Wednesday 11th September 2024
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Lords ChamberArbitration Bill [HL] 2024-26 View all Arbitration Bill [HL] 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 1-I Marshalled list for Committee - (9 Sep 2024)
Lord Hacking
“Award of costsIn section 61(2) of the Arbitration Act 1996 (award of costs), for the words from “costs should follow” to the end substitute “a reasonable amount of the costs of the successful party should be paid by the other party or parties, but account should be taken of costs incurred by the successful party which were unnecessary or excessive in whole or in part and which should not fall to be paid by the other party or parties.””
Lord Hacking (Lab)
My Lords, I will pause for a moment to allow Members of the House to leave, so that only those taking part in this Committee remain. I look to my right with some caution, because when I stood in support of my Amendment 1, I was unaware of a bank of noble and learned Lords on my right-hand side—there were three of them. Now there is only one: the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffman, who is sitting in his place. He told me over tea that the reason he is remaining is to oppose my next amendment. He opposed my Amendment 1 with some fierceness, and now he is staying back to oppose my next amendment.
This amendment goes back 28 years to the passage of the Arbitration Bill in 1996. I then objected to the introduction of the principle of “costs following the event”, which was in general usage in the English courts when the successful party was seeking costs against an unsuccessful party or parties. It was generally thought then that the event meant the winner won the costs, but Mr Justice Bingham—later Lord Bingham, Lord Chief Justice and then a senior Law Lord—said that was not right. It was in a case called Re: Catherine that Mr Justice Bingham said we should look at which party was responsible for what costs, and that the costs order should accordingly be made. My argument was that this obscure phraseology went against the drafting of the whole Bill.
Noble Lords who remember those days and now look at the Bill may remember that there was much praise for Mark Saville, later the noble and learned Lord, Lord Saville, who was chairman of the DAC that drafted the Bill—assisted by the secretary of that committee, the young barrister Toby Landau, and the wonderful parliamentary draftsman Geoffrey Sellars. The joy of the 1996 Act is that you can read it, passage by passage, in its clear, logical way and its clear, logical language. What a contrast that is to so many Bills that come before us—the detail and complication of many clauses cause most of us to put cold towels around our heads before we have a chance of understanding what is meant. I am not sure what the phraseology was then, in 1996, of the rules of the Supreme Court or the county court—in other words, the White Book and the Green Book—but I know now what the rules are in the new CPR. In particular, CPR rule 44.2(2)(a) says that
“the unsuccessful party will … pay the costs of the successful party”.
That is in the clearest possible language, so why should we continue to inflict upon the international community these ancient words of “costs following the event” when they are not used anywhere else? Why do international parties have to seek out the meaning? I am not suggesting that my drafting is perfect—indeed, noble Lords who have been looking at the Marshalled List will note that I made a mistake and had to re-draft—but it can all be quite simply done without any delay. For example, my drafting could be put in front of the rules committee of the Supreme Court, which can be consulted, as can the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, the London Court of International Arbitration, the ICC and so forth. There is no cause for delay. If the drafting of my amendment is thought to be worthy of improvement, I accept that, but can the Minister—and this is the second time I am asking him, almost imploring him after the response I got to my earlier amendment—keep an open mind and not leave this strange phraseology of “follow the event” in Section 61(2) of the Arbitration Act?
Lord Hoffmann (CB)
My Lords, I greatly regret that the noble Lord should have cast me as his personal nemesis, particularly since it is entirely desirable that an arbitration tribunal should have the power to do what he said Lord Bingham did in the case to which he referred; that is, to distinguish between the cost of issues on which people have been successful and those on which money has been spent and on which they have been unsuccessful. However, the tribunal has such a power already.
I am sure that my friend the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, would recognise that in the end the power to award costs is entirely a matter for the discretion of the tribunal. It can take into account whether it thinks the party has spent too much or whether it has succeeded on this or that issue. All these issues can be taken into account. What it says that is salutary—this is something which attracts persons to come to London and have arbitrations under English law—is that in the ordinary way, if you have not spent too much and not lost on some issues, if you have won the case you will get your costs. That is a very attractive thing to offer to people who are about to launch an arbitration.
We have in the 1996 Act a time-honoured formula which everybody knows. They know exactly how it works and I really see no advantage in substituting a new formula, when nobody quite knows now how it is going to work.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I hope that I can be relatively brief because this is a short point. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffmann, said, the costs of any arbitration are in the discretion of the tribunal. I would add only a slight gloss on that. As the noble and learned Lord knows, there is provision in the Act that if the parties have agreed the result or the provisions on costs, the tribunal has to respect that agreement, with one exception in the Act. Of course, that underlines a very important point: the whole arbitral process is consensual and contractual. We should therefore tread very lightly in this area generally, and especially when we are considering making changes to the terms of the Act.
With respect to the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, I have a certain amount of sympathy with his language point because we do not use “follow the event” anymore. That phrase is no longer used in the CPR, as he pointed out, but I took the opportunity this afternoon to have a look at the DAC report. At paragraph 268, it said in terms that the intention was to follow the normal rule in this jurisdiction—that the successful party should get the costs. That is one of the reasons why people choose to arbitrate in London and not somewhere else, and certainly not to litigate somewhere else where you can win and not get your costs back. I would be reluctant to do anything which would undermine London arbitration.
We could of course change the words to track CPR 44.2(2)(a), but I suggest that would be unnecessary and ill advised. I am not aware that there is any confusion in the international arbitration community as to what “follow the event” means. Arbitrators are perfectly able to make what are effectively issues-based awards of costs, or to reflect the fact that the claimant might have won on two issues but the defendant has won on another. Although I understand the noble Lord’s language point, I suggest that we should leave matters as they are.
As for the amount of costs or recoverable costs, which is the other point that the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, deals with in his amendment, Section 63(5) of the Act already provides that the tribunal can limit its award on costs to those costs which have been reasonably incurred. As someone whose fees are often challenged on the basis that they are unreasonable, that is a provision with which I am personally familiar. We appreciate the thrust of the amendment but, certainly on these Benches, we would suggest that it is not needed.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede) (Lab)
My Lords, perhaps I might read out from Rule 44.2 of the CPR. It says that
“the general rule is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party; but … the court may make a different order”.
There is then considerable further guidance on the assessment of costs in the remainder of Rule 44. I can say, as a non-lawyer, that I think that is pretty clear. I note the point that the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, made about having some sympathy with the language used, but the language which I just quoted is quite straightforward.
My noble friend Lord Hacking said that he was imploring me and he called the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hoffman, his nemesis. I might be my noble friend’s nemesis as well, because I will be arguing to reject his amendment. Of course, I thank him for tabling it. It is right that it is common practice that arbitrators already have great discretion on this matter under Section 61 of the 1996 Act. The Law Commission has made no recommendations for reform of Section 61, so we believe there is no reason for having a reform that may introduce some level of uncertainty, which we do not believe is necessary.
The previous arbitration Acts of 1889 and 1950 simply provided that costs were at the discretion of the arbitrators but the 1996 Act then provided the current default rule, which mirrored the position in the rules of the Supreme Court, which were the court rules then in force. Although the language has changed with the CPR now in force, the underlying principle is still the same. The CPR, and the RSC before them, take the view that costs should follow the event as a fair default rule. Section 61 allows arbitrators to depart from that rule as appropriate. In substance, therefore, Section 61 already allows the arbitration tribunal to award whatever costs it thinks fair.
The Law Commission received no representations from stakeholders that Section 61 was causing any difficulties in practice, and it is unusual to change the language of an Act if there is no change in principle. Indeed, it is possible that the amendment could be interpreted as a new, untested principle. In the light of this, I am grateful for the opportunity to clarify the current arrangements and would suggest that no amendment is needed. I therefore invite my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Hacking (Lab)
My Lords, I intend to withdraw this amendment but perhaps I could say a short word before I do that. Of course, I have to do it because I have no support from anybody; I am doing no better than I did 28 years ago. I still say that this is unfortunate terminology and that it would be much more sensible if we brought the description of what decision should be made by the tribunal on costs into modern language, but if noble Lords like this ancient phrase of following the event they can chase around and look at Mr Justice Bingham’s judgment in Re: Catherine and so forth.
So I am in no better position than I was 28 years ago. However, there is one point I would like to make, which the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, correctly made when he drew attention to Section 55. He could have drawn attention to Sections 62, 63, 64 or 65, because all of them deal with various provisions that are applicable to the cost issues that the tribunal faces. I respect and agree with that. I agreed with it 28 years ago and I agree with it now, but I still think it would be much nicer if we dropped this strange phraseology of costs “following the event”.
“Appeals to Court of Appeal from High Court decisions(1) In section 18(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (restrictions on appeals to Court of Appeal), for paragraph (g) substitute—“(g) from a decision of the High Court under Part 1 of the Arbitration Act 1996 in a case where that Part makes provision about appeals from the decision, except in accordance with that provision;”.(2) In section 35(2) of the Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978 (appeals to Court of Appeal from High Court), for paragraph (fa) substitute—“(fa) from a decision of the High Court under Part 1 of the Arbitration Act 1996 in a case where that Part makes provision about appeals from the decision, except in accordance with that provision;”.(3) In Schedule 3 to the Arbitration Act 1996 (consequential amendments), omit paragraphs 34(2) and 37(2).”Member’s explanatory statement
This clause corrects a drafting error identified in the House of Lords’ judgment in Inco Europe v First Choice Distribution and makes clear that appeals from High Court decisions under Part 1 of the Arbitration Act 1996 may, subject to provision in that Part, be made to the Court of Appeal.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, in this group I will speak to Amendments 3 and 4, tabled in my name.
It has come to light that Clause 13 does not adequately codify the case law on appeals under Part 1 of the Arbitration Act 1996. I have tabled Amendment 3 to replace Clause 13 and correct the root cause of this issue: a drafting error in the 1996 Act that provided for an incorrect approach to appeals under Part 1 of the Act. Allow me to explain both the underlying issue and the approach I am taking to resolve it.
Clause 13 of this Bill as introduced seeks to codify case law regarding leave to appeal decisions on staying legal proceedings under Section 9 of the 1996 Act, namely the House of Lords decision from 2000 in Inco and First Choice Distribution. As such, the current Clause 13 inserts into Section 9 provision that
“the leave of the court is required for any appeal from a decision of the court under this section”.
During the passage of this Bill, certain noble and learned Lords raised the point that Clause 13 as drafted would permit leave for appeal to be sought only from the High Court—the High Court being what is meant by “the court” in the provision. However, the current situation established by case law provides that leave to appeal can be sought directly also from the Court of Appeal. It seems that Clause 13 as drafted would have the effect of inadvertently narrowing the existing position, which was never the intention.
The root cause of this issue is that the 1996 Act made an incorrect consequential amendment to Section 18(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and Section 35(2) of the Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978. In Inco and First Choice Distribution, the late Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead identified that this provision in the Senior Courts Act was originally meant to give effect to restrictions on the right to appeal contained in Sections 1 and 2 of the Arbitration Act 1979. The Senior Courts Act then needed updating to reflect additional appeal restrictions in the 1996 Act. But, as Lord Nicholls put it,
“for once, the draftsmen slipped up”.
The provision in the Senior Courts Act, when read literally, suggests that no appeals against decisions under Part 1 of the 1996 Act are allowed, except where expressly provided for in the 1996 Act. However, the intended and correct position is that appeals are indeed permitted unless expressly restricted by the 1996 Act. Due to this misunderstanding, Clause 13, in inserting its express language on appeals into Section 9 of the 1996 Act, establishes restrictions on those appeals. Accordingly, the provision that
“the leave of the court is required for any appeal from a decision of the court under this section”,
as used in other sections of the 1996 Act, is intended as a restriction providing that leave under those sections can be sought only from the High Court. As it was not the intention of the Law Commission or the Government to add such a restriction on Section 9 appeals, we must correct it.
Simply amending Clause 13 to permit direct appeals to the Court of Appeal under Section 9 could raise questions about other sections of the 1996 Act and whether similar provision should also be made elsewhere. Deleting Clause 13 would maintain the current appeal process but miss the opportunity to fix the issue properly. This seems remiss, given that the clear objective of this Bill is to refine and clarify our arbitral framework.
Amendment 3 therefore rectifies the underlying issue. It replaces the current Clause 13 with amendments to the Senior Courts Act 1981 and the Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978. These clarify that appeals against High Court decisions under Part 1 of the 1996 Act, including under Section 9, may, subject to provision in that part, be made to the Court of Appeal. This will establish beyond doubt the current position on appeals.
Amendment 3 also necessitates a change to the Bill’s Long Title, which is currently:
“A Bill to amend the Arbitration Act 1996”.
However, under Amendment 3, it will now also amend the Senior Courts Act 1981 and the Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978. This will not practically widen the scope of the Bill, given that it modifies that other legislation only to the extent that it relates to the 1996 Act. Nevertheless, Amendment 4 is required and updates the Long Title, adding “and for connected purposes”. I beg to move.
Lord Beith (LD)
My Lords, we support this amendment and are grateful to the Government for bringing it forward. The Minister’s remarks could usefully be framed and provided as an object lesson in the fact that drafting really does matter and that, when it goes wrong, the consequences mount up in subsequent legislation. He illustrated that well.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I am personally grateful to the Minister for engaging with me and others on this. These are technical matters, but it is important to get them right. I acknowledge the assistance I have had from my colleague Toby Landau KC, who, as the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, said on the previous group, did a lot of work on the original DAC report. I also acknowledge members of the Law Commission team with whom the Minister and I have both engaged, especially Nathan Tamblyn.
As the Minister said in moving his amendment, in Inco Europe, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, with whom the rest of the Appellate Committee agreed, said:
“I am left in no doubt that, for once, the draftsman slipped up”.
He put it in those terms because, again, as the noble Lord, Lord Hacking, said on the previous group, this is an extremely well-drafted Act. It is probably one of the best-drafted Acts on our on our statute book. To pick up the other phrase that Lord Nicholls used in that case, for once, Homer had nodded. This amendment rectifies the position—I am not sure what the opposite of nodding is, but, whatever it is, it puts Homer’s head back upright. I am grateful to the Minister for bringing forward this amendment, which we support.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their support for this amendment. I agree with noble Lord, Lord Beith, that drafting matters, and I agree with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson. I note the support given to him by those individuals, including Toby Landau, who was an expert witness in the previous consideration of these matters.
Member’s explanatory statement
The amendment amends the long title to cover my amendment to replace Clause 13.