Grand Committee
(2 months, 2 weeks ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Read Hansard Text
Arrangement of Business
(2 months, 2 weeks ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Read Hansard Text
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Haskel) (Lab)
My Lords, as noble Lords can see, the annunciator is not working. Staff are working on it. If there is a Division in the Chamber while we are sitting, the Committee will adjourn as soon as the Division Bells are rung and resume after 10 minutes.
Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL]
Thursday 5th September 2024
(2 months, 2 weeks ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL] 2024-26 View all Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL] 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 2-I Marshalled list for Grand Committee - (3 Sep 2024)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that the bill applies primarily to smaller banks, using Minimum Requirement for Own Funds and Eligible Liabilities (MREL) as a definition.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
My Lords, I am pleased to open the Committee stage of this Bill. I expect this to be the only longish speech that I will make, so noble Lords should not worry about getting six of this length.
I have two amendments in this group but, first, for the benefit of anybody following these discussions either now or later, I shall mention the scope issue that has reared its head for several noble Lords in trying to formulate amendments. The Long Title, which defines scope, is:
“A Bill to make provision about recapitalisation costs in relation to the special resolution regime under the Banking Act 2009”.
The Bill’s provisions have effects that reach into resolution decisions, bail-in and capital structures, but various amendments’ attempts to take that into account in other relevant ways have been ruled out of scope. Indeed, in the light of this amendment-drafting experience, I wonder whether all the bits of the Bill pass the scope test; that may become clearer as we work through the amendments, in particular my Amendment 22 in this group and Amendment 23 in the final group.
I turn to my Amendment 1 and the similar amendments in the rest of the group. They have a common theme: making sure that the provisions really are limited in application to small or smaller banks, which is what we have been told they are about following on from the actions taken for Silicon Valley Bank. However, there is no such small bank limitation in the Bill. Clearly, the question arises: how small is “small or smaller”? Like other noble Lords, I have taken the view that the only clear distinction is for non-systemic banks—that is, those required to hold MREL, bail-in bonds or whatever you wish to call them, which represent the only regulatory division we have.
Of course, as raised by me and others at Second Reading, we then have the issue that the PRA has extended the MREL requirements far lower down the bank size range than systemic banks, well into the “smaller bank” range. This may well be the reason that there is no differentiation in the Bill: so that, in theory, the Bill applies to any bank and everything rests on the Bank of England’s decision. It seems that the majority of us here disagree with that and think that it should be limited by a defined measure; the obvious one is the level at which MREL is required. If the PRA causes the resolution provisions to be impeded by its MREL choices, that will be something for it and the Bank of England to consider and live with.
My Amendment 1 has another little tweak, in which I suggest that the cutoff is linked to the index-linked value of the net assets at which MREL was originally set in 2016: £15 billion. In numbers, that would mean the size now would be £22 billion if it were index linked, not £15 billion, and it would not continue to dwindle, relatively speaking, as is happening with the PRA MREL threshold. My amendment therefore overlaps with regimes that can do bail-in, although my real hope, as I have already suggested, is to make the PRA see that, for various good reasons, it should increase the MREL threshold at least by indexation, and ideally to the level where it applies only to banks that have full capital market access, so that bail-in instruments are not disproportionately expensive for them. However, if we want to coalesce around MREL as the dividing line, I am not going to rock the boat. Indeed, I tabled an amendment to that effect, but it got lost somewhere. I think the Bill Office thought that my other amendment was an amendment to my amendment.
I turn to my Amendment 22. This deletes Clause 4(3), which is not needed in the event that there is limitation to application only to non-MREL banks. I will explain how I came to that conclusion. The subsection references Section 12AA of the Banking Act 2009, which in turn references Article 47.3(b) and (c) of the EU’s Resolution and Recovery directive. Most compliance with EU directives has been put into the 2009 Act.
I happen to think, especially nowadays, that it would be much better to say more clearly what we actually meant in Clause 4(3) than to have to pedal all the way back to a European directive. I have another amendment on it, Amendment 23, right at the end of our considerations next week. I will let noble Lords know what it is all about. Article 47.3(b) of BRRD is the amount by which the authorities assess that common equity tier 1 items must be reduced to the relevant capital instruments written down or converted, pursuant to Article 61. The latter gives the order of writing down priority. Article 47.3(c) is the aggregate amount assessed by the resolution authority, pursuant to Article 46. To save noble Lords the misery of me reading out Article 46, it is the sum of write-down and recapitalisation.
To cut this long story short, the subsection refers to things that happen only when you are in a bail-in situation. So, if we limit it to non-MREL banks, it would seem to be superfluous, because there cannot be any bail-in as they are not required to hold MREL. Of course, if we use my Amendment 1 with the index threshold of MREL, we might need it or need to rewrite it.
However, thinking about it further, I also query whether this subsection is properly in scope as it seems to relate to changing bail-in requirements and not to recapitalisation. That is made clear in the Explanatory Notes, which state that Clause 4(3) basically amends the bail-in sequence and conversion of capital instruments to allow adjustment to the contribution of shareholders and creditors when exercising the bail-in write-down tool. We should bear in mind that there are other parts of legislation that tell you the sequence in which you must do one, and how you exhaust the first before you move on to the next, and all those kinds of measures.
The end result that it has a knock-on effect of increasing recapitalisation costs that are then to be met by the FSCS. As I said, that seems to depart from what I envisaged was the purpose of the Bill. I did not have in my mind that it was about levying banks to help rescue shareholders or bail-in bond holders of another bank. I understood that it would be more like the Silicon Valley Bank rescue, where the point would be to rescue unprotected depositors.
Overall, we can do without this clause in all circumstances and I wait to hear the Minister’s explanation. It would be useful, before we get to Report, if we could have some kind of laid-out worked examples of where this might come in and what might happen. I understand why the Government wish for flexibility but it is a flexibility that goes way beyond what I have understood to be the intents of the Bill. I beg to move.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I have Amendment 5 in this group, to which I will speak. I regret that I was unable to take part at Second Reading in July, but I have read the Hansard report of the debate and I can see that there is a lot of common ground on the Bill between those of us not on the Government Benches.
As this is the first time that I have spoken in Committee, I draw attention to my interests as recorded in the register of interests, in particular that I hold shares in banks which, under the terms of the Bill, will end up footing the bill if the bank recapitalisation power is used.
My Amendment 5 is slightly different from Amendment 1 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and slightly different from Amendments 8, 10, 12 and 18 in the names of other noble Lords. Those amendments basically seek to confine the use of this power to small banks—typically using MREL as the deciding point. Mine does not rule out using the power for larger banks but instead inserts the requirement for Treasury consent.
The Government clearly sold this legislation, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, explained, as being about smaller banks, referring to it as being a better route for a better outcome compared to using the bank insolvency procedure, which is the current default assumption for smaller banks. As is often the case with legislation, however, the stated aim then gets converted into a very broad power. This power is so broad that if the RBS failure happened again it could cover the recapitalisation of RBS, which, I remind noble Lords, cost £45.5 billion in 2008. The Bank would have that power with nothing in the Bill to prevent it.
There is a constraint on the amount of annual FSCS payments set by the PRA, which I think is £1.5 billion a year, but that can be changed by the PRA at any time, and the PRA is not, of course, independent of the Bank of England; it is fully part of it.
I am not surprised that the Treasury does not want to narrow the drafting of the Bill to cover only those banks that do not have MREL. The Government have themselves talked about wanting to cover the case where MREL has been set but the banks are on a glide path and have not yet achieved the full amount of their MREL. It seems reasonable for the power to be used in those circumstances, but the Government have not even offered to amend the Bill to confine it in that way.
I broadly accept that there may be a good case for using recapitalisation schemes beyond non-MREL banks or those that have not yet raised their full amount of MREL, because it is genuinely difficult to predict circumstances where such a power would be extremely useful. However, when the Government draft broad and unconstrained powers, they have a duty to put checks and balances in place, and there are none in the Bill. If they do not put checks and balances in place, we must take that on as part of our duties in scrutinising legislation. My amendment has opted for Treasury consent, but there could well be better ways of putting guard rails in place. Treasury consent is not an onerous requirement when the Bank of England is handling a potential bank failure. It inevitably works closely with the Treasury; the Treasury has to be consulted whenever a stabilisation power is used, and we should be in no doubt that when, for example, SVB UK was in trouble, the Treasury was intimately involved in the arrangements to deal with HSBC very rapidly. Therefore, obtaining Treasury consent need not cause a delay or any other real problems.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
My Lords, as we have heard, this group of amendments, including my Amendment 10, probes the reasons for including all banks in the scope of the Bill, rather than just the smaller banks, as originally envisaged in the consultation that started in January. The first sentence of the consultation was very clear:
“This consultation sets out the government’s intention to enhance and keep up to date the UK’s Special Resolution Regime … providing a new mechanism to facilitate use of certain existing stabilisation powers to manage the failure of small banks”.
But, as we have heard, it is not restricted to small banks. Most of the amendments in this group would remove from the scope of the Bill those banks that are required to hold MREL and would be subject to bail-in procedures using those MREL resources. I think the number of separate but similar amendments that we seem to have is probably down to the fact that this all happened in recess, and we did not have the opportunity to get together. I am sure that if the Minister is not able to satisfy us, we will be able to coalesce around something in common.
It is worth quoting from paragraph 7 of the Explanatory Notes:
“This means taxpayers are exposed if a small bank failure is judged to require resolution action but the firm in question does not possess sufficient MREL resources to provide for recapitalisation, unlike larger banks that do possess these resources”.
If larger banks possess those resources, as they are required to do, why do we need them to be subject to the process envisaged by the Bill? The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, talked about the glide path situation where a bank has not quite got there—yes, I see that point—but for those that are there, does this not imply that we are not confident that the existing MREL scheme is sufficient? If there is a problem with the MREL scheme, surely it would be better to fix that rather than adding a new process on top of it.
So could the noble Lord please clarify under exactly which circumstances he sees the recapitalisation process in the Bill being used for a failing MREL bank? Is there a concern that the MREL resources are insufficient? Other than glide path situations, that is the only logical reason I can see to include big banks in the scope of the Bill.
Secondly, not having the expertise of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, I do not really understand how the two processes would work together. Is this an either/or situation; is it either a bail-in using MREL resources or a recapitalisation? If that is the case, surely there is a risk that the industry would be required to fund the recapitalisation of banks with large balance sheets instead of the costs being borne by the failed bank’s shareholders and subordinated debt holders. That would create a potential moral hazard. Or is it a combined process where the MREL resources would be used first and, if insufficient, the recapitalisation would follow on top? If that is the case, it implies that there is a concern that the MREL funds are insufficient. The best way forward would be to fix that problem rather than add another process, as I said before.
So could the noble Lord please clearly explain how he sees the two processes working together? I am drawn to the suggestion by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, of a worked example between now and Report to help us see how that could work. In particular, can he clearly confirm that the recapitalisation process can never be used to reduce the losses of a failing bank’s shareholders or creditors?
In the absence of a strong explanation of why, contrary to the originally stated intention, the scope of the Bill has been extended to larger banks, I would be minded to support amendments on Report that restrict its scope to exclude MREL banks.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, my Amendment 11 also—I think rather neatly—confines the Bill to what are defined as small banks. However, my concern is somewhat different from those voiced by noble Lords until now. It is that the whole approach to the resolution regime suggests that banks fail one at a time and not all together. Anyone who went through the experience of 2007 to 2009 knows that, in a systemic crisis, it is possible for all the banks in the country to be suffering major problems at the same time. In the circumstances of a systemic crisis, I fear that the mechanism proposed in the Bill could be a source of contagion, in the sense that the cost of the collapse of a bank, or of many banks together, would be seen by the market as imposing costs, which are now unbearable, on other parts of the banking sector.
This comes down to two issues—that of contagion and, I am afraid, that of persistent complacency. The Treasury and the Bank of England refuse to face up to the fact that, in the end, it is the taxpayer who will pay in a systemic crisis.
I will deal first with contagion. The levy links the financial failure of a bank or number of banks to the banking sector as a whole. Does this create a contagion effect? It must be remembered that much of contagion is created by the expectation of a cost, not just the reality. Expectation then becomes the parent of reality. It can reasonably be expected that the failure of a small bank would be manageable under the resolution regimes set out by the Bank of England and discussed in this Bill and its explanatory documents.
However, there are two fundamental problems where one could have significant contagion. One would be multiple failures, an issue I will address in a moment. The other is the potential failure of a big bank, because the Bill and the Explanatory Notes explicitly refer these mechanisms to big banks as well as small ones.
I will take the issue of the failure of multiple banks or a big bank. I wrote to the Financial Secretary about this and he very kindly wrote back a very valuable explanation. I presume that his letter has been circulated to the people who took part—no, I see that it has not. Well, I will quote a bit of it, because it seems to reveal the problem that I am identifying. He refers to multiple bank failures, but I would apply the same thing to a big bank failure. He says that there will be levies when the bank fails and adds:
“These levies are subject to an affordability cap”—
I did not know that—
“by the Prudential Regulation Authority based on how much the sector can safely be levied in a given year. This cap is currently set at £1.5 billion. If multiple firm failures resulting in a recapitalisation requirement is under £1.5 billion, the Government would expect the FSCS to borrow from its commercial borrowing facility and be able to safely levy from the banking sector and repay that commercial borrowing within 12 months. However, if the amount exceeds £1.5 billion, or if it is below £1.5 billion and the PRA has determined that the FSCS is unable to raise the levy on affordability grounds, the Government would expect levies to repay any borrowing from the National Loans Fund to be spread out over multiple years”.
But, no, you do not have multiple years in a systemic banking crisis; you have to operate now.
The cap of £1.5 billion is worth comparing with the measures that the Government had to take in 2007-08—Lloyds Bank, £20 billion and NatWest, £45 billion. So the failure of one of those banks could be somewhat above the affordability cap, as set out in the Financial Secretary’s letter to me. Indeed, today, those numbers could be multiplied by a factor of roughly five.
Even when MREL is taken into account, the £1.5 billion cap seems to me to expose the fact that this scheme is not applicable to large banks. For example, if we look at the largest MREL plus required capital, it is that of Barclays, which is 30% of risk weighted assets—the largest of all the major banks. That leaves 70% of risk weighted assets to which the taxpayer is exposed. There would not be a collapse of all of those, but there can be very large numbers very quickly. So the idea that with an affordability cap of £1.5 billion, one could handle the Lloyds Bank situation or the NatWest situation as the Government confronted them in 2007-08 is, it seems to me, fanciful.
This brings me to my final related point. There is a persistent reluctance in all the documents concerning the resolution regime to admit that the resolution of a large bank will always fall on the taxpayer. Given the need for the maintenance of confidence in the banking sector, this persistent reluctance and the pretence that MREL has eliminated the taxpayer from exposure is damaging to confidence. It would be valuable for the Purple Book to make clear that, in extremis, Bagehot’s rule comes into effect, the Bank lends without limit and the Treasury will step in to resolve those banks that are “too big to fail”. My amendment clears away a dangerous ambiguity in the Bill. The threat of multiple small failure will continue to exist, but it takes away the ambiguity that this could be involved in the resolution of a big bank in the circumstances of a systemic crisis similar to that which we have faced in the past.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to be back in this Room—sadly, standing on this side. Nevertheless, it is an interesting experience being in opposition and doing my first Committee—a learning experience. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have participated in scrutinising the Bill. I recognise that we are at the beginning of the Session and sometimes it takes a while for things to get into place. There has been quite a lot of work done and I think we have made some very good progress. I, too, did not speak on Second Reading, and I blame that entirely on the Prime Minister, because he extended Parliament and I was already on holiday, so therefore I could not do that. I am very grateful and put on record my thanks to my colleague, my noble friend Lady Penn, who did it in my stead.
The Bill was originally developed by the previous Government and was waiting for parliamentary time, so I think my role today is to test the thinking of the new Government to make sure that they are still on the same page. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for kicking off this debate so eloquently and knowledgeably. I note her concerns about the scope of the Bill. I would love to say that she did not slightly lose me, but she did, so I will come back to that if it seems to be a problem that we need to look at.
I want to go back—to be helpful, possibly to me—to first principles on this. Having listened to the contributions that have gone before me, I think I have got it right that there are three groups of financial institutions. I am going to call them “banks”, because “financial institutions” is long and it takes a while to get my tongue around.
The first group are the MREL—the big eight banks. These are the ones that have been directed by the Bank of England to hold MREL, and they must also submit a resolvability assessment framework, or RAF, to regulators. The RAF is structured so that these firms can think about how their business works and what capabilities they need to achieve the three resolvability outcomes: having adequate financial resources; being able to continue business through resolution restructuring; and effective communication and co-ordination.
I read somewhere that the 2024 assessment of these documents was due to be published in September, and I should like an update as to whether it has been published. Can the Minister comment on the outcomes of this scrutiny: is the system working? I understand that one bank was not quite there yet. Let us see whether we are going to try to exclude the largest banks from the scheme or whether we follow the suggestion of my noble friend Lady Noakes of getting the involvement of the Treasury. We need to test whether those banks which are deemed too big to fail have a coherent and funded plan in place should they get into financial difficulty. If that were the case, there would be some argument for potentially excluding them from the Bill, but there should at least be some safeguards in place.
Then there is the second group. This was raised with me by UK Finance, and this is why my amendment is slightly different to those of other people. There are those banks in the second group that are on the glide path to full MREL status. These institutions will get there, but it would be helpful to get an update from the Minister as to how many institutions make up this second group so that we can consider further whether there is a substantial risk and where that risk might reasonably lie—and so how long they will take to reach their destination.
Finally, there is the third group. These are the important ones. They are the ones that the Bill should be focused on. These are the smaller banks, and they are often innovative, they are often very high growth and sometimes that in itself can lead to challenges. It is these banks that the Bill seeks to target. Indeed, it was my understanding, as it was that of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, that they would exclusively benefit from this scheme.
If things start to go awry, due to either a business-specific issue or wider market turmoil, these proposed powers would create this mechanism where the banking sector itself, in its entirety—all three groups—would fund the recapitalisation of the relevant bank or banks, and the taxpayer would be relieved of that burden. So that all makes perfect sense to me.
Then we come to the reasonable worst-case scenario, which I think is what the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, was referring to. It is not beyond our imagination that things could get very bad very quickly, with a number of small or even medium-sized banks getting into trouble at the same time. The first group would, I hope, have their MREL in place; they would have their plan, which has been approved by the regulators to make sure that they continue.
I am slightly less clear what would happen to the second group—those on the glide path to MREL—were there to be a market-wide event. These are significant institutions and if they are to be included in this mechanism, we get into issues of how the banking sector then repays that through the levy, which I will come on to. There might well be a situation where one, two or more quite substantial institutions need recapitalisation from the FSCS in the same financial year. Have the Minister’s officials done any sort of assessment of how bad that could possibly get and any thinking about what the plan would be if it were to get that bad? Also, what would the hurdle be for declaring this sort of state of emergency?
While the FSCS might have a looming potential liability from the second group, there is also the third group to be considered. These ones are the potential future lifeblood of our financial sector in the United Kingdom and they would most likely need a relatively small amount of recapitalisation funding to get them through the turmoil. This is why parity is needed around the applicability of the scheme proposed in the Bill, but also the circumstances in which the scheme would reasonably and rationally be used—and, frankly, the circumstances in which it would not be, because it would just not work. In a reasonable worst-case scenario, how is anyone going to decide which ones get saved and which do not? One has to rely upon the amount of funding that could be affordable over several years of a levy applied to the UK banking sector, but that is not going to be enough money. How would that resolve itself and what would that process look like?
As mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, which I picked up in one of the briefings as well, the FSCS will have significant powers to apply the levy, not only in the financial year when the event or events take place but in subsequent financial years. If I am in the UK banking sector and things have gone pretty bad, and I suddenly have this massive weight of a levy going over several years to repay the events of one financial year, that to me is concerning.
It is also concerning because, of course, things are done differently in the EU, so you would get a slight mismatch from a competitiveness perspective. I would be worried about that. Has the Minister done an assessment of the impact of this potential multiyear hit, once we have an idea of the reasonable size and then the potential maximum size? Has he assessed the competitiveness of the UK banking sector, should this multiyear levy suddenly be required? How much could the UK’s system cost our banking sector and over what period of time? Are there circumstances, and in which circumstances, when rationally there is a systemic failure and the only person who could step in would be the taxpayer? I do not want the taxpayer to step in, trust me, but that would prevent permanent damage to one of our most important sectors.
The other key consideration is the impact on the FSCS and its ability to meet its obligations under the deposit guarantee insurance scheme, because if that has all gone to recapitalisation funding, there will be nothing left. I believe we will come on to that later in Committee.
This is a range of thoughtful amendments tabled by noble Lords and I am grateful for them. As many noble Lords pointed out, they very much go along the same sorts of lines. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to them. I will not go into a great amount of detail on them, but I note that my Amendment 8 takes into account those on the glide path, which we need to recognise. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for the fine case she made for Amendment 22; I will move quickly on from that.
That brings me to the remaining amendment in the group: Amendment 18, which is in my name. Here, in essence, I am probing whether the Minister is content with the current imbalance between the banks liable to pay the levy versus the ones that, realistically, will make use of the new powers. Does he feel it is fair that the entire banking sector pays to recapitalise what, I feel, the Committee hopes will be smaller banks only? Does he accept and is he comfortable with the largest banks paying twice, in essence—particularly as they will have to have limited or no input in or influence on many of the events that might cause a resolution event or events? These largest banks will pay twice: once for their MREL and associated requirements, and again in the event of a resolution event or events of which they would not be able to take advantage.
Context is important here. We will come back to costs again but banks already pay a plethora of taxes, levies and charges, both to regulators and directly to Treasury funds. There is the bank levy, the bank corporation tax surcharge, the economic crime levy, the FSCS levy and the FCA/PRA fees. That is a lot—and let us recall that these costs are never borne by the banks themselves; they will always be borne by the businesses and consumers who use them.
The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Livermore) (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for taking part in this debate on the first group of amendments. I note that the scope of the mechanism is a key and central issue, both for noble Lords and for the wider banking sector. I hope to offer some reassurance to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and other noble Lords regarding this concern.
I start by addressing Amendment 1, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, which would prevent a recapitalisation payment involving a bank that has issued minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities, otherwise known as MREL. I stress that the Government’s strong policy intention is for the mechanism provided by the Bill to be used primarily to support the resolution of small banks. The Government therefore do not generally expect the mechanism set out in this Bill to be used on the type of firms that these amendments would seek to exclude.
The principal issue here is whether that intention should be set out in the Bill. The Government’s considered view is that it is right for the Bill to contain some flexibility for the Bank of England to be able to use the mechanism more broadly in some circumstances. That is because firm failures can be unpredictable and there could be circumstances in which it would be appropriate to use the mechanism on such firms.
For example, this may be relevant in situations where a small bank has grown but is still in the process of reaching its end-state MREL requirements. Firms in this position would have at least some MREL resources to support recapitalisation but the new mechanism could be used to meet any remaining shortfall if judged necessary. Without the proposed mechanism, there would be a potential gap in this scenario, creating risks to public funds and financial stability.
Ultimately, the decision to use the mechanism would rest with the Bank of England, having assessed the resolution conditions. The Bank of England is required by statute to consult the Treasury before any use of resolution tools, providing an effective and legally binding window for the Treasury to raise concerns if it had any.
I also point out that, during the Government’s consultation period, more respondents were in favour of the scope set out in the Bill than opposed. I appreciate noble Lords’ concerns about this issue and am happy to commit to exploring how to provide further reassurance on the Government’s intent via the code of practice.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked whether the Bank of England should reduce MREL requirements in the knowledge that it could instead use FSCS funds. The Bank of England sets MREL requirements independently of government but within a framework set out in legislation. Any changes to firms’ MREL requirements would therefore be a decision for the Bank of England. The Bank of England will consider, in the light of this Bill and wider developments, whether any changes to its approach to MREL would be appropriate.
I turn briefly to Amendment 8, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, which similarly aims to exclude from the new mechanism those firms that are required to hold MREL. I hope that I have already fully responded to her concerns in that regard; the Government are clear that this Bill is primarily intended for small banks, but that it is right to retain flexibility.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
Just to clarify, is there anything in the Bill that changes the effect on shareholders and creditors compared with if it had been done by just the bail-in approach?
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
I know that the notes have no effect, but those regarding Clause 4(3) say that it
“amends section 12AA … to allow the Bank to take into account the funds provided by the FSCS when they are calculating the contribution of shareholders and creditors required when exercising the bail-in write-down tool”.
That says that you will be able, and consider it positive, to adjust the contribution of shareholders. That is because you are using incoming capital. I think that the shareholders and bail-inable creditors should be written down as they are supposed to be, then, when you still do not have enough money for capitalisation, there is the money from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. I understood that and have no problem with it, apart from the size issues. Saying no to the question just put by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, contradicts what is written in paragraph 26 of the Explanatory Notes.
Lord Livermore (Lab)
It may be best if I write to noble Lords to clarify this point.
Amendment 11, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, would exclude from the scope of the new mechanism those firms whose MREL requirement exceeds their minimum capital requirement. This would include both firms expected to be transferred to a private sector purchaser and those bailed in when they fail.
I stress to the noble Lord, as I have to others, that the Government’s intention is for the mechanism to be used primarily for small banks. That is ultimately central to the Bill’s purpose, but I emphasise the importance of having flexibility in the legislation for the Bank of England’s ability to respond effectively in a crisis. As I have noted, this may, for example, be relevant if a firm is still in the process of building up its MREL requirements to be able to fully implement a bail-in strategy.
I also note the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, which intends to ensure that, if the Bank of England seeks to use the new mechanism on a bank required to hold bail-in liabilities, it must first get the consent of the Treasury.
I am conscious that there are other amendments related to the subject of Treasury approval for the use of the Bank of England’s powers and that we will turn to this matter more substantively later. What I will say now to the noble Baroness is that the Government consider it important for the Bank of England to be able to take decisions in a resolution independently and decisively.
I will mention two important safeguards. First, as required by statute, the Treasury will always be consulted as part of the Bank of England’s formal assessment of the resolution conditions. Secondly, if using the mechanism on larger banks had implications for public funds, such as requiring the use of the National Loans Fund, this would be subject to Treasury consent. But I repeat that the Government’s strong policy intention is ultimately for the mechanism to be used primarily on small banks.
Amendment 18 was tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Vere. It seeks to clarify the rationale for the scope of financial institutions liable to pay the levy for the new mechanism delivered by the Bill, given the expectation that the new mechanism would apply primarily to small banks. The Government believe there to be benefits to mirroring the existing process for recouping the costs of paying out depositors in insolvency and maintaining a broad-based levy. In particular, as noted in the Government’s cost-benefit analysis, the exclusion of larger banks would raise concerns about the affordability of the levy for other banks, which would in turn increase risks to public funds and the overall viability of the new mechanism.
In addition, in cases where the new mechanism may be used, the counterfactual would be for the failed bank to enter insolvency. As a result, the sector would already be liable to contribute to the costs of a small bank failure. As set out in the Government’s cost-benefit analysis, while highly case-specific, the upfront costs of an insolvency are generally expected to be greater than those under the new mechanism delivered by the Bill. The Government therefore feel it is right to mirror the arrangements in place for an insolvency and to maintain a broad-based levy.
The noble Baroness asked about the Bank’s resolvability assessment framework. I am told that the latest update was published in August. She asked how many firms were on the glide path. I will write to her with specific details, and if any of her other questions are not answered in my speech today, I will write to her also on those points.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)
One concern was raised in the document that has been published, so I would be grateful for the Minister’s comments on that.
Lord Livermore (Lab)
I will write to the noble Baroness on that point.
I turn finally to Amendment 22 in this group, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, which concerns the use of the bail-in resolution tool. Section 12AA of the Banking Act 2009 sets out the principles by which the Bank of England calculates the shortfall amount when the bail-in tool is used and, as a consequence of that calculation, how much of a failed firm’s resources needs to be bailed in. The addition to Section 12AA in Clause 4, which this amendment seeks to prevent, ensures that any available funds from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme via the new mechanism could be taken into account when calculating the shortfall amount and, as a consequence, how much of a firm’s resources would need to be bailed in when the new mechanism is used alongside the bail-in tool.
This change to Section 12AA is important as there are some circumstances where bail-in may be the preferred tool for the Bank of England to use as a precursor to transfer of the firm to a bridge bank or private sector purchaser, even if the bank is small. This is because the bail-in tool permits the writing down of subordinated debt or other liabilities, to which mandatory reduction under the bridge bank or private sector purchaser tools does not apply. There may be circumstances in which it is appropriate to write down the subordinated debt or other liabilities of a small bank. The intention is therefore for the bail-in tool to be available alongside use of the new mechanism.
In such circumstances, this amendment would preclude the Bank of England, when calculating the shortfall amount, from being able to take into account any funds that were available from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme under the new mechanism. As a consequence, when determining how much of the firm’s subordinated debt and other liabilities should be bailed in, the Bank of England would be obliged not to factor in those external funds and would have to write down more of the firm’s resources than it needed to. In certain circumstances this would be undesirable and could undermine the wider goals of a resolution process. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, suggested worked examples. We will of course take that idea away for further consideration ahead of Report.
I hope that these explanations have been helpful and that I have provided some reassurance on these points. I will of course write where I have indicated that I will do so. In the circumstances, I hope that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, before the noble Baroness decides what to do with her lead amendment, I will raise two points. The first is that the noble Lord referred fairly briefly to the code of practice. Could he explain, first, how he sees the code of practice being used for the issues that we have identified in this group of amendments? Secondly, will he update the Committee on when we expect to see a revision to the code of practice? At Second Reading, my noble friend Lady Penn asked whether she could have sight of the draft updates. The noble Lord responded very positively to that, but clearly no draft updates have yet appeared. My additional question is: are we likely to get those draft updates? Clearly they have not arrived before Committee; will we get them ahead of Report? Seeing codes of practice, or updates of codes of practice, helps us to understand exactly what the Government are doing.
The second point I wish to address is a mechanical one. The noble Lord has already said he will write on a number of things; I expect he will say that quite a lot as we go through Committee. It would be very helpful if those letters were copied to all the Members who are taking part in Committee, or that the mechanism of “will write” letters on the publications page of the Parliament website is used promptly so that all noble Lords who have an interest in the areas get an opportunity to see the correspondence.
Lord Livermore (Lab)
On the noble Baroness’s first point, we are committed to updating the code of conduct, to doing so swiftly and to consulting with industry thoroughly on it. I cannot give her a timescale today. On the commitment to write letters, of course I will make sure those letters are copied to all noble Lords.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
I thank everybody who has spoken in this debate. Not surprisingly, we have had quite a lot of good points. I am still not reassured that the Bill’s scope is right. I understand entirely wanting to give the Bank of England flexibility. Ultimately, it is in the best place to judge what is the best thing to do, taking into account public interest, not setting off a systemic failure and all those kinds of things. At the same time, I have this instinctive dislike of something that enables the Bank to do something that I think it definitely should not be allowed to do, which I have said is in paragraph 26 of the Explanatory Notes. I will not repeat it.
I noticed, as the Minister spoke, that he very carefully said “primarily small banks” the whole time. There is this issue of “primarily” and where it stops. There could be other ways to include up to medium-sized banks. The code of practice could be one way of doing it, or a strategy, as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, had as part of one of his amendments. I do not think it can be passed in this case which, as was said by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, could start a whole systemic issue. It is really built for the idiosyncratic case, or maybe for a couple of small banks, but that is it. It is basically about saving the uninsured depositors and people like that, in the public interest, rather than, as unfortunately it says, saving the shareholders and creditors. We have to look carefully at which creditors and at the definitions. I would like to see that laid out, because my reading is that, when we looked at the sections I quoted that date back to the BRRD, we looked at the bail-in things that happen in big banks, not at the other liabilities generally held by small banks. I might have got that wrong, but I would really like to see this properly laid out.
So I still have some issues. There needs to be something in the Bill that takes account of the concerns raised, however that is done. I can be flexible about it, but I think that my Amendment 23, when we get to it, would be one way to do it.
I am afraid that I will withdraw my amendment at this stage, but I expect to return afresh on Report. We have all been hampered by the fact that this has been a first-up Bill after vacations—and this will happen again on Report, when we will have been back for only one week. That makes it very difficult to have communications and meetings with the Minister.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Haskel) (Lab)
My Lords, I have to inform the Committee that the annunciator will not be repaired until this evening. Apparently, there is a fault with a cable and the carpet has to be taken up to get to it. We will have to manage without the annunciator this afternoon.
Amendment 2
Baroness Noakes
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment probes the nature of “other expenses” and the persons other than the Bank which could incur expenses.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 2 is a probing amendment. It would delete new Section 214E(2)(b) of FSMA. Under new subsection (2), a “recapitalisation payment” includes the cost of recapitalisation; that is at new paragraph (a). There is clearly no issue there because that is what the Bill is about. However, new paragraph (b) would allow the Bank to include
“any other expenses that the Bank or another person has incurred or might incur in connection with the recapitalisation of the institution or the exercise of the stabilisation power”.
This raises a number of questions.
First, who are these other persons who can incur expenditure in connection with the recapitalisation? The Government’s consultation referred to the Treasury, the Bank of England and a bridge bank. If that is the case, it seems that the paragraph ought to be confined to those persons, as I could not think of any other person who could make a case for receiving money under the auspices of the recapitalisation payments power.
Secondly, why is there not more precision about exactly which costs could be covered? Again, the response to the Treasury’s consultation gives the sorts of expenses that could be covered—legal fees, consultancy fees and the like—but is virtually silent on what should not be covered. The only example cited for what is not covered is the cost of preparing in parallel for an insolvency process, but that leaves a huge swathe of costs that could well be brought within the ambit of the recapitalisation payments. As drafted, it could certainly include many expenses that no one could reasonably label as being related to recapitalisation.
The Minister will be aware that UK Finance has expressed very real concerns that the banking sector will be left exposed to litigation or regulatory costs that emerge once a failed bank is in a bridge bank. In a bank insolvency procedure, such litigation or regulatory action would lead nowhere, as there would almost certainly not be any spare funds to cover any costs arising in that way. However, once the possibility of financing via the recapitalisation power arises, a new deep pocket appears, which could act as a magnet for litigation. Does this legislation mean that the banking sector is writing a blank cheque for whatever litigation emerges and which the Bank then chooses to engage in? Can there be any constraints on the Bank’s decision to fight or concede litigation? What are the incentives for the Bank to seek the optimal outcome, which may or may not be to concede a case in litigation? How is the banking sector to be protected in these circumstances?
Costs arising from regulatory action is even trickier. Let us assume that, following a small bank failure, the FCA decides to take regulatory action in relation to non-compliance with the consumer duty prior to the failure. As anybody who has been involved in one of the regulatory actions taken by the FCA, or indeed the PRA, will know, these are long, drawn-out and very expensive processes. Who should decide whether to fight regulatory action or concede and pay fines or redress? These could end up being funded by the recapitalisation payments. If the PRA were involved in regulatory action, rather than the FCA, how can the conflict of interest within the Bank be dealt with so that the costs falling on the banking sector are seen to be fair?
Lastly, new paragraph (b) allows the Bank to include costs that “might” be incurred. I completely understand why, when the recapitalisation calculations are made at the outset, that will involve an element of forecasting, because the formulation is not confined to, say, costs that are reasonably expected to be incurred. Instead, the Bank is allowed to include any costs that “might” be incurred, however improbable that might be. An overly conversative approach to working out what costs might be incurred will result in the banking sector bearing too much cost up front. It is not good enough to just say that, if there is a surplus left at the end of the day, it will be returned via the FSCS.
To sum up, the formulation in new subsection (2)(b) is simply too wide. As I said at the outset, this is a probing amendment and I shall listen carefully to what the Minister says, but my instinct is that new subsection (2) needs some guard-rails drafted into it. I beg to move.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
I only need to say briefly that I am in agreement with the noble Baroness. This is drafted too widely. Part of me thinks that some of this should be covered by the ordinary banking levy, and that the PRA and the Bank of England have to manage their budget, as anybody else would have to, in expectation of sometimes having adverse effects, rather than there being some bottomless pit, or pool, of money into which they always have access. The truth of the matter might need to be somewhere half way in between, but it is too open at the moment.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
My Lords, I briefly add my support to what the noble Baronesses have said. This is drafted extraordinarily widely. The words
“another person has incurred or might incur in connection with the recapitalisation”
could theoretically include the legal costs of the shareholders of the bank that is going bust, for example. We have to find some way of reducing that scope. I had attempted to deal with this in Amendment 12 on reporting, but having heard what the noble Baroness said I do not think that does it. We need to find some way of narrowing it.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)
I am grateful to my noble friend for tabling this amendment and I added my name to it. I am also grateful for the comments made by my noble friend Lord Moylan. He is not in his place but he raised this issue during Second Reading and set people thinking about it.
I do not have a huge amount to add. I agree with the comments made by my noble friend Lady Noakes, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, but I would also say that this will have to be a double-edged attack. Not only must we potentially do something on this but the reporting of it will have to be clear and go into great detail.
When it comes to expenses, all noble Lords will be aware that the costs of financial lawyers and other professional financial advisers are not de minimis. The total cost of expenses may well exceed the cost of the recapitalisation of the bank, so it is important that we ensure that there are some guard-rails around this, recognising as ever that these costs will end up falling not on the banks but on the people who bank with the banks.
Does the Minister have any view as to roughly how large an expense bill might be? I do not even want to guess, because I hope that he will be able to give me some idea of what we are looking at.
The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, mentioned the expenses incurred by another person. I think that all noble Lords who have spoken so far agree that that is extraordinarily broad, and we will need to consider what we might do about that. Potentially, one could put something in the code of practice but, again, is that sufficient? We might also protect ourselves by requiring Treasury consent—who knows? Again, we might want to think about that. Going back to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, it is tempting to think about these things as a single event, and we might be talking about £10 million-worth of expenses, but if a whole bunch of such events happened at the same time, we could very soon be talking about real money. We need to get to the bottom of this. I look forward to the comments from the Minister.
Lord Livermore (Lab)
My Lords, in response to the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, I hope to explain and provide some clarification around the expenses within scope of the mechanism under the Bill, as well as clarify the Government’s rationale for our approach.
The key purpose of the Bill is to ensure that there is a source of funding for recapitalisation of a bank in resolution, where that bank does not hold the necessary resources to allow it to be bailed in. In addition to the core expense of the recapitalisation payment, other expenses are likely to be incurred. There are two in particular.
First, there are likely to be a number of ongoing expenses incurred by the Bank of England, or by a Bank of England-owned holding company or operating company, when running a bridge bank, beyond those concerned with simply injecting new capital into the failed firm. This could, for example, include additional staffing costs and advisory fees incurred by the Bank of England to support its ability to operate a commercial bank.
Secondly, there will likely be a set of ancillary expenses incurred by both the Bank and the Treasury in undertaking a resolution of this type. As set out in the Government’s consultation response, this could include, for example, the costs of receiving professional advice, such as on legal or accountancy matters. It may also include the costs of appointing an independent valuer, as required under the Banking Act. As such, the persons other than the Bank of England referred to in the legislation whose expenses could be met using the new mechanism are expected to be the Treasury and any other Bank of England-owned legal entities that are not the Bank of England itself. The noble Baroness asked why the full set of costs are not specified. It is important that the Bill is not overly prescriptive, allowing the Bank to respond flexibly when costs arise.
The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, also raised concerns about the treatment of litigation costs. As the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, noted, this arose at Second Reading as well. Depending on the circumstances, these again may be covered by the relevant part of Clause 1 addressed by this amendment—for instance, where the Bank of England is subject to litigation concerning the resolution and recapitalisation process. Given the fast-moving and unpredictable nature of bank failures, the Government believe that it is prudent to ensure that there is broad provision to cover these potential additional expenses incurred by both the Bank of England and other persons such as the Treasury. Ultimately, the alternative is that the cost of such expenses may need to be met by the taxpayer.
I wish to reassure noble Lords that in determining whether to include certain ancillary expenses in its request for funding to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, the Bank of England is subject to the usual obligations under public law to act in a way that is reasonable and it will need to factor this into any assessment of what is in the public interest. In addition, the legislation does not allow the Bank of England or any other person to claim expenses that arise exclusively for preparing for bank insolvency.
I hope this provides the noble Baroness with a helpful explanation of the Government’s approach, and I respectfully ask her to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, first, many thanks go to the noble Lords who supported my amendment. I thank the Minister for his response but, with the greatest respect, he did not go much beyond what is in the Treasury’s response to the consultation document. He reiterated that the Bank and the Treasury, or the Bank and its entities, are likely to be the ones that have their costs covered. I have no real problem with that—put it in the Bill.
Similarly, the Minister talked about the Bank needing to be reasonable but I am not sure that being reasonable about the kinds of expenses that could occur via litigation is going to satisfy the banking sector, which fears that judgments working significantly to its disadvantage are going to be made and that it will have no way of influencing those decisions. There is not even the kind of protection that you get in insolvency, where you get, for example, creditors’ committees that act as a constraint on what liquidators can do. So I do not think that the Minister has really given a proper response on how the sector, which is going to pick up the tab—ultimately borne, as my noble friend Lady Vere pointed out, by the customers of banks—can be satisfied about the judgments made about the huge range of costs that could emerge during the course of handling a failed bank using the recapitalisation power; and how those costs can be seen to be properly incurred and not acting against the interests of the banks.
The Minister also did not engage with the issue of whether, in estimating future costs, you should constrain the costs to those that are reasonably foreseen, which is a natural formulation in legislation. Frankly, “any costs that might be incurred” is too big a definition to be used reasonably. I think that that formulation needs to be used again.
I will read carefully what the Minister has said in Hansard but my instinct is that he has not added to anything that is already in existence via the Treasury’s response to the consultation. I suspect that we will want to return to this on Report but obviously, for now, I beg leave to withdraw.
Baroness Noakes
“(2A) The Bank may not exercise the power in subsection (1) more than once in respect of the same financial institution without the consent of the Treasury.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Bank to obtain Treasury consent before it can require the FSCS to make a second (or subsequent) recapitalisation payment in respect of an individual bank.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, it is me again, I am afraid. That is the trouble with getting enthusiastic about amendments during recess—you pay for it when you get back.
Amendment 3 is a probing amendment to find out the Government’s approach to using the recapitalisation power on more than one occasion. The amendment uses the technique of requiring the Treasury’s consent to the use of the recapitalisation power more than once in respect of the same financial institutions. My purpose in this amendment is not to debate the formal involvement of the Treasury, as I will return to that broader topic in a later group. I am using the amendment as a technique to find out whether there are any constraints at all on the use of the recapitalisation power on multiple occasions.
When the Bank of England decides to use the recapitalisation power, it works out what sum of money it needs to put the bank in a position where it can be sold on. We discussed in our debate on the previous amendment the kinds of expense that can count as recapitalisation costs for the purposes of the power. My own view is that the Bank must try at the outset to reach as clear a view as possible on the amount of the whole that the recapitalisation payment is designed to fill because, if the Bank does not do that properly at the outset—making a good, honest assessment of what the total cost will be—it cannot reach a realistic judgment about whether to proceed with a bridge bank or to initiate an insolvency process.
So I find it disturbing that the drafting of new Section 214E seems to allow the Bank to double-dip into the FSCS without any other process or consideration. If the Bank runs out of recapitalisation cover, it probably means that it did its sums wrong in the first place or that additional facts have emerged, increasing the costs in ways that were not anticipated at the outset. In either event, that can call into question whether the initial decision to use the bridge bank instead of the bank insolvency procedure was the correct one. It may also raise the question of whether the bridge bank strategy should be continued or replaced with the bank insolvency procedure.
It also brings into question the nature of the additional hole in the finances of the failed bank, which is covered in part in the previous amendment. It may not be clear that the incentives are in the right place for the correct judgments to be made about whether any additional costs arising from regulatory action or litigation should be accepted or challenged. If the costs are down to PRA action, there are clear conflicts of interest involved.
I completely understand the need for flexibility in legislation. I hope that the Minister will also appreciate that the open-ended nature of the Bank’s powers in the use of the recapitalisation payment technique carries particular problems when a second or subsequent attempt is made to obtain a recapitalisation payment. I hope that the Minister can explain how the Government see this power being used, if it is to be used more than once, and whether—including to what extent—there are mechanisms in place to ensure that the way in which the Bank uses that power is fair to the banking sector.
The Bill makes the banking sector pick up the costs. The sector itself will probably have had no involvement whatever in the failure of a bank yet it has to pick up the tab, ultimately borne by its own customers; that is whenever the Bank decides to use the recapitalisation powers. So it is only fair and reasonable that there should be some checks and balances in return. I hope the Minister can reassure the Committee that there are checks and balances and that, when the Bank uses the power in what has to be quite an unusual situation—for example, it has got the sums wrong or something else has caused a requirement for more to be put in—it raises the need for additional safeguards in order to satisfy the banking sector that the costs that will be loaded on to it are reasonable.
I beg to move.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
My Lords, I rise again briefly. The noble Baroness has made some really important points. Once again, I have attempted to deal with this as a reporting question in Amendment 12, which states that a report would be required each time a recapitalisation payment was made; that should stand anyway.
This can become quite significant if, for example, there is a situation where the Bank of England expects to be able to sell a bank immediately but that falls over and then goes into a bridge bank for two years—or, indeed, more—and picks up all those costs along the way. One can see a situation where you could have, for example, an annual payment covering the costs of the bank until the Bank eventually decides to put it into insolvency. The critical factor must be that, any time a recapitalisation payment is being considered, whether it is the first one or a subsequent one, the insolvency route is reconsidered at each point and this does not become an open-ended default drag on costs—but the reporting point, which we will come on to later, stands as well.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, made a good point. I agree entirely with what the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, said.
I raised double-dipping at Second Reading and got the answer, “Well, yes, you could double-dip”. Of course, if you go from thinking that you are going to do the bridge bank or whatever to having to move into insolvency, there will be another dip if there are deposits to cover; I have a later amendment on that but it is all part of the same conversation. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, knows a lot more about this than I do because he is an accountant, but things always get worse than you expect. How is the Bank going to deal with that? Initially, it is probably going to have to ask for more than it thinks it could possibly ever need.
Some kind of structure around this, with points at which it is revisited and good reporting, appears to be the only solution. I initially thought, “Yes, maybe HMT intervention is the solution”, but I take the point that the Minister made earlier on about HMT intervention and independence. The fact is that, really, they are all in it as a club taking the decisions together already, so I am not sure that that would necessarily be the decisive factor one would want. It is about what the procedures are; the way things are being done and being understood; and how the reviews and reporting happen so that, when the worst happens and another dip comes along, one is not totally taken by surprise.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)
I rise only to celebrate the fact that my noble friend Lady Noakes had so much time during recess in which to draft all these marvellous amendments because they certainly get the little grey cells going. I appreciate her eloquent explanation of her amendment and the very practical example of what could happen that was provided by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. This goes back to a topic that was raised earlier about there being a certain feeling of a blank cheque in terms of certain elements of the scheme and wanting to ensure that there are appropriate guard-rails.
I will not go much further; I will come on to my observations about the sharing of powers and responsibilities between Ministers and regulators in due course. I look forward to hearing from the Minister.
Lord Livermore (Lab)
My Lords, I note that this amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, is one of several concerning whether Treasury consent is needed when the Bank of England is exercising its powers—in this case, when the mechanism is used more than once for a particular institution.
Addressing the specific case of the amendment, although I think we can agree that it would usually be desirable to have to use the mechanism only once in respect of a particular institution, this may not always be the case. As an example, if a failed bank is transferred to a bridge bank, there is a risk of further deterioration in its balance sheet over time. It is foreseeable that, if that were the case, the Bank of England may need to use the mechanism again in order to recapitalise the institution; this would allow the Bank of England to maintain confidence in the firm, promoting financial stability.
The Government believe that it is important for the Bank of England to have reasonable flexibility to do so, reflecting that the full implications of a bank failure are hard to anticipate in advance. In addition, if further approvals are required, this may undermine market confidence in the original resolution action given that such approvals cannot be presumed in advance.
However, I note a few important pieces of context to this broader position. First, as required by statute, the Treasury is always consulted as part of the Bank of England’s formal assessment of the resolution conditions assessment. In practice, there is also frequent and ongoing dialogue between the authorities. Therefore, the Government are confident that there are proper and robust channels by which it could raise concerns if it had any.
Secondly, given that the new mechanism is ultimately funded by industry, we would expect the Bank of England to consult the Prudential Regulation Authority on any additional request to use the new mechanism. This is important as the Prudential Regulation Authority determines what is considered affordable to be levied on the sector in any given year.
Finally, if additional use of the mechanism had implications for public funds, such as requiring use of the National Loans Fund, provision of this additional funding would be subject to Treasury consent. Overall, the Government believe that this strikes the right balance in preserving the Bank of England’s freedom of action while ensuring the appropriate level of Treasury input into decision-making.
I hope that this provides some comfort to the noble Baroness and respectfully ask that she withdraw her amendment.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
The one thing the Minister did not cover there was the question of whether, on a second or subsequent recapitalisation payment, the Bank would have to look again at whether the insolvency route is the one it should go down, rather than a secondary payment.
Lord Livermore (Lab)
It would always look at the situation at the time and make each individual decision on that basis.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
It would always do so or it would always have to do so?
Baroness Noakes (Con)
Okay. We understand that the Bank has to make these decisions. The issue is what there is to provide a check or balance on the Bank. That has not been addressed by the Minister.
I thank noble Lords who supported this amendment. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, that there has to be something that allows a proper judgment to be made if there is a second go. It is also important to consider at each stage whether the bank insolvency procedure should be the right route. It is not clear that that is written into the legislation. It appears not to be very transparent after the initial use of the powers. I think the Bank is required to consult the Treasury on the initial use of the powers, but it is not required to consult the Treasury on any subsequent use of the stabilisation powers or of the bank recapitalisation power itself. I think the Minister referred to the fact that there was a lot of contact between officials. I know that, but the issue is what is formally required.
The Minister’s response in respect of guarding the finances of the industry seemed to be that the PRA has to be consulted, but the PRA is not overinterested in the finances of individual institutions. Indeed, a big conflict of interest exists between the Bank of England and its component part of the PRA. The governor chairs both the Bank of England and the PRA and the deputy governor sits on the Court of the Bank of England. This is all very intertwined, so consulting the PRA does not provide a mechanism that gives comfort to the banking industry that its interests are being dealt with. This is another bit of unfinished business.
I have one question for the Minister: is any of this territory, such as using the mechanism more than once, likely to be covered in the code of practice?
Lord Livermore (Lab)
We can certainly take that away and look into doing so.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
That means you were not thinking about it, but you might think about it, so I will leave that for the time being.
I remain uncomfortable at the scale of the powers that the Bank has without any real practical constraints on how they are used. Given that we are using the banking industry to avoid amounts falling on taxpayers, which is reasonable and accepted by the industry up to a point, I think we need to make sure that it is protected in that, and I cannot see where the protections are.
I need to think about this further. I will certainly read what the Minister has said, but I suspect we will return to this in some way when we get to Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Noakes
“(2A) The Bank may not exercise the power in subsection (1) in respect of a financial institution which meets the condition in subsection (2B) without the consent of the Treasury.(2B) The condition is that the financial institution is a subsidiary of a company based outside the United Kingdom.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Bank of England to obtain Treasury consent before it can require the FSCS to make a capitalisation payment in respect of a bank which is a subsidiary of an overseas body.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, this is another probing amendment. In this, I want to probe the circumstances in which the Treasury believes it would be appropriate for the UK banking industry to stump up for the recapitalisation of a foreign-owned bank. This amendment uses the technique of Treasury consent, as some of my other amendments do, but this is not what I am trying to talk about in this amendment. I am trying to probe the substance of using the recapitalisation power for the subsidiary of a foreign company.
Of course, I know that SVB UK was a foreign-owned bank and the simple answer to my question might be that this gives the Bank another way of avoiding what happened in that case: SVB was gifted to HSBC with the additional present of permanent exemptions from the ring-fencing regime. If we accept that we should avoid being held over a barrel by HSBC in future, this would be a good use of the power. So can the Minister say whether, if presented with the same facts as those relating to SVB UK, the Bank would have preferred to recapitalise SVB via a bridge bank and then sell it on a timescale consistent with achieving better value for money from the UK? The heavens are opening as we are discussing these important things.
More broadly, is it not the case that the Bank should satisfy itself that the foreign subsidiary banks are either adequately capitalised in their own right or parts of groups that are expected to be resolvable via bail-in-able capital, in line with international expectations? In general, the regulatory system for banks following a financial crash is designed to ensure that they hold capital or bail-in liabilities, which avoids the need for extraordinary support. When a UK bank subsidiary of a foreign company fails and requires money to keep it going, there has been at least a prima facie case that there has been some element of regulatory failure, either in the UK or elsewhere. There should not be an expectation that the failure of a foreign bank would impose costs on the UK banking sector—nor, indeed, the UK taxpayer, if that is the alternative.
It would be helpful if the Minister could explain in what circumstances the Government would consider it appropriate for the Bank to use the recapitalisation power in relation to foreign-owned banks and, perhaps more importantly, when the Government would not consider it appropriate to use the power. Can he also say whether any of this is likely to be covered in the code of practice? I beg to move.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
My Lords, this weather sounds like the reason I ended up tabling a load of amendments in south-west Scotland: I had nothing better to do for a few days.
Again, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, raises a really important point. I have tried to attack it in a different way in Amendment 16, where I look at the recovery of money from shareholders. I will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say. I had in mind the sort of scenario where a foreign company sets up a bank in the UK, it does not go very well and it decides just to walk away from it, having perhaps removed all the assets in the meantime. Clearly, it does not seem fair that the costs of sorting that out should fall on the industry or, indeed, the British taxpayer. It would be really interesting to understand how we can ensure that foreign shareholders behave properly and how, when it does go wrong, we can recoup the money from them.
Lord Eatwell (Lab)
My Lords, I am somewhat puzzled by the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, in this case. Surely, under the Basel accord, the UK regulator is responsible for the regulation of a subsidiary that is legally established in the UK. If “subsidiary” were changed to “branch”, the foreign regulator would indeed be responsible for regulation in that case. It seems to me that this particular amendment would violate the Basel accord to which His Majesty’s Government are committed.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
I will just comment that we have seen capital being sucked out of subsidiaries and taken back to the States and have been left with the collapse here. Basel accord or not, there ought to be some kind of mechanism of group support. I wonder whether there has been any international progress on that. What other mechanisms could be used to ensure that those kinds of things do not happen? Ultimately, it is going to be quite difficult to do this unless you somehow put on some extra capital requirements–and then you then start to get into all kinds of international difficulty. Perhaps the Minister could say something about what levers, if any, are available.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)
I rise briefly to build on the comments made by previous speakers. This is an important issue. Again, it is worth recalling that this will not just be the recapitalisation funding; there might also be associated expenses. I note the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, about the Basel accord and it being a subsidiary et cetera, but it strikes me that this is of a different level of political salience than a purely domestic collapse might be, where one has established structures. It could get incredibly uncomfortable for the Government if we do not have a better and fuller understanding of what safeguards exist already to make sure that banks are appropriately capitalised by their parents abroad and of how we avoid the perception of the Bank of England acting in interests which are not necessarily aligned with those of Daily Mail readers—let us put it that way. It is not that they have to align with Daily Mail readers, but one might imagine that this could be very problematic.
I would like some reassurance about what we would do if it were to be a significant amount rather than the very small amount for Silicon Valley Bank and how we would seek to address the concerns that would inevitably arise from the general public.
Lord Livermore (Lab)
My Lords, in response to the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, I hope I can provide some clarification on how the resolution regime operates currently with respect to subsidiaries of international banks, and therefore how the Government have approached the design of the new mechanism with respect to those banks.
One of the strengths of the UK’s banking sector is that a number of international banks seek to operate within the UK, including by setting up subsidiaries. These are often providers of critical banking services, such as current accounts, business accounts and sources of working capital to businesses. It is therefore important that a robust system of regulation is in place to ensure that such subsidiaries can operate safely within the UK. This includes ensuring that in the event of their failure they can be managed in an orderly way. The resolution regime does not currently make a distinction between domestic UK banks and subsidiaries of international banks in terms of which authority is responsible for taking resolution action in the UK. In all cases, this responsibility falls to the Bank of England, except where there are implications for public funds. The Government continue to believe this is appropriate.
While the failure of banks is rare, the most recent example, and the genesis of this Bill, was Silicon Valley Bank UK, itself a subsidiary of an international bank. The Government consider that there were two key lessons from that event. First, it is critical that the Bank of England has the flexibility to move decisively during a crisis. Secondly, it is important to introduce the new mechanism delivered by the Bill in those cases where there is not a willing buyer. The Government do not therefore believe that there is a strong justification for treating subsidiaries differently from domestic UK banks and requiring a further set of approvals. To do so would create additional obstacles to efficient resolution decisions, which recent experience suggests can be necessary.
The noble Baroness asked whether the Bank would have used the mechanism on SVB. I cannot comment on an individual case or decision that it may have taken, but the case showed the usefulness of the option of having a mechanism provided to the Bank.
The noble Baroness also asked whether this issue will be covered in the code. The code updates will cover a broad range of issues following the Bill’s passage. We will progress and publish that code swiftly.
The noble Baroness further asked whether a parent company should be able to support the failure of a subsidiary. While the parent company may be able to recapitalise its subsidiary outside of resolution, there may be circumstances where that is not possible, as was the case with SVB UK. It is important that the Bank of England has the necessary tools to deal with a failing firm regardless of its home jurisdiction. In practice, the mechanism uses the Bank of England’s transfer and writedown powers, so the parent company would suffer losses on its investment in a subsidiary.
I therefore respectfully ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
I thank noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. I found what the Minister said very helpful. What the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, said, was also helpful, although I had understood that, where there are large groups, the group parent will be responsible for ensuring the capitalisation of the subsidiaries, in particular by holding MREL at the top level, but I may need to check my facts on that. I thought colleges of regulators would be working among themselves towards the health of the group overall, so I did not I think it was entirely located in the UK, but I will check that out.
What the Minister said is very helpful and I will reflect carefully on it. If the case is that there is no difference between a UK-owned and a foreign-owned bank, no issue arises. But if there are any differences in the way that a foreign-owned bank is treated in the UK, then that would be a case. I will go away and think about that further and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Noakes
“(2A) The Bank may not exercise the power in subsection (1) without the consent of the Treasury.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Bank of England to obtain Treasury consent before it can require the FSCS to make a capitalisation payment.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
I rise to move Amendment 6. Noble Lords will be pleased to know that I get a bit of a break after this one.
This amendment would require the Bank of England to obtain Treasury consent before it uses the recapitalisation power. When I introduced my last two amendments, which contained a requirement for Treasury consent, I explained that they were a device to probe issues about the use of the recapitalisation payment power. In this amendment, my use of Treasury consent is not a probing device and I am focusing on the role of the Treasury in the broader context of accountability.
The Minister is a newcomer as far as the passage of financial services legislation in your Lordships’ House is concerned; some of us are older hands at it. When the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 went through this House, accountability was one of the key themes which was debated on and off throughout its passage. This amendment and a later amendment return to that theme of accountability.
The Bank of England has been given huge powers by successive Governments, which we debated at length in passing the 2023 Act, but, like many other bodies which have accumulated in the public sector, it has relatively weak accountability. The governor may need to turn up to the Treasury Select Committee for an uncomfortable couple of hours from time to time, but that is just about it. One great outcome from the 2023 Act has been the creation of the Financial Services Regulation Committee in your Lordships’ House, which is chaired by my noble friend Lord Forsyth of Drumlean and on which several noble Lords on this Committee sit. I hope that our new committee will add significantly to parliamentary scrutiny of financial services quangos, but neither House of Parliament has any real powers in relation to these public sector bodies that have been given very significant powers.
This problem is not confined to the Bank of England or to financial services. The Industry and Regulators Committee of your Lordships’ House produced a report earlier this year, Who Watches the Watchdogs?, which will be debated in this House next week. One of its findings was that regulators, as a particular kind of public sector body
“exercise substantial powers on behalf of Parliament and the public, but are not subject to the same forms of accountability as ministers; to quote one witness, ‘the people can replace their elected representatives, but they can’t vote out bad regulators’”.
That applies, mutatis mutandis, to many other forms of public sector body.
The report noted that there was a
“widespread perception … that regulators’ accountability to Parliament is insufficient”.
It went on to recommend that there should be a new independent statutory body to support Parliament in holding regulators to account. All of this will sound familiar to those of us who took part in debates on the 2023 financial services Bill, because my noble friend Lord Bridges of Headley tabled amendments trying to set up something similar for the main public sector bodies in financial services—the PRA, the Bank of England, the FCA and so on. I hardly ever support setting up new public sector bodies, so I did not support my noble friend last year, and I would not support the Industry and Regulators Committee’s recommendation either. It does not form an approach that I think is the right one, but I wholeheartedly agree with the analysis that accountability is a real issue for these public sector bodies.
By enjoining the Treasury in any decisions as to the use of the recapitalisation power, Parliament gains the additional ability to question Treasury Ministers about the use of the power and the circumstances that surround the use of it. At the moment, it is easy for the Treasury Minister to say, “Nothing to do with me; it’s all down to that lot up in Threadneedle Street”. We have had many frustrating exchanges with Treasury Ministers along these lines, including when SVB UK was given away to HSBC. Treasury consent would be an important enhancement of the process of parliamentary accountability.
As I said in the earlier group, I do not believe that getting Treasury consent is necessarily an onerous part of the process, but it would be a small price to pay for an increase in accountability, so I regard this as a modest addition to the framework created by the Bill. Obviously, I have drafted this in connection with a specific power in the Bill, but it is a principle which could be applied to many uses of significant powers by the Bank of England, the PRA and the FCA.
The use of the power by the Bank of England could be entirely straightforward, in which case it is unlikely to engage the interest of Parliament, but there are likely to be some cases where the use of the power is controversial or where there are questions to be asked about whether bank failure is associated with some form of regulatory failure. Parliament should be very much engaged in cases of this nature, and my amendment would provide the platform for such engagement.
I know that the Minister will be briefed by his officials to resist this amendment, and I am sure that it suits the Treasury to be able to operate behind the scenes with the Bank of England but in a largely deniable way. I appeal to the Minister’s instincts, which I am sure are sound, about the need for effective parliamentary accountability. I beg to move.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)
My Lords, I am incredibly grateful for all the amendments from my noble friend Lady Noakes, but particularly this one. It gives the Committee the opportunity to consider the overarching balance of power and I think it is right that we start to do so—or continue to do so, as my noble friend pointed out.
I am the poacher turned gamekeeper. I am no longer a Treasury Minister. I have just spent many glorious months at the Treasury and prior to that I spent eight years as a Minister in government. I was in the Department for Transport for a long time and a Lords Whip, which many noble Lords will know puts one in touch with all sorts of government departments and various people giving you briefings and all sorts of things. One learns quite a lot about things and it is all very interesting. I am grateful for the opportunity to touch on the bigger picture, which my noble friend has allowed us to do.
The scrutiny and accountability of regulators is somewhat lacking. It was possibly the biggest surprise that I had as a Minister over the years. Having said that, each regulator is very different, and I have worked with a wide variety of them. Each wears the independence cloak in a different manner: some regulators, despite claiming independence, will actually work very closely with and listen to the Minister; other regulators, when I tried to ask them a question, literally slammed the door. It is really not on. Something needs to change.
It is entirely natural that operational decisions, based on a set of detailed regulations, should sit with regulators. Of course they should; that is unarguable. Ministers do not really have the time or the knowledge. They could do it, because they could have the knowledge as Ministers can be briefed, but they would not have the time to do it and it would gum up the system. That is fine. However, the balance between who takes the operational decisions and the broader operations of regulators is somewhat awry, in my view.
We have handed over a large amount of policy-development, policy-making, regulation-drafting, code of practice-drafting and consultation-issuing activities to regulators, over which Ministers have no insight. I know that officials from the Treasury will recall some issues that happened under the last Government fairly recently, when one of the regulators just took off on a path. I asked, “Why are you going down that path? That’s not a path you should be on. Come back”. They replied, “But we’re independent”.
How are we going to fix this? I have a niggling feeling that the Bill continues a trend to which I see no end. Fairly broad-brush powers are being given to a regulator or regulators that are then subject to interpretation and implementation. Often that interpretation and implementation cause the problems. There is mission creep. The regulators add another team of officials; the Minister never sees these officials and does not know what they do. They interpret the policy slightly differently, because they were not involved in its original development and so on. All this happens with little or no oversight.
I used to sit on the other side and would happily stand up to say—my goodness—the best thing that a Minister can say: “I’m sorry; I cannot comment on that. Regulators are independent”. It is really easy. The second thing I would say, if that did not wash, is that, “Ministers are accountable to Select Committees in Parliament”. Are they really? No, they are not really. I have appeared before Select Committees and it can be a bit uncomfortable for a while. They might ask you a couple of difficult questions, but it is not going to cause you to lose more than a couple of nights’ sleep.
Quite often, by the time you get to a Select Committee appearance by AN Other head of a regulator, it is too little, too late. The policies have already been devised, developed and put in place. The damage has already been done.
Furthermore, there seems to be no mechanism by which recommendations from these accountability sessions in Parliament are mandated for action by the relevant regulator. Many regulators can be told or asked by the Select Committee, “Please can you do X, Y and Z”, but they can basically take no insight from that at all.
I feel this quite personally, having recently lived through it, because throughout my time as a Minister I had the fear that if things go horribly wrong—sadly, sometimes they do—it is not the regulator that feels the heat. It is the Minister. One cannot go to the media and say, “The regulator is independent. I had nothing to do with it”. That does not wash with the public. Now that we have broken the connection between Ministers and regulators, we are in a very difficult situation. The Minister has no power—and that is why the fear exists—to make sure that things cannot go horribly wrong, even if they spot things that need to be improved.
This is but one amendment in a whole series. Yes, it was a useful device for getting amendments down for other elements for debate, but this is serious. My noble friend Lady Noakes is trying to take back control from the regulators and rebalance the system to enable Ministers to input at an appropriate point. She has a point.
Lord Livermore (Lab)
My Lords, I note that a number of other amendments have touched on the topic of Treasury consent before the Bank of England exercises its powers. I hope to fully address the Government’s position on that matter now.
I start by addressing the amendment laid by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes; I will touch briefly on some points that I have made previously. The Government believe that the existing division of responsibility between the relevant authorities in resolution works well. It is important to maintain the position that the Bank of England can take decisions on the appropriate resolution action independently, guided by the objectives given to it by Parliament under the Banking Act and in line with relevant international standards.
There would be two key risks if that system were to change. First, it would confuse the lines of accountability for resolution decision-making, in effect making the Treasury the de facto resolution authority in the case of certain banks that may be subject to the new mechanism. This would undermine the Bank’s role as the resolution authority and may be seen as out of step with the intent of the relevant international standards. Secondly, a resolution is more likely to succeed when it is conducted by a single decision-maker backed by the right resources and expertise. The Bank of England is ultimately best placed to make those judgments and, therefore, to ensure that there is market confidence in resolution action.
However, there are safeguards to ensure that the Treasury can engage with the Bank of England’s decision over resolution matters, including any use of the new mechanism. As I have noted before, the Bank of England must consult the Treasury during any resolution action as part of its assessment of the resolution conditions, which are required by statute. This is an important legal requirement and ensures that the Treasury is meaningfully engaged in the Bank of England’s decision-making process. The Treasury and the Bank also maintain a productive ongoing dialogue.
Finally, the Treasury retains absolute approval in any resolution with implications for public funds, ensuring that the interests of taxpayers are appropriately reflected in resolution decisions and the Chancellor’s ultimate accountability for public funds to Parliament. The Government view this as an appropriate and proportionate framework in the context of the new mechanism.
The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, asked about the Bank’s accountability to Parliament. I note that the Bank must inform the Treasury and share copies of legal instruments when taking resolution action. The Treasury must lay those in Parliament. The Bank must also report to the Treasury on the use of those powers; in some cases, the report must also be laid in Parliament.
I turn to the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Vere—I note what we might describe as a slight change of heart from her position in government over the past 14 years. Her amendment would require the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to seek the approval of the Treasury in circumstances where it has to levy in subsequent financial years after the mechanism under the Bill has been used. I should clarify that, in principle, the mechanism provided by the Bill could be used to manage multiple firm failures at once; of course, the Bank of England would carefully consider the implications of doing this when assessing the resolution conditions, having regard to the special resolution objectives.
Moreover, any levies would be subject to the affordability cap set by the Prudential Regulation Authority, based on how much the sector can be safely levied in a given year; currently, that is £1.5 billion. In the event that multiple failures resulted in a recapitalisation requirement under that cap, the expectation is for the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to be able to levy safely for the funds within 12 months. It would not do that only if the Prudential Regulation Authority considered that it would carry issues of affordability, in which case the levies could be spread over a longer timeframe. In the event that the amount exceeded the £1.5 billion cap, the Government would expect the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to levy over multiple years, ensuring that it remains affordable for the sector.
It is important also to note that, in these circumstances, the Financial Services Compensation Scheme would be able to turn to the Treasury and request a loan under the National Loans Fund. The levies charged over multiple years would then be used to repay such a loan. Of course, borrowing from the National Loans Fund remains at the sole discretion of the Treasury.
I hope that I have been able to provide noble Lords with some reassurance on these points, and that the noble Baroness is able to withdraw her amendment as a result.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
I did not speak earlier because all the points I wanted to make were picked up, but there are two things on which I wish to comment. We have a change now in that, before, the Treasury would be more involved when the matter involved use of public funds; now, that has been transferred to the industry, so the Treasury is less involved and perhaps less concerned. Yet the Treasury remains the only possible constraint around and is far from perfect.
For the PRA and the FCA, there are plenty of powers to instigate reviews by government. The big mistake, apart from us not having proper oversight of regulators in general—there are various mistakes—is that those reviews have not been used a lot more often. They should be done almost on a rolling regular basis, not just when there has been a big disaster.
The other thing we have done differently is that we have made the central bank the resolution authority. Therefore, you cannot hold the central bank to account, because of its independence, in the same way that you could if you had constructed an independent resolution authority. That is, as you might suppose, the subject of a big debate that went on in Europe when I was ECON chair. There is an independent resolution authority there; it is not the central bank. That was one of the big considerations, because you cannot really hold a central bank to account. Ultimately, the sort of change that is envisaged in this Bill may move us further towards considering whether we need to do that.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part. The predictions made by my noble friend Lady Vere on the content of the noble Lord’s response were pretty accurate in places. The noble Lord has not really engaged with the weak accountability that exists. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, is absolutely right about the use of the Bank of England as the resolution authority and giving it all those powers with almost no constraints whatever, other than consultation. Whoever chose to do that back in 2009—whichever Government were in power then—did not set up the right accountability environment for the use of those powers to exist. Once you put something inside the Bank of England, it is very difficult to engage in those issues, because it guards its independence on practically everything.
This is one of the big issues that will need to be addressed at some stage. There may not have been an instance yet that has caused people generally to realise how dangerous it is to have large, unaccountable bodies in the public sector with huge powers but relatively weak accountability. That is because we are still muddling through, and it is frustrating to some people who are dealing with these regulators, including Ministers, that they cannot fully engage. We have not had one of those big instances where everybody says that we have the wrong model. In a sense, I know that my pleas for a greater level of accountability to be included in statute are not really being heard, but that will not stop me raising them at every single opportunity I can. Indeed, I have some more amendments through which to talk about accountability further.
This has been a useful exchange. I will think about it further, having read the Minister’s response in Hansard. I will think further about whether I take this forward again on Report. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
“(2A) The Bank of England may only exercise the power in subsection (1) if it assesses that the use of the power would support the public interest, which may include but need not be limited by—(a) supporting market competitiveness, or(b) retaining or growing smaller banks.”
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
The point that I am trying to get to with Amendment 7 is, again, more transparency around what the public interest issues are. It is fairly reasonable to say that, of course, the Bank will do things that are broadly what it considers to be in the public interest, but there are quite a range of factors involved. They include the specific ones that were utilised in the Silicon Valley Bank case because of the potential loss of the float that companies had for paying their workforce and all those kinds of things. I did not object to that; I thought it was jolly good.
We also have the issue of wanting to encourage market competitiveness while retaining and growing smaller banks, which is always trumpeted as an issue, so I put those in as possible factors. But my real call is to say, again, that we need more things to be put into the documentation, whether that is a strategy, a code of conduct or even discussion documents, about the types of things that can be contributory factors to this public interest. Something may always happen that is a surprise. Maybe the Silicon Valley Bank and the large amounts of payroll in a particular sector of the economy was a surprise.
We need some kind of expectation and oversight of how these things are to be weighed up. That is the main force behind me putting this particular amendment in. Can we specifically mention, somewhere in the Bill, that it is in the public interest? As I said, it is accepted but I do not think that it is written down. I beg to move.
Lord Livermore (Lab)
My Lords, before I turn to the specific amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, I note that the Government fully recognise the importance of market competitiveness and the critical role played by small and growing banks in serving customers across the UK.
On the specifics of this amendment, I note that, before undertaking resolution, including when using the new mechanism, the Bank must be satisfied that the resolution conditions in the Banking Act have been met. The third resolution condition is that resolution is necessary having regard to the public interest in the advancement of one or more of the special resolution objectives. Those objectives are set out in detail in the Banking Act and are intended to reflect the key objectives of the resolution regime across all in-scope firms. For instance, this includes maintaining financial stability, protecting public funds and enhancing confidence in the stability of the financial system.
The objectives do not explicitly reference market competitiveness or supporting small banks. This reflects how, in undertaking resolution, the Bank of England should be appropriately focused on managing the significant risks to financial stability that can arise in a highly unpredictable scenario. As set out in their consultation response, this has informed why the Government believe that the broader resolution framework works well, including the existing balance of special resolution regime objectives, and why we have not proposed to change them.
I note, however, that the Government actively considered both the role of small banks and market competitiveness when developing the policy approach for this Bill. In particular, market competitiveness is a key reason the Government chose to pursue a solution whereby banks must contribute to the costs of recapitalisation only after a failure has occurred. Crucially, this means that the new mechanism does not create any upfront costs for the banking sector.
As noted at Second Reading, the Government have also committed to updating the code of practice to ensure there is a clear process by which the Bank of England calculates the costs that could arise for industry if the new mechanism is used. In addition, the Government believe that the new mechanism supports the UK’s small banks. It ensures that there is a robust system in place for resolving them and maintaining continuity, when that is judged to be in the public interest. This should help support wider confidence in the regulation of the sector.
The mechanism in the Bill is also designed to be proportionate. This is why any levies associated with recapitalisation will be spread across the entire banking sector, ensuring that it is affordable for small banks. Overall, the Government believe this strikes the right balance in that these wider policy issues have influenced the design of the Bill, but that in using the mechanism the Bank of England is ultimately guided by the existing special resolution objectives. I therefore respectfully ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
I thank the Minister for that response. Again, I make the point that, through the Bill, we are changing from an inherent public interest in public money into using private money to do the rescue. I am not sure that the Banking Act was drafted with that in mind and I doubt that we could amend relevant sections through the Bill. It is just worth having another look with those eyes, maybe after a period of time, to see whether some kind of adjustment is needed because this safeguard check that exists around the use of public money has been taken away. It has not been replaced by anything; it has not even necessarily been replaced by more transparency. With those comments I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Sikka
“(3A) Before exercising the power in subsection (1), the Bank and the scheme manager must assess whether they consider that there should be a clawback of executive pay and bonuses from the previous 12 months.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to address potential moral hazards through requiring the Bank and scheme manager to take directors’ pay and bonuses into consideration when a recapitalisation payment is made.
Lord Sikka (Lab)
My Lords, Amendment 9 deals with moral hazards, which, if anything, are multiplying. The amendment seeks to restrain excessive risk-taking by imposing possible personal penalties on bank directors.
The recent legal developments have actually multiplied financial moral hazards and the related risks. For example, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 reintroduced the secondary regulatory objective to promote the growth and international competitiveness of the finance industry. In effect, it dilutes the regulator’s remit to protect customers. On 12 August, the Chancellor said that she and the Economic Secretary to the Treasury were constantly asking regulators, “What are you doing in practice to meet that secondary objective?” The meeting of that secondary objective will necessarily increase moral hazards.
Secondly, further deregulation is coming in—reforms of Solvency II, for example—with the claim that this will somehow conjure up an additional £100 billion of investment by reducing capital requirements. There is no pot of gold sitting in a corner in any bank boardroom that people can simply empty and get £100 billion out of. All of that is underpinning bank resilience and insurance company resilience. All of that is invested in some safety buffers. All of that will have to be liquidated. Yet the consequences for how the directors might behave have not really been outlined.
The cap on bankers’ bonuses has been lifted, so there are now economic incentives for bank directors to be reckless and take excessive risks, as that would maximise executive pay and bonuses—all done in the full knowledge that the bank would be rescued, restructured, recapitalised or bailed out, be it through the mechanism of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme or, eventually, some reconstruction. There are no great pressure points on bank directors to be risk-averse and prudent or to act in a responsible manner.
The risk-boosting effects of moral hazards are ignored by this Bill, yet they are highly relevant to any form of stability. We have a whole history showing how this happens. In the 2007-08 banking crash, attention was drawn to moral hazards or conflicts of interest between the interests of shareholders and managers, debt holders and the public purse. Bank directors took on excessive leverage because the state incentivised them to do so. It continues to incentivise them to do so, for example by giving tax relief on interest payments, which reduces both the cost of debt and the weighted average cost of capital while increasing shareholder returns, providing a justification for greater executive bonuses and remuneration.
Numerous studies have shown that shareholders were, and remain, focused on short-term returns. In any case, they still do not get good-enough information to invigilate directors; perhaps at some point, when we are discussing the world of accounting, I will point out how almost useless company accounts are in enabling shareholders or anybody else to invigilate directors. Back at the time of the last crash, directors accepted excessive risks from not only financing the organisation but risky investments. For example, numerous varieties of derivatives and complex financial bets were made because of explicit guarantees about depositor protection, central banks providing liquidity and support, and, ultimately, publicly funded bailouts.
If the bets made with other people’s money paid off, directors got mega payoffs; if they did not, somebody else picked up the loss, leading ultimately to rescue bailouts—now we are using the term “recapitalisation”. This Bill adds another string to publicly funded bailouts—though it likes to use different language. Yes, the cost of the FSCS levies is borne ultimately by the people, as has already been pointed out, and not necessarily by other banks.
If the Government succeed in persuading the banks to lend more to facilitate additional investment, as they are trying to do, that will add to the risks and strain the capital adequacy requirements of those banks. In boom times, banks tend to lend more freely, because they do not want to miss out on the opportunity to make more profits, and they relax credit standards, but there are inevitably consequences, as we saw with the last crash. Directors are rarely held personally liable, and that remains the position today.
Amendment 9 would address this gap by requiring the Bank of England and the scheme managers to consider a clawback of directors’ pay and bonuses paid during the previous 12 months. In case the Minister might refer to other clawback arrangements, let me pre-empt those. Paragraph 37 of the UK Corporate Governance Code states:
“Remuneration schemes … should include … provisions that would enable the company to recover and/or withhold sums or share awards and specify the circumstances in which it would be appropriate to do so”.
That is of no help whatever, because such codes do not apply to large private companies, of which Wyelands Bank, which came to an end recently, is a good example. The codes are also voluntary and cannot be enforced in the courts. They do not empower stakeholders in any way; they do not require the clawed-back amounts to be handed to regulators or to be used for recapitalisation of banks.
The FCA handbook also has a section on possible clawback, but it applies to what it calls “variable remuneration”, which is generally taken to mean bonuses. It states that in certain circumstances the clawed-back funds need to be handed back to the institution. This does not cover entire remuneration; it does not require that the clawed-back amounts be used for the recapitalisation and reconstitution of banks. So, in the interests of clarity and certainty, a statutory approach to clawbacks is needed, not a mishmash of voluntary arrangements. I beg to move.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 16, which would do a certain amount of what the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, would do, but in a slightly different way. It is intended as a probing amendment to obtain clarification on what ability there would be to recover all or some of the costs of failure from either management or shareholders of the failed entity when it is recapitalised rather than being put into insolvency—there seem to be two different things there.
It is possible to imagine a situation where members of the management team responsible for the failure are paid large bonuses or dividends prior to that failure. As the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, pointed out, that is more possible now that the cap on bonuses has—rightly, in my view—been lifted. Can the Minister clarify in what circumstances it would be possible to recoup those bonuses or dividends to offset the recapitalisation costs? In an insolvency situation, where there is fault—for example, in cases of wrongful trading—it may be possible to recoup those payments, but I cannot see how that would work if the bank was recapitalised. To me, it must make sense that management should not see the risk of having to repay bonuses or dividends as being lower than it would have been if the bank had been put into insolvency just because the bank has been recapitalised.
Lord Livermore (Lab)
My Lords, I turn first to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, which seeks to ensure consideration is given to a clawback of executive pay and bonuses from a failed firm before using the new mechanism. I note that while the bank resolution regime does not set out powers allowing the Bank of England to claw back money from shareholders or management, it does provide an extensive and proportionate set of powers to the Bank of England to impose consequences on the shareholders and management of a failed firm in resolution.
First, on placing a firm in resolution, we expect that any existing shareholder equity would be cancelled or transferred. This is an important principle that ensures the firm’s owners must bear losses in the case of failure. In many circumstances, this will affect directors and management who hold shares or other instruments of the failed firm.
In addition, the Bank of England has the power to remove or vary the contract of service of its directors or senior managers. The Bank of England exercises its discretion in deciding whether to use this power. However, as set out in the Government’s code of practice, the Bank of England generally expects to remove senior management considered responsible for the failure of the firm and to appoint new senior management as necessary.
Finally, as reflected in the code of practice, it is a key principle of the resolution regime that natural and legal persons should be made liable under the civil or criminal law in the UK for their responsibility for the failure of the institution. This is delivered by Section 36 of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, which provides for a criminal offence where a senior manager of a bank has taken a decision which caused the failure of a financial institution, if the conduct of the senior manager
“falls far below what could reasonably be expected of”
someone in their position. Overall, this ensures that, as appropriate in the circumstances, there are material consequences for shareholders and senior management when a firm goes into resolution.
More broadly, I can further reassure the noble Lord that the Government recognise the importance of high standards in financial services regulation. The senior managers and certification regime supports high standards by ensuring individual accountability for senior individuals within firms, and by promoting high standards of conduct and governance. The Prudential Regulation Authority sets rules on remuneration and applies these to medium-sized and large banks, ensuring they are proportionate, and there are clear requirements in the PRA’s rules for firms to ensure they have policies on malus and clawback in place to align management incentives with that of the bank.
I should also note the intention of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, to ascertain under what circumstances the Bank of England may be able to recover all or part of remuneration to management and shareholders, or require a shareholder to cover all or part of the recapitalisation costs. If recoveries were made from management or shareholders of the failed firm, the amendment would make it clear that these types of remuneration could count towards these recoveries.
I hope I have addressed the broader point about the treatment of shareholders and former management in my earlier remarks. As a point of detail, I would add that the Government expect any recoveries not otherwise specified in the clause to be covered already by the catch-all phrase “or otherwise” at the end of proposed new subsection (2)(a). I hope that addresses the points raised and I respectfully ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
I think the Minister has answered the point about management, and I recognise that the words “or otherwise” are at the end of the new subsection. Where I am not sure that he has answered the point is on the inappropriate dividends paid to shareholders beforehand—the Thames Water situation, and how that would be dealt with. Just saying that the equity would be written down makes no difference; in this situation, the equity is already worthless. We are talking about recouping the costs of the recapitalisation rather than the fact that the worthless company is worthless.
Lord Livermore (Lab)
I have managed to get through several groups without promising to write, but on this occasion I will write to the noble Lord.
Lord Sikka (Lab)
I thank the Minister for his reply. I will divert slightly to the point made about dividends. The legislation is a complete mess on distributable dividends. The previous Government were going to table legislation about some disclosures of distributable reserves, then just a day before—without any notice to Parliament—they withdrew that, because most companies do not have a clue what their distributable reserves are. This raises all sorts of questions about what are realised or unrealised profits. I will not go into the technicalities at the moment. Any time I hear a Minister talk about dividends or say, “We are going to control dividends”, whether it is about water companies or any others, that is just a no-go area at the moment. It cannot be sorted out without major primary legislation.
The Minister said that there is already legislation in place for civil criminal prosecution. I am afraid that legislation delivered hardly anything after the last banking crash. Countries such as Iceland and even Vietnam prosecuted far more bankers for their negligence than the UK did, though we managed to elevate some afterwards to some very senior political positions, so that legislation is not really effective. I take it from the Minister’s reply that he is not prepared to consider legislation specifically saying that there will be a clawback of executive remuneration. That is the point—in the absence of it, who knows whether the management concerned will bear any personal cost at all? Is my interpretation of the Minister’s reply correct?
Lord Sikka (Lab)
I thank the Minister. I withdraw my amendment for the time being, though I may bring it back at the next stage.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden
“(6) When the Bank of England exercises its power in subsection (1), the Bank must make a report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer within 28 days of the date of any recapitalisation payment being made.(7) The report must comply with any requirements as requested by the Treasury, but must include—(a) the reasons why the Bank decided to make a recapitalisation payment in preference to allowing the financial institution to go into insolvency;(b) a breakdown of the costs referred to in subsection (2);(c) a comparison of the expected recapitalisation payment or payments that will be paid by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, compared with the expected costs to the Scheme in an insolvency process.(8) The Bank must make further reports to the Chancellor of the Exchequer within three months of the date of the sale of the institution to a private sector purchaser, or the sale, closure or winding up of the bridge bank, providing such information as the Treasury may require, including the breakdown of the actual recapitalisation payment or payments and the reasons for any differences to the expected costs referred to in subsection (7)(b). (9) The Chancellor of the Exchequer must lay a copy of each report under subsection (7) or (8) before Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to ensure that the reasons for decisions of the Bank to follow a resolution process in preference to an insolvency process are explained and the explanation laid before Parliament, both at the time of the decision and once the resolution process has been completed, and that the costs can be compared to what would have been expected if the institution had been placed into insolvency.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
My Lords, as we have heard several times already, the area of accountability around financial services Bills seems to always come to the fore, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, pointed out. She referred in a recent group to the weak accountability that exists in the Bill. My Amendments 12 and 24 in this group aim to improve that.
One of the main concerns raised at Second Reading was to ensure that the Bank of England explains why it has decided to follow a recapitalisation process rather than allowing a failing bank to fail and go into insolvency, which was the previous default. In particular, several respondents to the consultation raised concerns that the costs of the recapitalisation should not be greater than those that the FSCS would face under an insolvency process. Concerns were raised, not least by the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, that recapitalisation might become the default approach to a failing bank, rather than insolvency. At Second Reading, the Minister then referred to the strong expectation that
“any reports required under the Banking Act to ensure ex-post scrutiny of the Bank of England’s actions when using the new mechanism would be made public and laid before Parliament ”. —[Official Report, 30/7/24; col. 933.]
My Amendments 12 and 24 aim to strengthen the required reporting and to make it a requirement that those reports will be made public and laid before Parliament. Amendment 12 adds some detail around the contents of the report. In particular, it would require the Bank to explain why it chose recapitalisation over insolvency; to provide a breakdown of the expected costs, which we talked about in an earlier group; and to provide a comparison of the expected recapitalisation cost with what would have been expected to have been the cost under an insolvency situation. It allows the Treasury to stipulate other matters but, importantly, it also sets a shortish timetable for that report of 28 days. This really does have to be done on a timely basis.
Also, importantly, the requirement to report—again, we discussed this earlier—will apply to any subsequent recapitalisation payments made to the same failing institution. Again, this overlaps with Amendment 3 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, which we have already debated. As I said at the time, it is critical that, any time we further recapitalise, we look again at whether that is the appropriate thing to do or whether insolvency is the appropriate option.
To cover the ex-post scrutiny that the Minister referred to at Second Reading, the amendment also requires further reports to be issued and laid before Parliament once the resolution process comes to an end, whether that is through a sale or through an insolvency process. The whole process could be two years after the resolution process starts—indeed, it can be extended beyond two years—so it is important that what actually happens is scrutinised after the event and that any differences to what we were originally told was going to happen are explained.
Amendment 14 laid by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, does something similar but leaves the detail of what must be included in the report up to the Treasury. I would be keen to provide the Treasury with some minimum requirements for the report; what I have laid out are the important aspects.
Amendment 24 in my name simply tries to fix an anomaly, as I see it, in the Banking Act 2009. Under Section 80 of that Act, if a failing bank is transferred to a resolution company, the Bank of England must make a report to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and that report must be laid before Parliament. However, rather oddly—the Minister referred to this previously—according to Section 79A of the Banking Act, if all or part of the failing bank is sold to a private sector purchaser, the Bank of England must still report to the Chancellor but that report does not have to be laid before Parliament.
The eagle-eyed among you in this Committee may have noticed that my initial version of this amendment simply stated that the report had to be laid before Parliament. We are getting to the point of the scope issues that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, referred to in her opening of the debate. That amendment was, at the last minute, ruled as being out of scope of this Bill. I find that hard to understand, particularly given that I felt that the Minister rather firmly put it in scope in his Second Reading speech, but it was decided that it was too broad to be in scope. I had to change it so that it refers only to the situation where a recapitalisation payment has been made. I ask the Minister to consider seriously whether he can use his influence to change that. It seems mad to do it only in this circumstance and not in the wider circumstance of a bank being sold to a private sector player. The officials have perhaps been a little overzealous with their interpretation of scope in this case—and in this Bill, more generally.
As I said, in his Second Reading speech, the Minister pointed out the importance of Section 79A for scrutiny of the Bank of England’s actions. He also referred to the fact that there is no requirement for reports under Section 79A to be laid before Parliament. However, he went on to say that he could
“reassure your Lordships that in any event where the new mechanism was used the Treasury would intend to ensure that any such reports were made available to Parliament and the public”.—[Official Report, 30/7/24; col. 933.]
My amendment simply makes that intention a requirement; I hope that I am not pushing at a closed door and that it is not seen as controversial.
However we go forward, it is essential that the actions of the Bank of England are subject to full scrutiny and transparency. At Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord Macpherson, eloquently described the potential for a conflict of interest in the position of the Bank of England, pointing out that the Bank might choose to recapitalise rather than put a bank into an insolvency process
“less because it is in the national interest and more as a way of minimising the reputational damage of regulatory failure”.—[Official Report, 30/7/24; col. 914.]
Any decision to recapitalise should be explained to avoid possible creep to this process becoming the default. The noble Lord also raised his concerns that there is little incentive for the Bank to minimise the costs of resolution—after all, the industry, not the Bank, will pay. He gave the example of the Dunfermline Building Society incurring greater costs than the Treasury incurred in resolving the Icelandic banks.
So I think it is essential that we strengthen the scrutiny of the Bank when it exercises these new powers, to ensure that any decisions it takes are clearly justified at the time and examined publicly once the resolution is complete so that any lessons can be learned. These amendments, or amendments like them, would achieve that. The Minister has said he expects all reports to be made public and laid before Parliament, so I hope he will simply accept them.
Finally, I add my support to Amendment 25 from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, which is also in this group. We discussed in the first group the concerns around the MREL regime that are raised by the Bill, so it seems entirely appropriate that an assessment should be made of the impact of the Bill on the MREL regime. I beg to move.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has said, I have Amendment 14 in this group. In substance, it is the same as the noble Lord’s amendment. The only real difference, as he pointed out, is that mine is less prescriptive. I am entirely happy with either version, but it is important that we deal with the specific reporting requirements, because the existing provisions are simply not adequate. At Second Reading, the Minister basically said that the Government would use the existing reporting requirements in the Banking Act, but the time involved is simply too long. It could take at least a year after the powers have been exercised. When the recapitalisation powers are used, that deserves more immediate scrutiny and, unless there is awareness of it by way of a report, that is simply not going to happen. So I stand completely behind whichever of these amendments the Minister cares to choose.
I also completely support what the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has tried to do with his Amendment 24. It is a pity he cannot do it more generally in relation to Section 79A, but at least it rectifies what is clearly an anomaly that Parliament should not have allowed through when the Act was brought in. When the recapitalisation power has been used, it should be a requirement to lay a report before Parliament. This is in line with what the Minister said at Second Reading would happen, so I expect the Minister to accept the amendment with alacrity.
I am not quite sure why the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, allowed her amendment to be brought into this group. That said, I do think it is an important opportunity to look again at MREL, in particular because those banks that do not have MREL now become potentially subject to the use of the bank recapitalisation power. There ought to be more transparency about how banks can be categorised in that way and more understanding by those in the banking sector of which institutions they might have to pick up the tab for in due course.
It is generally a contentious issue in the banking sector, and the way in which banks trip from no MREL to MREL can be a deciding factor in whether they can scale up, because the cost of raising MREL when you are a very small bank, if you trip over into needing to raise it, can have a very significant impact. I have certainly heard smaller start-up institutions say that they deliberately do not grow above a certain size in order to avoid coming within the MREL provisions, and that cannot be good for the UK. So I am not quite sure about the wording of the noble Baroness’s amendment, but I completely support the principle.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, asked why I allowed my amendment to be grouped in this way. I was simply trying to expedite matters for us and I thought we did not need another whole group, which would get the Minister up and down again. I agree with the other amendments and everything that has been said on this group. They deal with issues around conflicts and so on, and transparency is one of the best weapons we have that presumably will be allowed or in scope.
My amendment is one of those that do not read as I originally wrote it, because again we came into scope issues. I could not get the exact amendment that I wanted, so this was the best that I could do. Obviously, it is a companion to the amendments in the first group, which were saying that the majority of us want to limit to a threshold equal to MREL. If you therefore want to resolve banks that are a little bigger, you would have to shift MREL. I am not going to cry over that; I will cheer.
That may be an improper tactic but we do not have any other tactics to try to focus the PRA on the damage being done to the growth of smaller banks by putting MREL where it was not intended to be. We are out of line internationally and we do not really have any good justification for that. If there is a division between those banks that can be resolved and those that cannot, I still think that it goes there and the Bank will therefore have to give its view as to why. Perhaps it wants an extension in some way, so that it can get at bigger banks. What do we get back from that? That is the thought process that lies behind my amendment.
I support all these amendments. If they are knocked into a format that is suitable for Report, they would be very good additions to the Bill.
Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)
My Lords, I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and to my noble friend Lady Noakes for thinking carefully about reporting and tabling amendments accordingly. I had to support one of these amendments and I am afraid that I picked the noble Lord’s on this occasion. This is not favouritism; I was purely trying to spread the love a little. But as we approach Report, we might want to go back and check that whatever we end up putting into the Bill is future-proofed.
Sometimes one can put in too much detail, then people can slide round the edges by saying, “Oh, you didn’t tell us to do that”. Alternatively, there is being too broad, when people slide round another edge by not putting in the detail that you want to see. There is a balance, but this is certainly worth taking forward and looking at. Obviously, the accountability element is key here.
Another thought I had around this was on timing. Again, sometimes one can go too far and have a report too far in the distance, so by the time it comes out no one remembers what the problem was in the first place. The amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, says “three months”; I was thinking “as soon as practical” or, in any event, within six months. I do not know, but in very complicated and complex circumstances there might still be issues and context to resolve to produce a report that is relevant in timing terms, but also incorporates everything that stakeholders wish to see.
When I was a Minister, my heart would sink when an amendment was put down about producing a report. I would think, “Another report—are we really going to read it?” To me, the question is: we might produce a timely report in a good fashion and with the right amount of detail, et cetera, but how do we then ensure the scrutiny of that report? It goes back to the issue of expenses which, as we agreed, could be quite significant. But who is going to look at those expenses and suck their teeth? Will they look at the legal fees of firm XYZ and say, “Do you know what? That’s too much”. Who is going to do that? Is there any body at all—not anybody—which would be able to look at it and do that? It has been suggested to me that the National Audit Office might occasionally pay attention to this sort of thing. This is about trying to get us beyond “Just produce a report”. Well, just produce a report and then somebody can look at it. I am sure that these are going to be great reports, but even so it is a concern.
I am looking forward to the response of the Minister. I believe that this should be our last group today, fingers crossed, but I am not sure that many of us want to go outside, given the weather.
Lord Livermore (Lab)
My Lords, I fully understand the substantial focus on the reporting requirements that will apply when the new mechanism is used. I shall start by addressing Amendment 12 on this point, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux.
The Government agree that, should the new mechanism be used, it is right for there to be a reporting mechanism to hold the Bank of England to account for its decisions, and that this should encompass estimates of the costs of different options. However, the Government intend to achieve the principles of scrutiny and transparency in a different way; namely, through the existing requirements placed on the Bank of England under the Banking Act 2009. As set out in their response to the consultation, it is the Government’s intention to use these existing reporting mechanisms to ensure that the Bank of England is subject to appropriate scrutiny when using the mechanism. The Government have committed to updating their code of practice to provide further details on how these reporting requirements will apply when the mechanism is used; I can re-confirm that the Government intend to include in the code confirmation that, after the new mechanism has been used, the Bank of England will be required to disclose the estimated costs that were considered as part of these reports.
The Government consider that using the code of practice is an appropriate approach to hold the Bank of England to account for its actions, rather than putting these requirements in the Bill. The Bank of England is legally required to have regard to the code and the Government are required to consult the Banking Liaison Panel, made up of regulatory and industry stakeholders, when updating it. Using the code will therefore ensure that a full and thorough consultation is taken on the approach. Given the complex and potentially fast-moving nature of bank failures, this is important to ensure that any approach is sufficiently nuanced to account for the range of possible outcomes under insolvency or through the use of other resolution tools. The Government believe that amendments to the code of practice are more likely to be successful in achieving this outcome. As I committed at Second Reading, the Government will share drafts of these updates to the code of practice as soon as is practicable and will provide sufficient opportunity for industry stakeholders to be consulted on them.
I acknowledge the further amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux—Amendment 24—which would make such reports available to Parliament when the new mechanism was used to facilitate a transfer to another buyer. It is the Government’s clear intention that any such reports required under the Banking Act, following the use of the mechanism, will be made public and laid before Parliament. The Government would not make reports public only if there were clear public interest grounds not to do so, such as commercial confidentiality reasons. This may particularly be the case when exercising the power to sell a failing bank to a commercial buyer. While such cases would hopefully be limited, it is important that they are allowed for.
I appreciate the intent of Amendment 14 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, which would require the Bank of England to report to the Treasury more swiftly than under the current requirements. The use of resolution powers is complex; in some cases, the Bank of England may be executing a resolution over a long period, particularly when placing a firm into a bridge bank. It is therefore sensible for the Bank of England to report a reasonable period of time after exercising its powers, ensuring that its report provides a full and meaningful assessment. On reporting more broadly, I repeat the points made in response to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux.
Finally, Amendment 25 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, would require the Chancellor to assess in the light of the Bill the appropriateness of the thresholds used by the Bank of England to determine which firms are required to hold additional loss-absorbing resources, known as MREL. As before, I should start by noting that the Government recognise the important role played by smaller and specialist banks in supporting the UK economy. I appreciate the concerns raised by the noble Baroness at Second Reading.
The Government have carefully considered the perspective of such banks in developing the mechanism in the Bill, which is intended to be a proportionate solution. On MREL, the Bank of England is responsible for determining MREL requirements for individual firms within a framework set out in legislation; that is an important principle, as the resolution authority, the Bank of England, is ultimately best placed to judge what resources banks should hold so that they can fail safely. I point out to the noble Baroness that, as set out in the Government’s consultation response, the Bank of England has committed to consider the potential case for changes to its indicative thresholds. Specifically, it has noted that it will consider whether any changes are appropriate in light of this Bill and other wider developments.
I hope that these points provide reassurance to noble Lords. On that basis, I respectfully ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
I will ask the Minister for one point of clarification. He referred to the reports under the Banking Act that will be provided as covering the costs and expenses. I do not think that he talked about the comparison with the counterfactual of the costs of insolvency, which is a critical aspect of this. Would those reports cover that?
Lord Livermore (Lab)
If the noble Lord does not mind, I shall add that to the letter to him.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this short debate and apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, for failing to thank her beforehand for signing her name to my amendment.
A number of points were raised. The noble Baroness was right when she discussed the timings. They were put in as a starting point; I would be very happy to look at what is appropriate. I still think that we need to beef up the reporting clauses in the Bill. I am encouraged by what the Minister said about the reports that exist being laid before Parliament, but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, referred to, there is more to do on the timings.
There is some merit in trying to put in the Bill at least some minimum requirements on what those reports should include. That will be important because, although I acknowledge what the Minister said about the code, we will not see it before Report. If we were able to see the proposed changes to the code before Report we might be able to take a different view. It happens quite regularly that we are told that something will be in a code of conduct, a future statutory instrument or whatever else, but we do not see it before we have to make the decisions on the amendments themselves. In the absence of that, I feel that we will probably want to come back to this on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.