Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between William Cash and Mark Durkan

Tuesday 6th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Sir William Cash]

There are very sound reasons why the Secretary of State should have the right to determine these questions, as she does in many other cases. I have already made the point that at every stage in conditions A to D the Secretary of State may take only such action that she “reasonably” considers appropriate under the circumstances. The Bill already takes account of the possibility of judicial review.

[Mark Durkan (Foyle) (SDLP)]

The hon. Gentleman refers to conditions A to D, which refer to the Secretary of State “reasonably” suspecting or considering something. Amendment 22 states that

“the Secretary of State has provided evidence, whether or not conditions A to D are met”.

Provided evidence to whom or to what?

[Sir William Cash]

Provided evidence to those who will be making decisions about terrorism-related activities. It is not just about providing evidence to the court, which I think is implicit in what the hon. Gentleman is suggesting; it is about providing evidence about the facts described in the amendment. It is not necessary for the case to go to court, and the amendment leaves out the word “reasonable” in this context for that reason. If the Home Secretary provides evidence that is based on the person in question having repudiated their allegiance to the United Kingdom, and if that person has provided evidence of their allegiance to the new state by virtue of their actions and statements, that is enough in itself. That individual has done those things, and that is the evidence in question.

The legislative framework of this measure has already been mentioned, and I say to the Minister and my colleagues—some of whom I thoroughly disagree with on these matters—that it will be extremely difficult to exclude the operation of the charter of fundamental rights in applications of the kind likely to arise under the Bill. That is a serious problem because it will mean that under sections 2 and 3 of the European Communities Act 1972, the charter of fundamental rights will apply. That has already been made applicable—the European Scrutiny Committee has established that without a shadow of doubt, over and against the continuing belief, which has now been abandoned, that that charter does not apply to the United Kingdom. The charter of fundamental rights will apply, as will the Human Rights Act 1998. In those circumstances, the question of whether decisions will be taken by the British courts is a matter of extremely grave doubt; in fact, I would go further and say it is an impossibility. On the basis that the charter of fundamental rights does apply, if a decision were to go to the courts as in the Opposition amendments, it would be decided by the European Court of Justice under matters covered by the charter. That is a fatal objection. If the measure were to be carried out notwithstanding the European Communities Act 1972 it would be another story, but that is not what the amendments would do.

In conclusion, these are grave issues with great sensitivities, beliefs, convictions and principles at stake. There is an honest disagreement, to say the least, between myself and other Conservative colleagues, and I think we should put the British subject first, by which I mean those liable to be affected by jihadist atrocities, and not put forward the generalised view that the human rights lobby would prefer. This matter is too serious and too dangerous. It is not just about allegiance in its own right, but about a physical danger to the British public.

Financial Services Bill

Debate between William Cash and Mark Durkan

Tuesday 22nd May 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mark Durkan]

I had not originally intended to speak to this amendment, as time is tight and we need to make progress. I have also dealt with some of the points in interventions.

The Government say that they are committed. This Bill gives them an opportunity to go a bit further on that commitment. That is what the amendment offers them. The Government have said that they want to encourage mutualisation. I have heard Ministers talk about the damage done by the rampant trend towards demutualisation in the past—they have blamed that on others, as well as perhaps accepting some blame on behalf of a previous Government. However, clause 47 is a permissive clause, and there is good cause for saying that if the Treasury amends legislation dealing with mutuals—let us remember that we are talking about industrial and provident societies, building societies, credit unions and friendly societies—and if it transfers functions to the FCA, the PRA or both, given that the clause provides that functions can be transferred between different bodies, the Treasury should, in making those arrangements and exercising those powers, have regard to ensuring that someone can measure the size of the mutual sector overall and show progress where that is relevant. That is what the amendment would provide for. Such information will be relevant for Parliament’s interests and purposes—I am sure that future Treasury Committees will want to know what is happening and who is responsible for measuring such things, rather than relying on the market players. The information will also be hugely important for consumers, because if, as the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash) said, we are to encourage more people to have confidence in this option, then the more people we can show are using it successfully, the better.

When the hon. Gentleman suggested that the mutual sector would, by its nature and character, not need detailed regulation and legislation, it occurred to me that he was going off in a different direction. Given the experience that some of us had with the Presbyterian Mutual Society and others, I can say that mutuals do need to be regulated by their nature, so that people can be sure that they are living up to the good name that they properly have. Consumers embrace mutuals on the basis of that confidence. They need to be able to rely on the fact that legislators have put in place a regulatory system to ensure that what they are getting is what they think they are getting.

[Mr Cash]

I would not want the hon. Gentleman to misunderstand what I meant. It is not that I do not think that there should be a degree of regulation. Rather, I am concerned about over-regulation to the point where the purposes of mutuals, as with so many other sectors of society, are sucked out by a vast amount of oppressive legislation, which is so bureaucratic and impossible for people to understand that they cannot see the wood for the trees. The whole objective of the mutual arrangement is that it is very much a personal relationship in a society to enable people to benefit one another.

[Mark Durkan]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that clarification. That brings us to the point that we go through all this complicated legislation, with all this complicated jargon, to try to give consumers confidence that a regulatory regime is policing these matters for them, so that they know that the people they are entrusting with their money—their savings and so on—are performing to a due and proper standard. I would not want the House to create a situation where people felt that mutuals were, by their nature, less safe and less regulated, because non-mutuals would use that on a predatory basis in their marketing.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between William Cash and Mark Durkan

Tuesday 15th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Cash]

I will not give way.

I say that for a very simple reason, which is that when this House votes to pass legislation for a referendum so that the people can decide, just as it is necessary, according to the principles of the Bill, for there to be a system of preference voting that is said to be fair, so it has to be fair for the electorate as a whole to know that when the decision is taken there is a proper threshold. According to all the constitutional authorities, there is no credibility in a referendum whose turnout is less than 40%—I am talking about turnout, not a yes vote, which is what the Cunningham amendment related to in the 1970s. I tabled my amendment in order to be useful, to help the Government get this right and to help the Lords, who have done a great job, ensure fairness for the electorate by providing that a 40% threshold is the principle on which the provisions should go forward.

[Mark Durkan]

The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) has referred to the wrecking amendments we debated and voted on in Committee. Essentially, what we have tonight are wrecking amendments that are bubble-wrapped. No matter what the sophistry of Opposition Front Benchers or anyone else, we know what the intention is: to put a serious and direct brake on the possibility of the referendum being won.

Loans to Ireland Bill

Debate between William Cash and Mark Durkan

Wednesday 15th December 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mark Durkan]

On amendment 3, tabled by the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash), the amendment of itself does not preclude the fear that he and my hon. Friend the Member for Luton North (Kelvin Hopkins) have that at some point in the future there might be a loans to Spain Bill, a loans to Portugal Bill or something similar. The amendment would not preclude the possibility of any other such bilateral loans being arranged in future. I do not believe that the amendment, which is commended to us in those terms, will serve the purpose for which it was tabled.

[Mr Cash]

I agree with that, but that is not what I have said. I have said that under this Bill, the consequence of not adding the words that I have provided puts the Bill in jeopardy of falling within the framework of European jurisdiction, which is a different point.

[Mark Durkan]

I know that the hon. Gentleman made that point, too, and I want to turn to it. He carefully quoted and referred to a number of points in the loan agreement, which was made available at the start of the debate. The summary of key terms refers to a number of matters, and the hon. Member for Stone seemed to say that those references alone mean that the bilateral loan is being interweaved with the wider EU and IMF support packages to Ireland. However, hon. Members should bear in mind a point that the Chancellor made on Second Reading—that one advantage of the bilateral loan arrangement is the place that it gives the UK at the table when it comes to arranging and overseeing the restructuring plan that is to take place in relation to the Irish banking sector.

The key terms include, under the heading “Other Terms”, at paragraph 1(d):

“no amendments to the facilities provided by the IMF, European Financial Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Fund or Sovereign bilateral lenders or to the Memoranda of Understanding that would have a material adverse effect on the Borrower’s ability to restore its capacity to access the capital markets.”

Given that the purpose of the loan arrangement is to make sure that Ireland can go to the bond markets on its own as soon as possible and get money at competitive rates, it is clearly in the House’s interests, as the UK will be providing this loan, to make sure that the loan terms are protected against any undue terms coming from the other loans being made available in this context.

Several hon. Members have mentioned the role of the European Central Bank. We can look at the history of this situation and question the role of the ECB on a number of occasions. First, it kept interest rates very low—at times against the express wish and request of the Irish Finance Minister—which helped to contribute to the problem. Secondly, as many hon. Members have mentioned, there is the open-ended nature of the Irish Government’s guarantee to the banks. Again, the ECB seems to have been the primary body urging a guarantee of that extent. Thirdly, there is the whole issue of the need for the bail-out and the creation of circumstances in which the Irish Government have had to seek it. Again, many people have questions about the precise role and performance of the European Central Bank in all that. Hon. Members have asked serious questions about the ECB, and we know that a much bigger loan facility is being granted through the EU and the IMF, so surely the House will want to know that the terms of the bilateral loan and its operation will not jeopardise the interests or purposes for which it is being made available. It therefore makes sense for the key terms that are summarised in the document to refer to the restructuring plan that is to be undertaken in relation to the banks.

The document makes it clear that “conditions precedent” will include “finalisation by the Borrower”—namely Ireland—

“after consultation with the Lender, of a restructuring plan in relation to its banking sector with the IMF, European Commission and European Central Bank”.

That is not the interweaving that the hon. Member for Stone has discussed, but a sensible, diligent precaution on the part of the House in providing for money to be borrowed. The “Other Terms” also include at paragraph 1(c):

“no amendments to the Restructuring Plan that would have a material adverse financial impact on the UK operations of Anglo Irish Bank, Allied Irish Banks and Bank of Ireland”.

Again, it makes absolute sense for the House and the Government, who are responsible to it, to make clear cross-reference to what else is happening under the restructuring plan and to what other lenders might urge in relation to other parts of the plan in terms of key interests that the House needs to protect, including those of the banking sector in Northern Ireland and the contribution of the Irish banks to the wider UK economy.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between William Cash and Mark Durkan

Wednesday 24th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Cash]

The hon. Gentleman’s point is extremely sensible and full of common sense, which is what this Bill lacks. This is about something else; it is not about the manner in which our democratic system functions. It is about something completely different and I will come to that in a moment.

[Mark Durkan]

Does the hon. Gentleman not think that his case against the idea of a special weighted majority for Dissolution in this House would be more credible if he had not previously proposed amendments to the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill that required a threshold of support for any referendum on the alternative vote? He supported other amendments as well, which required not just a threshold that related to those who voted, but to the total number on the electorate. Is there not some hypocrisy in the argument he makes today?

[Mr Cash]

I am more than delighted to reply to the hon. Gentleman. Sparring with him always causes me great amusement. As for what he says, there is a substantial difference. The threshold amendment that I moved on the other Bill was to do with the threshold of a number of people who would participate in the election, and not what was going on in this House. It was not even related to the question of the threshold of those who voted yes, as in the Scotland Act 1998 and the amendment of George Cunningham, the then Member for Finsbury and Islington, so there is a significant difference. I am talking about the trust that is given to us in this House and the manner in which we discharge it.

The coalition originally proposed 55%, but that was so manifestly absurd that the coalition agreement was then torn up and the figure was replaced with two thirds. If not 55%, why two thirds? The Scottish Parliament—I am using this analogy because it has already been raised, but I think that it is completely irrelevant—does not form Her Majesty’s Government. Decisions in time of war, a Finance Bill or any of the other great levers of power are determined, and will continue to be determined, by the United Kingdom Parliament. One such great exercise of power at a most important time was the confidence motion of 10 May 1940, which was passed, as it happened, by the Government, and it led to the demise of Neville Chamberlain’s Government, because everyone knew he had to go. I do not regard the Scottish parliamentary experience as relevant. If not two thirds, why not 75%, 60% or any other number that Harry Potter’s wand might conjure out of thin air?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Durkan]

Many valid arguments have been made about this group of amendments by a number of right hon. and hon. Members. I have total sympathy with the cynicism that has been expressed about some of the devices in the Bill and the motives for them.

However, I believe totally in the idea of a fixed-term Parliament and have supported amendments that clearly stated “fixed term”, although I believe that the term should be four years, rather than five. I have to ask myself, as all of us as legislators and members of the Committee must ask ourselves, if we do not like the present provisions, what is our alternative that would mean that we have credibly passed a Bill for fixed-term Parliaments? That is where I part company and cease to be persuaded by some of the arguments that I hear in respect of some of the amendments.

With reference to cynicism about the motives, a number of hon. Members have articulated the basic nature of the Bill. It is the means by which the two coalition parties have created a statutory harness to keep them together for this Parliament. It is, in essence, a fixed this-Parliament Bill, rather than a Fixed-term Parliament Bill. It is designed to solve the conundrum of either party collapsing the coalition. The Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill is for fixing future elections. This Bill is about fixing this Parliament.

If I want the Bill to be a Fixed-term Parliament Bill, I have to be judicious about its content and any amendments that I might support. That is why I have some questions about some of the amendments that have been so articulately presented today.

The hon. Member for Epping Forest (Mrs Laing) presented amendment 33 with a white flag and in a very novel way, which just goes to show that it is entirely possible for people to present themselves in all sorts of ways in the House. People say that a Government would not use or exploit in any way a no confidence motion against themselves, but any available device will be used in any particular circumstances. That is the nature of politics.

The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) spoke to amendment 21 and made a strong case for an “immediate” as opposed to an “early” general election. The only problem is that if “immediate” can mean only six weeks, as he said to the hon. Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar (Mr MacNeil), what happens if, for example, we are close to Christmas—perhaps the middle of November—notwithstanding that allowances will be made for holidays? If we are truly to take account of media coverage and other activities during that time, is it credible to confine ourselves to six weeks and six weeks only? Clause 2 as it stands allows for consensus in the House on the need to bring forward considerably the due date for an election, and people might do so conscious of current and pending events.

Another hon. Member mentioned the situation in Dublin at the minute, and many people would say that, although confirmation of an early election there has helped to clear the political air, going for an immediate election might cause more market turmoil not just for Ireland, but for others. There are times when we need to leave ourselves and this House the room to make a distinction between “early” and “immediate”.

[Mr Cash]

I am well aware that the hon. Gentleman is pretty close to and talks frequently with those in southern Ireland and in the Dail, but I doubt whether the Dail or the people of Ireland would be particularly enthusiastic at this moment, when the Government are in coalition with the Greens, to have such a provision imposed upon them. I suspect that, if the idea were suggested, it would lead to serious disturbances in Ireland, and I am quite sure that the hon. Gentleman will agree.

[Mark Durkan]

The hon. Gentleman raises some wider questions, and you, Mr Hoyle, have said that the next group of amendments deals with confidence, but this debate has strayed well on to that ground and conflated the two issues of whether the House, by a weighted majority, calls for an early election or whether it passes a motion of no confidence in the Government.

In 1994, the Government changed in the Dail. The Labour party left its coalition with Fianna Fail, supported a motion of no confidence in the then Taoiseach and reappeared in a new coalition with Fine Gael and the then Democratic Left. In that situation, as in the Bill before us, provision has been made for a Government to change—a new Government to be constituted—in the lifetime of a Parliament, and in 1994 the people of Ireland settled quite happily for that.