Human Rights Abuses: Magnitsky Sanctions

Wendy Morton Excerpts

Thursday 8th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Wendy Morton (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con)]

I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) on securing the debate. He has long been a determined and principled advocate for human rights, and it is entirely fitting that he brought this important issue before the House for debate. I thank Members from across House for their many contributions.

The debate is not about whether Magnitsky-style sanctions are justified—they are—but about whether they are being used as effectively as they should be, and whether the Government are doing enough to ensure that they deliver real consequences for those responsible for the gravest human rights violations.

The UK has one of the most developed autonomous sanctions regimes in the world. The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, introduced by the last Conservative Government, gives Ministers the power to impose asset freezes and travel bans on individuals and entities responsible for serious human rights abuses and corruption. That framework was designed to give the UK the ability to act decisively, in co-ordination with allies and without delay. Ministers spoke of a regime capable of reaching from Xinjiang to the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and to the persecution of the Rohingya. Those ambitions were right, but the test is how the regime is applied in practice, because sanctions that are slow, inconsistently applied or weakly enforced do not deter abusers; they signal hesitation.

Much of today’s debate has understandably focused on Russia, and rightly so. Since launching its illegal, full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has been responsible for widespread and systematic abuses, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. The UK’s response has been significant. It was under the last Conservative Government that the framework for these measures was put in place; as a result, around £28.7 billion in Russian-linked assets have been frozen, but freezing assets is only part of the picture. How is this sanctions regime being enforced? How many investigations has the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation opened in the last year? How many enforcement actions have been taken, and how many penalties have been imposed? Without visible and credible enforcement, there is a real risk that sanctions become something that can be managed, worked around or even absorbed as a cost of doing business.

Several Members have raised the issue of Russia’s so-called shadow fleet—the vessels and networks used to evade sanctions and to continue exporting oil. The Government have sanctioned a number of ships, which is welcome, but, as others have said, the shadow fleet is consistently adapting. It relies on complex ownership structures, opaque insurance arrangements and ship-to-ship transfers designed to obscure origin and destination. As the shadow Foreign Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Witham (Priti Patel), has made clear from this Dispatch Box, enforcement needs to be relentless, not only identifying vessels but targeting the wider networks that enable this activity.

That brings me to a recent example that raises important questions about enforcement. Recent reporting has suggested that sanctioned Russian crude oil was delivered to a refinery part-owned by Lakshmi Mittal, a UK-resident businessman, using vessels that had already been blacklisted by western authorities. Those shipments reportedly involved ship-to-ship transfers and other practices commonly associated with sanctions evasion. Those reports may ultimately lead to enforcement action, and I have written to the director of OFSI to seek clarification, but they underline a wider point: if sanctions are to be effective, they must follow all those involved in enabling sanction busting, not just the ships themselves. That includes those who benefit from, facilitate, finance, or fail to exercise proper oversight over, the continued flow of Russian oil revenues.

When credible concerns are raised about potential sanctions circumvention involving UK-linked individuals or businesses, there must be confidence that those concerns are examined rigorously and without hesitation. Does the Minister know whether OFSI is actively assessing the activity reported in connection with Mr Mittal’s refinery? How does OFSI approach cases where supply chains are deliberately complex, span multiple jurisdictions and are designed to obscure accountability? How are the Government ensuring that enforcement action keeps pace with increasingly sophisticated attempts to evade sanctions in the energy sector?

It is also reasonable to ask whether the Government are prepared to apply the same level of scrutiny where individuals with UK links hold influential positions, such as directorships in major international institutions, banks and multinational companies, while also being connected to sectors implicating Russian energy flows. Can the Minister confirm that no individual, however prominent, and no corporate structure, however complex, is treated as being beyond scrutiny? Sanctions must be applied consistently and without exception, because their credibility depends on it.

Magnitsky-style sanctions were never intended to apply to Russia alone; they were designed to target serious human rights abuses wherever they occur, so let me turn to a number of other areas. First, there is Sudan, which has been mentioned today. We welcome the sanctions already imposed on individuals associated with the RSF, but the situation on the ground remains dire. Civilians continue to suffer, particularly in Darfur, so what more is being done? Are further designations under active consideration? How are sanctions being used alongside diplomatic efforts at the UN and with regional partners to press for a ceasefire and accountability?

Secondly, let me turn to people smuggling and human trafficking. These crimes, which have been mentioned today, involve exploitation, violence and abuse on a large scale, often facilitated by corruption and financial secrecy. In 2025 alone, more than 41,000 illegal migrants crossed the channel in small boats—nearly 5,000 more than in the previous year. Have the Government considered whether Magnitsky-style sanctions could be used more systematically against the leaders of those criminal networks, particularly where there is evidence of corruption or serious human rights abuse? What assessment has been made of that option?

There are a number of long-standing and deeply concerning situations in which Magnitsky sanctions remain highly relevant. In Hong Kong and China, the UK has sanctioned some officials for abuses in Xinjiang and for undermining rights and freedoms. That was the right decision, but serious concerns remain; for instance, not a single Chinese or Hong Kong official has been sanctioned in connection with the dismantling of Hong Kong’s freedoms, despite more than 200,000 Hongkongers relocating to the UK. The recent guilty verdict against Jimmy Lai is a stark reminder of the continued assault on the rule of law, press freedom and judicial independence in Hong Kong. Are the Government actively considering Magnitsky-style sanctions against Chinese Communist party officials involved in that case, including those responsible for political interference in the judicial system?

I also ask the Minister what action is being taken against those responsible for placing bounties on the heads of activists—including individuals now living here in the UK—in acts of clear transnational repression. The US has already sanctioned officials linked to those bounties; why has the UK not followed suit? More broadly, these issues sit alongside growing concerns about foreign influence and intimidation here in the UK, including through the proposed Chinese super-embassy in London, and the need for the effective implementation of the foreign influence registration scheme. How confident is the Minister that the UK’s sanctions policy, its approach to foreign influence, and its response to transnational repression are properly aligned?

Turning briefly to Iran, as we have seen, the regime’s response to peaceful protest has been brutal. Arbitrary detention, torture and executions continue, so what further steps are being taken to sanction those responsible for repression, and how is the UK working with partners to ensure that Iranian officials involved in those abuses cannot move or hide assets abroad? In Myanmar, nearly four years after the coup, the military junta continues to carry out widespread abuses against civilians, so are additional designations being prepared, and how is the UK ensuring that sanctions remain targeted, relevant and effective over time?

Finally, I turn briefly to Venezuela, where decisive action taken by the US against the Maduro regime has once again underlined the seriousness of the human rights and democratic crisis facing that country. Against that backdrop, can the Minister set out clearly the Government’s current approach to Venezuela sanctions, how human rights considerations are being reflected in policy, and whether Magnitsky-style sanctions remain firmly on the table?

[Joe Powell]

Would the shadow Minister consider briefly responding to my question about whether she thinks it is appropriate for the shadow Attorney General to be simultaneously advising shadow Ministers and a sanctioned Russian oligarch?

[Wendy Morton]

I am happy to respond. I refer the hon. Gentleman and his colleague who also raised that question, the hon. Member for Bolton West (Phil Brickell), to a letter that Lord Wolfson, the shadow Attorney General, has published. That letter sets out the position very clearly.

Returning to the subject of the debate, when we step back, a clear pattern emerges: sanctions only work if they are enforced rigorously, applied consistently and backed by the political will to follow the evidence wherever it leads. As such, I will close with a few final questions for the Minister. How are the Government strengthening enforcement against sanctions evasion, particularly in complex sectors such as energy and shipping, and where do they see as the next priority for designations? What steps are being taken to improve transparency and accountability to Parliament? If sanctions are to serve their purpose, they must be more than symbolic; they must be enforced, credible and consistent. That is what victims of human rights abuses deserve, and that is what the UK’s reputation as a serious and principled actor on the world stage requires.