Draft Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Amendment of List of Responders) Order 2023
(1 year, 3 months ago)
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The Minister for Veterans’ Affairs (Johnny Mercer)
I beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Amendment of List of Responders) Order 2023.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. The order was laid before the House on 6 December. I think we all agree on the importance of improving the UK’s resilience, and the recently published resilience framework illustrates the need for clear roles and responsibilities in order to drive planning activity across the risk lifecycle.
This statutory instrument will provide for exactly that by creating the legal basis for improved co-operation, information sharing and integration between both the Meteorological Office and Coal Authority and the wider list of categorised organisations operating at local level in the United Kingdom. It will deliver those important changes by making both organisations category 2 responders as defined under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, in turn bolstering the planning activities conducted by local resilience forums in England, a further commitment of the new resilience framework. That will ensure that they are well integrated in wider emergency planning frameworks, able to collaborate in the development of localised risk assessments, and contribute information and expertise to support local resilience forums—otherwise known as LRFs—in planning for and responding to emergencies.
Both organisations hold information and experience that is integral to the process of civil protection, with the Met Office able to support effective management of severe weather risks and the Coal Authority positioned to ensure that due consideration is given to the unique risks presented by our industrial heritage. Approximately 25% of property across the UK is located on a coalfield, and the Coal Authority responds to a wide range of incidents—including but not limited to subsidence, sudden ground collapses, emissions of water or gas, coal tip slips as well as metal mine pollution incidents, with extreme weather often heightening the likelihood of those risks materialising.
The Civil Contingencies Act, also known as the CCA, was introduced in 2004 following a review of emergency planning arrangements as a result of the fuel crisis and severe flooding in 2000, as well as the outbreak of foot and mouth disease in 2001. That Act establishes a framework for civil protection in the UK. It imposes a clear set of roles and responsibilities on those organisations with a role to play in preparing for and responding to emergencies.
Category 1 responders are those organisations that collectively form the core of local emergency preparedness and response. They include emergency services, local authorities, health bodies—including NHS England, foundation trusts and integrated care boards—His Majesty’s Coastguard and Government agencies. Category 1 responders are subject to the full set of statutory civil protection duties, including assessing risks to inform contingency planning, warning and informing the public, and putting in place business continuity arrangements.
Category 2 organisations, which include the Health and Safety Executive and utilities and transport operators, are “co-operating bodies” and, although less likely to be involved in the heart of planning work, are heavily involved in incidents that affect their own sector. Category 2 responders have a statutory duty to co-operate and share relevant information with other category 1 and 2 responders. The Act and regulations made under it create the basis for these organisations to collaborate through LRFs, where all responders can come together to ensure effective multi-agency emergency preparation and response. Regulations made under the CCA also place a duty on responders to help to co-ordinate risk assessment at their local level through the production of the community risk register, which ensures that the LRF members hold a consistent understanding of the hazards and threats across their area.
The CCA is reviewed every five years. The most recent post-implementation review was laid before the house in March 2022 and proposed the categorisation of the Met Office and Coal Authority as one of its key recommendations. The Met Office and Coal Authority perform important functions in preparing for and responding to risks associated with extreme weather events and the coalmining legacy. Recent examples include several heatwaves in 2022, a number of floods in recent weeks and, in the past few days, a sinkhole that has opened up in Caerphilly. The two organisations have significant expertise and technical knowledge in their respective fields and provide critical support, such as severe weather warnings, hazard assessments, training and response planning.
Although the organisations already work closely with local partners, our consultation and engagement with LRFs indicated that without their integration in the legal framework, that work was taking place in an inconsistent or ad hoc way. Categorising the organisations will ensure that they are able to systematically share information and co-operate with local resilience forums across the UK in a more regulated and structured way. Ultimately, that will improve the preparedness of local partnerships to respond to incidents related to coal mining or severe weather and strengthen their ability to protect the public and save lives.
The instrument is being made using powers set out in section 13(1) of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, which allows a Minister of the Crown to amend the list of categorised responders. It will add the Met Office and the Coal Authority to the list “Category 2 Responders: General” under part 3 of schedule 1 to the Act. Importantly, these amendments do not add significant financial burdens to the Met Office or the Coal Authority, as the organisations are already equipped to perform these additional duties under their current budgets, with a de minimis impact assessment completed in December 2022.
The provisions will be implemented across the UK, and we have consulted officials from the devolved Administrations throughout the process. We have also formally notified each Administration, via ministerial letters, of our intention to lay the instrument, and all devolved Administrations were supportive of the inclusion of these agencies as categorised responders for the whole United Kingdom. I thank each Administration for their engagement and collaboration.
I hope that colleagues will join me in supporting the draft regulations, and I commend them to the Committee.
Fleur Anderson (Putney) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this morning, Mr Twigg. I am pleased to be speaking to this statutory instrument.
Labour will be supporting the instrument; these two additions to the list of responders—the Coal Authority and the Met Office—are sensible and necessary. However, the legislation gives rise to more questions over the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and how ready we as a country are for the next major emergency. Two of the questions raised by the legislation are: why is it so late, and why are only two more organisations being added to the list?
The Civil Contingencies Act is an excellent piece of legislation and a Labour invention, introduced in 2004, but it is important to note that the Government at the time recognised that it would need to change and adapt over time. Between 2004 and 2010, the Government attempted to improve and develop it; sadly, since 2010 it has been left to gather dust and deprioritised by successive Conservative Governments. This is only the second SI introduced on the Act in the past 10 years, despite all the threats and dangers that we have faced and the learning from them, including the pandemic. The changes made on those occasions were piecemeal and fairly inconsequential.
It is not just the Opposition saying that. I have been speaking to experts for over a year now and finding out more and more about this interesting and necessary field of government. Those experts include members of the National Preparedness Commission, who are also concerned about the lack of proactive development of civil contingencies policy since 2010.
The Minister highlighted the national resilience framework published by the Government just before Christmas, and there is also the post-implementation review of the Civil Contingencies Act that was carried out last year. Notwithstanding the fact that it was late, why is this just a framework? Why is it not a strategy, as originally promised? Where is the detail and the meat behind it? More to the point, why has it taken a deadly pandemic to force any kind of action or review of the Act? The whole point of civil contingencies is to continually plan ahead, think ahead and deliver ahead, but all the Government seem to do is react when it is too late.
I return to the purpose of the instrument. It is all well and good adding these two further organisations to the list of responders but, going ahead, a more fundamental issue needs to be addressed: communication between all these responders. As the National Preparedness Commission has pointed out in its review of the Act, the mechanism for effectively building relationships between the local resilience forums and the category 2 responders—all responders—that can work in a crisis is very weak. The Minister highlighted the often inconsistent and ad hoc nature of that. In fact, the report says that category 2 responders are seen as second-class citizens, which is eroding the sense of partnership on which resilience depends. Resilience depends entirely on partnerships that spring into action to prepare and deliver in an emergency. We saw that most acutely during the pandemic, with whole sectors brought into the covid-19 response on a scale never seen before.
I advocate a shift in the Government’s thinking towards investing more in improving the relationship between category 1 and category 2 responders, and supporting local resilience forums. We could add as many organisations as we wanted to the list, but if they were not ready and had little or no relationship with category 1 responders, it would all be pointless. On that point of adding more organisations, does the Minister plan to do that? Will we be back again next week and the week after?
The National Preparedness Commission has recommended adding several more organisations to the list, including the Animal and Plant Health Agency, the Food Standards Agency, the internal drainage boards, operators of COMAH and REPPIR sites—under the control of major accident hazards, and the radiation emergency preparedness and public information regulations—the UK oil pipeline system, the Oil and Pipelines Agency, the Crown Estate, and St John Ambulance and other charitable ambulance services. It further recommended that the status of the British Red Cross as an auxiliary to the UK Government, with its particular and valuable capabilities in planning, needs assessment and humanitarian assistance for emergencies, should be recognised in statutory guidance.
Does the Minister intend to bring forward further instruments to add more agencies to that important list? What other reforms are being brought forward following the post-implementation review?
To summarise, we support the draft instrument, but it cannot end here. A lot more work needs to be done in this area, and we need to go further and deeper if we are to get an Act that delivers on its purpose of keeping all British residents and citizens safe. I will be grateful for the Minister’s thoughts on the questions I have asked.
Edward Timpson (Eddisbury) (Con)
It is a pleasure to be able to speak about this important draft statutory instrument. I welcome the extension of the list of responders under the Civil Contingencies Act.
In reading the explanatory notes, which is always a pleasure on these occasions, I noticed that the expansion of the list, to include the Coal Authority as one of named responders, would have no practical effect in Northern Ireland, so that part of the United Kingdom will not be covered. Will my hon. Friend the Minister clarify whether that leaves any potential gaps in the ability of that area of civil contingency to be met in that part of the United Kingdom?
Johnny Mercer
I thank my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Eddisbury and the hon. Member for Putney for their contributions. I hope to answer some of their questions.
I can only apologise for the fact that between 2004 and 2010 everything was absolutely perfect and that since 2010 it has been a total car crash. I have no idea why that might have happened; I am sure it has nothing to do with the change of Government.
Let me answer a couple of questions. The framework sets out the Government’s intention to make fundamental improvements to UK resilience, but the hon. Member for Putney wants a detailed strategy to get into, so I will write to her with that. I will ensure that she understands clearly what that strategy is. That is extremely important.
Why does the draft order include only two additions to the list? There is always a balance in getting organisations into these things: ensuring that those critical to local resilience planning are on the list, without it being too onerous. There can always be arguments about why there are only two additions and why there are not more, but that is where the line has been drawn at the moment.
On the legislation being late, we have an obligation to review every five years, but we may review and amend at any time. It is fair to say that it is important that we allow lessons to be learned from covid. As for adding more organisations—as much as I have enjoyed this morning, I have no plans to come back next week to do the same thing—this is an ongoing process. On the issue of when the situation changes, the Government have demonstrated flexibility with this review by updating the framework and adding the Coal Authority and the Met Office to the list, to ensure that the legislation is appropriate and responds the challenges we face under the Civil Contingencies Act.
My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Eddisbury asked a very good question about Northern Ireland—to which I do not know the answer, I am afraid. I will write to him with the details. The draft order has been agreed across the devolved authorities—it is important to make that clear. Elected representatives in Northern Ireland are happy that this is covered and the same effects are achieved, but to ensure that I get the answer right, I will write to him about the specific levers used in Northern Ireland to achieve the same outcome.
To conclude, the Civil Contingencies Act delivers a strong framework for protection in the UK. Categorising the Met Office and the Coal Authority as responders strengthens that framework further and recognises the integral role of those organisations in national preparedness. I hope that colleagues will join me in supporting the draft order, which I commend to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Plant Health and Trade in Animals and Related Products (Amendment) Regulations 2022
(1 year, 3 months ago)
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The Minister for Food, Farming and Fisheries (Mark Spencer)
I beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the Plant Health and Trade in Animals and Related Products (Amendment) Regulations 2022 (SI 2022, No. 1367).
Ms Cummins, we often use these words, but it is a true pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. Protecting our biosecurity is of paramount importance, and we are correcting some deficiencies that have arisen from our EU exit. This instrument ensures the effective operation of the biosecurity regime in Great Britain by making amendments to the plant health legislation.
It is urgent that we move this legislation now. A recent outbreak of plant disease near the Welsh-English border has highlighted a gap in the legislation, which prevents an authority in one territory of Great Britain from establishing a demarcated area based on the findings of a pest disease in another territory. Additionally, the withdrawal Act powers required to make changes in this instrument were due to sunset on 31 December, so we needed to address the identified deficiency before that date.
I turn to the details of the instrument. First, it ensures that all relevant pests are included in the legislation for the application of demarcated areas. It also allows authorities in Great Britain to co-operate with one another. Authorities are then permitted to take measures in their own territory. Amendments are additionally made to domestic legislation in England, Scotland and Wales to allow notices to be served to establish demarcated areas in those instances. Given the urgency of the instrument, the Scottish and Welsh Government Ministers have formally consented for the amendments to be made on their behalf. The animal health instrument is also corrected to ensure the transfer of functions from the EU Commission to the appropriate authority in Great Britain. I am pleased to say that the devolved Administrations have also given their consent for those regulations to extend across the whole of Great Britain.
To conclude, I emphasise that the regulations ensure that effective biosecurity controls are in operation within Great Britain. They also enable co-ordinated action between the territories within Great Britain to manage any outbreaks of certain pests. I commend the regulations to the Committee.
Daniel Zeichner (Cambridge) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Ms Cummins. You will be glad to hear that my comments today will be brief, and we will not be opposing this statutory instrument. That is not only because it is a clean-up measure, essentially—I love the Minister’s language and will remember “It’s a deficiency!” the next time I make a mistake—but because on Monday evening we had a bit of a marathon with some SIs. This one is much simpler.
Today, we debate the amendments made by the Plant Health and Trade in Animals and Related Products (Amendment) Regulations 2022. I read at the top of the page with interest that this statutory instrument has been made in consequence of defects—the “deficiencies” —in a series of SIs. I looked a bit more closely at that first one—2020 1482—which was discussed with the Minister’s predecessor, I think, back in 2020. I looked back to my opening comments then, and my notes said, “Very lengthy. Hundreds of pages—much room for error.” It seems that I was a touch prescient.
However, I make no criticism of those tasked with this complicated work. I would just gently point out to the Government the scale of the challenge if they seek to rush to amend many hundreds of these complicated regulations; there will inevitably be mistakes.
Sir Oliver Heald (North East Hertfordshire) (Con)
Does the hon. Gentleman want to pay tribute to the work of the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, because it actually spotted this?
Daniel Zeichner
Absolutely, and I must say that as I delve through the various papers, I admire the in-depth work of the various Committees, which is so useful, particularly for an Opposition spokesperson, as we come to these discussions. I generally quote them at length, and I commend them for the work that they do.
I turn to the substance. It is welcome that the problems facing devolved authorities when seeking to collaborate in the face of a Great Britain-wide pest outbreak are being addressed. I am grateful to the Horticultural Trades Association, whose advice I sought on this, for confirming that it is necessary and important because the change will allow the demarcated areas to cross boundaries between Administrations, with the competent authorities working as one. That, apparently, was not possible before, preventing authorities from introducing a demarcated area within their own territory if a pest is identified in another, which limited the authority of that unaffected territory implementing necessary prevention measures.
The explanatory notes say that the amendment has been introduced following a
“recent outbreak of a certain pest near the Wales/England border”.
Can the Minister give us any details of that outbreak? Was it the only incident? How significant was it? What happened prior to this amendment if an authority from England, Scotland or Wales needed to extend a demarcated area beyond its territory?
Moving on to a further defect in another regulation, article 4 of the retained commission implementing decision relates to the import of potatoes from two regions of Lebanon. The eagle-eyed Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments referred to the two issues in its “Eighteenth Report of Session 2022–23”. The first relates to changes in labelling requirements so that they are in English, rather than one of the languages of the European Union, which is understandable. The second relates to an omission in the previous SI, which revoked the requirements for inspections to be carried out at one of the intermediate stages. It is clearly sensible to rectify that, but has an assessment been made of the consequences of that defect in the initial SI?
Finally, on the issues relating to the Trade in Animals and Related Products (Amendment and Legislative Functions) Regulations 2022, there is an amendment to correct an omission that will ensure that the appropriate authority has the power
“to change the rules on imports of equine animals from a particular country and the power to establish specific rules if there is a change in the disease situation of the approved country.”
I note that the language in regulation 8(2)(d) changes from “shall be established” to “may be established” in relation to the functions undertaken by the appropriate British authority. Was that a deliberate alteration to limit the obligation of GB authorities to change and implement animal and public health requirements for imports from the EU? [Interruption.] The Minister is shaking his head, but I am sure he will explain.
As we are all aware, health certificate requirements are currently being implemented for exports, but not for imports. That certainly could be interpreted as meaning that any additional checks and requirements on imports might not be carried out, possibly due to a lack of vets and capacity at the borders. If that is the case, we should all be concerned, because animal and plant health matters, and we should insist on the very best biosecurity procedures.
Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)
I have a couple of points of procedure and then some questions, if I may. First, the legislation obviously refers to the amendment of EU regulations, but I have not, I am afraid, been able to get hold of those regulations, so it is quite hard for me to understand the amendments being made. Normally, one would expect such regulations to be available in the room.
Secondly, I do not know whether this is usual, but from reading the legislation over the past couple of days, I see that a section of it is understandably in Welsh. Although it may be appropriate for the legislation to be in that language, I am at a loss to know what it says. Section 6, which is in Welsh, may be a faithful reproduction of section 5, which is in English, but I cannot tell whether that is the case. There may be a Member present who is able to translate it quickly and tell us, but I do not know whether it is usual to vote on legislation that is in a language I do not understand; I have not done that before, as far as I am aware.
Those questions are for you as Chair, Mrs Cummins—
Alun Cairns
Diolch yn fawr—[Laughter.] I can reassure my right hon. Friend that section 6 is a duplication of the English version.
Kit Malthouse
I am grateful for that reassurance. We are fortunate on the Committee in having a native speaker of that fine, although for me incomprehensible, language. If my right hon. Friend had not been here, Members may have found themselves in some difficulty with the legislation.
I have some questions for the Minister. I understand that the intention of these imposed regulations is for Ministers to be able to demarcate an area to allow for disease control. At the moment, in my constituency, I am living in the middle of one of those areas, which is to deal with avian flu—although the demarcation seems to be some road signs and not much else. Owners of chickens have been told to keep them indoors, and that type of thing. What I am unclear about is, while Ministers have the power to introduce those zones, how would they actually give effect to them? Is it a purely ministerial discretion? Is there a bar of disease and infection that needs to be reached? Is it on advice from some body? Similarly, on removal, where is the judgment made and by who? Obviously, it is quite a draconian power in certain circumstances. Having some kind of understanding of how it might be executed would be helpful. I could not find anything in the legislation or the guidance notes that told me that.
I also want to explore the issue about Lebanese potatoes, which seems to be of particular interest. I understand that verticillium wilt is prevalent in the Bekaa valley and is of some concern. But my reading of the legislation is that there is essentially an absolute bar on the import of potatoes from that country, which is currently struggling and for which the agricultural sector is a huge earner.
I had some difficulty understanding that—it may just be me being thick. Could the Minister explain to me what the impact of that is on the seed potato industry from those two regions of Lebanon, or whether it is a general Lebanese exclusion? Other than those points, I am broadly content to support the regulations.
The Chair
Thank you for those questions. I can give assurances that the specific regulation is in the Committee Room, but the Clerk is checking. I hope to have an absolute assurance by the time the Minister has finished his concluding remarks.
Mark Spencer
That sounded like a challenge to speak quickly, Ms Cummins. I thank colleagues for their interest in this SI, and for taking the trouble to read it and engage. My right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire raised the question about how those decisions are made. We are blessed in the UK with some of the best scientists in the world, who are able to make an analysis of what the risks are and what the response should be. Of course, Ministers will ultimately decide on the response, but on the back of the advice they receive from those experts.
Action would be something along the lines of stopping the trade in the material that was at risk of spreading the disease. For example, the Opposition asked about the actual disease that has highlighted this challenge; it is actually called phytophthora pluvialis. In English—I think that might be Welsh—it is a fungus that affects trees, mostly pines and Douglas firs. What we would do in those circumstances, and what we have done, is prevent the movement of timber of that nature. We would put restrictions on nurseries and wholesale plant areas, but also on physical timber that was being moved from woodland in a certain area to another. We would prevent the movement of that to stop the disease spreading, so that fungus spores were not allowed to be transported anywhere else.
The hon. Member for Cambridge also made reference to the challenges of ensuring that our borders are safe in the future. That is something that the Government are very much alive to. I spend a lot of time, for example, worrying about the possibility of African swine fever spreading across Europe and reaching our borders. We have protocols in place to try to stop that from happening, which is actually one of the benefits of Brexit. It allows us to put more controls at our borders to try to prevent that from happening and to ensure that Border Force is aware of the challenges that we face. But, of course, we try to balance that with ensuring that trade is as free as possible. Working with our colleagues in Europe, we are able to strike that balance, but it is one that we take seriously.
Kit Malthouse
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I take his point. Obviously, there has been a phytosanitary boundary around the whole of the island of Ireland for some time now, which has protected it from diseases coming from the continent of Europe, the wider world and indeed the rest of the UK. However, my constituency, for example, is being devastated by ash dieback. We have hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of ash trees that are struggling and will be gone from the landscape quite soon.
While I understand the scientific advice that will be given, that is the same scientific advice, presumably, that resulted in the awful foot and mouth disaster that hit farming a couple of decades ago, which people remember well. Mounds of carcases were burnt on farms. Whether that was the right approach has been debated, even to this day.
Is the Minister able to give an example of a plant or animal disease being controlled by the imposition of one of these zones in the past, and therefore being eradicated from the UK? It strikes me that what we are learning—whether from Dutch elm disease, ash dieback, avian flu, or even tuberculosis, which we are obviously trying to control—is that these techniques are actually not that effective from a disease control point of view. As the Minister said, our most effective defence is at the border, by stopping the stuff coming in in the first place.
Mark Spencer
The best example that I can think of within two or three generations would be anthrax. We were able to eradicate that completely from the United Kingdom. However, of course, it is about not just eradication but mitigation, in terms of stopping that spread.
My right hon. Friend mentioned avian influenza. Of course, had we taken no measures and just allowed the disease to run its course, that would have led to the total devastation of the UK poultry sector and enormous damage to the wild bird population. While it sometimes appears that we are not having the positive effect that we would like to deliver, taking no action would lead to catastrophe. I think there are examples of where stepping in, and intervening at that moment does assist and does lead to better outcomes, although it may not feel like that at the time.
Patricia Gibson (North Ayrshire and Arran) (SNP)
The right hon. Member for North West Hampshire made a point about the importance of Border Force in preventing diseases coming in over the border, and how that was an important element. Does the Minister share my concern that Border Force itself is under such pressure, in terms of staff shortages and morale, that it has said that those factors are impacting its efficacy in doing the job required?
Mark Spencer
There is no evidence that that is the case and that Border Force’s impact is negatively affected, but I recognise the huge challenges in keeping our borders safe. The Government are enormously grateful for the efforts that many people make on a daily basis, 24 hours a day, to keep us safe—not only from animal and plant disease, but from other things that might have far worse consequences.
Lloyd Russell-Moyle (Brighton, Kemptown) (Lab/Co-op)
Given the mention of successful demarcations, I point to the success—albeit limited, and we always have to be vigilant—of the prevention of Dutch elm disease in the city of Brighton and Hove.
We still have the world’s largest elm tree population in Brighton, in the national elm collection, and that is because we have continued to be vigilant on the borders of Brighton and Hove, with the assistance of the Secretary of State, signage and the prevention of the importation of wood products. That is not perfect, but goes along with having to be vigilant about what happens with plant life in the city. However, demarcation of zones helps to provide an additional tool to the armoury for preventing disease. Dutch elm disease has spread across the rest of the UK, but for the past 25 or 30 years we have prevented it from destroying the last remaining national collection of elm trees.
Mark Spencer
That is a fantastic, positive story, and I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. In conclusion—
Mark Spencer
Lebanese potatoes, of course. We take such things case by case, and will continue to take that approach. There are some challenges in the seed potato market, not least to the ability of Scottish growers to export to the EU. We will continue to push that agenda as well, to ensure that the Scots can export seed potatoes. Decisions on whether we allow the import of seed potatoes will have to be taken on a case-by-case basis and with a risk analysis of the risk to UK growers. Decisions will be taken by those with the expertise, but we recognise the importance of trade links with Lebanon.
In conclusion, this is an important piece of legislation and it is important that we agree the draft regulations today. They will help to fight disease and to prevent disasters in future. I am grateful for the Committee’s support.
The Chair
Before I put the Question, to address the issue raised by the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire I should say that it is not usual practice to have the parent regulation in the room. The copy of the relevant legislation is in the room. However, the Clerk will pick that up with him directly afterwards.
Question put and agreed to.