Wednesday 11th September 2024
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Lords ChamberArbitration Bill [HL] 2024-26 View all Arbitration Bill [HL] 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: HL Bill 1-I Marshalled list for Committee - (9 Sep 2024)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede) (Lab)
My Lords, perhaps I might read out from Rule 44.2 of the CPR. It says that
“the general rule is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party; but … the court may make a different order”.
There is then considerable further guidance on the assessment of costs in the remainder of Rule 44. I can say, as a non-lawyer, that I think that is pretty clear. I note the point that the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, made about having some sympathy with the language used, but the language which I just quoted is quite straightforward.
My noble friend Lord Hacking said that he was imploring me and he called the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffman, his nemesis. I might be my noble friend’s nemesis as well, because I will be arguing to reject his amendment. Of course, I thank him for tabling it. It is right that it is common practice that arbitrators already have great discretion on this matter under Section 61 of the 1996 Act. The Law Commission has made no recommendations for reform of Section 61, so we believe there is no reason for having a reform that may introduce some level of uncertainty, which we do not believe is necessary.
The previous arbitration Acts of 1889 and 1950 simply provided that costs were at the discretion of the arbitrators but the 1996 Act then provided the current default rule, which mirrored the position in the rules of the Supreme Court, which were the court rules then in force. Although the language has changed with the CPR now in force, the underlying principle is still the same. The CPR, and the RSC before them, take the view that costs should follow the event as a fair default rule. Section 61 allows arbitrators to depart from that rule as appropriate. In substance, therefore, Section 61 already allows the arbitration tribunal to award whatever costs it thinks fair.
The Law Commission received no representations from stakeholders that Section 61 was causing any difficulties in practice, and it is unusual to change the language of an Act if there is no change in principle. Indeed, it is possible that the amendment could be interpreted as a new, untested principle. In the light of this, I am grateful for the opportunity to clarify the current arrangements and would suggest that no amendment is needed. I therefore invite my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
My Lords, I intend to withdraw this amendment but perhaps I could say a short word before I do that. Of course, I have to do it because I have no support from anybody; I am doing no better than I did 28 years ago. I still say that this is unfortunate terminology and that it would be much more sensible if we brought the description of what decision should be made by the tribunal on costs into modern language, but if noble Lords like this ancient phrase of following the event they can chase around and look at Mr Justice Bingham’s judgment in Re: Catherine and so forth.
So I am in no better position than I was 28 years ago. However, there is one point I would like to make, which the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, correctly made when he drew attention to Section 55. He could have drawn attention to Sections 62, 63, 64 or 65, because all of them deal with various provisions that are applicable to the cost issues that the tribunal faces. I respect and agree with that. I agreed with it 28 years ago and I agree with it now, but I still think it would be much nicer if we dropped this strange phraseology of costs “following the event”.
“Appeals to Court of Appeal from High Court decisions(1) In section 18(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (restrictions on appeals to Court of Appeal), for paragraph (g) substitute—“(g) from a decision of the High Court under Part 1 of the Arbitration Act 1996 in a case where that Part makes provision about appeals from the decision, except in accordance with that provision;”.(2) In section 35(2) of the Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978 (appeals to Court of Appeal from High Court), for paragraph (fa) substitute—“(fa) from a decision of the High Court under Part 1 of the Arbitration Act 1996 in a case where that Part makes provision about appeals from the decision, except in accordance with that provision;”.(3) In Schedule 3 to the Arbitration Act 1996 (consequential amendments), omit paragraphs 34(2) and 37(2).”Member’s explanatory statement
This clause corrects a drafting error identified in the House of Lords’ judgment in Inco Europe v First Choice Distribution and makes clear that appeals from High Court decisions under Part 1 of the Arbitration Act 1996 may, subject to provision in that Part, be made to the Court of Appeal.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, in this group I will speak to Amendments 3 and 4, tabled in my name.
It has come to light that Clause 13 does not adequately codify the case law on appeals under Part 1 of the Arbitration Act 1996. I have tabled Amendment 3 to replace Clause 13 and correct the root cause of this issue: a drafting error in the 1996 Act that provided for an incorrect approach to appeals under Part 1 of the Act. Allow me to explain both the underlying issue and the approach I am taking to resolve it.
Clause 13 of this Bill as introduced seeks to codify case law regarding leave to appeal decisions on staying legal proceedings under Section 9 of the 1996 Act, namely the House of Lords decision from 2000 in Inco and First Choice Distribution. As such, the current Clause 13 inserts into Section 9 provision that
“the leave of the court is required for any appeal from a decision of the court under this section”.
During the passage of this Bill, certain noble and learned Lords raised the point that Clause 13 as drafted would permit leave for appeal to be sought only from the High Court—the High Court being what is meant by “the court” in the provision. However, the current situation established by case law provides that leave to appeal can be sought directly also from the Court of Appeal. It seems that Clause 13 as drafted would have the effect of inadvertently narrowing the existing position, which was never the intention.
The root cause of this issue is that the 1996 Act made an incorrect consequential amendment to Section 18(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and Section 35(2) of the Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978. In Inco and First Choice Distribution, the late Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead identified that this provision in the Senior Courts Act was originally meant to give effect to restrictions on the right to appeal contained in Sections 1 and 2 of the Arbitration Act 1979. The Senior Courts Act then needed updating to reflect additional appeal restrictions in the 1996 Act. But, as Lord Nicholls put it,
“for once, the draftsmen slipped up”.
The provision in the Senior Courts Act, when read literally, suggests that no appeals against decisions under Part 1 of the 1996 Act are allowed, except where expressly provided for in the 1996 Act. However, the intended and correct position is that appeals are indeed permitted unless expressly restricted by the 1996 Act. Due to this misunderstanding, Clause 13, in inserting its express language on appeals into Section 9 of the 1996 Act, establishes restrictions on those appeals. Accordingly, the provision that
“the leave of the court is required for any appeal from a decision of the court under this section”,
as used in other sections of the 1996 Act, is intended as a restriction providing that leave under those sections can be sought only from the High Court. As it was not the intention of the Law Commission or the Government to add such a restriction on Section 9 appeals, we must correct it.
Simply amending Clause 13 to permit direct appeals to the Court of Appeal under Section 9 could raise questions about other sections of the 1996 Act and whether similar provision should also be made elsewhere. Deleting Clause 13 would maintain the current appeal process but miss the opportunity to fix the issue properly. This seems remiss, given that the clear objective of this Bill is to refine and clarify our arbitral framework.
Amendment 3 therefore rectifies the underlying issue. It replaces the current Clause 13 with amendments to the Senior Courts Act 1981 and the Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978. These clarify that appeals against High Court decisions under Part 1 of the 1996 Act, including under Section 9, may, subject to provision in that part, be made to the Court of Appeal. This will establish beyond doubt the current position on appeals.
Amendment 3 also necessitates a change to the Bill’s Long Title, which is currently:
“A Bill to amend the Arbitration Act 1996”.
However, under Amendment 3, it will now also amend the Senior Courts Act 1981 and the Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978. This will not practically widen the scope of the Bill, given that it modifies that other legislation only to the extent that it relates to the 1996 Act. Nevertheless, Amendment 4 is required and updates the Long Title, adding “and for connected purposes”. I beg to move.
Lord Beith (LD)
My Lords, we support this amendment and are grateful to the Government for bringing it forward. The Minister’s remarks could usefully be framed and provided as an object lesson in the fact that drafting really does matter and that, when it goes wrong, the consequences mount up in subsequent legislation. He illustrated that well.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I am personally grateful to the Minister for engaging with me and others on this. These are technical matters, but it is important to get them right. I acknowledge the assistance I have had from my colleague Toby Landau KC, who, as the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, said on the previous group, did a lot of work on the original DAC report. I also acknowledge members of the Law Commission team with whom the Minister and I have both engaged, especially Nathan Tamblyn.
As the Minister said in moving his amendment, in Inco Europe, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, with whom the rest of the Appellate Committee agreed, said:
“I am left in no doubt that, for once, the draftsman slipped up”.
He put it in those terms because, again, as the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, said on the previous group, this is an extremely well-drafted Act. It is probably one of the best-drafted Acts on our on our statute book. To pick up the other phrase that Lord Nicholls used in that case, for once, Homer had nodded. This amendment rectifies the position—I am not sure what the opposite of nodding is, but, whatever it is, it puts Homer’s head back upright. I am grateful to the Minister for bringing forward this amendment, which we support.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their support for this amendment. I agree with noble Lord, Lord Beith, that drafting matters, and I agree with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson. I note the support given to him by those individuals, including Toby Landau, who was an expert witness in the previous consideration of these matters.
Member’s explanatory statement
The amendment amends the long title to cover my amendment to replace Clause 13.