy before the House.

The commission was established following the Fresh Start agreement of November 2015 to report on progress towards ending paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland. That agreement set out the Northern Ireland Executive’s commitments around tackling paramilitary activity and associated criminality, and led to a programme of work to deliver a Northern Ireland Executive action plan. It also provided the framework for the UK Government, the Executive and law enforcement agencies, alongside partners in Ireland, to work together to tackle the challenges of organised crime, paramilitarism and terrorism. In the New Decade, New Approach agreement in January 2020, a commitment was made to ongoing work to tackle paramilitarism, and this work continues, including through a second phase of the NI Executive programme.

The commission’s eighth report primarily considers activity undertaken to tackle paramilitarism in the financial year 2024-25. It highlights progress in a number of areas. It notes that Police Service of Northern Ireland statistics indicate that 2024-25 was the first year since records began in 1969 in which there were no security-related deaths, and that violent crime linked to paramilitarism appears to be on a downward trajectory. The report also notes law enforcement successes in tackling paramilitarism and welcomes progress across the justice system in embedding trauma-informed approaches. The report also highlights significant progress in the development of a co-ordinated response to child criminal exploitation.

The report points out that security statistics only tell part of the story. There is still much work to be done on tackling paramilitarism in Northern Ireland. The commissioners note that intimidation, coercive control, and threats linked to paramilitary groups persist, and that paramilitary structures continue to be used to facilitate organised crime and other forms of violence.

The commission has made a number of recommendations on how the approach to paramilitarism can be strengthened and on ways in which a focused effort on paramilitarism can be maintained beyond the life of the Executive programme on paramilitarism and organised crime. We will consider recommendations for the UK Government through engagement with representatives of Northern Ireland political parties, the Executive, the Irish Government, civic society and community representatives in Northern Ireland, and the Independent Reporting Commission. The commissioners also note the scoping exercise that is now under way by Fleur Ravensbergen, the independent expert on paramilitary group transition to disbandment. We look forward to receiving her report on this work next year.

Paramilitarism is a scourge on society in Northern Ireland. The UK Government remain committed to working closely with our partners to support efforts in tackling the enduring threat and harms posed to communities by paramilitary groups. The Executive programme has demonstrated how progress can be made in tackling these harms, and the UK Government look forward to continuing work with the Northern Ireland Executive as they develop plans to build a sustainable, long-term approach for addressing multiple types of violence and harm for the period beyond March 2027.

I would like to extend my thanks to the commissioners for their work in producing this report on progress made towards ending paramilitarism.

[HCWS1145]

Northern Ireland Troubles: Operation Kenova

Tuesday 9th December 2025 Written Statements

[The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (Hilary Benn)]

I am making this written ministerial statement following the publication of the Operation Kenova final report earlier today.

The report covers the activities of the alleged agent Stakeknife, as well as other investigations referred to Operation Kenova by the Police Service of Northern Ireland.

The Operation Kenova investigators received the Government’s full co-operation and have completed a thorough investigation which, in the Government’s view, has been article 2 compliant.

The way in which the Kenova team, led by Sir lain Livingstone, and before him, by Jon Boutcher, have carried out their work and engaged with families has been exemplary. They were able to build trust with families, put victims first and provided many answers about what happened to their loved ones. Operation Turma, which was part of Kenova, resulted in the prosecution of an individual, now extradited from Ireland and awaiting trial, for the murder of three Royal Ulster Constabulary officers in 1982.

Kenova has set a new standard for future legacy investigations, and we have drawn on a number of those lessons in drafting the Northern Ireland Troubles Bill. I wish to express my heartfelt condolences to all the families who lost loved ones in the appalling circumstances described in this sobering report.

Operation Kenova was asked to establish whether there was evidence of criminal offences by the alleged agent known as Stakeknife, or their alleged handlers. The activities of the alleged agent, and their role in the Provisional IRA, are deeply disturbing and should not have happened. The actions of the Provisional IRA led to the deaths of over 1,700 people, who were killed in the most brutal way, and whose remains—in some cases—were hidden in unmarked graves.

My thoughts are with all the families who lost loved ones to the Provisional IRA during the troubles, including as a result of the activities highlighted in this report. I would also like to commend the work of the security forces who operated at considerable personal risk in highly difficult circumstances.

On Operation Kenova’s request to the Government to name Stakeknife, I set out in a letter to Sir lain Livingstone on 13 August 2025, which I have placed in the Library, that

“Due to ongoing litigation relevant to the Neither Confirm Nor Deny policy, namely the Thompson Supreme Court appeal, a substantive and final response to your request will be provided after judgment has issued in that case.”

Judgment in the Thompson case is expected imminently, and we anticipate that this will provide some clarity on the use of NCND and the role of the courts.

The Government’s first duty is to protect the national security of the United Kingdom. When any agent—active, living or otherwise—is publicly identified by the state, that calls into question the whole premise of NCND and can deter future covert human intelligence sources from co-operation, while jeopardising the trust of current CHIS, even if such a confirmation of an identity were to happen decades after the events.

There have been significant reforms to agent handling practice, including through legislation, to ensure that lessons are learned from the past. The use of CHIS is nowadays subject to strict regulation under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the CHIS (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021.

Compliance with this legislation and the related code of conduct is subject to rigorous scrutiny by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office. The investigatory powers tribunal also provides a forum for individuals to challenge the state if they believe CHIS have acted improperly or illegally.

As outlined in another letter to Sir lain in August 2025, the Government notes Kenova’s recommendation of a review of NCND and the security classification of past Northern Ireland legacy reports. Past reports are owned by a number of different bodies, including the UK Government, the PSNI and the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland. The Government already follows a procedure for the declassification of historic material via the Public Records Act.

On the sections of the report regarding MI5’s discovery of material relevant to Kenova’s investigations of the alleged agent Stakeknife in 2024, it was deeply regrettable that the material was found after decisions were made by the Public Prosecution Service and the publication of the interim report on 8 March 2024. The Government are reassured, however, by former Assistant Commissioner Helen Ball QPM’s report, which found that none of the material was deliberately withheld from Kenova at an individual or organisational level. Helen Ball also found that much of this material had already been disclosed to Kenova during the original disclosure exercise. In its final report, Operation Kenova has said that MI5’s proactivity in volunteering the additional material is not consistent with a concerted attempt to conceal or cover up additional material. The Government are assured that MI5 has learned important lessons around information management and that proper procedures are now in place to reduce the risk of such a thing happening again.

The final Kenova Report also makes public the high-level findings of Operation Denton, which looked at killings carried out by the UVF Glennane Gang. The behaviour alleged in these findings, including collusion by individual members of the security forces, are shocking and would never be tolerated today. Checks and balances now exist to prevent such events from happening again. The Government will respond to the Denton Report when it is published in full, bearing in mind that there are related legal proceedings ongoing, as also in the case of Stakeknife.

In October, the Government brought forward the Northern Ireland Troubles Bill, which will bring about much-needed reform to the way legacy is addressed. This follows the framework agreement with the Irish Government announced in September. This will fulfil the Government’s King’s Speech commitment to repeal and replace the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023, acknowledge and address the suffering of victims and survivors, and take forward an unfinished part of the Good Friday Agreement.

We have drawn from the approach taken by Operation Kenova in drafting this legislation, particularly with regard to the formation of a new legacy commission, with statutory oversight arrangements to provide accountability and a statutory advisory group to ensure that the voices of victims, their families and survivors, including those who served, are heard as part of the commission’s work.

The Government responded to the recommendations in the interim Kenova Report in a letter to Sir lain Livingstone on 13 August 2025, which is available in the Library. On some of the matters raised, such as the recommendation of a state apology, the Government will not be considering this while litigation remains ongoing. Regarding Kenova’s suggestion that the longest day, 21 June, should be designated as a day when we remember those lost, injured or harmed as a result of the troubles, the Government are committed to recognising and supporting victims and survivors of terrorism. That is why the Government recently announced plans to introduce a national day, to be held on 21 August, dedicated to anyone in the UK impacted by terrorism—including terrorism related to the troubles. The Government are open to the suggestion of designating a day to specifically remember all of the victims of the troubles, as it is something that would carry significant weight. Our initial view is that this should be explored in consultation with the Northern Ireland Executive, victims and survivors groups and others.

Finally, I would like to pay tribute to Operation Kenova, and to Sir lain Livingstone and Jon Boutcher, for all of their work over the years. The investigations that they have led have been transparent and open to families who had many questions, and have always put victims first in everything they have done.

[HCWS1146]