(1 year, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I fully expect the Minister to stand up and tell us that none of these amendments, which have been put so well by noble Lords, is necessary. I expect him to say that there is no possibility of the Bill, once it becomes an Act, breaking or impairing our relationship with the international organisations that noble Lords have mentioned. I wonder how he will be able to say that, given the nature of the Bill.
We come back to its skeletal nature and the answer which nobody seems to know to the question “What is a minimum service level?” Until we know, we do not know whether the Bill breaks any agreements that we have with organisations in this country or around the world. I refer your Lordships to our previous debate in Committee, in which we discussed correspondence with the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, in which he represented the issues around the fire and rescue services. I remind noble Lords that, after I prompted him on why the consultation had raised the issue of the Grenfell Tower fire and the Manchester Arena bombing, the Minister—the noble Lord, Lord Callanan—said that one thing the consultation sought to probe was that the minimum service level would include the ability to cope with issues on that scale. He did not disagree with me when I came back and said that that implied that 100% of the fire and rescue services in an area would need to have been named in the work order under a minimum service level. In effect, that would ban striking.
In the event of such a minimum service level, that calls into question our relationships with the ILO, the EU under the TCA and others, because it is a de facto ban on striking. It may or may not upset those relationships, but I want the Minister to be able to say what minimum service level is being modelled when he tells us that we do not need to worry.
My Lords, I sometimes wonder when I listen to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, whether I need to bother replying to these debates, because he has written my speeches before I get up. For the benefit of the House, I will go through this anyway.
Amendments 18A, 18B, 32B and 36C all relate to the UK’s international obligations. Before I deal with the amendments in detail, it is worth reiterating, as I have previously and as we debated last time round with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that the Government firmly believe that the Bill is compatible with our convention rights and complies with all international conventions that the UK is signed up to. I signed a statement to that effect.
Amendment 18A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, looks to ensure that the Bill does not prevent people from taking strike action and cannot be used to create an offence. I oppose this amendment because its effect would be to prevent any minimum service levels from being implemented at all. He will understand my reservations, given how the Bill is drafted in respect of the operation of work notices and where an employee would lose their automatic protection from unfair dismissal for industrial action if they participated in a strike while being named on a work notice. To be clear, our Bill does not prohibit strikes or other industrial action, but it does enable employers to continue to deliver a minimum service level to their users and stakeholders during and notwithstanding that action.
The Bill is about balancing the ability to strike with the rights and freedoms of others. Preventing minimum service levels being implemented does not strike a balance; it would merely maintain the current disproportionate impacts that strikes can have on the public—although I expect that that is a cause of legitimate disagreement between us.
Amendment 18B would ensure that the regulations did not compromise our obligations under the trade and co-operation agreement. However, given the reiteration I made earlier, we believe that this amendment is duplicative and unnecessary. The Government remain committed to our international obligation and respect the process of the respective governing bodies in providing any rulings that are required concerning compliance. I recognise that the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, has a desire for relevant international conventions and treaties, and their associated governing bodies, to have a greater role in respect to minimum service levels in Great Britain. But my argument here is that incorporating decisions by supervisory committees into domestic primary legislation, as this amendment seeks to do, goes way too far.
Amendment 32B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Collins, and the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady, seeks similarly to prevent minimum service regulations being made where they could be said to be within scope of the trade and co-operation agreement and other international obligations. As I stated at the outset, the Government firmly believe that we are entitled to bring forward this legislation—many other European countries already have similar legislation—which I remain satisfied is compatible with all the international conventions the UK is signed up to. The noble Baroness will, of course, be aware that there are existing mechanisms for monitoring adherence to the trade and co-operation agreement—if indeed there are concerns from EU member states or the European Commission, although I do not believe there will be.
In any case, I am surprised if anybody thinks that ensuring that the public are able to access some level of service in key sectors, including emergency services, during strike action goes to the heart of the TCA, not least because many EU member states already have minimum service level arrangements in place. Indeed, in some of the services we have mentioned, some member states ban strike action completely in those areas. As drafted—and perhaps not intentionally—this amendment would prevent minimum service levels regulations being made at all, which, given that is the purpose of the Bill, we clearly cannot accept.
Finally, on Amendment 36C from the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, and to respond to the points the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Woodley, made, as I have stated previously, the Government firmly believe that the Bill is compliant with convention rights and international conventions. The Bill also enables regulations to be made in a way that is compliant with the convention rights, and on making those regulations, Secretaries of State will need to carefully consider the relevant articles of the ECHR, alongside international conventions, if they choose to suggest minimum service regulations to Parliament. So they will also have to make similar statements.
I highlight that this amendment seeks to restrict minimum service levels so that they can be made only where they are necessary to provide protection for the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population. While the protection of life and health are indeed important aims of minimum service levels in areas such as healthcare—
I apologise to the Minister—it took me a while to find this on my system. He referred to minimum service levels being common in other European countries. I submitted a Written Question on this, to which the noble Lord, Lord Johnson, replied:
“The Government does not believe that direct comparisons with other European countries are particularly helpful because of the different administrative and legal frameworks governing industrial action.”
The Minister will also be aware that the overwhelming majority of the other countries in Europe that are cited provide for negotiated minimum service levels, not state diktat.
I did not say that they were particularly common, just that they exist in some European member states. Of course, provisions, agreements, labour relations, laws, relations with trade unions, et cetera, are different in other member states. The example I cited last time was border service provisions; many member states prohibit, in effect, strikes by border service personnel because those services are delivered by police, army or military services. The arrangements are different in other member states, but that goes to my point that we are entitled to do what we believe appropriate for the United Kingdom. However, similar provisions—albeit in different circumstances—exist in other member states of the European Union and other democracies worldwide. Noble Lords will remember from the previous Committee day the reasons we have given for believing that the six sectors in the Bill are correct.
The amendment would incorporate into domestic law decisions of supervisory committees of the ILO. These committees’ conclusions and recommendations are non-binding; they are intended only to guide the actions of national authorities. The only body with explicit competence to interpret ILO conventions is the International Court of Justice. I highlight to the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, that the ILO supervisory committee has stated that minimum service levels can be made in services
“which are not essential … but where the extent and duration of a strike might be such as to result in an acute national crisis endangering the normal living conditions of the population … and … in public services of fundamental importance.”
We do not believe that we are in contravention of our ILO duties. The amendment does not provide for minimum service levels in those circumstances, and I am therefore puzzled as to why the noble Lord did not include them in it, given that they were referenced previously in Committee and today.
I hope that, with these reassurances, I have been able to persuade noble Lords to withdraw and not move their amendments in this group.
My Lords, I have two quick questions about the Minister’s answer to my noble friend Lord Hendy. First, I think I understood from his answer that he thinks that Amendment 18A would drive a coach and horses through minimum service level agreements. This may be an argument about “prohibit” or “prohibition”, because my understanding of the Bill as drafted is that, where a minimum service level agreement is imposed by regulations, that will remove some of the existing protections in trade union law. The Minister clearly wants that to be the case, but surely he is not suggesting that, for example, regulations should be able to impose criminal or civil penalties on workers. If that is not his intention, could something like Amendment 18A not be welcomed to make sure that regulations could not create that level of penalisation in the Bill? If regulations cannot criminalise workers, it is important that that is on the face of the regulation-making power.
Secondly, on the ILO as opposed to the ECHR, I think I heard the Minister say that the only body competent to determine compliance with the ILO is the International Court of Justice. That is hardly taking back control, and it is completely inconsistent with this Government’s permanent position on the Strasbourg court and the ECHR. What would be wrong with a domestic court having the ability to scrutinise whether or not regulations made by a future Secretary of State comply with the ILO conventions?
I will deal with the noble Baroness’s two questions. First, the reason I opposed Amendment 18A from the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, is that we believe it would effectively kill the Bill—indeed, this may be the noble Lord’s intention. This is because where a person is named on a work notice, they are effectively prohibited from striking for the day that they are identified to work; they would lose their automatic protection from unfair dismissal for industrial action if they did participate in the strike. This means that regulations for minimum service levels could not be made within the current drafting of the Bill. They would enable the prohibition of participation in a strike, and therefore the minimum service level could not be implemented—thus killing the Bill. I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, would be very happy if that were the case, but noble Lords will also understand that that is why the Government oppose the amendment.
Supervisory committees of the ILO are not entitled to interfere in UK law. There are conventions that we are signed up to, but the only way to interpret the decisions of the ILO is through the provisions of the ICJ. I am not a legal expert, but I can get legal clarification that it is possible for the ECHR to take into account the rulings of the ILO when adjudicating the relevant provisions in the ECHR.
Please forgive me; I do not mean to be difficult, but these are very important points and I do not think I made myself clear in the way I put the questions to the Minister. I will try just one more time.
I do understand that the Minister intends that once minimum service level agreements have been imposed by regulation, employees who breach work notices will lose their protection from dismissal. I understand that as the ultimate sanction against them in the Bill. But my understanding of Amendment 18A is that it is also trying to deal with things such as regulations being used to create new criminal offences or new civil penalties—things that are not just removing protection from dismissal. Is the Minister prepared to say, in Committee, that this is not the intention behind the regulation-making power? Accordingly, will he consider amendments at a later stage to that effect?
I was not suggesting that it is about the Strasbourg court adjudicating on the ILO. I was suggesting that in our domestic public law, our courts are normally capable of second-guessing the legality of regulations. If that is to be the case, will our courts be able to determine whether regulations comply with the ILO?
I am happy to give the noble Baroness the commitment she seeks. There is no intention to create any criminal offence within this Bill; it does not do that, and it is absolutely not our intention.
On her follow-up question, the provisions in the TCA relevant to minimum service levels include commitment to ILO conventions, non-regression and rebalancing. Enforcement mechanisms vary, depending on the particular provisions. For the non-regression clauses, enforcement mechanisms include consultation and escalation, involving panels of experts and potential rebalancing measures, all of which would take place at an international level and cannot bring any claims in the domestic courts. I hope that gives the noble Baroness the reassurance she is looking for.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for the clarity of his answer, and to all noble Baronesses and Lords who participated in the debate. I will not do them the disservice of attempting to summarise their speeches.
Let me deal with two points arising from what the Minister has said. First, he asked whether my intention is to kill the Bill. It would certainly be my desire, but that is not the effect of these amendments, for sure. He says Amendment 18A and the other amendments would prevent minimum service levels being set. That is simply wrong, as a matter of law. There is nothing to prohibit the minimum service levels being set. What the amendments propose is that the minimum service levels be set in such a way that, first, they cannot penalise workers for going on strike—individual workers who are requisitioned to provide service under a work notice should not be penalised, in accordance with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights—and, secondly, they comply with the standards of the ILO and the European Social Charter.
That brings me to my second point, which is the importance of the ILO. I say this with the greatest respect, but I am not sure the Minister has quite understood the position of the ILO in the hierarchy of international law so far as the United Kingdom is concerned. Before I explain that, I will make one thing clear: the Minister read a passage from one of the supervisory bodies of the ILO—it was in fact the committee of experts—and suggested that I had not quoted it. I read that very passage on to the record earlier this afternoon; I think Homer might have nodded briefly and missed that. The Minister said that the decisions of the ILO are not binding. In one sense, of course, that is true. Britain was the first country in the world to ratify Convention 87, which is the most ratified of all the conventions of the ILO. It is an international treaty and we are bound by it, but I agree that it is not binding in domestic law.
Secondly, ILO conventions and their jurisprudence are taken into account by the European Court of Human Rights in interpreting the various articles of the European convention, particularly Article 11. If you want to know what Article 11 has to say about the right to strike, it is no good looking at the text of that article. What you have to look at are the decisions of the European court. Every one of them refers to the jurisprudence of the ILO and the European Social Charter in defining what permissible restrictions there may be on the right to strike.
The third reason the ILO is so crucial is because of the trade and co-operation agreement. This is the point I was endeavouring to communicate to the Minister, but I think I failed to do so. I read a few words from Article 399 of the trade and co-operation agreement, but let me read a sentence. Article 399(2) says that
“each Party commits to respecting, promoting and effectively implementing the internationally recognised core labour standards, as defined in the fundamental ILO Conventions”.
So we are bound by the fundamental ILO conventions. Article 399(5) makes specific reference to implementing the provisions of the ILO conventions ratified by the UK and the provisions of the European Social Charter ratified by the UK.
It is not a question of the ILO interfering in the domestic jurisdiction of British courts or the British Parliament. We have chosen to be bound by the provisions of the ILO—a choice that we repeated in 2021 when we ratified the TCA. The fact of the matter is that we do not comply with the requirements of the ILO in relation to minimum service levels, particularly—I mentioned this earlier, but the Minister did not deal with it—because the ILO requires that minimum service levels are set with the intervention or input of the social parties, particularly the trade unions, and that there should be a specified mechanism for resolving any disagreements. That is not what the Bill provides, so we may well be in breach. Having said all that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I will now reply to the debate on Amendment 21, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, and Amendment 23 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, which have been grouped. These seek to limit how and when a work notice can be issued by an employer.
Amendment 21 seeks to place an additional and, in our view, burdensome requirement on employers in relation to issuing a work notice. Amendment 23 seeks to alter, fairly fundamentally, how a work notice operates. Both amendments would create unnecessary uncertainty for employers, unions and workers around their respective obligations for work notices.
Amendment 21 requires the employer to exhaust all options to prevent a strike before they issue a work notice. However, it is my submission that employers are already incentivised to avoid strike action due to the substantial cost and disruption that it causes them. If a trade union has given notice of a strike under Section 234A of the 1992 Act, which must happen before any work notice can be given, it seems reasonable for the employer to assume that the options to avoid a strike have, in fact, already been exhausted for the purposes of producing a work notice.
It is also not clear what the test would be for an employer to show that all the options had been exhausted to prevent a strike, creating significant uncertainty for employers and trade unions. The Bill does not prevent employers and unions continuing to negotiate to reach a settlement on the broader trade dispute and, we would hope, for the strikes to be called off. However, we know that negotiations can be complex and can cause uncertainty, so all parties, especially the public, need the fundamental reassurance that the minimum service will operate on a particular strike day. Therefore, the Government resist this amendment.
Amendment 23 seeks to alter how work notices are to operate by specifying that the work notice must identify only the number of persons required to work during a strike rather than actually naming them. There are a number of problems with this approach. First, trade unions are required under the legislation to take reasonable steps to ensure that members identified in the work notice comply with that notice. For that to be true, the trade union would need to see the work notice and to know which union members have been identified as required to work in order for it to take those reasonable steps to ensure that those members attend work rather than going on strike. Secondly, this amendment could lead to confusion between employers and workers about who exactly is required to work, particularly in instances where a large number of individuals are employed to deliver essentially the same duty—for instance, call handlers. There would no longer be workers
“identified in a work notice”
for the purposes of paragraph 8(3) in Part 2 of the Schedule. Consequently, the provision removing the automatic protection from unfair dismissal would presumably also not apply, and therefore cannot be accepted.
I reassure noble Lords that individuals named on a work notice will be notified of this as regards themselves only. They will not be issued with the work notice itself, and the work notice will not be a public document. Unions will be bound by data protection law in the usual way, and there will be no sanctions or consequences for individuals if the minimum service level is not then achieved.
Identifying individuals to work in advance of the strike day helps to provide clarity for workers, unions and employers about who exactly is required to work and the arrangements for that particular working day, as well as strike. Without this we believe it will cause confusion and would potentially lead to minimum service levels not being achieved, continuing the disproportionate impact strikes can have on the public, as well as potentially costly and unnecessary litigation between unions and employers.
Finally, let me pick up on the questions asked by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady.
Would the Minister accept that there is tremendous scope for victimisation in the provision that he is talking about, which this probing amendment is opening out? If the work notice is imposed on union officials—convenors, shop stewards, secretaries or whatever—they are in an extremely vulnerable position. They may have been doing the negotiation. They may have been regarded by the employer as awkward. All of a sudden they are put in the frame to say that you are coming into work, regardless of the role they may have played in the origins of the dispute. Is this not a victimisation permit for employers to use in all kinds of circumstances?
I worked in a place where the senior steward had been sacked and was victimised, and it is quite a common occurrence—other colleagues here will perhaps know more about that than me. It seems that the Government are giving a blank check to employers to take on individuals who are prominent in the union, and putting them in an impossible position of being summoned in by the employer at the same time as they may well have been leading the workers in the particular dispute that is taking place. What would the Minister say about that idea that he is giving a charter for victimisation?
I understand the noble Lord’s concerns but I do not believe he is justified in his worries. The Bill is clear that an employer must not have regard to whether a worker is or is not a member of a union when issuing a work notice. If an employee feels that they have been unfairly targeted then they can raise a grievance with their employer or ultimately take legal action to challenge whether the work notice complied with the law. That would then be a matter for the courts to decide.
I have listened with great care to what I think has been an analytical destruction of the very heart of this Bill. If, as the noble Lord has already enunciated, the right to take action for unfair dismissal is automatically removed by this Bill, how on earth can an individual take a grievance?
I do not understand the point the noble Lord is making.
I used to teach industrial relations a long time ago—I may be rusty. The purpose of unfair dismissal protection is that the employer cannot arbitrarily take away the right of a person to their employment unless they have good cause. If they have declined, and have taken a grievance following the notice they have been given, and unfair dismissal protection has been withdrawn, how can that grievance procedure be proposed and implemented?
They lose their protection only if they do not comply with a work notice. The whole principle of this—as the noble Lord has studied industrial relations, he will understand—is that, for a strike to be lawful, effectively you are breaking the contract you have with your employer. If the strike is lawfully called, you are entitled for the purpose of industrial action to break that contract. This merely reinstates that contract between you and your employer. If a work notice is issued and you do not comply with it, it would be treated as an unauthorised absence. There is no intention to say that that will result in dismissal. I would have thought that that would be very much a last course. As I said at Second Reading, we do not believe it will result in people being dismissed. We believe people will comply with the regulations and the law, and that the Bill will have the effect that we intended.
I am sorry but I did not quite understand the Minister. I can see that dismissal for refusing to comply with a work notice might be a matter of last resort for the employer, but we are dealing here with the potential for bad employers to take the opportunity to sack somebody, and they might sack somebody without notice. If they do that, there is no possibility at all of the worker taking up a grievance. I do understand what other legal avenues there might be for such a worker—I can visualise none.
I was responding to the point I was asked about, and I made the point that, under the Bill, it is clear that an employer must not have regard to whether a worker is or is not a member of a union when issuing the work notice. I was outlining procedures that they could then follow if that was the case. Ultimately, they could challenge it in court, and that would be a matter for the courts.
I was going to go back to the point from the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady, but I see that the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, wants to intervene.
In order to reassure me on the issue of names becoming public, the Minister said that names would not be made public and—I assume this is what he meant—would remain private between the employer and the employee. I just want to tease out how this will actually work. Apart from the fact that the person concerned would turn up at work on that day and so it would no longer be private, how would trade unions and other workers be able to challenge any of this legally? How would they challenge the overall balance of the decision-making of the employer and the fairness in the way in which all this has been carried out, particularly if someone were to end up losing their job as a result of the whole process? How would there be any legal assurance about this if the whole thing is cloaked in mystery?
Let me outline the procedure for the benefit of the noble Baroness. The work notice will not be a public document. The Bill makes it clear that current data protection legislation applies, while allowing the employer to provide the work notice to a trade union so that the Bill can be effective. Under the Bill, trade unions are required to take reasonable steps to ensure that their members who are identified in the work notice comply with that work notice. The trade union therefore of course needs to see the work notice and to know which union members may be named, in order to enable it to take those reasonable steps. Unions will otherwise be bound by data protection law in the usual way. Additionally, while those named on a work notice will be notified about that regarding themselves only, they will not be issued the work notice itself. Naming individuals to work in advance of the strike day helps to provide clarity to the workers, to unions and to employers regarding arrangements for that working day as well as the strike.
If the Committee will now permit me to move on and answer the question posed by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady, that may provide some clarity on the Government’s thinking in this respect. The first question the noble Baroness asked was whether Secretaries of State have a say in who is identified in a work notice. Fundamentally, the work notice is a matter for the employer, so there is no way that Secretaries of State can influence who is identified on a work notice.
Secondly, the noble Baroness asked whether a worker would be in breach of a work notice if they were sick on the relevant strike day. Workers should of course be supported if they are unwell and cannot work, and it remains the case that if a worker is too unwell to work, they are not obliged to work under a work notice. I hope that provides the clarity the Committee is seeking on this point, and I therefore hope that the noble Lord can withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, this debate has revealed—or rather, not revealed—more than I expected. I am grateful to the Minister for imaginatively making things up as he goes along, which is what this seems to be. We have a Bill in which none of the details is included, and we are relying on the Minister to flesh out from the Dispatch Box how the Bill will work. [Interruption.] I am not talking about what the Bill is, but how it will work.
At least two misapprehensions are driving that interpretation of how the Bill will work—not what it says in law, but what it will do. The first is that the nature of the service sectors the Bill has identified is such that they are politicised. The Minister’s description of the interplay between employer and employee is an unrestrained free-market description, but we know—and this is why I was talking in the last group about using the current dispute as a model—that this is not a pure-play employee/employer relationship. There are three parties in this dispute, and the third party is the Government. By experience, behind the scenes and sometimes in front of the scenes, the Government have been part of the process of progression of these disputes, and in the end, they have been the arbiter of whether or not they were settled. So the Minister’s description of the nature of the dispute in which these minimum service levels and work orders would be used is an inaccurate model for us to consider.
The Minister speaks of the unions and the workforce as if they are two separate entities. We have to understand what the Minister thinks a union is. In large part, the union is the workforce, so keeping the work order secret from the workers by giving it to the union is an interesting concept.
The second misapprehension is that the Minister is expecting the union to oversee the work order, which is a list of names. We know from the Bill, because it specifically says so, that the names on that list could and should be either union members or non-union members. How does the union deal with the non-union members? Is it fair for the non-union members to have their names on the union’s list? These are the sort of practical details we do not have to hand because we do not have a description of work orders and minimum service levels. That is the problem the Minister is having to deal with and is working very hard to do so.
I will look very hard at Hansard because I find it very difficult to understand how the Minister sees the unions and the workforce operating independently in a workplace. Leaving that to one side, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 21.
I will speak very briefly to this group of amendments; I will make no attempt to emulate the speeches from either the noble Lord, Lord Woodley, or the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady, who have great experience in the union movement.
In the Bill, there is a specific requirement for the unions “to take reasonable steps” to implement work orders. On these Benches, there is still no understanding of what “reasonable steps” actually means and what legal jeopardy unions would be in if they did, or did not do, particular activities. However, I characterise this collection of amendments as causing the employers to take reasonable steps not to victimise members of the union as a result of this legislation. Therefore, it adds a mirror to the reasonable steps that the unions have to observe, so that the employers should similarly observe the same steps—and I support the spirit in which the amendments have been delivered.
The noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady, mentioned private sector deliverers. Having read the letter from the noble Lord, Lord Markham, my reading is that he rules providers such as Amazon out of the remit of this legislation. It would be helpful if the Minister could confirm whether my interpretation is correct. I credit the noble Lord, Lord Markham, with coming to your Lordships’ House and participating in Committee. We had no such benefit of a Transport Minister, and we still do not know the position of private sector suppliers of services in the transport industry. While we seem to have an explicit ruling out of private sector deliverers in the health service, we have no such ruling out in the transport sector. Will the Minister, in responding to or confirming my interpretation of the letter from the noble Lord, Lord Markham, also tell us whether the similar and other deliverers of private sector services, which are crucial to the railway industry, will be included in the remit of the Bill, or, as in the health service, not included?
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this short debate: the noble Lords, Lord Collins, Lord Hendy, Lord Woodley and Lord Fox, and the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady.
Amendments 22 and 24 to 31 all relate to placing additional requirements on the process of issuing our famous work notice. It is the view of the Government that the current requirements in the Bill strike the right balance between the views and perspectives of employers and unions to enable a reasonable and fair work notice to be issued. The Bill explicitly requires that employers must consult a relevant trade union, and have regard to their views, before issuing a work notice. Additionally, work notices must not include more persons than are reasonably necessary to meet the minimum service level and employers, as I said earlier, must not have regard to whether a worker is or is not a member of a trade union when producing that work notice.
I respond, first, to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady, who waxed lyrical about Amazon warehouses. While it is possible for a private business to be in the scope of minimum service level regulations, if they provide a relevant service as specified within the regulations, I am happy to reassure the noble Baroness that the Government have no plans or intentions to apply minimum service levels to Amazon.
Amendment 22 tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Collins and Lord Hendy, and the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady, would limit the issuing of work notices to recognised trade unions only. However, it is of course possible that strikes can be called by recognised and unrecognised trade unions, which can lead to disproportionate impacts on the public. It is therefore our view that MSLs must be able to be applied where a union, recognised or not, provides a strike notice to an employer.
I move on to Amendments 24 to 31 from the noble Lord, Lord Collins, and noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady. Amendment 24 looks to ensure that employers cannot name more persons than necessary to secure the minimum level of service. However, it is already recognised that employers should not roster more people than are needed to achieve a minimum service level, so that some workers can continue to take strike action if they wish to—that is the whole principle of the Bill. That is why the Bill already requires employers not to identify more persons than are reasonably necessary. This enables the employer some limited flexibility in providing for contingency to respond on the day to any operational incidents, sickness or other types of absence. In our view, the existing approach strikes the right balance and provides sufficient safeguards for workers. To go further would limit or eliminate an employer’s flexibility, which could then mean that minimum service levels—the whole point of the legislation—would not be achieved.
Amendments 25 and 26 both look to ensure that each individual is able to go on strike for at least part of the period of the strike, notwithstanding any work notice. The Government resist these amendments for three reasons. First, the number of days on a strike notice could be substantial across both short and long periods for which the union has a mandate to strike. It is therefore reasonable that some workers may need to work more than 50% of those strike days, especially if their colleagues are off sick, on leave or attending training. Secondly, these amendments would cap the minimum service level and reduce the influence of the consultation, and those who respond to it, in the setting of the minimum service level. Thirdly, Amendment 26 appears to prevent any work notice being given where there is only one day given on a strike notice, which therefore creates a loophole which could be exploited—that may have been the purpose of the amendment.
Amendments 27 and 28 look to require the employer to ignore a person’s trade union activities or use of trade union services in deciding whether to identify a person in a work notice. However, we believe the Bill already sufficiently protects against any discrimination regarding a worker’s union status when employers are preparing their work notices. The trade union activity or services that a union member may have been involved in are connected to whether they are a union member, which, as we have already said, the employer must not have regard to.
Additionally, existing legislation—Section 146 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992—already provides a remedy for workers who are discriminated against on union grounds, and that section will continue to be applicable here. Therefore, we believe the amendment is duplicative in nature.
My noble friend Lord Woodley raised the issue of a health and safety rep, who does not necessarily have to be a union rep or even a union member but may well be victimised because of their activity in protecting workers. Will the Minister ensure that is explicitly addressed?
I do not accept the word “victimised”. A work notice effectively says that somebody has to fulfil their whole working contract as normal, whereby they come into work and get paid for it. That is not victimisation in any conventional sense of the word.
The Minister raises Section 146 of the 1992 Act, which protects against detriment on union grounds, as he rightly says. But “union grounds” means either union membership or union activity, and Section 151 is the same protection against dismissal on grounds of union membership or union activity. Can the Minister explain why only union membership is protected in this Bill and not union activity?
It is because, as we already said, Section 146 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act already provides a remedy for workers who are discriminated against on union grounds. That section will remain applicable here, as I said earlier.
I apologise for intervening again. The point is that Sections 146 and 151 specify membership and activities, whereas this Bill protects against discrimination on the grounds of union membership alone. If the same protection against union activity is required in Sections 146 and 151, it should be required here as well. The obvious implication, if you were arguing a case in court, is that that protection is not given under this Bill, otherwise it would have been included.
I will seek further legal advice. I am not a lawyer, but it seems to me that if the provision already exists in other applicable legislation, there is no need to duplicate that provision in another statute. I will certainly check that with the lawyers for the noble Lord.
Amendment 29 seeks to require the employers to be satisfied that the work notice does not identify more people than reasonably necessary before giving a work notice. However, as we set out in new Section 234C(5), the employer is already required to not identify more persons in the work notice than are reasonably necessary for the purposes of providing MSLs.
Amendment 30, meanwhile, seeks to require the employer to assess the equality implications of the work notice. Again, in our view, this is not necessary. The Bill does nothing to reduce the existing obligations of employers under the Equality Act 2010. As I said, there is an existing legal provision that continues to apply. There is no need to restate it.
Finally, Amendment 31 seeks to require the employer to assess the health and safety implications of the work notice and consult health and safety representatives. The Government’s view is that the current requirements in the Bill strike the right balance between the views and perspectives of employers and unions to enable a reasonable and fair work notice to be issued. As I have said, the Bill explicitly requires that employers must consult the relevant trade union and have regard to its views before issuing a work notice.
Adding any further steps or requirements to this process will result in disproportionate and costly burdens for employers and could result in delays to the issuing of a work notice by the employer and therefore delays to minimum service levels being applied. I fully accept that this may well be the purpose of the amendment, but I hope the Opposition understand why the Government cannot accept it. Additionally, when drawing up work notices, employers must still adhere to the relevant requirements set out in existing health and safety law. That is unchanged by this legislation.
For these reasons, the Government resist these amendments.
I thank the Minister—I think—for that response. Many of us raising legitimate concerns about this Bill are quite disturbed that the argument for naming individuals seems to be that you have to name individual workers so that they can be threatened with the sack and that it is necessary to share those names with employers so that they can be required to take reasonable steps or face significant sanctions, including seeing the entire workforce stripped of protection against unfair dismissal.
The whole basis of this Bill seems to be born of a “command and control” school of management where you order people to work rather than seek agreement, which I think most modern management is about. That is why it is particularly frustrating for those of us who are critics of the Bill, because we know that where minimum service levels are genuinely needed for safety issues and made by agreement, whether or not those agreements have been made at the last minute—so be it; that is often the case—they are much more likely to work effectively than anything proposed in this Bill.
I could make a number of points. I thank the Minister for his point about Amazon, but I feel I have now heard very confusing messages across this Dispatch Box from him and the noble Lord, Lord Markham, so I will want to come back and clarify that.
At some point I would like an opportunity to explain more clearly the real concerns in the trade union movement about victimisation and derecognition. They are not being brought up to put obstacles in the way of this Bill. They are born of real-life experience, both of trade union officers representing shop stewards, convenors and reps who have been victimised and of many of our families who have been through this. The penalty of victimisation is so high—to have your livelihood removed is massive. I would like to pursue this area in other ways if possible, because I am sure we can convince the Minister of the sincerity of that concern and the need for genuine protection.
It is confusing why there are specific references to not selecting people on the basis of trade union membership but not extending that to those who hold trade union office and lay leadership positions.
I could go on, but I will leave the Minister with one last question. I have yet to meet a reasonable employer who wants this Bill. I have had plenty queueing up to tell me that it is wrong, immoral or maybe just unworkable and will make matters worse from a pragmatic perspective. Can the Minister tell us of a single employer or group of employers batting for this Bill? I have yet to meet one. I beg leave to withdraw.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 41 in my name and the names of my noble friend Lord Collins and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London, and support the amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Hendy.
Many of us agree that one of the most disturbing features of the Bill is that it hands employers powers to name individual workers in a work notice and potentially force them to work against their will, through a strike, without their individual consent or the agreement of their union—or face the sack. Many employers in the public and private sectors have told us very clearly that they do not want this authoritarian power because it would sour industrial relations. If the Bill is enacted, they fear that they would come under undue political pressure to exercise that power. The publication of WhatsApp messages, as I mentioned previously, between the then Health and Education Ministers revealed that at the very same time as they were publicly praising, clapping and thanking key workers for their efforts during the pandemic, privately they were describing those same workers and their unions—unions are made up of workers—with contempt.
The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, has often sought to reassure us by saying that he hopes the powers will never be used and that there would be no undue pressure. However, I am sure that he would agree—I might even get a smile out of him—that if Gavin Williamson was Education Minister today, on the evidence of those WhatsApp messages, he would be straining at the leash to ensure that academy schools pulled that trigger. That is the fear.
The Government have continually cited France, Italy and Spain as countries that also provide minimum service levels. However, unlike in the UK, in each of these countries the right to strike is a constitutional right. Perhaps the noble Lord can also confirm which of these countries, if any, have provided a blanket power to remove protection against dismissal for individually named striking workers? I submitted a Written Question on this subject, but the response I received did not answer the Question. What is more, it took 15 days rather than the expected 10 not to answer my Question. In fact, the answer, as we have heard, is zero. None of those countries does that.
Can the Minister also explain and justify a gaping hole in the consultations issued on the Bill so far? Those consultations failed to ask whether respondents agree with the Government that it is acceptable to sack individual firefighters, ambulance staff and rail workers if, for example, for reasons of conscience they do not comply with the work notice. Could it possibly be that this is not in the consultation because Ministers know that they will not get the answer that they want? Most fair-minded people find the idea of such sackings abhorrent. The sacking of individually named workers who refuse to comply would be catastrophic for workers’ rights, staff morale and industrial relations in this country. I remind the Minister that NHS job vacancies currently stand at over 133,000 and that 17% of newly qualified teachers leave within two years.
Not so long ago, following a public outcry about what happened at P&O, Government Ministers condemned its scandalous behaviour, and rightly so. Ministers said then—I quote from the 24 January government press release—that unscrupulous employers
“must not use threats of dismissal to pressurise employees into accepting new terms”.
But the Bill provides powers to do exactly that: to pressurise key workers into accepting terms under threat of the sack. These key workers’ heroic work through the pandemic has earned the public’s respect and gratitude. One firefighter was moved to write a letter about his experiences. He says that he has been proud to work for the service for 15 years, including being deployed to Nepal following the devastating earthquakes in 2015; that he and his colleagues have a can-do attitude and have provided emergency cover voluntarily when needed through industrial action; and that they entered the service because they want to help people. He warns against this legislation and says that it is unnecessary, given that arrangements for emergency cover are already in place, and says that Ministers
“can’t simply legislate away the depth of anger and frustration we feel about how we’ve been treated. The Bill could lead to individual workers like me being sacked for taking part in legal and democratically decided industrial action over issues which are genuinely of concern to society in general.”
Taking the power to sack workers whose names are chosen unilaterally by employers, as sanctioned by Ministers, is understandably perceived as deeply provocative. If this firefighter refused to comply with the work notice, does the Minister really imagine that his colleagues would stand by and let him be sacked? Some argue that the Bill is intended to be provocative but, if so, that would be foolish. The provision to sack workers flies in the face of all industrial relations common sense and any sense of human decency.
I know that we are covering the same ground, but it is not just named individuals who could be vulnerable to the sack, as the Joint Committee on Human Rights made clear in its report:
“We find it hard to see how it is compliant with Article 11 ECHR to expose any participant in industrial action to the risk of dismissal simply because a trade union fails to take unspecified ‘reasonable steps’ required in respect of those subject to a work notice.”
I will not go on, but I look forward to the Minister's response—or, better still, an indication that this Government will remove that right to sack striking workers from the Bill.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. At the risk of provoking further interventions, I will start by replying to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. I do not know the legal definition of victimisation, but her understanding of it is clearly different from mine. I would define it as something like “subjecting an individual to degrading, unfair treatment”. In effect, a work notice says to an employee, “You fulfil your contract, as has been previously agreed, as normal. You come into work, do your normal contracted job and get paid for it.” In any definition that I understand, that is not victimisation. Obviously she has an alternative view, but I do not believe that it would come under the definition.
I will directly address the point by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady. I have said it before and will say it again: this legislation is not about sacking key workers. Let me be very clear about that. She inquired about the outline of the Bill: it is about protecting the lives and livelihoods of the public by enabling minimum service levels to be applied on a strike day. If people comply with the legislation, then there is no question of anybody being sacked on the basis of it.
This group of amendments seeks to ensure that no detrimental action could be taken by an employer against persons who are named on, but then fail to comply with, a work notice. There would be no consequences for participating in a strike despite being named on a work notice. The whole intention of these amendments is not to achieve a balance between the ability to strike and the rights and freedoms of the rest of us to go about our normal daily business—to get an ambulance, to attend the health service or to have a firefighter come to put out a fire in my property. This is about ensuring that strike action can continue with no consequence whatever and with no regard as to whether a minimum service level will be achieved. That fundamentally cannot be accepted by the Government.
For a minimum service level to be achieved, it strikes me as obvious that enough people need to attend work and therefore workers need to be appropriately incentivised to do that. The legislation achieves this by removing the automatic protection from unfair dismissal where employees participate in strike action despite being named on a work notice. While it is at the discretion of employers rather than the Government as to what, if any, action is then taken against employees in those circumstances, we think it vital that the Bill equips employers to manage instances of non-compliance, just as they would in any other case of unauthorised absence, to enable them to achieve that minimum service level. As my noble friend Lady Noakes observed, employees retain all their existing protections against discrimination—a very good point that further reinforces why these amendments are not required.
Overall, we believe that the approach in this legislation is fair and reasonable and ensures that there is the balance, which we have talked about so often, between the ability to strike and the rights and freedoms of everyone else to go about their daily business and use essential public services. Removing the ability for there to be any consequences whatever for failing to comply with a work notice would likely lead to strikes being more disruptive, as we have seen, when compared with the level of service that employers would be able to provide by applying a minimum service level that allows for these consequences.
Finally, there is a point of detail. Amendments 32 and 32A, if implemented, would cause a significant legal conflict with Part 2 of the Schedule, which makes amendments to the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 to make clear that there is no automatic protection from unfair dismissal for an employee who is identified in a valid work notice but participates in the strike contrary to that work notice.
In conclusion, I resist these amendments on the grounds that they seek to sustain or increase the disproportionate impact that strikes in these key areas can have on the public as a continuation of the status quo, a continuation of the public being disproportionately impacted by strikes and a continuation of lives and livelihoods being put at risk by those strikes. Therefore, I cannot accept these amendments.
With each group of amendments that passes, I get the impression that the area of carpet between me and the Minister is getting larger. The differences are getting larger rather than smaller, which is disappointing because sometimes in Committee they can be narrowed, but I do not get that sense. In describing the change in a person’s contract so that on one day they are able to strike with legal protections and on the next day that contract is unilaterally changed, I do not have to use the word “victimisation”. I can use some other word, perhaps “unfair” or “wrong”. That is the fundamental difference between me and the Minister, and that is what is causing the carpet to expand. Acknowledging that this was a probing amendment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
If I can elaborate even further, it is not necessarily the issue of being counterintuitive or not; if there is a voluntary agreement, both parties enter into that voluntary agreement with good faith. So if, as we have discussed many times before, safety is genuinely at risk and there are life and limb agreements, unions and employers work incredibly closely together to secure the consent of individual workers, and issue them with what we call exemptions to go across that picket line. That can all happen. But as soon as you introduce the law and remove that requirement for agreement, why is it our responsibility to make this work? It is not our responsibility; it is the employer’s responsibility. You cannot have it both ways. If we are going to have a voluntary agreement, we will do our best to honour and make that voluntary agreement work. If the state intervenes and dictates to workers under threat of dismissal, it simply will not work.
My Lords, I am grateful to those who have contributed to the debate.
It should go without saying that, to achieve a minimum service level, employers, employees and trade unions all have a part to play, and the Bill makes clear what those respective roles are. As many Members have quoted, unions are required to take “reasonable steps” to ensure that the union members named in the work notice comply with the notice. If they do not, they will lose protection from legal claims.
In response to the noble Lord, Lord Woodley, I say that there are a range of steps that trade unions could take, and what is considered reasonable can depend, as my noble friend Lady Noakes made clear, on each specific situation. First and foremost, a trade union should not call a union member identified in a work notice as required to work on a particular day out on strike that day. The trade union could also encourage those individual members to comply with the work notice and make it clear in its general communication with workers that, where members are named in a work notice and therefore required to work on a particular day, they should work on that particular strike day.
Before turning to the individual amendments, I will respond to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Fox, about what would happen if a number of the workforce are sick on the day of the strike. As I indicated to the noble Lord from a sedentary position, the responsibility of the unions is to take “reasonable steps”, as it says in the Bill. If union members named in a work notice are off sick, it is not the responsibility of the trade unions to find other members to take their place; it is the responsibility of employers to ensure that enough work notices are issued to fulfil that minimum service level.
Amendments 34 and 34A seek to diminish the responsibility of unions to take reasonable steps to ensure that their members who are named on a work notice actually attend work rather than participating in strike action. These amendments would remove any obligation on the trade unions to notify their members of the need to comply with a work notice and not to take part in the strike, which, in my view, would reduce the likelihood that a minimum service level will be maintained or achieved. Therefore, the Government are unable to accept them.
Amendment 33 goes further and seeks to ensure that unions have no responsibility whatever for ensuring that their members comply if they have been named on a work notice. It also ensures that there are no consequences for failing to meet that responsibility. I submit that that is an attempt to disrupt the balance between the ability to strike and the rights and freedoms of others, and therefore the Government cannot accept the amendment.
If a union member does not cross a picket line when identified on a work notice, this will of course negatively affect the employer’s ability to achieve the minimum service level at all. The picket line is usually a critical place for a union to exercise persuasion over its members, and we have seen some egregious examples of that. However, the Bill and the achievement of minimum service levels would be substantially undermined if the union’s obligations did not extend to picketing, and therefore we cannot accept Amendment 35.
The responsibility of the union to take reasonable steps is a continuing one, because the impact on the public is the same if a minimum service level is not achieved, whether or not that results from picketing activities. Therefore, the Government cannot accept these amendments, which would significantly reduce the responsibilities of trade unions. Our view, which is reflected in the legislation, is that they need to play their part in ensuring that essential services continue during strikes. As always, we encourage unions to act responsibly and to fulfil their statutory duty that will be established by the Bill if it becomes law. I therefore hope that the noble Lord, Lord Collins, will withdraw his amendment.
The simple fact is that the Minister tries to keep repeating a narrative that the Government are on the side of the public and, somehow, the Opposition are not. Actually, that is not the case, and, as I said before, the public will not be fooled.
I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Markham is here, because we had a discussion about the six sectors. There was a manifesto commitment on transport, but then that disappeared, especially when an impact assessment said that the law would not work and would prolong disputes, with greater impact on the public, so it is not worth doing. Now, we have had discussion about six sectors, a number of which have very strong voluntary agreements that work. Employers have told us that where people volunteer to do something, against their conscience, which is what we are talking about, it will be more effective. In the health service, NHS Providers is telling us that that is what it wants to do: it wants to ensure that people volunteer and that there are proper cover arrangements. What we are moving to here is compulsion, penalties and dismissal. It will have the complete opposite effect to what the Minister has said.
My Lords, at the risk of saying what I said earlier, if this amendment is not accepted by the Government, that presents a problem to the whole House as to what is to be done about Bills that do not conform to the elementary requirements of various committees, where detail is not published in the Bills but reserved to regulations. That problem will have to be confronted if the Government are not prepared to accept this very modest amendment, as my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti put it.
I thank noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. To start with the question from the noble Lord, Lord Collins, about the Government’s response to the reports from the Delegated Powers Committee, the Constitution Committee and the Joint Committee on Human Rights, I am happy to confirm that I expect to be able to respond to those reports before Report.
This amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Collins, and the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady, requires indicative minimum service levels to be set out before regulations can be made for that service. The Government recognise the importance of relevant parties having sight of a minimum service level before it is applied. That is why Secretaries of State must consult on minimum service level regulations and why Parliament will have an opportunity to contribute to the consultation and scrutinise those regulations, which are subject to the affirmative procedure, as I have said before.
The effect of this amendment is superfluous, given that all parties will be able to know the proposed minimum service levels once regulations are laid in the usual way. This approach ensures that the implementation of MSL is not significantly delayed, thereby not extending the disproportionate impact that strikes can have on the public. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Collins, and the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady, will understand, if not agree, why the Government cannot accept the amendment.
In light of those comments, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment so that we can move on to the next group, where we will have a much more comprehensive debate.
My Lords, as I set out in the previous group, which the noble Lord, Lord Fox, described as the amuse-bouche grouping, there are already sufficient checks and balances built into the legislation before any regulations can be made. These include the need to carry out consultations with key stakeholders, including employers, employees, relevant trade unions and their members, who are all encouraged to participate in the consultations—we have some of the regulations out for consultation at the moment—and have their say in setting minimum service levels before they come into effect.
Parliament, including Select Committees, will also have an opportunity to contribute to the consultation and scrutinise the regulations. The Government firmly believe that this is the right approach. It ensures that a wide range of views can be gathered. Parliament can scrutinise regulations without significantly delaying the implementation of MSLs and therefore extending the disproportionate impact that strikes can have on the public.
Amendments 42 to 48 all seek to amend the provisions to make consequential amendments. The Government resist these amendments on the grounds that Clause 3 is a fairly standard clause, used regularly in primary legislation. Let me explain to the Committee what it is for. The power to amend primary legislation within the clause is a standard power with standard wording. Perhaps it will be helpful to give some examples of where it is on the statute book already. It is in Section 182 of the Health and Care Act 2022, Section 47 of the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020, Section 23 of the Bus Services Act 2017—I am sorry that the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, is not here to hear that—and Section 66 of the Children and Social Work Act 2017. This power is not unique to legislation introduced under a Conservative Government. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Collins, that Section 51 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 also includes the same power. Additionally, the report, The Legislative Process: the Delegation of Powers, published by the Lords Select Committee on the Constitution in 2018, states:
“Delegating power to make provision for minor and technical matters is a necessary part of the legislative process … Delegated legislation, which is subject to less parliamentary scrutiny, should only be used to fill in the details.”
That is exactly what this power is intended for.
I remind noble Lords that the DPRRC did not draw attention to or raise concerns about this delegated power in its report published on 2 February. I know that it did on others, but it did not with this one. The power may be used only to make amendments to other legislation that are genuinely consequential on this Bill. It is there purely to ensure that the legal provisions within this Bill can be maintained after they have received Royal Assent. Therefore, the Committee will understand why I cannot support these amendments.
Amendment 48 seeks to remove the power for the Secretary of State to make consequential amendments to primary legislation made by the Scottish Parliament or the Senedd. The Government again resist this amendment on the grounds that the provisions of this Act will extend to England and Wales and Scotland. Employment rights and duties and industrial relations are reserved in respect of Scotland and Wales. Therefore, it is right that the Secretary of State has the power to make consequential amendments to primary legislation made by the Scottish Parliament or the Senedd, if required to ensure that the new legal framework operates in a coherent way across the entirety of Great Britain.
The disproportionate impacts that strikes can have are no less severe on people in Scotland or Wales than they are in England. They have every right to expect the Government to act to ensure that they can continue to access vital public services during strikes. The Government will of course engage with the devolved Administrations as appropriate. I have met devolved Ministers to discuss the Bill. Obviously, we will engage further if any consequential amendments are required to Acts of the Scottish Parliament or Welsh Assembly. As this clause is completely standard and has been introduced in several pieces of legislation, including by a previous Labour Government, I hope that noble Lords will feel able to withdraw or not move their unnecessary amendments.
Turning to Amendments 45 and 46, I believe that the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Collins, is to delay the commencement of regulations providing for minimum services until the Government have assessed the Bill’s impact on recruitment and retention in the public and private sectors, and the impact on those with protected characteristics. However, the amendments as drafted are to Clause 3, which provides a power to the Secretary of State to make consequential provision. Therefore, the amendments would delay commencement of regulations which make consequential amendments to other legislation.
Speaking to what I believe is the intended purpose of the amendment, I say that the Government resist it. As I have already set out in my response to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, the Secretary of State must consult on regulations, and they must be approved by both Houses before they can be made.
Impact assessments will be published for all subsequent regulations on minimum service levels and will, as always, contain a public sector equality duty assessment. I also draw noble Lords’ attention to the already published impact assessments for the Bill and currently ongoing consultations on establishing minimum service levels in ambulance, fire and rescue, and rail services, all of which contain public sector equality duty assessments. I hope that I have convinced noble Lords to withdraw and not move their amendments.
I thank noble Lords for their contributions to the debate on this group. I am particularly grateful to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds for painting a picture of King Henry VIII strutting across the Field of the Cloth of Gold on a pair of stilts.
My Lords, I get the impression that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, did not necessarily want to associate himself with the whole Bill, but was asking questions about who was included and excluded and why.
From our Labour perspective, one of the key worries about the Bill has been: are we going to see executive powers taken to add in sectors at different stages without proper scrutiny, proper accountability or consultation? Many see this as an attempt to ban strikes, a fundamental human freedom, through the back door. It might get to the stage where it would be easier to have a list of sectors not covered as opposed to those that are.
We oppose this amendment; fundamentally, because it fails to address the root causes of the problems people face. I hesitate to advise the noble Lord, who knows far more about this than I do, but since 2010 we have seen police funding cut by £1 billion. We have seen huge cuts to police officer numbers of 20,000 and a similar number of support staff being cut. In the Casey report, it was pointed out that those cuts in support staff were having a direct impact on police officers, who were having to cover that work too and that impacts the effectiveness of the service.
It seems to me that these are far bigger issues at a time when so many staff in the police service and elsewhere are facing real-terms pay cuts year after year, which have a real impact on morale, recruitment, retention and our ability to deliver the high-quality service that we all want to see. My sense is that it would be much better to focus on tackling the root causes of concern and discontent rather than suppressing the symptoms.
I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to the debate and in particular my noble friend Lord Greenhalgh and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for their amendment.
This amendment seeks to require the Government to undertake a review into whether and to what extent the legislation has met its objectives and whether the legislation should be extended to additional services, particularly police support services. On completion of the review, the report would be laid in Parliament. The Government are committed to reviewing the impact of the Bill within five years of when the first secondary legislation comes into force. Given that the detail of minimum service levels will be set out in the regulations that follow the Bill, this is an appropriate approach and timeframe.
On the specific point about extending the Bill to additional services, it is worth repeating that the key sectors covered by the Bill are broadly the same set of services that were listed as important public services in the Trade Union Act 2016, which have long been recognised as being important for society to function effectively. The 2016 Act did not include policing, in part because the prohibition on police officers taking strike action meant that this was not felt necessary.
Police staff across the country make an exceptional contribution to policing and we are grateful for the professionalism and dedication they show in their work. Police staff, including police community support officers and other members of the police workforce who do not have warranted powers, have no restrictions on their right to take industrial action and there are no provisions currently in place to provide minimum service levels. However, chief constables have a statutory duty under the Civil Contingencies Act to ensure that plans are in place to maintain key services when instances such as a strike occur. When police staff have taken strike action in the past, police forces have put in place plans to ensure resilience among their police officer workforce to ensure that essential front-line services are maintained.
Similar responsibilities apply in the fire service, in respect of the Civil Contingencies Act, so why is it necessary to include fire services in the Bill?
The context for the police is clearly different from that for the fire service, in that the vast bulk of police officers, as described by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, are covered by the provisions of the earlier legislation precluding them from striking. As we discussed, this puts them and the force in a different category.
Contingency plans are largely based on the redeployment of police officers to cover operational staff roles. Police officers are of course prohibited from participating in strike action and, therefore, chief constables are able to meet any such obligations under the Civil Contingencies Act. I hope that goes some way to address the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. The Government currently have no intention to add to the sectors covered by the Bill, and any future amendments would require separate primary legislation.
The Minister’s point—that arrangements are being put in place for police officers to backfill—is fair, but there are two problems: if you have fewer and fewer cops who can be in the control room all the time, you have to keep them trained, and then you have to withdraw them from the street, which is a significant diminution. First, if you have to train them every year, that costs money and takes time—and then you presumably have to withdraw them when there is some kind of action. For me, it is not a reassuring answer to say that police officers can just backfill, because I am afraid that they cannot without training or experience in this vital part of the service.
The contingency plans are of course already enabled in the Civil Contingencies Act and, although this situation would be less preferable than the one that prevails in a non-strike scenario, it would be successful in the Government’s view. Furthermore, in the event that police staff take strike action, or when they have taken strike action in the past, police forces will or have put in place plans to ensure resilience among their police officer workforce, to ensure that essential front-line services are maintained. However, as noble Lords would expect, we will keep under review the sectors that we are discussing in this debate, and will not hesitate to take further action if we judge that necessary.
I will briefly address some of the specific points raised by noble Lords. Clearly, from the Government’s perspective, we accept that the points raised by the noble Lord address a broader class of people—of police auxiliaries, if I might style them like that—than just those in call handling. Of course, he made a good point that this goes across the piece; the vital work done by broader police staff is something we should consider.
The noble Lord raised points in relation to His Majesty’s Coastguard. I confirm that the Department for Transport is still considering which other sectors minimum service levels may apply to. Therefore, the position on applying MSLs to coastguard services will be kept under review, and any decision regarding these services will of course be subject to consultation. Similarly, my noble friend Lord Greenhalgh made some powerful points about the importance of auxiliary staff in this context, and I take those very much on board.
As to the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, I can confirm that there was consultation with other government departments prior to the selection of the list described in the Bill.
Turning to the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady, this is clearly not an attempt to ban strikes. The key sectors covered in the Bill are broadly the same set of services as those listed in the Trade Union Act 2016, which have long been recognised as being important for society to function effectively. Strike action in these sectors has the potential for far-reaching consequences for members of the public who are not in any way involved in the dispute, and it is only right that these sectors are included within the scope of the legislation.
For all those reasons I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
I am grateful for the Minister’s reply and for the contribution of other noble Lords. I was not sure whether the Minister said that the Home Office or other departments had been consulted, but I will let that rest. I am grateful for the consideration and take his point that there will be further review in due course, be it the police or the coastguard. I am content to withdraw the amendment.