European Union (Withdrawal) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateWes Streeting
Main Page: Wes Streeting (Labour - Ilford North)Department Debates - View all Wes Streeting's debates with the Department for Exiting the European Union
(6 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberWith respect, we have had one lengthy intervention, and I have to make some progress.
Our current estimate is that the UK Government will need to make between 800 and 1,000 statutory instruments to make exit a reality in UK law. That may seem, in some ways, like a large number—it is a little less than one year’s quota, as it were—and I understand that Members have concerns about scrutiny of that volume of legislation, but let me contrast that with the 12,000 European Union regulations and 8,000 domestic regulations—20,000 pieces of law—that have brought forward new policies while we have been members of the European Union.
This one-off task is very different from the flow of new law from the European Union in the last 40 years, and it is ultimately about ensuring that power returns to this House. The people who complain about using secondary legislation should remember that of those 20,000 pieces of law, 8,000 went through under secondary legislation and the remaining 12,000 went through without any involvement from this House at all, because they came as regulations. They changed the law rather than maintaining it.
No. All these changes must happen quickly to maintain stability as we leave the European Union. Many of the changes will be minor and technical, replacing, for example, references to European Union law or to other member states. It would not make sense, nor would it be possible, to make these numerous changes in primary legislation. Some of the changes will, by nature, be more substantial and demand more scrutiny. An example would be a proposal to transfer a function currently exercised by the Commission to a new domestic body that needs to be set up from scratch. We hope to minimise the need for such bodies, but where they are needed I readily accept that such changes require fuller parliamentary scrutiny. That is why the Bill sets clear criteria that will trigger the use of the affirmative procedure, ensuring a debate and vote on the statutory instrument in both Houses. Over the course of the two days we spend debating this Bill, I am sure that we will hear calls for the secondary legislation to receive greater scrutiny—
I will give way in a second.
These corrections need to be made to ensure that we have a functioning statute book. As far as we can see, the power we have proposed is the only logical and feasible way to make those corrections. Our approach remains the only viable plan—we considered others—put forward in this House. Although we have heard complaints from the Opposition, we have not heard any alternatives from them.
The central premise of the Secretary of State’s argument is that in order to ensure a smooth exit we need to maintain as much of the status quo as possible on the way out. But this Bill goes much further, because the changes contained in clauses 5 and 6 would effectively rule out being within the customs union and the single market for a transitional period. That represents the single biggest risk to our economy, and that is what is in the Bill.
The hon. Gentleman is quite right in one respect: that is clear Government policy. That is, in fact, the decision that was taken by the British people last year. They wanted to leave the European Union, which means leaving the single market and leaving the customs union. That point is clear. I know it is confusing for Labour Members, because their deputy leader appears to have a different view from the rest of the party.
Let me make some further progress after that rather silly intervention. The Bill also contains a limited power to implement the withdrawal agreement by statutory instrument if that proves necessary.
No. I spent 20-plus years as a human rights lawyer interpreting and applying provisions such as the charter and acting for many people to whose lives it made a real difference, as the Secretary of State will know.
I want to move on the question of devolved powers. At the moment, EU law limits the powers of the devolved institutions. On withdrawal, the default position ought to be that the devolved institutions would have power over matters falling within the devolved fields, but clause 11 prevents that and diverts powers that ought to go to Edinburgh, Cardiff or Belfast to London, where they are to be hoarded. That is fundamentally the wrong approach, but it is totally consistent with the Government’s approach of grabbing powers and avoiding scrutiny.
On that topic, let me deal with exit day, a crucially important day in the Bill. It is the day on which the European Communities Act will be repealed. It is also the day on which the role of the European Court of Justice will be extinguished in our law, and that matters hugely, whatever anyone’s long-term view, particularly for transitional arrangements. I heard the Secretary of State say this morning that he wanted transitional arrangements that were as close as possible to the current arrangements. I think he knows, in his heart of hearts, that that will almost certainly involve a role for the European Court of Justice—although he will say that it would be temporary.
Exit day, the day on which the role of the Court is extinguished, is crucial. Without it, we might not be able to transition on the terms that the Secretary of State was suggesting this morning. He knows that. Control over exit day is therefore hugely important. Who will have that control? People talk about bringing back control, and they might think that Parliament would have control over this important issue. But no. Enter clause 14, which states that
“‘exit day’ means such day as a Minister of the Crown may by regulations appoint”.
This will be in the sole power of a Minister. Anyone simply passing this Bill must be prepared to be a spectator on the question of what the transitional measures should be and how they operate. That is a huge risk to our national interests.
The Secretary of State said earlier that it was “silly” of me to raise the transitional arrangements in relation to our continuing to be in the single market and the customs union. If the Bill is enacted and we are outside the purview of the ECJ and not subject to EU law, we will effectively be ruling out membership of the single market and the customs union during the transition. How will that bring stability and certainty to British businesses? Why is this provision in the Bill?
This is the conundrum that the Secretary of State and the Bill have created. If exit day is in March 2019, it is difficult to see how we could transition on terms similar to those we are now on. What could we do? We could choose to push exit day two years down the line. [Interruption.] No? Well, if we did not do that, but we recognised that the ECJ was necessary to the process, we would end up repealing what was once this repeal Bill, only to have to bring it back in again. That is the extent of the absurdity of the powers in the Bill.