European Union (Referendum) Bill

William Cash Excerpts

Friday 8th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Adam Afriyie]

As I said, we are completely united as a party in wanting to give the British people a say. There are differences between us on timing, and I will come to that point in a moment.

It strikes me that, at a time when the majority of our constituents want a referendum before the next election, I have never known a period in British politics when the political establishment has been so disconnected from public opinion, and so remote from, opposed to and out of touch with it. Politicians have wilfully kicked the can further and further down the road, and we will be in danger of doing that again if neither my amendment 3 nor amendment 22 is supported.

[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

rose—

[Mr Jenkin]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Cash]

The right hon. Gentleman has massive pro-European credentials, as he puts it, so will he explain why he voted against the Maastricht treaty Bill on Third Reading?

[Mr Hain]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention because I am about to name-check him—and to answer his question.

The City must be properly consulted, as new schedule 2 and amendment 68 would provide, and its concerns, like those of CBI members, need to be understood by the electorate well in advance of a short and compressed campaign so that voters are not bamboozled by newspapers and stampeded into a referendum.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hain]

I want to make some progress so that others have a chance to speak.

A consultation with the Institute of Directors, the CBI or the independent economic think-tanks would also endorse the notion that joining the EEA would cost Britain about £6 billion. Yes, that is about £1 billion —or 17% less than our membership of the EU—but it is still a large amount in comparison and assumes that our EU partners would, after our departure, be in an open frame of mind to accept us back into some kind of trading relationship. I am sure that the CBI and all the other business organisations, including the British Chambers of Commerce, would want to have a say on that.

As members of the European economic area, we would still be bound by the regulations that the anti-EU camp denounce. In return for access to the single market, Norway and all the other relevant countries, such as Switzerland and Iceland, must adopt nearly all European Union legislation relevant to the free movement of goods, services, capital and people, together with laws in areas such as employment, consumer protection, environmental policy and competition.

There would, of course, be the chance properly to assess such a move. A report would be placed before Parliament and we would spend days debating on the Floor of the House whether to accept the report and the assessment. We would also be able to assess one point made by the CBI, which would also have a greater chance to have its say than it would during the compressed period of a short referendum campaign. That point is that we would also be bound by future European law in those areas, even though we were outside the European Union.

[Mr Cash]

Will the right hon. Gentleman address the question asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Windsor (Adam Afriyie) about the date of 23 October 2014, which has not yet been debated? Does he agree that a referendum on that date would get totally entangled with the Scottish referendum, which will take place only a month before? Furthermore, it is dangerous to choose a specific date, as was the case in 2007 when we had to delay the local elections because of the foot and mouth outbreak. There are a whole stack of reasons for not having a specific date for a referendum.

[Mr Hain]

As in 1992 and 1993, when the hon. Gentleman and I were on the same side of the argument on the Maastricht treaty, I completely agree with him. His logic on this point is absolutely faultless, even if it often is not on many other European matters.

I believe—perhaps I am wrong—that all the business organisations, if consulted, would take the view of the CBI report and dismiss a customs union as an alternative to European Union membership—the “Turkey option”—as the very worst of all the halfway alternatives, leaving the UK with very limited EU market access and zero influence over trade deals.