Northern Ireland Backstop: Conditional Interpretative Declaration

William Cash Excerpts

Thursday 21st February 2019 Commons Chamber

[Sir Edward Leigh]

I entirely agree with that. I have been working on this issue with international lawyers for some weeks precisely to try to implement what the Democratic Unionist party wants, first because that is the way to get this through Parliament and secondly because I agree with it. I agree with the DUP. In fact, I agree with the DUP on most things. If the hon. Gentleman will be patient, I will try to outline a legally enforceable way in which we can time-limit the backstop. That is terribly important. It has to be clear cut, legally enforceable and, above all, not subject to any kind of arbitration that is in any way in the hands of the EU. I am trying to get to where the DUP is, and if the hon. Gentleman will listen, I hope that I can help him out with a way forward. In fact, I hope that I can help out the EU and our Government.

We all know that the unfortunate thing is that the current deal cannot get through Parliament because people do not trust the EU not to spin things out, but the EU says that it will not unpick the agreement. That is why everyone says that there is an impasse. I am not sure that that is entirely correct. I think there is a way of proceeding.

I was saying before the hon. Gentleman’s intervention that we could get an agreement and get rid of the backstop altogether, but that is unlikely given the EU’s attitude. Secondly, there is a reasonable possibility that even without any amendments to the current agreement, “alternative arrangements” could start to operate on the Northern Irish border during the transition period. These would supersede the protocol and make it irrelevant before it could even be applied. Indeed, the Prime Minister has said many times that she does not even want the backstop to come into force. Unfortunately, but understandably, there is not enough trust in the Commons to rely on that happening.

Thirdly, there is the suggestion of a unilateral exit mechanism. It would be contained within the withdrawal agreement, which would be renegotiated, but the EU is unlikely to agree to any amendment that allows the UK to exit from the backstop if negotiations have broken down, without the EU’s consent. That is where we are at present. Even if such a thing were agreed, the EU could easily prevaricate and deny negotiations had broken down. That is why I made the point earlier that it is important that nothing is subject to international arbitration.

That leaves us with a fourth option: a clear time limit—it would be difficult to arbitrate about that, as we would have reached the time limit or we would not—or an end date for the backstop, which can be obtained by a conditional interpretative declaration. That is what I am now talking about.

I am not sure that in these debates we have had, because of the short time limits that we have been given, anybody has had the time to go into the legal background to this, so it is important that we put it on the record. As far as I know, my understanding of international law is correct, but of course, we have the Minister and my hon. Friends here, and they can put their own viewpoint forward. At least we can get this debate on the record. Let me try to explain.

There is a long-established practice of countries making unilateral statements when they ratify a treaty clarifying how they interpret the wording of a particular aspect of the treaty. The United Kingdom can interpret the wording in the agreement that the backstop is

“intended to apply only temporarily”

as meaning it must have an end date. What else is temporary? It has an end date, so it must end after a specified period. Such a declaration would be subject to the same rules that are applicable to reservations—another term of art in international law—but would not be a reservation itself, as these cannot be applied to bilateral treaties. Even if the other three options were pursued, whether individually, sequentially or simultaneously, the conditional interpretative declaration would be useful to have on hand already if the first three options ceased to be viable, or if the EU would not negotiate on that basis.

As international law provides that the rules for declarations follow the rules for reservations, it is useful to consult the United Nations International Law Commission’s “Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties”. Guideline 1.2 defines an interpretative declaration as

“a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State or an international organization, whereby that State or that organization purports to specify or clarify the meaning or scope of a treaty or of certain of its provisions.”

A conditional interpretative declaration is a more forceful variant of this instrument of international diplomacy whereby the United Kingdom would assert that its consent to be bound by the withdrawal agreement is dependent upon the interpretation that the backstop has an end date.

Lest one think that interpretative declarations are just a back-door way of applying a reservation to a bilateral treaty, it should be clarified that their applicability is much less extensive than that of a reservation. Conditional interpretative declarations cannot negate any part of a treaty. That is a vital part of what I am arguing. I am not trying to negate any part of the withdrawal agreement.

These declarations can only constrain the meaning given to part of a treaty. A state’s declaration when ratifying a multilateral treaty does not stand in the way of that state remaining a party to the treaty. With a conditional interpretative declaration to a bilateral accord, the outright rejection of the declaration by other parties means the treaty would not come into force. I am going to go into this in more detail in a moment.

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

I want at this stage to ask my right hon. Friend to get on the record the fact that, of course, this is only a draft withdrawal agreement. Furthermore, it is not signed; we know that. If signed, it would be, prima facie, a treaty. Would the question of a manifest violation of our internal law arise if the consequences of what was in the withdrawal agreement vitiated the constitutional integrity of the United Kingdom in relation to Northern Ireland?

[Sir Edward Leigh]

That is an interesting political argument, and I am not sure I am qualified to give a firm reply. However, there is clearly a lot of concern in the House of Commons, and if the EU is following debates such as this one, it should be aware that there is no way in which the House of Commons will ever vote for any agreement that in any way divides up the United Kingdom. I think we have to make that absolutely clear. If it wants to get a deal through, it has to try to listen to creative solutions, such as the one I am advocating.

I presume that the EU is absolutely sincere in saying that it wants a deal and that it is sincere, as Mr Juncker made clear today, in saying that no deal would be catastrophic not just for the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, but for the EU. I presume it is sincere, and it has to understand what my hon. Friend has said and find a way around it.

[Sir William Cash]

I want to add a short and simple point to my right hon. Friend’s comment that this would be a political consideration. I used the words “manifest violation”, which is in fact a term of art that arises under article 46 of the Vienna convention. I thought I would put it on the record that this is not political, but legal.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

As always, I am very grateful to my hon. Friend. One of the advantages of these debates is that we can get such legal points across and put them on the record, and I am grateful to him for making that clear.

With a conditional interpretative declaration to a bilateral accord, the outright rejection of the declaration by the other party means the treaty would not come into force, as I said before the interventions. While there is every chance that the EU might object to a conditional interpretative declaration, that objection might fall short of outright rejection. I want hon. Members to listen to that very carefully, because I am trying to find a way forward for Mr Juncker. If they like, I am actually trying to save his face. I am trying to give him an opportunity to object, but not to indulge in outright rejection.

The EU could argue that attempts during negotiations to achieve an end date were rejected, and I am sure it might start by arguing that. It might also argue that an end date would be incompatible with the concept of the three protocols forming an integral part of the agreement, as provided for in article 182 of the withdrawal agreement. However, perfectly valid counterpoints to those objections exist. We would need to argue that our declaration is compatible with our commitment to use “best endeavours” —a very important phrase—to negotiate “alternative arrangements” so that, as provided for, the backstop applies “temporarily”, if indeed it is ever applied at all. That is a fundamental point.

The fact that the backstop would not necessarily come into force under the terms of the agreement means that, in my view, it is not actually integral to the agreement at all. The termination of the backstop within a reasonable amount of time is fully in accord with the agreement, rather than an amendment to it. I therefore think that the arguments in favour of the applicability of just such a declaration are very strong.

What about the European Union’s likely response to such a move? There are four main possibilities. First, it could accept our interpretative declaration and move ahead with obtaining the consent of the European Parliament to the withdrawal agreement. This might include making a political protest, while accepting the declaration’s legality and applicability. That is the ideal response so far as we are concerned. As guideline 1.6.3 states:

“The interpretation resulting from an interpretative declaration made in respect of a bilateral treaty by a State or an international organization party to the treaty and accepted by the other party constitutes an authentic interpretation of that treaty.”

In other words, we would have obtained a legally binding commitment from the EU to end the backstop—victory.

Secondly, the EU could reply with an assertion that the interpretative declaration is in effect an attempt to impose a unilateral reservation, and therefore has no legal validity, but at the same time agree to negotiate solely on the question of an end date for the backstop to solve this issue head-on. This would mean it had abandoned its previous insistence that no further negotiations were possible—again, a way forward.

Thirdly, the EU might reply that the interpretative declaration has no legal validity, but request further negotiations in the hopes of obtaining something of value in exchange for giving way on an end date for the backstop.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Edward Leigh]

The hon. Lady asks how it could be resolved by the EU. It simply refuses to ratify the treaty. There is no deal—end of story. The interpretative declaration falls, the withdrawal agreement falls. We have made it clear that we are only going to ratify the treaty on the basis of the interpretative declaration that there is an end date to the backstop. They say, “We don’t agree with that, so we’re not going to ratify the treaty”, and that is the end of it.

We cannot impose this. I think people have misunderstood in thinking that we can somehow impose this idea I have been talking about on the EU. We cannot impose our ideas on the EU, but it has to make it clear that it will refuse to ratify the treaty.

[Sir William Cash]

Would it also be relevant to consider the situation whereby a reservation by one party to a multilateral treaty is only binding on another party when the second party has not made an objection? That, I think, is part of the parameters within which my right hon. Friend is making his argument. But of course it is not just a matter of whether they refuse it; it is whether they make an objection. Is that not something that also ought to be brought into the debate?

[Sir Edward Leigh]

Yes, it should be brought into the debate. There is no way a party can ignore the interpretative declaration and argue later in a court of international law that there were not aware of it or that it has no validity. It is pretty clear that this is the time to refuse to accept it.

There is, by the way, an argument—I do not want to get into this level of legal detail—about bilateral and multilateral treaties and letters of reservation, which I have talked about in the past. If I have talked about letters of reservation I apologise, because this would I think be a bilateral treaty with the EU, and therefore interpretative declarations are a more appropriate vehicle than letters of reservation. But I think that is almost to become too embroiled in legalisms and legal descriptions. The important thing is that the House understands that there is a way forward.

I was setting out the various scenarios for what might happen. Fourthly, the EU might reply that the submission of the interpretative declaration in fact invalidates the UK’s ratification of the withdrawal agreement and refuse to move on with obtaining the European Parliament’s consent so that the agreement can be fully ratified and come into force. Aside from the arguably dodgy legal grounds the EU would be on, because we would only be interpreting something that the withdrawal agreement says is the view of both parties, that—I have said this already, but I emphasise the point—would also have the effect of shifting responsibility for a no-deal Brexit from the UK on to the EU.

If we ratify the withdrawal agreement with a conditional interpretative declaration providing for a backstop end date, any ensuing deadlock could be ended in a single stroke by the EU simply deciding to accept the declaration. Again, it must be emphasised that under the terms of the backstop protocol it is perfectly possible that the backstop might never enter into force at all. The withdrawal agreement states that its

“provisions shall apply unless…they are superseded, in whole or in part, by a subsequent agreement”.

Both the UK and the EU are committed to “use their best endeavours” to conclude an agreement superseding the backstop by the end of 2020, the minimum transition period.

The essential purpose of a conditional interpretative declaration, then, is to achieve, before the end of the time limit, a set of trade facilitation procedures, predominantly by the extension of existing electronic customs procedures applied by the UK to imports from non-EU countries. It is vital that a conditional interpretative declaration brings the backstop to an end without being reliant upon a phrase such as, “subject to the withdrawal of negotiations”. That is a very important point. I know that some in the Government have argued that we could get some sort of codicil or declaration around a breakdown in negotiations, but the trouble is that all that is subject to arbitration. The EU could argue that it was still using its best endeavours to bring negotiations to an end and that it wanted to go to arbitration. That is where all the difficulties would come in and that is why I think that the end point date is much the best way of proceeding.

[Sir William Cash]

On that point, if the arbitration arrangements to which my right hon. Friend is referring are by reference to the arrangements of the joint committee arbitration panel, that ultimately, insofar as it engages with European law, will be adjudicated by the European Court of Justice. That, of course, takes us back to a point we could not accept.

[Sir Edward Leigh]

I am really trying to find a way forward for the DUP to support the deal. I am trying to help the Government in all this. I know that one thing the DUP will never accept is anything where there is a whiff of arbitration by the EU, because it does not trust the EU, so we have to close that down. It is opposed to anything that may be subject to arbitration, and I understand its fears.

So long as one side is willing to talk, there is a debate about whether a breakdown in negotiations has been reached, so we have to be careful with that way forward. I am talking about a small legal step that is legally in line with the agreement but that politically would produce a major change, putting the UK on a better, more equal footing with the EU in the forthcoming negotiations on our permanent future relationship.

The EU does not want a no-deal Brexit, or that is what it has said. If the current deadlock continues and the EU forces a no-deal Brexit upon us, personally, I believe that it could be manageable. It might put us back in the driver’s seat and I should think that we would be able to conclude bilateral agreements to continue on current terms until long-term agreements are worked out. Given that we would continue our membership of the World Trade Organisation, its set of trade rules would apply in this situation, which means that in a sense it is not really no deal at all, and it certainly is not “crashing out”.

I know, however, that businesses are desperately seeking reassurance and that there are political problems, which I do not need to go into at the moment, about no-deal outcomes. I know that many farmers and agribusinesses in my constituency in Lincolnshire want to know the trading context of the coming years so that they can plan and adapt accordingly. While the withdrawal agreement is far from perfect—that is the nature of compromise—it delivers on some essentials, and we need to make good on our promise to the British people to deliver Brexit on time.

In conclusion, I hope all this is helpful. It is designed to try to achieve a compromise. It will not please everybody, but if we are not prepared to compromise, if us Brexiteers and our remainer friends try to get everything we or they want, one side or another may be in for a very big disappointment. I do not want to take any risks with Brexit—I am sorry, that is my view. I think that would be catastrophic for the Government. We have to deliver Brexit on 29 March, or within two or three weeks thereafter to get the proper legislation through. We have to get through a deal that Parliament can accept, and I hope that what I have been talking about this afternoon may be one small step in making that possible.

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

I want to make just a few comments. I pay respect to my right hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) for coming forward with this ingenious and no doubt carefully analysed proposal. However, because of the importance of this question, I would not want any smoke and mirrors to come out of this or, indeed, the mouth of the Attorney General when he makes his statement, as I believe he will in due course. I am not sure about its timing at the moment, but hon. Members may recall that I raised this question in the exchanges a couple of days ago, when I said that my European Scrutiny Committee is looking carefully at this matter.

Furthermore, there is the question of the validity of the Attorney General’s opinion or statement, or whatever form it takes when he makes it. It is something that ought to be done at least by Monday of next week to give everybody an opportunity to assess its nature—including some points that my right hon. Friend has made in this debate—to be sure that when he does make such a statement, it stands up. What we do not want is a smoke-and-mirrors operation. We do not want anything that will sound terribly important but, in practice, turns out to be effectively of less significance than it might sound when it is first uttered.

We had this situation during the Iraq war, when I was shadow Attorney General and I sought the opinion of the Attorney General, who was in the House of Lords, through various questions that I raised about him giving an opinion. Eventually, he came forward with a truncated opinion. Subsequently, despite the fact that it silenced a lot of critics during the debate itself, it would be fair to say that, actually, they were blinded by science and did not really know quite what he was talking about because it all came out so quickly. That is what we must avoid, which is why, as Chair of the European Scrutiny Committee, I am insisting that we get plenty of time for proper examination of the wording that the Attorney General, who is in Brussels discussing this very question, comes up with.

I feel that that is an important warning to put down as a marker. We do not want to be bounced. With Chequers, the Cabinet was bounced—there is no doubt about that; the Government had been planning it for about 18 months. We do not want another bouncing operation. Were my right hon. Friend to put forward his proposal and after consideration—I know it has already gone to the Attorney General—his thinking were built into the discussions that our right hon. and learned Friend is having in Brussels as we speak, it is incredibly important that the House is not bounced by it. It is difficult enough—my right hon. Friend and I are pretty much here on our own, with the exception of our hon. Friend the Member for Cleethorpes (Martin Vickers) and the hon. Member for Belfast South (Emma Little Pengelly). The House will be packed when—if—a statement is made on this subject. Before then, it must have been properly assessed and analysed, and any problems that might arise anticipated.

Let me give an example. As has been stated, the Attorney General in his advice to the Prime Minister concluded that in the situation of the backstop being activated

“the Protocol would endure indefinitely until a superseding agreement took its place”.

There is not even a mechanism for the EU and the UK to agree on termination of the backstop if negotiations were to break down. The Attorney General’s advice was restricted to the text of the protocol; he was not asked to consider whether the impact of the protocol could be constrained by a UK unilateral statement in the form of a conditional interpretive declaration.

[Emma Little Pengelly]

Unfortunately, I have to leave shortly, or I might miss my flight—I may do so anyway. This debate is incredibly interesting. I concur absolutely with what the hon. Gentleman is saying. What is important in all this is not a discussion of what is legally possible, or even what is legally probable; what many of us in the Democratic Unionist party and across this Chamber want is what is legally certain, in so far as legal certainty is possible to achieve. There are lots of interesting ideas, but that is critical: we must all be sure of the legal certainty, in so far as that is possible, before we can agree the way forward.

[Sir William Cash]

I am deeply grateful to the hon. Lady because she expresses exactly my line of argument. I hope that it is understood that this is not a matter of being obstructive for its own sake. It is incredibly important that the House is not bounced, or confronted with smoke and mirrors or something Members do not completely understand, but then they all go off and vote and afterwards someone says, “Actually, that doesn’t stack up.” I know that my right hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough entirely agrees with me on that, and I know the Minister does, too—

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Kwasi Kwarteng)]

indicated assent.

[Sir William Cash]

I see him nodding his head, for which I am grateful. It really is important. We are not talking about something like a free trade agreement, like the one with Canada—the CETA arrangements—at which my Committee has also been looking very closely. In fact, it is a matter of profound and fundamental constitutional significance, and I am deeply concerned that the EU has taken an intransigent position.

We know that Martin Selmayr is reputed to have said that the price the United Kingdom will have to pay for the way in which it has carried on—I am paraphrasing—is Northern Ireland. We know that there are powerful forces in the Republic who want a united Ireland, and there are also those who believe that the whole backstop argument has been engineered to lead to a border poll and ultimately a united Ireland. There are some very clever lawyers at work in all this. It is our job in the House, with such resources as are available to us, to try to penetrate the fog and make it crystal clear that no solution that would have the effect of undermining the constitutional status of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom could possibly be put forward.

I do not think that I need to say much more. Mine is a profound concern, but I am sure that it will be understood in Downing Street and in the Attorney General’s own mind. Let me simply say that I am extremely grateful to my right hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough for the way in which he has set out what I have understood him to be seeking to achieve. The danger would arise if we ended up taking a route that looked plausibly good and then turned out to be not merely a bear trap but a disaster.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

I thank you very much for those tips, Madam Deputy Speaker. I was just making a rather flippant observation; I do not think I have ever seen entirely empty Opposition Benches.

Clearly the Government and the Prime Minister have set out three possible routes—three ways in which the backstop can be addressed. Members will know those three options, but for the sake of the record we should recapitulate. The first was whether the backstop could be replaced with alternative arrangements, and those arrangements are expressed exactly in the political declaration. They are arrangements that will avoid a hard border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, and this process has been constructively led by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and he has been engaging with MPs across the House on that issue.

My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has also discussed alternative arrangements with the ongoing alternative arrangements working group in Brussels and with Mr Barnier. The Commission has changed its language over the last few weeks and is beginning to engage seriously with the proposals we have suggested. Although the Commission has expressed some concern about the viability of alternative arrangements, I would suggest that it is more flexible and open to these alternative arrangements than has been the case hitherto.

[Sir William Cash]

Will the Minister also accept that, as he has made clear, the only basis on which this entire analysis and investigation and possible wording could be effective in the Government’s mind would be if it were legally binding? However, it is manifestly obvious that the political declaration is not legally binding and therefore to conduct the alternative arrangements on the basis of a political declaration which is not legally binding simply does not wash.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

My hon. Friend with his customary acuity stresses and reinforces what I and the Government have already said: we are seeking legally binding changes to the backstop.

The Government have also looked at the issue of a time limit to the existing backstop, and this is where the suggestion of my right hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough plays its part. His suggestion is that conditional interpretative declarations could be employed as a mechanism for interpreting what exactly is meant by “temporary” in relation to the backstop and defining this in such a way that results in the fact that the UK would not be bound indefinitely to the backstop. It is an elegant solution on first reading, but an issue has arisen as to exactly how binding such a declaration would be. My guidance has been that any changes would still have to be jointly agreed by both parties, and that is a key aspect we must consider. My right hon. Friend has pointed the way on this: in the withdrawal agreement, which I have studied carefully, the Northern Ireland protocol, which is about 185 pages long, sets out in clear, some might even say stark, terms the role of the joint committee and the fact that any end of the backstop would have to be mutually agreed. It is unclear to me and a number of people who have looked at this in the interests of the Government whether such a conditional interpretative declaration would allow the UK unilaterally to impose an end date for the protocol. My right hon. Friend in his comprehensive and excellent speech also suggested that such a declaration could not contravene the withdrawal agreement itself.

[Sir William Cash]

The other point to throw into this equation is the question of whether the European Court of Justice would, at the end of this process, be able to adjudicate on the outcome, because it would be manifestly in the minds of the EU that this matter engaged European law.

[Kwasi Kwarteng]

As my hon. Friend will know, the status of the backstop will be subject, I suppose, to the scrutiny of the joint committee. He is suggesting that the joint committee will ultimately be somehow under the jurisdiction of the European Court. This is not actually—