Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill Debate

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Department: Home Office

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Viscount Hanworth Excerpts
Tuesday 13th January 2015

(9 years, 11 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Viscount Hanworth Portrait Viscount Hanworth (Lab)
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My Lords, the Bill is a mixture of new initiatives and refinements of existing legislation. It is being fast-tracked through Parliament in a way that makes it very difficult to subject it to adequate scrutiny. The complicating factor is that much of the information that might enable parliamentarians to judge the likely effects of the powers to counter terrorism or the terrorist threat is unavailable to them. To reveal more might prejudice the security of operations, so parliamentarians have to work in the dark.

Apart from the questionable urgency that Governments typically associate with such legislation, there is a new factor that might affect our critical judgments. We witnessed appalling terrorist atrocities in France last week. These are bound to increase anxieties about the possibility of a similar event occurring in the UK. This, I am sure, will predispose many of us to look favourably on the Bill’s provisions. Nevertheless, the Bill deserves detailed and critical scrutiny. It requires far more scrutiny than the time that has been allocated to it will allow.

In the absence of such careful oversight, it may be appropriate to offer some words of warning. This is an enabling Bill that grants powers without either mandating their use or posing limitations on the extent to which they might be used. They are powers that in the main should be used very sparingly. There is a danger that some of the powers will be used to the extent that they will become counterproductive. In addition to refining the existing powers, the Bill adds a whole new dimension to the counterterrorist legislation. This is contained in Part 1.

Chapter 2 concerns a new power to enable the Home Secretary to issue a temporary exclusion order that would control the return to the UK of a British citizen who is reasonably suspected of involvement in terrorist activities abroad. An exclusion order can last for up to two years, after which it will be renewable. Very little has been said to justify these orders. They seem to have originated in an extemporary pronouncement of the Prime Minister when the atrocities of ISIL were prominently exposed for the first time in our media. It was in August that David Cameron first raised the prospect of barring a British jihadist from returning to the UK. At the time Dominic Grieve, the former Attorney-General, said that the proposal was likely to be a non-starter. He pointed out that withdrawing an individual’s passport would effectively make them stateless, which would contravene international laws.

In an address to the Australian Parliament in November, David Cameron said that British fighters in Syria and Iran would be barred from returning to this country for two years unless they submitted to strict conditions. He also indicated that they would be granted a right of appeal. That represented a refinement of the original proposal which has been described by some as an attempt to dump the UK’s toxic waste in distant places. The suspicion remains that the Bill’s proposals represent an attempt at saving face by turning a hasty and ill considered reaction into practical legislation. However, few of the practicalities have yet been considered.

An appropriate policy for confronting British nationals who wish to return to the UK after visiting the areas of conflict in the Middle East would make some clear distinctions regarding their motives for going there and their reasons for wishing to return. There should be no automatic presumption of guilt in advance of proof of innocence. We must distinguish among the various categories of Muslim Britons who have travelled, or are thinking of travelling, to the areas of conflict.

In the first category, which might be the predominant category, are young and naively impressionable individuals who have been influenced by others to espouse the cause of the jihadists. When confronted with the realities of the conflict they might seek to return home. They should be assisted to do so in every possible way, and they should not be made fearful of punishment or reprisals. There will be others who have inevitably been involved in brutal acts of war. In those cases, it will be difficult to judge how a balance should be struck between any punishments and programmes of rehabilitation to which individuals should be subjected. Those involved in barbaric acts that can be classified as war crimes ought not to go unpunished, and in the light of the likelihood of such punishment it will be less likely that they should seek to return. There will be some who would seek to return for the purpose of wreaking havoc in the UK. They will be very few in number but they will pose a disproportionate threat to our security. These dangers need to be averted by enhanced levels of surveillance and intelligence.

Our Islamic community will be one of the most important factors in overcoming the threat of Islamist terrorism in this country. The opinions of parents, siblings, friends and elders will eventually discourage young people from espousing the ideology of jihad. Every effort must be made to make sure that such people are not alienated by the rough handling of their errant relatives. Senior police officers who have been involved in these matters understand this. Helen Ball, of the Metropolitan Police, who is the senior national co-ordinator for counterterrorism and terrorist investigations, has stated this clearly in outstanding testimony to the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee. She confirmed that the police clearly see the need to build trust and confidence which will enable families, schools and institutions to be forthcoming with intelligence about people who are in danger of being radicalised.

Another testimony from the police is that their ability to handle the cyberintelligence that should enable them to avert acts of terrorism is constantly being degraded by the advent of new means of electronic communication. It is to matters of cyberintelligence that Part 3 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill is devoted. There are various provisions that will enable the Home Office to require communication service providers to retain the data that would facilitate the identification of individuals who might be planning acts of terrorism in association with others. It is by no means certain that these provisions will enable the investigators to redress the balance in their favour. This is where part of the danger to which I have alluded resides.

What might happen in the event of a failure of this intelligence? A likely outcome could be increasing harassment of young individuals of the Islamic community whose profiles might resemble those of the terrorist suspects. This would serve only to generate the alienation and resentment that sustain the cause of the terrorists. In the opinion of many who are concerned with civil liberties, a further expansion of the powers to retain electronic data is inconsistent with our rights to privacy. However, we all demand a degree of security against the threat of terrorism. We cannot expect to have the best on both accounts. We must tolerate a degree of intrusion into our private affairs as the cost of this security but we must be vigilant in guarding our rights.