Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement, albeit in the graveyard shift: she could have got in a bit earlier. Having read through the details of the events of the last weekend, I can understand why the Statement veers towards the slightly triumphalist: the sale of Silicon Valley Bank to HSBC averted existential problems for a huge number of UK tech businesses, and I am sure the Minister and colleagues are pleased to have done this. We should congratulate the Treasury and the Bank of England, as well as Coadec, Tech London Advocates and BVCA on the industry side, all of which came together very swiftly over the weekend. But where do we go from here?
First, can the Minister confirm that there will be a full investigation, both to confirm how this happened and, more importantly, what lessons can be drawn? One lesson we can all observe is that bank runs in the social media age happen in hours rather than days: the speed with which the run on this bank happened points, I think, to future issues if we ever came to them. As we know, Silicon Valley Bank’s UK wing oversaw roughly £7 billion in deposits from 3,000 entities across the country’s important tech industries and, contrary to US reports, it was not ring-fenced from its US parent. My first specific question is how we ended up in a situation where a huge proportion of a vital sector of the UK economy was reliant on one regional US bank. I am sure the answer is not simple, but it is important. For example, accessing connections to venture capital may have led banks to SVB, but there is also evidence that the traditional UK banks just do not have the appetite to take up this kind of business. Where will the tech start-ups go now for funding, especially in an environment where capital is getting more scarce?
History tells us that, when interest rates rise as fast and by so much as they have during the past period, bad things nearly always happen. It is a near certainty that one of two outcomes will occur: recession or a bank crash—sometimes both. I am sure we all hope that the failure of SVB, the closure of Signature Bank and the Tory-created crisis in UK government bonds and the pension sector are just outliers and do not herald something worse. They may, indeed, be one-offs; however, it seems to me that the Government, the Treasury and the Bank of England have to err on the side of caution. Can the Minister assure us that the tone of this announcement does not indicate a sense in our financial institutions that their work is done?
The SVB crash epitomises the risks buried in our financial system as central banks rapidly lifted borrowing costs. SVB’s unhedged investments in long-term, fixed-rate, government-backed debt securities left it doubly exposed to rising interest rates because it reversed tech companies’ growth and hit the price of its securities. There may be other issues that unwind when investigation of this bank carries on—we will have to wait and see—but how did the US regulators miss the issue at the heart of SVB? Since the 2008 financial crisis, the focus has been on liquidity, although I would suggest that not even that has been particularly successful. Interest rates have grabbed little attention because they had not posed a significant threat in recent decades, but they do now.
Can the Minister confirm that the Government have asked the Bank of England to review the stress tests it conducts in order to take into consideration the rapid rise in interest rates? Can the Minister confirm that the tests will be extended into the so-called shadow banking sector, which is increasingly grabbing large slices of business traditionally carried out by banks? Can the Minister also assure your Lordships’ House that the necessary horizon scanning is under way?
I do not think anyone predicted the LDI issue in the autumn, and I do not think anyone pointed to a sector-focused regional bank like SVB being the source of a crisis. So where could the next crisis come from? I can offer three options in the current environment: insurance funds investing in illiquid assets; overvalued real estate; and private equity funds with opaque valuations. I am sure the big brains in the Treasury will be much better at navigating the complex and interwoven investment landscape and come up with a better list to enable them to avoid unpleasant surprises. Can the Minister confirm that there are people digging down into the systemic risks which are buried deep inside the highly complex finance systems and finance products that exist around the world today?
At the heart of this is also politics. Republicans have loosened US bank regulations in recent years and banks such as SVB had previously lobbied successfully to be excluded from the category of systemically important banks—that meant they faced lower capital and liquidity standards. We are not immune from the same political pressures in this country. The Edinburgh reforms announced late last year also point towards deregulation, not least in the plan to reform the ring-fencing regime for banks.
But more than that, and as the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, referred to, we can see this trend in the Financial Services and Markets Bill that is currently being debated by your Lordships. For example, Clause 24 in that Bill requires the FCA to help drive the international competitiveness of the economy of the United Kingdom, in particular the financial services sector—help drive the competitiveness of the economy. This creates a huge conflict of interest within the FCA, and in light of the SVB it looks at least questionable. Can the Minister confirm that this clause will be reviewed with a view to future amendment when the Bill comes back on Report?
Finally, after 2008 the Government and the financial sector all said “Never again”, and there were significant changes to the banking regulations; much of this was based on a report led by Sir John Vickers. Speaking today on the BBC, Sir John said that the country made advances in 2009 and we must not row back on these advances. He explicitly said that the Edinburgh reforms should be reviewed again and that ring-fencing should be maintained. I would remind the Minister that, failing anything better, the Government are the scrutiniser in chief, and the buck stops with the Government. Will the Minister listen to Sir John and halt the slide towards deregulation in this country?
The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Penn) (Con)
My Lords, as noble Lords have recognised, the course of events over the weekend was a good outcome for the customers of Silicon Valley Bank in the UK and an example of the Bank of England, in consultation with the Treasury, using powers granted by the Banking Act 2009, as part of the post-crisis reforms, to safely manage the failure of a bank and, in this case, facilitate its sale, which has protected those customers and taxpayers. I add my thanks to both noble Lords’ to the officials in the Treasury and at the regulators who worked tirelessly through the weekend to grip the situation and prevent real jeopardy to hundreds of the UK’s most innovative companies.
The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked whether any assessment was made of the significant liquidity risks associated with SVB UK’s deposit base at the time its licence was granted. Those authorisation decisions are for the independent regulators to comment on. However, requiring SVB to subsidiarise meant that it was independently capitalised from its parent in the US and had its own liquidity buffers. That brought the firm into the scope of the UK’s resolution regime. Had SVB UK remained a branch, it would have been resolved by the US resolution authority as part of action taken with respect to SVB.
That distinction is important to make in relation to a few of the points from the noble Lord, Lord Fox, in looking at the potential differences between the regulation and the regime in the US and the regime in the UK. However, there is read-across between the two. That is why we have measures in place to ensure that banks that are of systemic risk to different jurisdictions have cross-jurisdiction oversight, and that regulators work together on these matters.
The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, also asked about the ring-fencing changes made to facilitate the sale. To ensure the sale could proceed, the Government used powers under the Banking Act to provide HSBC with an exemption to certain ring-fencing requirements. This was crucial to ensure that a successful transaction could be executed, that the bank had the liquidity it needs, and that deposits and public funds were protected. We broadened an existing exception in the ring-fencing regime, allowing HSBC’s ring-fenced bank to provide intragroup lending to SVB UK. This should facilitate the smooth operation of SVB UK. In addition, SVB UK, which is now a subsidiary of HSBC’s ring-fenced bank, is not subject to the ring-fencing rules.
Both noble Lords spoke about the importance of doing everything possible to ensure that there is confidence in the UK’s financial system. We absolutely agree with the importance of that, which is why the UK authorities took such swift and decisive action this weekend to facilitate the sale of the firm. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, noted how quickly events unfolded. It is certainly true that the timeline including the weekend gave the time and space for such a resolution to be found, but that only adds to the point about the speed at which these events can take place.
Both noble Lords also asked about the stress test system for banks and about launching a wider systemic review of the risks facing the financial sector, including non-bank risks. Of course, both noble Lords will know that that is the role of the Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England, which is responsible for identifying, monitoring and addressing systemic risks to financial stability.
The FPC meets quarterly, following which a record of its discussions is published. It produces a biannual financial stability report setting out its assessment of the risks facing the financial system and its resilience. It looks at it for the non-banking sector, but also sets the scenarios and coverage used for stress tests within the banking sector. Those decisions remain with the Financial Policy Committee.
Both noble Lords also rightly pointed out that, while we reached a good resolution in this instance, it is of course right that we reflect on what happened and look at whether any lessons can be learned. I can confirm that the Treasury and the Bank of England are looking to work together to ensure that we reflect properly on the events in this case.
Finally, both noble Lords also referenced the reforms that we are currently taking through this House in the Financial Services and Markets Bill and through the wider Edinburgh reforms set out by the Chancellor in December. I assure all noble Lords that the Financial Services and Markets Bill introduces ambitious reforms for a financial services sector that will give the UK the ability to continue to grow and be internationally competitive with other markets, while adhering to the highest-quality regulatory standards. As my honourable friend the Economic Secretary to the Treasury said to the House of Commons yesterday, having good, healthy businesses that grow and are profitable is the best way to avoid jeopardy. The Bill and the Edinburgh reforms deliver that commitment. We are confident that our reforms will deliver a high-quality regulatory environment for our financial services sector in future.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)
I know it is unconventional, but will the Minister advise us whether the lessons learned report is going to be published?
Lord Fox (LD)
The Minister is getting a job lot of questions. I was hoping to hear her say that the shift in danger has gone from being just about liquidity to being about a lot of things connected with interest rates. We saw that in the autumn and again this week. When I suggested that the Treasury talk to the Bank of England about stress tests, I was suggesting not that the Treasury did the stress testing but that we would all be much more comfortable if we knew that shift had been taken on board and would inculcate future stress tests.
Baroness Penn (Con)
The point I was trying to make is that I am sure the Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England will want to consider that. It updates its approach to stress testing both for banks and in its wider assessment of the risks to the financial sector more broadly. The noble Lord is not wrong in painting a picture of a changed context. We can also look at it for LDI, for example. While that is something for the FPC to take forward, I recognise the noble Lord’s points about that changed context. I hope that the points I made about how it holds its meetings and provides transparency about its considerations will reassure noble Lords about that process.
I will have to come back to the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, about the lessons learned and whether this reflection will be published. I do not know what form it will take. With the LDI process, interim findings have already been made public for people to take forward, but there is also further work. I imagine that a similar process may be followed here, but I will confirm this to noble Lords.
Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)
My Lords, I have been reading paragraph 11 of this Statement against paragraph 17. Paragraph 11 rather surprisingly says that
“the system worked as we would hope.”
Paragraph 17 notes that officials at the Treasury and regulators
“worked tirelessly through the weekend to grip the situation … and to prevent real jeopardy to hundreds of the UK’s most innovative companies.”—[Official Report, Commons, 13/3/23; cols. 560-61.]
As the noble Lord, Lord Fox, observed, it was lucky that it was a weekend. We surely do not want to have our financial sector and the stability of our economy dependent on that kind of luck.
Paragraph 11 states:
“the system worked as we would have hoped.”
If this is really how the system is supposed to work, I suggest that we need a new or at least significantly reformed system—a more secure, stable, less fragile system than what followed the collapse of the Silicon Valley Bank at the weekend. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, talked about the speed at which events happen these days. There is a Bloomberg article headlined, “The Digital Age Ushers In A Speedier, More Viral Breed of Bank Run”, and I think that was clearly demonstrated here.
The Minister mentioned the Financial Services and Markets Bill, which refers to maintaining the UK’s position as an open and global financial hub. Have not the events of the weekend demonstrated the extreme dangers of pushing that as far as we possibly can, and the dangers of Clause 24, on the competitiveness of UK markets, which the Finance Innovation Lab, among many others, has noted is a push towards deregulation—to reduce regulation and increase risk—when it is clear we cannot afford the amount of risk we have now, as demonstrated by this case and the events involving our pensions last October? As we speak, the situation with Credit Suisse in Europe is still very unclear, as is that of a number of US banks.
Will the Government take a real look at the Financial Services and Markets Bill and their positioning of the UK’s financial sector, and look for a safe, secure sector that meets the needs of the real economy, rather than chasing growth?
Baroness Penn (Con)
On the noble Baroness’s final point, I do not think that those two aims need to contradict each other. In fact, the Financial Services and Markets Bill aims to deliver on both. I emphasise to the House the importance of a healthy financial services sector to growing our economy in all parts of our country. I point out to the noble Baroness that no one has said that the events over the weekend have brought into question the UK’s prudential regulatory regime and the protections we have put in place.
However, the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, about the changing context and being able to remain dynamic in our assessment of the risks and, therefore, in looking at how our system works, is absolutely right. The world changes very quickly and there is absolutely no room for complacency here. But do I think that the reforms we are proposing in the Bill are right? Do I think they will both promote growth in the UK and protect the safety and soundness of our system? I do, and we will continue to strike that balance as we take our reforms forward.
Lord Grantchester (Lab)
Although the main reason for Silicon Valley Bank’s collapse may be its poor handling of the bond market, whether or not augmented by aggressive raising of interest rates by the Fed in the US and turbulence from the Truss era in London, nevertheless, the fact that the bank’s business was focused on new technology and innovation has raised some alarm. Can the Minister give the House an assurance that the technology sector, with its own stresses, has been protected by the transfer to the safe haven of HSBC, and that the drive to net zero and the raising of finance for that imperative has not been impeded in any way?
Baroness Penn (Con)
I can absolutely reassure the House that all depositors’ money with SVB UK is safe and secure as a result of the transaction. The noble Lord is right that many of SVB UK’s customers represented large parts of the tech sector in the UK. Part of the success of securing that sale means that they can continue with their business and with investing in innovative solutions to challenges such as net zero, confident that their banking services remain in place.