Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Bill

William Cash Excerpts

Committee stage & 3rd reading: House of Commons & Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons & 3rd reading & Committee: 1st sitting
Wednesday 12th February 2020 Commons Chamber

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 3, page 1, line 8, after “force”, insert

“and notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998”

The intention of this Amendment is to ensure that the Bill meets the rule established by Willes J in Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1 that the courts will ascribe retrospective force to new laws affecting rights if by express words or necessary implication it appears that such was the intention of the legislature.

[The Chairman of Ways and Means (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

With this it will be convenient to consider:

Amendment 4, in page 1, line 12, after “force”, insert

“and notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998”

The intention of this Amendment is to ensure that the Bill meets the rule established by Willes J in Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1 that the courts will ascribe retrospective force to new laws affecting rights if by express words or necessary implication it appears that such was the intention of the legislature.

Amendment 1, page 2, line 34, leave out “two-thirds” and insert “nine-tenths”.

Amendment 2, page 2, line 37, leave out “two-thirds” and insert “nine-tenths”.

Clauses 1 and 2 stand part.

Amendment 5, in clause 3, page 4, line 2, after “force”, insert

“and notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998”.

The intention of this Amendment is to ensure that the Bill meets the rule established by Willes J in Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1 that the courts will ascribe retrospective force to new laws affecting rights if by express words or necessary implication it appears that such was the intention of the legislature.

Amendment 6, page 4, line 6, after “force”, insert

“and notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998”.

The intention of this Amendment is to ensure that the Bill meets the rule established by Willes J in Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1 that the courts will ascribe retrospective force to new laws affecting rights if by express words or necessary implication it appears that such was the intention of the legislature.

Clause 3 and 4 to 10 stand part.

That schedules 1 and 2 be the First and Second schedules to the Bill.

New clause 1—Review of prison deradicalisation programme—

“(1) The Secretary of State must appoint a person to review the operation of the provisions of the prison deradicalisation programme.

(2) The person appointed under subsection (1) may enter any prison premises in order to scrutinise the operation of the prison deradicalisation programme.

(3) The person appointed under subsection (1) must make a report to the Secretary of State on the operation of the provisions of the prison deradicalisation programme before the end of the period of 6 months after the date on which this Act is passed.

(4) The person appointed must make further reports at intervals of not more than three months to the Secretary of State on the operation of the provisions of the prison deradicalisation programme.

(5) The person appointed under subsection (1) may include in any review or report under this section consideration of the adequacy of resources made available to the prison deradicalisation programme, including resources made available for the supervision of probation and rehabilitation work.

(6) On receiving a report under this section, the Secretary of State must make arrangements to lay a copy of it before each House of Parliament as soon as the Secretary of State is satisfied that doing so will not prejudice any criminal proceedings.

(7) The Secretary of State may, out of money provided by Parliament, pay a person appointed under subsection (1), such expenses and allowances as the Secretary of State determines.”

This new clause would require the appointment of an independent reviewer of the prison deradicalisation programme.

New clause 3—Review—

(1) The Secretary of State must arrange for an independent review of the impact of sections 1 to 9 to be carried out in relation to the initial one-year period.

(2) The Secretary of State must, after consultation with the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, appoint a person with professional experience relating to the imprisonment for offences of terrorism to conduct the review.

(3) The review must be completed as soon as practicable after the end of the initial one-year period.

(4) As soon as practicable after a person has carried out the review in relation to a particular period, the person must—

(a) produce a report of the outcome of the review, and

(b) send a copy of the report to the Secretary of State.

(5) The Secretary of State must lay before each House of Parliament a copy of the report sent under subsection (4)(b) within one month of receiving the report.

(6) The Secretary of State may—

(a) make such payments as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate in connection with the carrying out of the review, and

(b) make such other arrangements as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate in connection with the carrying out of the review (including arrangements for the provision of staff, other resources and facilities).

(7) In this section, “initial one-year period” means the period of one year beginning with the day when this Act comes into force.”

[Sir William Cash]

I have already canvassed some parts of what I am about to say, but there is more to say, for a very sound reason. Parliament is full of opinions and Ministers are full of opinions. Two Ministers are sitting on the Front Bench at the moment, no doubt debating the issue before the Committee, but their opinions are not the law, and nor are those of leading counsel, whether senior Treasury counsel or those involved in academic discussion. I say that really seriously. I have been practising the law since 1967 and I know a little about how the law is interpreted. We saw the Gina Miller case the other day. How many times were we told that there was absolutely no question but that the Government were right in their interpretation? I served as the shadow Attorney General and saw the whole of the Iraq and Peter Goldsmith exercise. We were told over and over again in the House this, that and the other about interpretation—“This is what will happen. This is the way it will go.” That is no way to make decisions on matters of this kind of critical importance.

There are occasions on which the question of interpretation may merely be about a modification of policy; this is actually about saving human life. I repeat that: saving human life. Where it is possible for the House to ensure that human life cannot be unreasonably and wilfully disposed of by people who are intent on murdering for no reason at all, we need to take seriously the question of whether or not we can exclude the courts —because this is Parliament, not the judiciary—from making wrong decisions when matters come before them.

I heard with interest the Chairman of the Justice Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), and the various cases he mentioned, and I have just heard the Minister refer to the Uttley case. There is also the Hogben case, which was of course in 1985, before the Human Rights Act 1998. Reference was also made to the del Río Prada case. As a matter of fact, the legislation does not depend on an interpretation of those individual cases by way of precedent, and that is not what we should be worried about; we should be thinking about the purpose and scope of the Bill and its objective, which is to do everything that we can to ensure that human life and public safety come first. I do not want this to become an argument about the interpretation of law, which is why I tabled amendment 3 to clause 1.

[Sir Greg Knight (East Yorkshire) (Con)]

On the subject of opinions, does my hon. Friend intend to test the opinion of the Committee, or merely the opinion of the Minister?

[Sir William Cash]

That is an extremely good question on which I have already given an indication. Being a realist, I know perfectly well that this is not a Bill to which an amendment is going to be passed—certainly not today—but I did say that the House of Lords, which is where the Bill is going, is full of lawyers, some of whom I will disagree with and have disagreed with for as many years as I have been in the House, but there are others who will take a different view.

I am interested to hear the views of the House of Lords on the question of my proposal to amend clause 1. The wording of clause 1 currently refers to an offence “within subsection (2)” and a sentence imposed

“whether before or after this section comes into force”,

at which point I propose to insert the words

“and notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998”.

The effect of that would be to put a complete bar on the use of the Human Rights Act, by interpretation of the courts, in any attempt, whether it is regarded as misguided or is a matter of culture—there is currently a load of culture in the courts relating to human rights questions that have built up over the whole of my lifetime in the law.

I am deeply concerned that we could allow legislation to go through that could be interpreted in a way that would result in human life being lost and public safety being infringed. That is my concern. [Interruption.] I see the Minister looking at me either apprehensively or with anticipation; I am not sure which it is and I do not really care. What I am saying is that I want certainty. I know that if the words “notwithstanding the Human Rights Act” are brought into the Bill, the effect will be to exclude completely, for reasons that I am about to give, any attempt by the courts to modify the effect that the Bill otherwise would have.

I have other concerns about the Bill that I have already made clear. I do not think that offenders should be considered for release after half or two thirds of their sentence. I have a lot of sympathy for what my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest West (Sir Desmond Swayne) proposes in amendment 1; he says it should be nine tenths. I do not know whether he will address that point later.

The bottom line is that we should not allow this situation if we can avoid it—and we can avoid it, because we are the Houses of Parliament, and as a result of Brexit, we have just regained an awful lot of our sovereignty. This is more a matter of the European convention on human rights than of the charter of fundamental rights—or, for that matter, of Brexit—but the amendment is an indication of the House’s determination to use our sovereignty to make law that will guarantee that we do not face people losing their life, or public safety being undermined.

If we do not include in the Bill the words that I propose in my amendment 3, I believe—as I said before with respect to the Lee Rigby case—that it is not a matter of if such a thing happens again; it is a matter of when. I concede that this is emergency legislation; that is why I support it, but it requires a full, thorough review, perhaps by the Justice Committee, to ensure that we deal with the issue properly and fully.

I applaud the Government for bringing in this Bill on an emergency basis, but I criticise the fact that the Bill does not go far enough. The Minister is, if I might say so, not a lawyer; he can only have received his information from others who are. He is taking a bit of a punt in saying that the words

“and notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998”

are not needed. He does not know that. I say that with not only respect, but knowledge and certainty. It is very difficult even for lawyers to be sure what the impact would be of allowing the Bill through without excluding the Human Rights Act 1998 from it.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Chris Philp)]

I thank the hon. Member for giving way, despite my non-lawyer background. I am of course interested in what he says, and have been listening extremely carefully, as he has seen. How does he think his amendment would operate? In particular, does he think it would in any way disapply our ECHR treaty obligations? Even if we passed his “notwithstanding” amendment, could applicants not still go directly to the European Court in Strasbourg? We cannot disapply that route through this amendment.

[Sir William Cash]

I notice that the Minister is reading very carefully from the notes with which he has been provided, and I agree with the sentiment behind them, but I am putting the case in a different way. We are talking about serious questions of human life, and every step should be taken to preserve it. I was originally minded to use the amendment to exclude the European convention on human rights, too. I describe amendment 3 as a probing amendment, but I want proper consideration of it, not just someone saying, “I don’t think the wording would achieve the total effect that the hon. Gentleman would wish it to.”

The risk to human life is serious; we have to take every step to ensure no repetition of the instances of murder and terrorism that we have witnessed, and which, in recent times, from Lee Rigby onwards, have become more and more prevalent. We know that people are prepared to take such steps; it may be that some of them are mentally disturbed. Perhaps people do not think that these things will happen again, but as I said in debate on another counter-terrorism Bill four or five years ago, the question is not whether we have another Lee Rigby, but when. We have had one after another, at regular intervals. They are becoming more and more imminent, and more and more serious. I doubt whether this Bill, however worthy its objectives, will deal with the problem in the manner in which I am setting out and which is necessary.

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[Adam Afriyie (Windsor) (Con)]

I am another layperson —a non-lawyer. Can my hon. Friend see any downside to including the set of words that he is suggesting in his amendment? Would they limit something that might otherwise not be limited? I hear very clearly his arguments about its possibly being superfluous and the legislation being subject to interpretation, but is there any downside other than it being an additional safeguard that might not have been required?

[Sir William Cash]

Indeed. As usual, my hon. Friend is very perceptive. This is really the main purpose of my words on the subject, because there is no downside at all in this context. I can think of circumstances where it might be arguable that there could be, because somehow or other one might be infringing some genuine human right. However, given that we are dealing with this issue for the sole purpose of preventing people from being murdered in the circumstances and in the manner of these heinous acts, and for the purposes for which people indulge in them, there can be no downside in making this absolutely crystal clear, subject to comments that may be made by other lawyers as a result of what I am saying now and, for that matter, what is said in the House of Lords.

I am not pretending that I have all the answers to every question in matters of this kind, but I do think it is our duty, in the context of what we are seeking to prevent, to ensure that we are as crystal clear as we can be in our direction to the courts that they should not and must not allow human rights considerations to allow murder to take place. That is the problem and that is why I am so emphatic about it. I have noted from the Minister’s remarks and from other conversations I have had with senior Ministers that they are perhaps more interested in questions of interpretation than I am. I do not want any interpretation in this context.

The sole purpose of this Bill is to deal with people who are going to commit murder. Let us be under no misapprehension: this Bill has not been brought forward to deal with some questions relating to the whole generality of human rights law; it is specifically emergency legislation to deal specifically with preventing people who, for a variety of reasons or without reasons, intend to perpetrate murder from doing so. Human life is at risk. That is why this is such a good move on the part of the Government. There is nothing negative in my approach; it is entirely belt and braces. If the opportunity is to be given to Parliament to make sure that we have both the belt and the braces, then for heaven’s sake let us take it and not leave it to the vagaries and the uncertainties of judicial interpretation.

I have already referred to the Hogben case. I am not going to go through the analysis, because this is not something that depends on compiling a judgment about the interpretation of law based on precedents. I do not think that any case we put forward, coming back to what my hon. Friend the Member for Windsor (Adam Afriyie) said, could generate an upside or a downside. I just want clarity; that is the whole point. The words that I have used adopt the “notwithstanding” formula in section 38 of the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, relating to the sovereignty of Parliament. I argued this in No. 10, and the Prime Minister, to his enormous credit, completely backed me. I said, “You have to include the words ‘notwithstanding the European Communities Act 1972’.” By doing this in a certain manner, one ensures that one achieves one’s objective, without the uncertainty that can arise in the circumstances that I have described.

We need to bear in mind that the Del Rio Prada case was a decision by the European Court of Human Rights. The Minister referred to the other cases. In the case of Uttley, there was an appeal on which the House of Lords concluded that article 7 would be infringed only if a sentence was imposed on a defendant that constituted a heavier penalty than that which would have been imposed at the time the offence was committed. The ECHR then declared that his application was inadmissible. The Del Rio Prada case was to do with Spanish policy, but there is no doubt that part of the argument put forward by the Government today has depended on administration, rather than the object of the Bill. That is another area that needs to be carefully considered, because the question of administration should not be the basis on which we make these decisions.

There we are—I have made my case. The Government could review the situation when the Bill goes to the House of Lords, and I will be interested to see how people develop this argument from now on.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds (Torfaen) (Lab)]

I rise to speak to new clause 1, in my name and that of my hon. and right hon. Friends, but before I do I want to commend my hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Bell Ribeiro-Addy), who has had to deal with the awful incident that happened on the high street in Streatham shortly after coming into the House. On her intervention on the Minister on Second Reading, the issue of various sentencing decisions over the last 10 years was touched on in a new clause that was not selected, but more broadly I commend the idea of strategically reviewing the sentencing regime, and I hope that the Ministry of Justice will consider that.

I made clear to the Minister previously that it is not my intention to divide the Committee on new clause 1, but scrutiny of the de-radicalisation programme and giving Parliament confidence that the programme is being monitored is very important, and I hope he will address that when he responds.

The new clause specifically requires the appointment of an independent reviewer of the prison de-radicalisation programme. On Second Reading, the Minister mentioned some figures with regard to resources, including £90 million on counter-terror policing and an uplift in the prison budget from £2.55 billion to £2.9 billion, but that does not tell us specifically how much is being spent on the de-radicalisation programme. That is the sort of information that an independent reviewer would be able to discover and then put in a format that the House could consider.

We have already discussed Mr Ian Acheson’s review of Islamist extremism in prisons, probation and youth justice. One of his recommendations was to have an independent adviser on counter-terrorism in prisons who is accountable to the Secretary of State. My new clause goes slightly further than that recommendation. It would require the Secretary of State for Justice to appoint a person to review the operation of the prison de-radicalisation programme, with the power to enter prison premises both to gather evidence and provide scrutiny. There would be a statutory requirement for a report to be laid before Parliament every three months on the programme. That could be regarded as too often, but the general point stands—this House would be in a position to properly judge the effectiveness of rehabilitation work in our prisons.

Subsection (5) of the new clause gives the independent reviewer the power to look into the resources available to the programme, including for probation and rehabilitation work. That proposal of an independent reviewer would give the opportunity for proper scrutiny of this very important programme. The Minister will be aware of the healthy identity intervention and other such programmes that currently exist. Through new clause 1, we seek to build on that and give real confidence in the Government’s work in the rehabilitation and de-radicalisation space. I am not absolutely clear of the extent to which those who have perpetrated these awful atrocities in recent months took part in de-radicalisation programmes, but I hope that will be considered and that the Minister will learn the lessons from that. It is vital that we use the time in prison of whatever length—I had a debate about that earlier with the right hon. Member for New Forest West (Sir Desmond Swayne)—in a constructive way to protect the public.

The broader point is such an important one. I have throughout the debate indicated that, while of course there is support for the principles behind the Bill, including the principle of Parole Board involvement, there must in addition be a focus on resources and on strategy in relation to de-radicalisation. The proposal I have put forward of an independent reviewer is one way of producing that, but I accept that there are others, and I look forward to hearing the remarks of the Minister.

[Sir William Cash]

Before the shadow Minister sits down, may I ask him a question? I am engaged in a probing exercise—I am not going to push amendment 3 to a vote—and I would like to know what the Opposition think about excluding the Human Rights Act 1998 and what reason he would give for saying that it was unnecessary.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I am delighted to have a chance to respond. I will do so in a moment, but the first thing I would say is that I remember the criticism of me and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) in the last Parliament when we were seeking disclosure of legal advice—not from the hon. Gentleman, but perhaps from others. It strikes me that Members are now discussing case law across the Floor of the House and Ministers are referring to legal advice, which perhaps shows that there is a change.

I do not support the hon. Gentleman’s amendment. First, the point made by the Minister is correct, and even if we put this into the legislation, the right to go to Strasbourg would still exist. The second reason why I am uncomfortable with what the hon. Gentleman is saying—I am quite happy to give way to him again if I am wrong in my interpretation—is that he, as I understand it, wants the House to pass legislation and then somehow prevent courts from being able to adjudicate on it, which surely is not what is meant by having a sovereign Parliament that is accountable to judges.

[Sir William Cash]

I can respond to that very simply by referring the hon. Gentleman to the speeches made on the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998. I was in the House at the time, and it was made absolutely clear that this Act would not in itself impinge on the sovereignty of Parliament. That was made clear, and therefore as far as I am concerned—I understand where he is coming from, but I am afraid that his point is erroneous—it is implicit in the passing of the 1998 Act that we are able, if we wish to do so, to take the legislation that we pass in this House as the final word, and the courts are obliged to obey that.

With respect to the European convention on human rights, I would simply make the point that I made just now, which is that I could have included such words—yet again, that is another part of my probing amendment—and they could have been “notwithstanding the charter of fundamental rights” as a matter of fact, but that would have been destroyed by the existence at that time of the European Communities Act 1972, which was binding on us by Act of Parliament.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

With the greatest of respect to the hon. Gentleman, it is not an erroneous point. I taught the Human Rights Act for the best part of 11 or 12 years, but I will resist the temptation to give his contribution a grade. Yes, the Human Rights Act contains the power to make a declaration of incompatibility, thus preserving the concept of parliamentary sovereignty —it is absolutely right that Parliament does not have a strike-down power as, for example, the US Supreme Court does—but I have two fundamental problems with his amendment. The first problem is the one I have set out: this House passing legislation that essentially tells the courts, “Well, you can move aside: this is absolutely what we say”, without any scrutiny.

[Sir William Cash]

indicated assent.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I know the hon. Gentleman nods his head, but I am not comfortable with that position.

The second point is that I firmly believe we can tackle this issue of terrorism and remain signatories to the European convention on human rights. That is essentially the Government’s position here today, and I really do not think that we need to get into this debate because the Government have clearly stated that the Act—or the Bill, as it currently is—is compliant with article 7. If people wish to challenge that in the courts, that is a matter for them, but the Government must be confident in their legal position.

Under the Human Rights Act, each Bill that comes before the House contains a sentence on its front page to show that Ministers have considered whether it is compatible with that Act. If they had wished, the Government could have stated in the Bill that they did not think it compatible with the Human Rights Act, but they wanted us to proceed regardless. They did not do that, however, and they clearly state on the Bill their belief that it is compatible with the Act. We have heard a case law of history from the hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash), and others, but that is the Government’s position, and for those reasons I cannot support the amendment. I understand that he will not push it to a vote, and the debate will continue in the other place, but this is not an amendment that would have found favour on the Labour Benches.

Let me return to new clause 1. I will not push the idea of an independent reviewer to the vote—I will not frustrate the passage of the Bill in that way. However, it would assist the Committee if the Minister set out how Members will be able to scrutinise the programme of de-radicalisation over the next few years, and how we can have the information before us—whether from the Ministry of Justice directly or in another way—to assess how it is working.

The former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May), intervened on the Justice Secretary during his opening speech, and said that she felt there had been a lack of success in the de-radicalisation programmes. She is right, and we need to see some success in the years ahead. I will not push new clause 1 to the vote, but I hope the Minister will provide some assurances about how such scrutiny could take place.

[Sir Desmond Swayne (New Forest West) (Con)]

I do not intend to detain the Committee long, Dame Eleanor, and the Minister should consider this not so much a probing amendment as a prodding amendment—it is my intention to prod the Minister.

The purpose of my amendments is stunningly obvious. At lines 34 and 37 I wish to remove “two-thirds”, and insert the words “nine-tenths”. In reality, many sentences, even for acts of terrorism such as the possession of terrorist promotional material with intent, give rise to a surprisingly short sentence, such as four years. In such a case, the difference between half the sentence, as currently served, and two-thirds, is a mere six months. Admittedly, extending that to nine-tenths of the sentence does not address the nature of the problem—that is why this is a prodding amendment—but the fact is that sentences are too short.

There is a general problem of honesty in sentencing. When a judge hands down a sentence in court, all those in the know work out on the back of a fag packet what it means in terms of imprisonment, but the public, who are generally not in the know, do not understand that the sentence is not that at all. They would be scandalised if they knew.

[Sir William Cash]

Does my right hon. Friend remember a recent case of two treasure hunters who I think got as much as 10 years because they had not declared a treasure trove? Compare that with somebody who is intent on murdering people on the streets of London, or anywhere else.

[Sir Desmond Swayne]

That is the random caprice of the judiciary! Returning to the issue before us, on the specific point of sentencing for terrorist acts, we must be clear in our minds about what intention lies behind our whole sentencing policy. I believe that fundamentally it must be to secure the reformation of the offender before he is released. The problem is that existing strategies for reforming offenders, and de-programming them from their ideology, are somewhat untested. Those that are tested—such as the programme run in Saudi Arabia, which has been shown to be effective—take a relatively long time. I suggest, therefore, that that lends itself to an indeterminate sentence to detainment at Her Majesty’s pleasure until a licensing authority, the Parole Board, has decided that the offender is safe to be released. That is the purpose of my amendment: merely to contribute to that debate.

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[Sir William Cash]

In the context of what is developing into a very interesting speech, I refer to Edmund Burke’s famous attack on Thomas Paine in respect of what he really thought about human rights. It was a brilliantly expressed metaphor—that we would not be “trussed” like chickens, or something of that kind, by the human rights proposals of Thomas Paine.

[Sir John Hayes]

Now I might really test your patience, Dame Eleanor, because my hon. Friend invites me to articulate a Burkean case against natural rights, which I will be happy to do, but perhaps on another occasion. Given that I offered the hon. Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper) the opportunity to have a debate about this, that might be the very occasion. Perhaps my hon. Friend will agree to be my seconder in such a debate—what a humbling experience that would be for me and an elevating one for him. I hope we will do that on another occasion and we can indeed explore why so many people take for granted the existence of natural rights, as though they spring from the ether. As a Christian, of course I could not possibly take that view, but now is not the time to get into that discussion.

On the specifics of the amendment, my hon. Friend makes a belt-and-braces case, as I said, for a notwithstanding clause. The shadow Minister made the point that that was fundamentally disagreeable and made a constitutional argument against the notwithstanding clause per se. However, he also went on to say that he believed the Government were right, or were likely to be right, in asserting that they were clear that, in any case, this legislation did not contradict any existing rights legislation. We heard that today from the Secretary of State and again subsequently in the debate: the Government do not feel that the proposed legislation is likely to be successfully challenged, as my hon. Friend suggested it might. We have to assume that the Government have taken legal advice to make that claim.

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[Sir John Hayes]

I would not have wanted to suggest anything other than that. The hon. Gentleman was very clear that he had heard what the Government said about having taken that advice and their confidence that a legal challenge would not succeed on that basis. My hon. Friend the Member for Stone may be more sceptical than others about that, but it is important to point out that the Government have made it clear that further legislation on counter-terrorism will be forthcoming. That legislation might in itself, on a primary basis, revisit the issue of how counter-terrorism measures interface with and may be contradicted by existing legislation. That would be a very fundamental debate, because of course it will oblige the consideration of exactly the kinds of points that he made. On that basis, I am happy to go with the Minister. Notwithstanding my temptation to follow the example of my esteemed hon. Friend the Member for Stone, I am happy, like the shadow Minister, to err on the side of the Government and to say that if they have taken legal advice, with the further opportunity to revisit these matters in the primary legislation that we hear will be speeding its way to the House, I am prepared to concede the argument about rights.

[Sir William Cash]

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

[Sir John Hayes]

My hon. Friend is going to try to persuade me not to.

[Sir William Cash]

My right hon. Friend will accept that this is primary legislation and furthermore that I have already said I am looking forward to a proper discussion about this in the future, with a view to getting it right, because the object of the Bill is to prevent people from being killed on the streets of this country.

[Sir John Hayes]

I am talking about the murderous intent of people I described earlier as wicked. I use that word advisedly: not all these people are mentally disturbed. Some may be, and we know from evidence that some are, but not all. Crime is not an illness to be treated; it is a malevolent choice, an act of wickedness, and wickedness is entirely different from mental illness. I know it is difficult for some to grasp that, but it is important to emphasise it.

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[Chris Philp]

I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s confirmation that the Scottish Government support these provisions.

Clause 5 relates to the setting of licence conditions. Clause 6 makes further consequential amendments relating to transitional cases. Clause 7 makes further consequential amendments that apply to England and Wales. Clause 8 makes transitional provisions in relation to offenders in Scotland and, again, clause 9 makes further consequential amendments that apply to Scotland.

Finally, clause 10 specifies the Bill’s territorial extent and commencement. It is worth saying that commencement will be upon Royal Assent, and we therefore hope the Bill takes effect from 27 February, which is important from the perspective of the release of certain dangerous offenders.

I hope that covers the clauses and schedules, and that they will stand part of the Bill.

[Sir William Cash]

As I have already made clear, I am happy to ask leave to withdraw the amendment with the restrictions and conditions that I have already imposed with regard to the House of Lords.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clauses 1 to 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedules 1 and 2 agreed to.

The Deputy Speaker resumed the Chair.

Bill reported, without amendment.

Third Reading