Grand Committee
Arrangement of Business
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Viscount Stansgate) (Lab)
My Lords, in the event of a Division in the Chamber, this Grand Committee will be adjourned for 10 minutes—but, let us face it, that is vanishingly unlikely.
Contracts for Difference (Electricity Supplier Obligations) (Amendment) Regulations 2024
(3 weeks, 3 days ago)
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Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
That the Grand Committee do consider the Contracts for Difference (Electricity Supplier Obligations) (Amendment) Regulations 2024.
Relevant document: 2nd Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee
The Minister of State, Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (Lord Hunt of Kings Heath) (Lab)
My Lords, these draft regulations were laid before the House on 30 July 2024. This instrument forms an important part of the Government’s commitment to accelerate the deployment of carbon capture, usage and storage—CCUS. We believe this to be critical to deliver clean energy and accelerate our net-zero journey. As the Government recently announced, CCUS is vital as we enter a new era of clean energy, investment and jobs. By boosting this tried and tested technology, the UK has the potential to become a global leader in CCUS, delivering good jobs and economic growth for decades to come.
A critical element of the CCUS mix is the successful deployment of power CCUS—gas-powered electricity generators fitted with carbon capture technology. Power CCUS will complement the rollout of renewable energy, providing secure, flexible, non-weather-dependent low-carbon electricity, critical for a reliable energy system and achieving our mission of clean power by 2030.
The Government are committed to incentivising the deployment of power CCUS and this instrument will enable future payments to power CCUS plants under the business model known as the dispatchable power agreement. This agreement—the DPA—is the contractual framework to support power CCUS. It has been designed specifically to incentivise the investment and deployment of power CCUS in the UK. The DPA is a type of contract for difference and, like a contract for difference, uses the electricity supplier obligation to fund support payments. This levy is calculated and managed by the CfD counterparty—the Low Carbon Contracts Company—and collected from electricity suppliers, who are able to pass the costs on to their customers if they choose to do so.
In addition to the existing renewable contract for difference contract design, the DPA business model will provide an alternative payment based on a power CCUS generator’s availability. This availability payment is based on a generator’s availability of electricity generation and carbon capture, and associated carbon dioxide transport and storage network costs. Under the DPA terms, payments will reduce proportionally to reflect any reduction in a generator’s capture rate or generation.
The payment is made whether a generator dispatches power or not. This ensures that a CCUS power plant will run in response to market signals, ahead of unabated gas plants, but will not surpass cheaper renewables. This arrangement will strengthen security of supply, ensuring that a source of reliable low-carbon energy is available when the wind does not blow and the sun does not shine.
Let me be clear: this proposed instrument enables only certain types of payments under the renewable CfD and DPA contracts to be funded by the supplier levy. Any future support offer to a project will be subject to rigorous negotiation with partners. Any decision to award support will be subject to value-for-money and subsidy control tests to ensure best value for money for consumers.
In effect, this statutory instrument amends the Contracts for Difference (Electricity Supplier Obligations) Regulations 2014. The amendments will allow the payments made under the DPA to be funded by the supplier levy, by changing how the supplier levy rate calculation works in the regulations.
First, Regulation 4 relates to the way an electricity supplier’s daily contributions paid to the CfD counterparty is calculated. This instrument amends Regulation 4 to enable the definition of generation payments such that the supplier obligation can be charged for payments related to the activities of a dispatchable power plant fitted with CCUS technology. This includes amendments to take into account: the electricity generation capacity made available by a generating station on a given day; a generating station’s achieved carbon dioxide capture rate or capture capacity on a given day; the incurred CO2 transport and storage capital costs incurred for transporting such captured carbon dioxide and if required, associated carbon dioxide; transport and storage network revenue shortfalls proportionate to a DPA-supported generating station which arose on that day.
Secondly, Regulation 7 of the 2014 regulations sets out how the CfD counterparty estimates the quarterly obligation payment that electricity suppliers will be required to provide to the counterparty. This instrument amends Regulation 7 to ensure a consideration of matters related to a dispatchable power agreement-supported generating station are taken into account, including the carbon dioxide transport and storage network capital costs and, if required, revenue shortfalls, and the amount of carbon captured.
Together, these amendments allow a CfD counterparty to estimate, raise funds and ultimately pay a DPA-supported CCUS-enabled power plant. The existing payment calculation, based on the amount of electricity generated by renewable CfD-supported generating stations is retained and unaffected.
These proposals have been long considered as the power CCUS business model has been updated. This has included update publications in December 2020, May 2021, October 2021 and April 2022. The instrument was formally consulted on from December 2023 and received a range of responses from electricity suppliers, power operators, a trade body and a consumer-focused charity. Respondents were broadly in agreement with the principles laid out. My department continues to engage closely with industry in the development of the CCUS sector.
In summary, this instrument represents a positive step forward in the delivery of the Government’s ambitious CCUS programme and 2030 clean power mission. It will lay the regulatory groundwork to encourage the deployment of power CCUS and begin to unlock the great economic and jobs opportunities that we see coming from this important development. I beg to move.
The Earl of Effingham (Con)
My Lords, His Majesty’s Official Opposition welcome the Government’s Contracts for Difference (Electricity Supplier Obligations) (Amendment) Regulations 2024. These regulations will enable licensed electricity suppliers to make payments to natural gas power plants fitted with carbon capture, usage and storage—also known as CCUS—technology. In 2023, we introduced funding for CCUS with the plan to make up to £20 billion available to support the early development of CCUS, so we welcome this step as an essential part of reaching the net-zero target, and we are pleased to see that the current Government are continuing our work in this area.
On these Benches, we both aspire to and understand the need to reach net zero, and there is indeed consensus from all on the 2050 target. The use of carbon capture technology will play an important role in achieving that goal, and this amendment introduces incentives for suppliers to produce low-carbon electricity—an objective with which we agree.
However, we seek clarification from the Minister. When in government, we committed to deploying CCUS technology in four industrial clusters by 2030. Can he please inform the Committee as to whether his Government will also commit to working towards and reaching that same target?
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
My Lords, I welcome the noble Earl’s welcome for the statutory instrument. He is right that a lot of the original work was undertaken by the previous Government. I think I said in my opening speech that most of the consultations took place under the auspices of the previous Government, so there is clearly consensus about the key role of CCUS.
I had expected greater attendance and that we might have debated the principles of CCUS. For me, it is an essential part of the transition. We will need gas-powered electricity generators for years to come. They give the flexibility we need in relation to renewables and having nuclear as a baseload. If we can have it abated then that would clearly decarbonise our energy structure, but it can also play a key role in the industrial use of energy.
On the noble Earl’s question, I say gently to him that, in a sense, the previous Government’s £20 billion seemed rather a theoretical figure. We have had to work hard with our colleagues across government to get to the almost £22 billion that we have announced. Clearly, that money is to be spent on building the foundations for the industry. Basically, the funding we have announced is being invested in our first projects. These include the underpinning CO2 transport and storage networks and three CO2 capture projects. Other projects will join later, but these are subject to agreement across government. Of course, the noble Earl will know that we will have the Budget and spending review decisions very shortly. I will have to wait till those decisions are made before I respond on where we will go next.
I thank the noble Earl for his general support for this instrument. I believe we need as much political consensus as possible in relation to net zero, and the general support for CCUS is very welcome.
Carbon Dioxide Transport and Storage (Determination of Turnover for Penalties) Regulations 2024
(3 weeks, 3 days ago)
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Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
That the Grand Committee do consider the Carbon Dioxide Transport and Storage (Determination of Turnover for Penalties) Regulations 2024.
The Minister of State, Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (Lord Hunt of Kings Heath) (Lab)
My Lords, these regulations, which were laid before the House on 30 July, are technical but, we believe, necessary. They are part of the implementation of the economic regulation framework for carbon dioxide transport and storage established in the Energy Act 2023.
I do not need to repeat what I said earlier about the potential of CCUS, but one of the key points here is the potentially monopolistic characteristics of carbon dioxide pipeline transportation and storage infrastructure. A framework of economic licensing and regulation is necessary to prevent anti-competitive behaviours by infrastructure operators and ensure protections for users and consumers.
Under this framework, an operator of a carbon dioxide transport and storage network requires a licence that permits charging users of the network a fee for delivering and operating the network. The licence will determine the “allowed revenue” for a transport and storage operator, reflecting its efficient costs and a reasonable return on its capital investment. The economic regulator, Ofgem, will oversee charges and determine whether costs can be passed on to users in accordance with the agreed economic framework.
To ensure that the economic regulation framework operates as intended, Ofgem has enforcement powers to ensure compliance with licence conditions and provide appropriate redress for any regulatory breaches. Such redress includes the ability for Ofgem to impose financial penalties on licence holders for contraventions of the licence, up to a maximum amount of 10% of company turnover. That the maximum amount of penalty cannot exceed 10% of company turnover is established in the primary legislation; the regulations that we are discussing today specify how a company’s turnover is to be determined for the purpose of calculating the maximum amount of penalty that could be imposed.
The amount of financial penalty imposed will not automatically be set at the maximum; the maximum penalty of 10% of turnover is a cap, not a target. Any penalty imposed should be reasonable and appropriate, considering all the circumstances of the case. The regulations before us today set out that turnover is to be calculated based on the revenue from the company’s ordinary activities, excluding trade discounts, VAT and other taxes. This includes revenue from goods and services provided by the company, whether authorised by the licence or not.
The turnover is usually based on the company’s revenue for the business year preceding the date of notice of the penalty. However, if the business year is not 12 months long, the turnover is adjusted proportionally. This is consistent with general accounting practices. Any financial assistance from public bodies or publicly owned companies that is directly linked to the company’s ordinary activities, or is provided under a carbon dioxide transport and storage revenue support contract, is included in the turnover calculation.
Ofgem is required by the primary legislation to prepare and publish a statement of policy outlining its policy and approach to enforcement and penalties in the carbon dioxide transport and storage sector. This statement of policy should include the factors and circumstances considered in decisions on whether to impose a financial penalty and in determining the amount of any financial penalty. Ofgem has consulted on documents explaining how it will conduct its enforcement activities and issue penalties in its role as the economic regulator of the CCUS sector. The consultation closed in early July; Ofgem has now considered and published its response.
To conclude, these regulations are technical but necessary, providing clarity on what is meant by “turnover” when determining the maximum amount of a financial penalty that can be imposed by Ofgem. We see these regulations as an essential part of the economic regulation framework for carbon dioxide transport and storage, designed to overcome market barriers to deploying CCUS infrastructure in the UK and achieving net zero while protecting the interests of users and consumers of this infrastructure. I beg to move.
The Earl of Effingham (Con)
My Lords, these regulations are made using the powers created in the Energy Act 2023. They form part of the implementation of the economic regulation framework for CO2 transport and storage involved with carbon capture, usage and storage—CCUS—which we have just debated.
This measure will introduce a framework of economic licensing and regulation to prevent anti-competitive behaviour and to avoid the potential monopolistic characteristics of CO2 pipelines. Operators of carbon dioxide transport and storage networks will operate with licences that allow them to charge gas plants for using their CCUS services. This licence will determine the revenue that the CO2 transport and storage operators can receive. Ofgem will oversee the charges and determine whether the costs can be passed on to users.
As we have heard, Ofgem will have the power to address any regulatory breaches with a financial penalty of up to 10% of company turnover. However, it will not automatically be set that high; the 10% is a cap, not a target, and Ofgem will have to publish a statement of policy to explain any penalties.
His Majesty’s Official Opposition support this regulation. I will use the words of my colleague in the other place, as he put it so well:
“The regulations address a technical point arising from the Energy Act 2023 and follow on from the ambitions of the previous Government. This is a necessary measure to clarify the technical detail of how big the maximum fine can be, and we are 100% behind it”.—[Official Report, Commons, Fourth Delegated Legislation Committee, 9/10/24; col. 4.]
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
I am very grateful to the noble Earl. I emphasise two points. First, the 10% is a cap, not a target, as he rightly said. Secondly, Ofgem has now published its statement of policy, so we have the clarity that industry needs. Having said that, I am most grateful to him for his support. I beg to move.
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Ombudsman Scheme) (Fees) Regulations 2024
Baroness Blake of Leeds
That the Grand Committee do consider the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Ombudsman Scheme) (Fees) Regulations 2024.
Relevant document: 2nd Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee
Baroness Blake of Leeds (Lab)
My Lords, these regulations are made under the powers in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023. Noble Lords may be aware that the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee raised this SI as an instrument of interest in its second report, published on 5 September. This statutory instrument will enable the Financial Ombudsman Service —also known as the FOS—to charge case fees to claims management companies and relevant legal professionals when they bring cases to it on behalf of complainants.
The Financial Ombudsman Service provides a proportionate, prompt and informal service to resolve disputes between consumers and financial services firms. It is designed as an alternative to resolving cases through the courts, which can be expensive for both firms and consumers and is a lengthy process that can delay redress. The Financial Ombudsman Service is cost-free to consumers and funded by a combination of an annual levy on firms and case fees charged to firms that are subject to complaints.
The FOS is designed to be an accessible service, and indeed the majority of consumers raise complaints directly with it. However, some consumers choose to use claims management companies or law firms to bring claims to the Financial Ombudsman Service on their behalf. Collectively, these are known as professional representatives. These professional representatives normally take a proportion of any compensation awarded as payment for their services. This can reduce a consumer’s redress by as much as 30%.
Currently, these professional representatives cannot be charged for bringing cases to the FOS, despite the fact that they gain an economic benefit from doing so. Although many of these professional representatives act responsibly, there is evidence that some firms are exploiting the cost-free service provided by the FOS to consumers by flooding it with templated and poorly evidenced complaints. This behaviour negatively impacts the ability of the FOS to resolve other consumer complaints promptly. It also has a significant cost to industry, as firms are required to pay a case fee of £650, regardless of whether a complaint is upheld against them.
The Government have also noted concerns that firms experiencing this treatment may feel pressured into settling claims early by offering an amount below the £650 case fee in order to reduce the overall cost to the firm, even where they feel the claim is without merit.
To address these exploitative practices, this instrument will enable the FOS to charge a case fee to professional representatives for bringing complaints on behalf of claimants. This will provide a financial incentive for those professional representatives to consider carefully the merits of any cases they are bringing on behalf of complainants and to avoid flooding the Financial Ombudsman Service with templated complaints. Charities bringing complaints on behalf of consumers are not included in this instrument and therefore will not be charged by the FOS and, of course, the FOS will remain completely free for consumers to access directly.
As it is already for financial services firms subject to complaints, the Financial Ombudsman Service will be responsible for determining exactly who is charged and the level of any fees. The FOS has consulted on its proposed detailed approach to charging fees to professional representatives in anticipation of this instrument. This proposed a fee of £250 to professional representatives for each case they bring. When the FOS finds in favour of the claimant represented by the professional representative, it has proposed that the fee will be reduced to just £75. In this way, it has sought to disincentivise bad behaviour, while minimising the impact of the changes on professional representatives bringing cases with merit. If this SI is approved, the Financial Ombudsman Service will confirm its final plans, having considered the responses to its consultation.
The approach taken through this SI ensures that the FOS will remain cost-free to consumers while ensuring that the poor behaviour of some professional representatives does not undermine the ability of the FOS to deal with consumer complaints promptly. I hope noble Lords will join me in supporting these regulations, I commend them to the Committee, and I beg to move.
Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Lab)
My Lords, I take this opportunity to thank my noble friend the Minister for explaining clearly what this statutory instrument is about. I declare an interest as a member of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. I have some questions, about which I have already alerted the Minister. I actually alerted my noble friend Lord Livermore, thinking he would be answering on this, but I think he has passed them on.
There is a concern that, while it is laudable that no charges will be involved for claimants who make direct contact with the Financial Ombudsman Service, which has proven to be an excellent service for people who have particular issues in the financial world, notwithstanding that, some people like the services of professional representatives. A recent survey found that 43% of people were likely to be vulnerable prior to financial scams—we are all beset by them—and 85% became vulnerable in the aftermath as the reality of the situation hits them and their mental health may deteriorate. Will the Minister outline the real reason for eradicating, in many instances, the middle person, the professional representative? That would be very useful.
As we know, all professional representatives are regulated either by the Financial Conduct Authority or the SRA. Claims management companies are explicitly forbidden by regulations from bringing cases that do not have “a good arguable case”, or that are “frivolous or vexatious”. Therefore, firms are required to learn from the FOS approach to ensure that they do not continue to submit cases with an unrealistic chance of success. So why is the FOS not pushing regulators to enforce this more? The FOS would be better highlighting this to the regulators, which have the power to take heavy action against these firms. The ombudsman has the power to reject poor-quality submissions. Why is it not using this to a greater extent against the 10 firms that are particularly clogging up the system?
Finally, could my noble friend the Minister advise, or come back by way of writing, on whether the Government intend to ameliorate the situation? Sometimes, people like the services of professional agents, notwithstanding their level of financial security, and would appreciate that, and they do not think that it is fair that the cost that has been levied on the professional claims person should be passed on to them.
The Earl of Courtown (Con)
My Lords, I welcome these regulations and appreciate the very full description of them that the Minister gave. As she said, they enable the Financial Ombudsman Service to amend its rules to charge case fees to claims management companies and legal professionals on behalf of complainants when a customer launches a complaint against a financial services firm.
On these Benches, we believe in the importance of fair and justified financial regulation and the ability for customers to issue a complaint against financial services firms when necessary. We recognise the benefit of this legislation, which seeks to address the economic benefit gained by intermediaries from bringing a case and the large volumes of poorly evidenced complaints submitted to the FOS.
We welcome the Government’s continuation of our work in which we introduced the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023, which enabled the Government to add to the list of persons to whom the FOS can charge fees. I would like answers to a couple of questions, but the Minister can write to me if need be. What measures are His Majesty’s Government taking to ensure that genuine and well-evidenced complaints continue to be submitted to, and heard by, the Financial Ombudsman Service? Can the Government confirm that this legislation will not result in increases in fees paid by consumers who have submitted a complaint?
I was interested in the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, and look forward to hearing the Minister’s responses to them. As I said, we support these regulations, and I look forward to the response from the Minister.
Baroness Blake of Leeds (Lab)
I thank both my noble friend Lady Ritchie and the noble Earl, Lord Courtown, for their comments, in particular their close consideration of these draft regulations. It is important that everyone in the Committee has an opportunity to raise important points. I re-emphasise that this SI will play an important role in ensuring that the Financial Ombudsman Service can focus on promptly resolving consumer complaints and reduce the impact of spurious complaints on financial services firms.
I thank my noble friend Lady Ritchie for her detailed questions. I know from her comments earlier, before we came into this Committee, that her primary concern is for the consumer and to make sure that the necessary protection is in place. By way of reassurance, we are looking at the needs of vulnerable people, in particular, to make sure that they will not be disadvantaged by this amendment; that is the crux of what we need to address today.
I re-emphasise that the Government are clear that all consumers should be able to access the FOS without the need for professional representative support. Serious consideration has been given to that while developing this policy. The final outcome, as I mentioned earlier, is that charities, family members and advisory organisations will not be charged for this service; that is an important consideration. Another aspect here—it is reassuring, I hope—is that the FOS has a dedicated accessibility team as well as the additional support team, working specifically to ensure that complaints with additional needs are added. I hope that that goes some way to providing the reassurance sought.
The other question is: should the Financial Conduct Authority not be doing more to regulate professional representatives effectively in the first place? It is a very reasonable question. The Financial Conduct Authority and the Solicitors Regulation Authority play an important role in regulating, respectively, claims management companies and law firms. The Government strongly support the relevant regulators in taking robust action to tackle poor claims management behaviour wherever it arises.
There is an important point here that needs to be firmly pointed out. We re-emphasise: all consumers can access the service free of charge and without the need for any professional representative support. Where consumers choose to use a professional representative, there are rules in place to limit the amounts that these firms can charge. The FCA, which regulates claims management companies and professional representatives, and the Solicitors Regulation Authority, which regulates legal professionals, already restrict the fees that a professional representative can charge to consumers through their fee cap rules. The FCA has agreed that any fee paid by professional representatives to the Financial Ombudsman Service will be included in this cap; this will prevent fees being passed on to consumers in cases where the representative is charging at the maximum level, which the FOS understands to be the case already for most professional representatives.
If there is a feeling that I need to follow up in writing, I will of course do so, but, with those closing comments, I hope that we can move forward.
Insurance and Reinsurance Undertakings (Prudential Requirements) (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 2024
Baroness Blake of Leeds
That the Grand Committee do consider the Insurance and Reinsurance Undertakings (Prudential Requirements) (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 2024.
Baroness Blake of Leeds (Lab)
My Lords, as reported to the other place, this Government are determined to reinvigorate the UK’s capital markets to drive growth and investment. These regulations form part of that commitment by implementing a smooth transition to the reformed Solvency II regime, which governs the rules that maintain the safety and soundness of UK insurance firms.
This updated regime utilises the approach to regulation in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to empower our regulator—the Prudential Regulation Authority—while addressing demand-side barriers by reducing insurers’ regulatory capital requirements, reducing pressuring on insurers’ balance sheets and incentivising them to invest in the UK. The regulations make necessary provision to maintain these reforms and the wider regulatory regime on the revocation of the relevant assimilated EU law on 31 December 2024.
In summary, this instrument preserves a significant cut in the regulatory capital buffer known as the risk margin, which came into force at the start of this year; it maintains the regulatory requirements on insurance groups and undertakings in Gibraltar; and it makes further amendments required as a result of changes to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and other legislation. But I should reiterate in more detail what these regulations do, as laid out in the other place.
The regulations restate provisions on the calculation of the capital buffer known as the risk margin, which would otherwise be repealed at the end of this year. They also affirm the Prudential Regulation Authority’s power to make rules permitting insurers to adopt proportionate approaches in determining the risk margin. The regulations also provide that UK supervisory arrangements for Gibraltarian firms will continue unchanged until the broader Gibraltar authorisation regime, legislated for in the Financial Services Act 2021, comes into force.
The regulations empower the PRA to publish results for individual firms within scope of its life insurance stress tests—generally, the largest firms in the life sector. This is in addition to the sector-level results that the PRA has been publishing since 2019. This safeguard provides additional transparency to the market around the resilience of life insurers. It mirrors the approach taken for the results of stress tests for banks.
Finally, the regulations make a number of technical amendments to existing legislation, including the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, to support implementation of the Government’s package of Solvency II reforms. For example, the regulations amend the definition of both insurance and reinsurance undertaking to remove references to assimilated EU law. They also remove the definitions of “third-country insurance undertaking” and “third-country reinsurance undertaking”, which are not relevant now that the UK is no longer part of the EU.
Other parts of the regulations make changes that are consequential to the proper functioning of the reformed regime, including for the necessary retention of the risk margin and the Gibraltar regulations, as already noted.
As I said in opening, these regulations are a vital aspect of ensuring a smooth transition to the reformed Solvency II regime by the end of this year. I hope that the Committee will follow the other place and endorse these technical but highly necessary reforms. I beg to move.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
My Lords, I recognise the circumstances in which these regulations have been brought forward. They are part of the Brexit dividend that we end up discussing—this carrying forward of regulations as a consequence of leaving the single European regime. I will use them as an opportunity to raise an issue of concern about the reassurance provided for people’s pensions.
As noble Lords will know, the benefits held by occupational pension schemes—specifically defined benefit schemes—are increasingly being shifted away from those schemes; they are being wound up. The benefits are being protected in one way or another. An increasingly popular way of protecting members’ benefits following the winding up of a scheme is bringing them out in the form of annuities. The annuity market is commercial, and I think people who hold annuities are often surprised at the way their futures are treated as a form of commodity to be bought and sold on markets and—relevant to these regulations—to be reinsured in ways that leaves them concerned about the security afforded for their future pensions. The particular concern, and these regulations are directly relevant, is those annuities where the reinsurance arrangements are dealt with by overseas entities. The distance between people’s expected future pensions and where the ultimate security for their pension rights lies is giving rise to increasing concerns.
There were suggestions earlier this year that the Bank of England would tighten supervision of life insurance—the annuity offices’ use of what are called funded reinsurance markets—and the extent to which this approach to securing people’s pensions will lead to riskier benefits securing members’ rights and riskier securities holding members’ rights, and the extent to which the ultimate protection is achieved not under UK provisions but by the provisions placed on overseas reinsurance facilitators. I raise that in the context of these regulations. It is an issue on which I have not given notice to my noble friend so I am not expecting an immediate response, but perhaps she could commit to giving some attention to the concerns held by ordinary policyholders about where, ultimately, the security for their benefits ends up when they are bought out of their occupational pension schemes. If necessary, perhaps we could have a meeting to discuss this in greater depth and with greater notice.
The Earl of Courtown (Con)
My Lords, I welcome these regulations and thank the Minister for her very clear description of their use and how they will be put into practice. We on these Benches recognise the importance of this legislation in ensuring that insurance firms act safely and responsibly. The legislation also seeks to minimise the likelihood that insurance firms will come into financial difficulty. This instrument will allow for this by making a series of amendments to legislation—that is, to make certain that the UK’s insurance regulatory regime functions as planned following the implementation of the Solvency II reforms and the revocation of assimilated EU law at the end of this year.
The previous Government, following engagement with industry, created detailed plans to reform Solvency II, and we welcome this Government’s decision to continue our plans. These reforms were designed to allow for a prosperous insurance industry, while ensuring the soundness of firms by demanding that insurers hold enough capital to withstand. I have just one question for the Minister: can His Majesty’s Government confirm what conversations they are having with the insurance industry to ensure that these reforms are implemented properly? I again confirm that His Majesty’s Opposition welcome these regulations, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Baroness Blake of Leeds (Lab)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their interest in this area, which is exceptionally important to putting ourselves in the best possible position to take advantage of the different agendas that the Government are moving on.
My noble friend Lord Davies was absolutely correct that I am unable to answer his specific questions today —they are outside the scope of this SI. However, HMT officials would be pleased to write to him. I am sure that, if there is a need for meetings, we can move forward.
I welcome the comments of the noble Earl, Lord Courtown. I absolutely assure him that there is continued engagement with the industry at ministerial level. There is a recognition that it has taken a significant time for the process to get to this point. We are almost at the last hurdle, and it is crucial that we keep everybody informed and successfully move forward towards its conclusion at the end of the year.
I am sure the Grand Committee will join me in supporting these amendments to ensure a smooth transition to the reformed Solvency II regime.
Communications Act 2003 (Disclosure of Information) Order 2024
(3 weeks, 3 days ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch
That the Grand Committee do consider the Communications Act 2003 (Disclosure of Information) Order 2024.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade and Department for Science, Information and Technology (Baroness Jones of Whitchurch) (Lab)
My Lords, this order was laid before the House on 9 September this year. The Online Safety Act lays the foundations of strong protection for children and adults online. I am grateful to noble Lords for their continued interest in the Online Safety Act and its implementation. It is critical that the Act is made fully operational as soon as possible, and the Government are committed to ensuring that its protections are delivered as soon as possible. This statutory instrument will further support the implementation of the Act by Ofcom.
This statutory instrument concerns Ofcom’s ability to share business information with Ministers for the purpose of fulfilling functions under the Online Safety Act 2023, under Section 393 of the Communications Act 2003. This corrects an oversight in the original Online Safety Act that was identified following its passage.
Section 393 of the Communications Act 2003 contains a general restriction on Ofcom disclosing information about particular businesses without consent from the affected businesses, but with exemptions, including where this facilitates Ofcom in carrying out its regulatory functions and facilitates other specified persons in carrying out specific functions. However, this section does not currently enable Ofcom to share information with Ministers for the purpose of fulfilling functions under the Online Safety Act. This means that, were Ofcom to disclose information about businesses to the Secretary of State, it may be in breach of the law.
It is important that a gateway exists for sharing information for these purposes so that the Secretary of State can carry out functions under the Online Safety Act, such as setting the fee threshold for the online safety regime in 2025 or carrying out post-implementation reviews of the Act required under Section 178. This statutory instrument will therefore amend the Communications Act 2003 to allow Ofcom to share information with the Secretary of State and other Ministers, strictly for the purpose of fulfilling functions under the Online Safety Act 2023.
There are strong legislative safeguards and limitations on the disclosure of this information, and Ofcom is experienced in handling confidential and sensitive information obtained from the services it regulates. Ofcom must comply with UK data protection law and would need to show that the processing of any personal data was necessary for a lawful purpose. As a public body, Ofcom is also required to act compatibly with the Article 8 right of privacy under the European Convention on Human Rights.
We will therefore continue to review the Online Safety Act, so that Ofcom is able to support the delivery of functions under the Act where it is appropriate. That is a brief but detailed summary of why this instrument is necessary. I should stress that it contains a technical amendment to deal with a very small legal aspect. Nevertheless, I will be interested to hear noble Lords’ comments on the SI. I beg to move.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her introduction and for explaining the essence of the SI. We all have a bit of pride of creation in the Online Safety Act; there are one or two of us around today who clearly have a continuing interest in it. This is one of the smaller outcomes of the Act and, as the Minister says, it is an essentially an oversight. I would say that a tidying-up operation is involved here. It is rather gratifying to see that the Communications Act still has such importance, 21 years after it was passed. It is somewhat extraordinary for legislation to be invoked after that period of time in an area such as communications, which is so fast-moving.
My question for the Minister is whether the examples that she gave or which were contained in the Explanatory Memorandum, regarding the need for information to be obtained by the Secretary of State in respect of Section 178, on reviewing the regulatory framework, and Section 86, on the threshold for payment of fees, are exclusive. Are there other aspects of the Online Safety Act where the Secretary of State requires that legislation?
We are always wary of the powers given to Secretaries of State, as the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, will probably remember to his cost. But at every point, the tyres on legislation need to be kicked to make sure that the Secretary of State has just the powers that they need—and that we do not go further than we need to or have a skeleton Bill, et cetera—so the usual mantra will apply: we want to make sure that the Secretary of State’s powers are proportionate.
It would be very useful to hear from the Minister what other powers are involved. Is it quite a number, were these two just the most plausible or are there six other sets of powers which might not be so attractive? That is the only caveat I would make in this respect.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)
My Lords, I begin with a comment that I hope will not be taken badly by either my noble friend the Minister or the large number of civil servants who have been involved in this Bill over the years. Colleagues may recall that the Bill took seven years to pass through the various processes and procedures of Parliament, including initial Green Papers and White Papers and then scrutiny by the Joint Select Committee, of which my noble friend opposite was also a member, and it seems slightly surprising and a bit odd that we are dealing with what seems to be an administrative oversight so late in the process. I do not expect a serious response from the Minister on that, but I wanted to put on the record that we are still very much aware of the fact that legislation has its faults and sometimes needs to be corrected, and we should perhaps be humble in expecting that the material we finally agree in Parliament is indeed the last word on things.
Having said that, I think I follow the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on this point: the subsequent legal analysis, which has identified a potential gap in provision on this instrument, tries to tidy it up but, in doing so, has left me a bit confused. I simply ask the Minister to make it clear to me when she responds that I am reading it correctly. The worry that has been exposed by this subsequent legal analysis is about the sharing of information when Ofcom is using its powers to address issues with the companies with which it has an engagement. Indeed, the whole purpose of the Bill is to ensure that companies are taking their burden of making sure that the Bill works in practice. There may be a deficiency in terms of what the Secretary of State has separate powers to do, but my confusion is that the Explanatory Memorandum says:
“The Secretary of State has several key functions relating to the implementation of the framework under the”
Online Safety Act. It is obviously sensible, therefore, that the sharing of information that Ofcom gathers is available for that. But is that all the powers of the Secretary of State or only the powers of the Secretary of State in relation to the Online Safety Act? The Explanatory Memorandum says:
“If Ofcom were not able to share business information relating to these areas”—
that is, the areas directly affected by the Online Safety Act—
“there is a risk that implementation and review of the framework could be delayed or ineffective”.
I accept the general point, but, to pull up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, is this an open invitation for Ofcom to share information that does not relate to its powers in relation to the Online Safety Act with the Secretary of State and, therefore, something for the Secretary of State to take on as a result of a slightly uncertain way of doing it? Are there are any restrictions to this power as set out in that paper? I could mention other points where it comes up, but I think my point is made.
The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, also touched on the point that this is a power for Ofcom to share with the Secretary of State responsible for Ofcom, which is fair enough, but, as the Explanatory Memorandum points out:
“There are also certain functions relating to definitions conferred on Scottish and Welsh Ministers and Northern Ireland departments”—
presumably now Ministers—which may also be “relevant persons” of the Act, but we are not given much on that, except that
“these are unlikely to require business information for their exercise”.
I would like a bit more assurance on that. Again, that might be something for which the department is not prepared and I am quite happy to receive a letter on it, but my recollection from the discussions on the Online Safety Bill in this area, particularly in relation to Gaelic, was that there were quite a lot of powers that only Scottish Ministers would be able to exercise, and therefore it is quite possible that business activities which would not be UK-wide in their generality and therefore apropos of the Secretary of State might well be available to Ofcom to share with Scottish Ministers. If it is possible to get some generic points about where that is actually expected to fall, rather than simply saying that it is unlikely to require business information, I would be more satisfied with that.
Viscount Camrose (Con)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for setting out this instrument so clearly. It certainly seems to make the necessary relatively simple adjustments to fill an important gap that has been identified. Although I have some questions, I will keep my remarks fairly brief.
I will reflect on the growing importance of both the Online Safety Act and the duty we have placed on Ofcom’s shoulders. The points made by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, about the long-standing consequential nature of the creation of Ofcom and the Communications Act were well made in this respect. The necessary complexity and scope of the work of Ofcom, as our online regulator, has far outgrown what I imagine was foreseeable at the time of its creation. We have given it the tasks of developing and enforcing safety standards, as well as issuing guidance and codes of practice that digital services must follow to comply with the Act. Its role includes risk assessment, compliance, monitoring and enforcement, which can of course include issuing fines or mandating changes to how services operate. Its regulatory powers now allow it to respond to emerging online risks, helping to ensure that user-protection measures keep pace with changes in the digital landscape.
In recognising the daily growing risk of online dangers and the consequent burdens on Ofcom, we of course support any measures that bring clarity and simplicity. If left unaddressed, the identified gap here clearly could lead to regulatory inefficiencies and delays in crucial processes that depend on accurate and up-to-date information. For example, setting appropriate fee thresholds for regulated entities requires detailed knowledge of platform compliance and associated risks, which would be challenging to achieve without full data access. During post-implementation reviews, a lack of access to necessary business information could hamper the ability to assess whether the Act is effectively achieving its safety objectives or whether adjustments are needed.
That said, I have some questions, and I hope that, when she rises, the Minister will set out the Government’s thinking on them. My first question very much picks up on the point made—much better than I did—by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara. It is important to ensure that this instrument does not grant unrestricted access to business information but, rather, limits sharing to specific instances where it is genuinely necessary for the Secretary of State to fulfil their duties under the Act. How will the Government ensure this?
Secondly, safeguards, such as data protection laws and confidentiality obligations under the Communications Act 2003, must be in place to guarantee that any shared information is handled responsibly and securely. Do the Government believe that sufficient safeguards are already in place?
Thirdly, in an environment of rapid technology change, how do the Government plan to keep online safety regulation resilient and adaptive? I look forward to hearing the Government’s views on these questions, but, as I say, we completely welcome any measure that increases clarity and simplicity and makes it easier for Ofcom to be effective.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
I thank noble Lords for their valuable contributions to this debate. It goes without saying that the Government are committed to the effective implementation of the Online Safety Act. It is critical that we remove any barriers to that, as we are doing with this statutory instrument.
As noble Lords said—the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, stressed this—the Online Safety Act has taken on a growing significance in the breadth and depth of its reach. It is very much seen as an important vehicle for delivering the change that the whole of society wants now. It is important that we get this piece of legislation right. For that purpose, this statutory instrument will ensure that Ofcom can co-operate and share online safety information with the Secretary of State where it is appropriate to do so, as was intended during the Act’s development.
On specific questions, all three noble Lords who spoke asked whether the examples given were exclusive or whether there are other areas where powers might be given to the Secretary of State. The examples given are the two areas that are integral to implementation. We have not at this stage identified any further areas. The instrument would change to allow sharing only for the purposes of fulfilling the Secretary of State’s functions under the Online Safety Act—it does not go any broader than that. I think that answers the question asked by the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, about whether this meant unlimited access—I assure him that that is not the purpose of this SI.
My noble friend Lord Stevenson asked whether this relates only to the powers under the OSA. Yes, the instrument allows Ofcom to share information it has collected from businesses only for the purposes of fulfilling the Secretary of State’s functions under the Act.
On the question of devolution, the powers of Scottish, Northern Ireland and Welsh Ministers primarily relate to the power to define the educational establishments for the purpose of Schedule 1 exemptions. There are also some consultation provisions where these Ministers must be consulted, but that is the limit of the powers that those Ministers would have.
I am conscious that I have not answered all the questions asked by the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, because I could not write that quickly—but I assure him that my officials have made a note of them and, if I have not covered those issues, I will write to him.
I hope that noble Lords agree with me on the importance of implementing the Online Safety Act and ensuring that it can become fully operational as soon as possible. I commend these regulations to the Committee.
Online Safety Act 2023 (Priority Offences) (Amendment) Regulations 2024
(3 weeks, 3 days ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch
That the Grand Committee do consider the Online Safety Act 2023 (Priority Offences) (Amendment) Regulations 2024.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade and Department for Science, Information and Technology (Baroness Jones of Whitchurch) (Lab)
My Lords, these regulations were laid before the House on 12 September this year. The Government stated in their manifesto that they would
“use every government tool available to target perpetrators and address the root causes of abuse and violence”
in order to achieve their
“landmark mission to halve violence against women and girls in a decade”.
Through this statutory instrument, we are broadening online platforms’ and search engines’ responsibilities for tackling intimate image abuse under the Online Safety Act. More than one in three women have experienced abuse online. The rise in intimate image abuse is not only devastating for victims but also spreads misogyny on social media that can develop into potentially dangerous relationships offline. One in 14 adults in England and Wales has experienced threats to share intimate images, rising to one in seven young women aged 18 to 34.
It is crucial that we tackle these crimes from every angle, including online, and ensure that tech companies step up and play their part. That is why we are laying this statutory instrument. Through it, we will widen online platforms’ and search engines’ obligations to tackle intimate image abuse under the Online Safety Act. As noble Lords will know, the Act received Royal Assent on 26 October 2023. It places strong new duties on online user-to-user platforms and search services to protect their users from harm.
As part of this, the Act gives service providers new “illegal content duties”. Under these duties, online platforms need to assess the risk that their services will allow users to encounter illegal content or be
“used for the commission or facilitation of a priority offence”.
They then need to take steps to mitigate identified risks. These will include implementing safety-by-design measures to reduce risks and content moderation systems to remove illegal content where it appears.
The Online Safety Act sets out a list of priority offences for the purposes of providers’ illegal content duties. These offences reflect the most serious and prevalent online illegal content and activity. They are set out in schedules to the Act. Platforms will need to take additional steps to tackle these kinds of illegal activities under their illegal content duties.
The priority offences list currently includes certain intimate image abuse offences. Through this statutory instrument, we are adding new intimate image abuse offences to the priority list. This replaces an old intimate image abuse offence, which has now been repealed. These new offences are in the Sexual Offences Act 2003. They took effect earlier this year. The older offence was in the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. The repealed offence covered sharing intimate images where the intent was to cause distress. The new offences are broader; they criminalise sharing intimate images without having a reasonable belief that the subject would consent to sharing the images. These offences include the sharing of manufactured or manipulated images, including so-called deepfakes.
Since these new offences are more expansive, adding them as priority offences means online platforms will be required to tackle more intimate image abuse on their services. This means that we are broadening the scope of what constitutes illegal intimate image content in the Online Safety Act. It also makes it clear that platforms’ priority illegal content duties extend to AI-generated deepfakes and other manufactured intimate images. This is because the new offences that we are adding explicitly cover this content.
As I have set out above, these changes affect the illegal content duties in the Online Safety Act. They will ensure that tech companies play their part in kicking this content off social media. These are just part of a range of wider protections coming into force next spring through the Online Safety Act that will mean that social media companies have to remove the most harmful illegal content, a lot of which disproportionately affects women and girls, such as through harassment and controlling or coercive behaviour.
Ofcom will set out the specific steps that providers can take to fulfil their illegal content duties for intimate image abuse and other illegal content in codes of practice and guidance documentation. It is currently producing this documentation. We anticipate that the new duties will start to be enforced from spring next year once Ofcom has issued these codes of practice and they have come into force. Providers will also need to have done their risk assessment for illegal content by then. We anticipate that Ofcom will recommend that providers should take action in a number of areas. These include content moderation, reporting and complaints procedures, and safety-by-design steps, such as testing their algorithm systems to see whether illegal content is being recommended to users. We are committed to working with Ofcom to get these protections in place as quickly as possible. We are focused on delivering.
Where companies are not removing and proactively stopping this vile material appearing on their platforms, Ofcom will have robust powers to take enforcement action against them. This includes imposing fines of up to £18 million or 10% of qualifying worldwide revenue, whichever is highest.
In conclusion, through this statutory instrument we are broadening providers’ duties for intimate image abuse content. Service providers will need to take proactive steps to search for, remove and limit people’s exposure to this harmful kind of illegal content, including where it has been manufactured or manipulated. I hope noble Lords will commend these further steps that we have taken that take the provisions in the Online Safety Act a useful further step forward. I commend these regulations to the Committee, and I beg to move.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her introduction. I endorse everything she said about intimate image abuse and the importance of legislation to make sure that the perpetrators are penalised and that social media outlets have additional duties under Schedule 7 for priority offences. I am absolutely on the same page as the Minister on this, and I very much welcome what she said. It is interesting that we are dealing with another 2003 Act that, again, is showing itself fit for purpose and able to be amended; perhaps there is some cause to take comfort from our legislative process.
I was interested to hear what the Minister said about the coverage of the offences introduced by the Online Safety Act. She considered that the sharing of sexually explicit material included deepfakes. There was a promise—the noble Viscount will remember it—that the Criminal Justice Bill, which was not passed in the end, would cover that element. It included intent, like the current offence—the one that has been incorporated into Schedule 7. The Private Member’s Bill of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen—I have it in my hand—explicitly introduces an offence that does not require intent, and I very much support that.
I do not believe that this is the last word to be said on the kinds of IIA offence that need to be incorporated as priority offences under Schedule 7. I would very much like to hear what the noble Baroness has to say about why we require intent when, quite frankly, the creation of these deepfakes requires activity that is clearly harmful. We clearly should make sure that the perpetrators are caught. Given the history of this, I am slightly surprised that the Government’s current interpretation of the new offence in the Online Safety Act includes deepfakes. It is gratifying, but the Government nevertheless need to go further.
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge (Con)
My Lords, I welcome the Minister’s remarks and the Government’s step to introduce this SI. I have concerns that it misses the wider problems. The powers given to Ofcom in the Online Safety Act require a lengthy process to implement and are not able to respond quickly. They also do not provide individuals with any redress. Therefore, this SI adding to the list of priority offences, while necessary, does not give victims the recourse they need.
My concern is that Ofcom is approaching this digital problem in an analogue way. It has the power to fine and even disrupt business but, in a digital space—where, when one website is blocked, another can open immediately—Ofcom would, in this scenario, have to restart its process all over again. These powers are not nimble or rapid enough, and they do not reflect the nature of the online space. They leave victims open and exposed to continuing distress. I would be grateful if the Government offered some assurances in this area.
The changes miss the wider problem of non-compliance by host websites outside the UK. As I have previously discussed in your Lordships’ House, the Revenge Porn Helpline has a removal rate of 90% of reported non-consensual sexually explicit content, both real and deepfake. However, in 10% of cases, the host website will not comply with the removal of the content. These sites are often hosted in countries such as Russia or those in Latin America. In cases of non-compliance by host websites, the victims continue to suffer, even where there has been a successful conviction.
If we take the example of a man who was convicted in the UK of blackmailing 200 women, the Revenge Porn Helpline successfully removed 161,000 images but 4,000 still remain online three years later, with platforms continuing to ignore the take-down requests. I would be grateful if the Government could outline how they are seeking to tackle the removal of this content, featuring British citizens, hosted in jurisdictions where host sites are not complying with removal.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)
My Lords, I started my discussion on the previous instrument on a slightly negative note. I want to change gear completely now and say how nice it is to see the first of the SIs relating to the Online Safety Act come forward. I welcome that.
Having said that, may I inquire what the Government’s intention is in relation to the Parkinson rule? I think I am correct in saying that we wish to see in place an informal but constant process by the Government when they bring forward legislation under the Online Safety Act, which would be offered to the standing committees so that they could comment and make advice available to Ministers before the Secretary of State finally approved any such legislation. This would primarily be concerned with the codes of practice, but this is exactly the sort of issue, well exemplified by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, where there is still some concern about the previous Government’s approach to this Bill.
If I recall, this rule was in one of the later amendments brought in towards the end of the process. Rather unlike the earlier stuff, which was seven years in the making, this was rushed through in rather less than seven weeks as we got to the end of discussions on the Online Safety Bill. To get the deal that we all, across the political parties, hoped would happen, and so that the country would benefit from the best possible Act we could get out of the process, there were a number of quite late changes, including the question about deepfake issues, which was not given quite the scrutiny that it could have had. Of course, we are now receiving discussion and debate on those issues, and it is important that we understand them and the process that the Government will take to try to resolve them.
This question of having consent was hotly debated by those who led on it during the time the Bill was before your Lordships’ House. I felt the arguments very clearly came out in favour of those who argued that the question of consent, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, really is not relevant to this. The offence is caused by the circulation of material, and the Act should contain powers sufficient for the Secretary of State to be satisfied that Ofcom, in exercising its regulatory functions, has the powers to take down this material where it is illegal.
There are two issues tied up in that. I think all of us who have spoken in this debate are concerned that we have not really got to the end of the discussion on this, and we need to have more. Whether through the Private Member’s Bill that we will hear about in December or not, the Government need to get action on that. They need to consult widely with the committees, both in the Commons and here, to get the best advice. It may well be that we need further debate and discussion in this House to do so.
Having said that, the intention to clarify what exactly is legal lies at the heart of the Online Safety Act. The Act will not work and benefit the country if we go back to the question of legal but harmful. The acid test for how the material is to be treated by those who provide services to this country has to be whether it is legal. If it is illegal, it must be taken down, and there must be powers and action specifically for that to happen. It is unfortunate that, if material is not illegal, it is a matter not for the Government or Parliament but for the companies to ensure that their terms of service allow people to make judgments about whether they put material on their platforms. I hope that still remains the Government’s position. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Viscount Camrose (Con)
My Lords, I shall also start on a positive note and welcome the ongoing focus on online safety. We all aim to make this the safest country in the world in which to be online. The Online Safety Act is the cornerstone of how all of us will continue to pursue this crucial goal. The Act imposed clear legal responsibilities on social media platforms and tech companies, requiring them actively to monitor and manage the content they host. They are required swiftly to remove illegal content and to take proactive measures to prevent harmful material reaching minors. This reflects the deep commitment that we all share to safeguarding children from the dangers of cyberbullying, explicit content and other online threats.
We must also take particular account of the disproportionate harm that women and girls face online. The trends regarding the online abuse and exploitation that disproportionately affect female users are deeply concerning. Addressing these specific challenges is essential if we are to create a truly safe online environment for everyone.
With respect to the Government’s proposed approach to making sharing intimate images without consent a priority offence under the Online Safety Act, this initiative will require social media companies promptly to remove such content from their platforms. This aims to curb the rise in abuse that has been described as “intolerable”—I think rightly—by the Secretary of State. The intent behind this measure is to prevent generations becoming “desensitised” to the devastating effects of online abuse.
Although this appears to signal a strong stance against online harm, it raises the question of what this designation truly accomplishes in practical terms. I am grateful to the Minister for setting this out so clearly. I am not entirely sure that I altogether followed the differences between the old offences and the new ones. Sharing intimate images without consent is already illegal under current laws. Therefore, can we not say that the real issue lies in the absence not of legal provision but of effective enforcement of existing regulation? We have to ensure that any changes we make do not merely add layers of complexity but genuinely strengthen the protections available to victims and improve the responsiveness of platforms in removing harmful content.
With these thoughts in mind, I offer five questions. I apologise; the Minister is welcome to write as necessary, but I welcome her views whether now or in writing. First, why is it necessary to add the sharing of intimate images to the list of priority offences if such acts are already illegal under existing legislation and, specifically, what additional protections or outcomes are expected? The Minister gave some explanation of this, but I would welcome digging a little deeper into that.
Secondly, where consent is used as a defence against the charge of sharing intimate images, what are the Government’s thoughts on how to protect victims from intrusive cross-examination over details of their sexual history?
Thirdly, with respect to nudification technology, the previous Government argued that any photoreal image was covered by “intimate image abuse”—the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, touched on this issue well. Is there any merit in looking at that again?
Fourthly, I am keen to hear the Government’s views on my noble friend Lady Owen’s Private Member’s Bill on nudification. We look forward to debating that in December.
Fifthly, and lastly, what role can or should parents and educators play in supporting the Act’s objectives? How will the Government engage these groups to promote online safety awareness?
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. This is, as I think all noble Lords who have spoken recognise, a really important issue. It is important that we get this legislation right. We believe that updating the priority offences list with a new intimate image abuse offence is the correct, proportionate and evidence-led approach to tackle this type of content, and that it will provide stronger protections for online users. This update will bring us closer to achieving the commitment made in the Government’s manifesto to strengthening the protection for women and girls online.
I will try to cover all the questions asked. My noble friend Lord Stevenson and the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, asked whether we will review the Act and whether the Act is enough. Our immediate focus is on getting the Online Safety Act implemented quickly and effectively. It was designed to tackle illegal content and protect children; we want those protections in place as soon as possible. Having said that, it is right that the Government continually assess the law’s ability to keep up, especially when technology is moving so fast. We will of course look at how effective the protections are and build on the Online Safety Act, based on the evidence. However, our message to social media companies remains clear: “There is no need to wait. You can and should take immediate action to protect your users from these harms”.
The noble Baroness, Lady Owen, asked what further action we are taking against intimate abuse and about the taking, rather than sharing, of intimate images. We are committed to tackling the threat of violence against women and girls in all forms. We are considering what further legislative measures may be needed to strengthen the law on taking intimate images without consent and image abuse. This matter is very much on the Government’s agenda at the moment; I hope that we will be able to report some progress to the noble Baroness soon.
The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, asked whether creating and making intimate image deepfakes will be an offence. The Government’s manifesto included a commitment to banning the creation of sexually explicit deepfakes. This is a priority for the Government. DSIT is working with the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice to identify the most appropriate legislative vehicle for ensuring that those who create these images without consent face the appropriate punishment. The Government are considering options in this space to protect women and girls from malicious uses of these technologies. The new sharing intimate images offence, which will be added to the OSA priority list through this SI, explicitly includes—for the first time—wholly synthetic manufactured images, such as deepfakes, so they will be tackled under the Online Safety Act.
The noble Baroness, Lady Owen, asked about the material that is already there and the ability to have a hash database to prevent those intimate images continually being circulated. We are aware that the technology exists. Strengthening the intimate image abuse priorities under the Act is a necessary first step to tackling this, but we expect Ofcom to consider this in its final draft illegal content codes and guidance and to give more information about both the codes of practice and the further measures that would need to be developed to address this issue.
Several noble Lords—the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and my noble friend Lord Stevenson—asked for more details on the new offences. As I tried to set out in my opening statement, the Online Safety Act repeals the offence of disclosing private sexual photographs and films with the intent to cause distress—this comes under Section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 and is commonly known as the revenge porn offence—and replaces it with four new offences.
First, there is a base offence of sharing an intimate image without consent, which carries a maximum penalty of six months’ imprisonment. Secondly, there are two specific-intent offences—the first is sharing an intimate image with intent to cause alarm, humiliation or distress; the second is sharing an intimate image for the purpose of obtaining sexual gratification—each of which carries a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment to reflect the more serious culpability of someone who acts without consent and with an additional malign intent. Lastly, there is an offence of threatening to share an intimate image, with a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment. This offence applies regardless of whether the image is shared.
These offences capture images that show, or appear to show, a person who is nude, partially nude, engaged in toileting or doing something sexual. These offences include the sharing of manufactured or manipulated images, which are referred to as deepfakes. This recognises that sharing intimate images without the consent of the person they show or appear to show is sufficiently wrongful or harmful to warrant criminalisation.
The noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, asked what is so different about these new offences compared to those in the Act. I stress that it is because they are being given priority status, which does not sound much but gives considerable extra powers under the Act. There will be new powers and new obligations on platforms. The key thing is that all those offences that already exist are being given priority status under the Online Safety Act. There are thousands of things that Ofcom could address, but this is now in the much smaller list of things that will place very specific obligations on the platforms. Ofcom will monitor this and, as I said earlier, companies can be fined huge sums of money if they do not act, so there is a huge obligation on them to follow through on the priority list.
I hope that I have answered all the questions and that noble Lords agree with me on the importance of updating the priority offences in the Online Safety Act. The noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, asked about parents and made an important point. This is not just about an Act, it is about everybody highlighting the fact that these activities are intolerable and offensive not just to the individuals concerned but to everybody in society, and parents have a responsibility, as we all do, to ensure that media literacy is at the height of the education we carry out formally in schools and informally within the home. The noble Viscount is absolutely right on that, and there is more that we could all do. I commend these regulations to the Committee.