Higher Education: Overseas Students
Viscount Hanworth Excerpts(9 years ago)
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Lord Bates
In terms of numbers, the UK remains the second most attractive country in the world for students to come to. After they have studied, if they apply for a graduate-level skilled job—which certainly someone graduating in the sciences would be able to do—they would be welcome to transfer from the tier 4 visa to the tier 2 visa; if they want to stay on for an internship they can apply for a tier 5 visa; and if they want to set up a business they can stay on under the tier 1 visa. There are lots of opportunities for the brightest and best people to stay on, and we want that to continue.
Viscount Hanworth (Lab)
Some institutions surely take in rather few overseas students. Has it not occurred to the Government that a percentage threshold of visa refusals is entirely inappropriate in such cases? Might they not think of an alternative threshold in such cases?
Lord Bates
The threshold is there to trigger whether there is a potential abuse of the system. When we came into power in 2010 we inherited the old points-based system. This was poorly run and not robust and we wanted to strengthen it with tests. That is why we closed down 900 bogus colleges. At the same time as the clamp-down on the bogus aspects of it, we have seen an increase in the quality of students who are choosing to make their investment in education in the UK. That shows that the system is working.
Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill
Viscount Hanworth Excerpts(9 years, 10 months ago)
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Viscount Hanworth (Lab)
My Lords, I had an opportunity earlier this afternoon to read the letter from the noble Lord, Lord Bates, to those who intended to participate in today’s Report stage. I express my appreciation of his consideration in writing, but I must observe that the fast-track schedule of the Bill is severely impeding its proper parliamentary scrutiny. The Government have not given themselves enough time to think.
The letter points to the Government’s amendments of Monday that represented their response to the widely expressed anxieties about the way in which the statutory Prevent strategy was liable to conflict with the duty of freedom of speech enjoined by the Act of 1986. The Government also tabled an amendment two days ago that is ostensibly intended to ensure that the guidance issued in connection with the Prevent strategy will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. In the judgment of the proposers of the current amendments, the Government’s concessions are inadequate. They are therefore calling for something more extensive and secure.
The letter of the noble Lord, Lord Bates, observes that, between 1999 and 2009, a full 30% of persons convicted of terrorist offences associated with al-Qaeda had attended a higher education institution. It is difficult to place this figure in an appropriate context, but given the extent of participation in higher education of the relevant age group, this seems a strikingly low figure. It might be interpreted as an indication of the efficacy of higher education institutions in diminishing the threat of terrorism.
The effect of higher education is typically to stimulate individualistic freedom of thought—the very antithesis of the dogmatic nostrums of the radical Islamists, which differ so markedly from the religious injunctions of Islam. A liberal higher education is undoubtedly a most effective means of combating ideological extremism. The success of British institutions of higher education as effective agents of counterterrorism ought to be widely recognised. Instead, the Government’s statutory Prevent strategy, which promises to be clumsy and intrusive, threatens to subvert the role of higher education in countering Islamic radicalisation.
Another aspect of the statutory Prevent strategy disturbs me. It concerns the cost and bureaucracy that will be imposed on the designated institutions. As I observed in a previous debate, there has been a hypertrophy of bureaucracy in British universities for which the interventions of central government have been largely responsible. Nowadays, in almost every institution, the numbers of administrative staff exceed those of teaching staff—and by a significant margin in many cases. The Prevent strategy, with its specially appointed officers, mandated staff training courses, obligation to report compliance with its nostrums and duty to inform the police and others of any suspicions and anxieties, is a bureaucratic nightmare. Finally, I have to wonder whose opinions have been elicited by the consultation on the draft guidance. If, as I strongly suspect, those few opinions have come predominantly from the administrative faculties of universities, then I suggest they should be treated with due caution.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Bates) (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for moving this amendment and giving the opportunity to put one or two additional points on record. This amendment would not permit guidance to be issued to universities until a report had been laid before Parliament setting out the impact of—
Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill
Viscount Hanworth Excerpts(9 years, 11 months ago)
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Viscount Hanworth (Lab)
My Lords, my name is also attached to the amendments in this group and I strongly support the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Phillips.
One of the most arresting testimonies that I have heard recently concerns the way in which the alienation and radicalisation of young British Muslims has been related to a rising tide of Islamophobia. It would be wrong to suggest that the existing Prevent strategy is grounded in Islamophobia, but there are clear indications that it has added to the sense of alienation. In other words, the strategy has already become counterproductive. By placing the strategy on a statutory basis and by mandating acts of surveillance on the part of various public institutions, the damage that has already been done is in danger of being exacerbated. The danger can only be averted if the Prevent agenda is pursued with sensitivity and with a light touch and if it is subject to careful and ongoing parliamentary scrutiny. Amendment 115A and the other amendments with which it has been grouped seek to ensure that there will be some scrutiny at the outset. I observe that these amendments are conformable with Amendments 112C and 112E, which concern the need to review the guidance on subsequent occasions.
The consultation document titled Prevent Duty Guidance gives an indication of what might transpire if the strategy were unleashed in an unbridled manner. It has the potential to give rise to an era comparable to the post-war era of anti-communist persecution in the United States, known as the era of McCarthyism. The document describes a duty to prevent people from becoming terrorists and a duty to challenge terrorist ideas. These duties will be imposed on specified institutions: hospitals, schools, prisons, young offender institutions, universities and local authorities. The intention is that the Secretary of State should have the freedom to specify the duties that will be incumbent upon each category of institution, without submitting them to parliamentary scrutiny. Little regard has been given to the potential within the institutions for fulfilling such duties. Nevertheless, it is proposed to establish an inspection regime that will determine whether the duties are being fulfilled. If they are not fulfilled, then it is proposed that penalties may be imposed.
Specially appointed agents may be assigned to the institutions to ensure their compliance with the statutory obligations. We are told that the specified institutions must demonstrate evidence of productive co-operation with local Prevent organisations, the police and local authorities. Those in positions of leadership must ensure that the staff of their institutions implement their Prevent duties effectively. To this end, they will need to ensure that the staff are appropriately trained.
People suspected of being involved in terrorist-related activities must be reported to the police. If I understand correctly, terrorist-related activities are deemed to include non-violent extremism, which would make the category very wide and ill-defined. All the activities in fulfilment of the duties must be recorded, and reports of compliance must be made available on request.
These provisions are quite sufficient for the creation of a totalitarian police state. If that sounds far-fetched, that it is only because, in view of the nature of British society and its ingrained resistance to tyranny, such an outcome seems unimaginable. However, I suggest that our complacency in itself is not a sufficient protection against tyranny. Instead, we need to ensure that our legislation does not sanction such dangerously oppressive powers. To fulfil the various injunctions of the statutory Prevent strategy, the institutions will need to establish specialised units. The Home Office will be charged with monitoring all the resulting Prevent activity and ensuring that every specified institution has a suitable inspection regime.
An immediate concern is the expense that would be entailed in even a partial fulfilment of the agenda of the statutory Prevent programme. In this connection, I can speak of what I have experienced within the university environment. There are already precedents that provide ample warning of the deleterious effects of centrally directed inspection regimes. I have in mind the quality-assurance regimes to which universities have been subjected since the late 1980s. These have entailed considerable expense. They have pre-empted the time of lecturers and others, who have been required to provide extensive documentation of their activities and to submit reports to demonstrate compliance with the nostrums of the regimes. They have inhibited flexibility and innovation and imposed a heavy workload. This is exactly what we should expect from a centrally imposed, statutory Prevent agenda. The superfluous compulsory training courses that it mandates and the reports of compliance that will be demanded are aspects that are all too familiar to those who have served in universities in recent years. The injunction that lecturers should spy upon their students will subvert the essential relationship between staff and students. It will make it difficult for those charged with the pastoral care of students to discern what is actually happening in their lives. The injunction that all visiting lecturers should submit their material to prior inspection is absurd and unworkable; others have already commented on this point.
Finally, I should say that there is no evidence that I am aware of to suggest that the existing voluntary Prevent programme has been effective in averting terrorist outrages. Instead, this has been achieved by careful police work that has depended on the close co-operation of the Muslim community. To an extent that cannot be determined, it has been assisted by covert—that is to say, non-intrusive—surveillance and cyber-intelligence. It is these aspects of the counterterrorist strategy that need to be enhanced. A statutory Prevent strategy will be of no assistance in either connection.
Lord Bates
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for moving the amendment and giving us the opportunity to consider the important issues that he has raised. I agree with him that it is quite proper that the Government undertake reviews of policy and strategies from time to time to ensure they remain relevant and effective. The Government comprehensively reviewed the Prevent strategy in 2011. Since then, we have kept the various elements of the strategy under review. This has been part of regular business and in particular part of the annual report on our counterterrorism strategy, Contest, which is laid before Parliament. In the light of that, we have expanded the Prevent priority areas to reflect the changing threat, prioritised those that we feel are most effective and increased guidance and support for the voluntary Channel programme. In addition, the Prime Minister’s extremism task force was established in the wake of the murder of Drummer Lee Rigby,
“to identify any areas where the current approach was lacking”.
That task force reported in December 2013, just over one year ago. One of its conclusions was that delivery of Prevent should be put on a statutory footing in areas of the country where extremism was of most concern. The duty outlined in Clause 21 does just that. It does not limit itself to specific areas of the country. As the subsequent geographical spread of travellers to Syria has shown, such travellers can come from areas beyond those of most concern and listed under the current arrangements for Prevent.
Reviews of strategies can take many months to complete. It would be wrong in our view if we were to ignore the findings of the extremism task force and delay the implementation of this important duty in order to carry out yet another review. Should such a review take place at some point and recommend, in the light of actual experience of the implementation of the duty, that changes be made—for example to the authorities listed in Schedule 3—then the Government would be able at that point to lay regulations amending that schedule, which would need to be approved by both Houses.
Regarding the report to be provided prior to commencement, we have already published impact assessments on the measures in the Bill. As for the comparable legislation in other countries, the UK’s efforts in the field of Prevent are considered by most of our allies to be several years in advance of where they currently are.
I say to the noble Viscount, Lord Hanworth, who spoke on this, that when we are talking about a duty that is effectively about the upholding of democracy, tolerance and respect for others I do not think it is in any way appropriate to draw upholding those values akin to a totalitarian approach. I know that he was trying perhaps to provoke us into some further response. What we are talking about here is how, as a free liberal society, we react to a growing threat from within our society from people who seek to challenge those very basic freedoms and who pose a serious risk through potential violence to individuals, be they on campuses or in wider society. That was why when we had an extensive review of the Prevent strategy—which was launched in 2010 and, I think, published in 2011—it took the view that we should focus on national security as the priority of Prevent. That is why the Prevent programme has changed to being one of safeguarding and protecting people’s liberties in our society. I think that is right. It is kept under review, as I have tried to outline to my noble friend, and there are opportunities caused by that systematic review for Parliament to consider the progress of the strategy as it moves forward. In the light of that, I wonder if he might feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill
Viscount Hanworth Excerpts(9 years, 11 months ago)
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Viscount Hanworth (Lab)
My Lords, the Bill is a mixture of new initiatives and refinements of existing legislation. It is being fast-tracked through Parliament in a way that makes it very difficult to subject it to adequate scrutiny. The complicating factor is that much of the information that might enable parliamentarians to judge the likely effects of the powers to counter terrorism or the terrorist threat is unavailable to them. To reveal more might prejudice the security of operations, so parliamentarians have to work in the dark.
Apart from the questionable urgency that Governments typically associate with such legislation, there is a new factor that might affect our critical judgments. We witnessed appalling terrorist atrocities in France last week. These are bound to increase anxieties about the possibility of a similar event occurring in the UK. This, I am sure, will predispose many of us to look favourably on the Bill’s provisions. Nevertheless, the Bill deserves detailed and critical scrutiny. It requires far more scrutiny than the time that has been allocated to it will allow.
In the absence of such careful oversight, it may be appropriate to offer some words of warning. This is an enabling Bill that grants powers without either mandating their use or posing limitations on the extent to which they might be used. They are powers that in the main should be used very sparingly. There is a danger that some of the powers will be used to the extent that they will become counterproductive. In addition to refining the existing powers, the Bill adds a whole new dimension to the counterterrorist legislation. This is contained in Part 1.
Chapter 2 concerns a new power to enable the Home Secretary to issue a temporary exclusion order that would control the return to the UK of a British citizen who is reasonably suspected of involvement in terrorist activities abroad. An exclusion order can last for up to two years, after which it will be renewable. Very little has been said to justify these orders. They seem to have originated in an extemporary pronouncement of the Prime Minister when the atrocities of ISIL were prominently exposed for the first time in our media. It was in August that David Cameron first raised the prospect of barring a British jihadist from returning to the UK. At the time Dominic Grieve, the former Attorney-General, said that the proposal was likely to be a non-starter. He pointed out that withdrawing an individual’s passport would effectively make them stateless, which would contravene international laws.
In an address to the Australian Parliament in November, David Cameron said that British fighters in Syria and Iran would be barred from returning to this country for two years unless they submitted to strict conditions. He also indicated that they would be granted a right of appeal. That represented a refinement of the original proposal which has been described by some as an attempt to dump the UK’s toxic waste in distant places. The suspicion remains that the Bill’s proposals represent an attempt at saving face by turning a hasty and ill considered reaction into practical legislation. However, few of the practicalities have yet been considered.
An appropriate policy for confronting British nationals who wish to return to the UK after visiting the areas of conflict in the Middle East would make some clear distinctions regarding their motives for going there and their reasons for wishing to return. There should be no automatic presumption of guilt in advance of proof of innocence. We must distinguish among the various categories of Muslim Britons who have travelled, or are thinking of travelling, to the areas of conflict.
In the first category, which might be the predominant category, are young and naively impressionable individuals who have been influenced by others to espouse the cause of the jihadists. When confronted with the realities of the conflict they might seek to return home. They should be assisted to do so in every possible way, and they should not be made fearful of punishment or reprisals. There will be others who have inevitably been involved in brutal acts of war. In those cases, it will be difficult to judge how a balance should be struck between any punishments and programmes of rehabilitation to which individuals should be subjected. Those involved in barbaric acts that can be classified as war crimes ought not to go unpunished, and in the light of the likelihood of such punishment it will be less likely that they should seek to return. There will be some who would seek to return for the purpose of wreaking havoc in the UK. They will be very few in number but they will pose a disproportionate threat to our security. These dangers need to be averted by enhanced levels of surveillance and intelligence.
Our Islamic community will be one of the most important factors in overcoming the threat of Islamist terrorism in this country. The opinions of parents, siblings, friends and elders will eventually discourage young people from espousing the ideology of jihad. Every effort must be made to make sure that such people are not alienated by the rough handling of their errant relatives. Senior police officers who have been involved in these matters understand this. Helen Ball, of the Metropolitan Police, who is the senior national co-ordinator for counterterrorism and terrorist investigations, has stated this clearly in outstanding testimony to the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee. She confirmed that the police clearly see the need to build trust and confidence which will enable families, schools and institutions to be forthcoming with intelligence about people who are in danger of being radicalised.
Another testimony from the police is that their ability to handle the cyberintelligence that should enable them to avert acts of terrorism is constantly being degraded by the advent of new means of electronic communication. It is to matters of cyberintelligence that Part 3 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill is devoted. There are various provisions that will enable the Home Office to require communication service providers to retain the data that would facilitate the identification of individuals who might be planning acts of terrorism in association with others. It is by no means certain that these provisions will enable the investigators to redress the balance in their favour. This is where part of the danger to which I have alluded resides.
What might happen in the event of a failure of this intelligence? A likely outcome could be increasing harassment of young individuals of the Islamic community whose profiles might resemble those of the terrorist suspects. This would serve only to generate the alienation and resentment that sustain the cause of the terrorists. In the opinion of many who are concerned with civil liberties, a further expansion of the powers to retain electronic data is inconsistent with our rights to privacy. However, we all demand a degree of security against the threat of terrorism. We cannot expect to have the best on both accounts. We must tolerate a degree of intrusion into our private affairs as the cost of this security but we must be vigilant in guarding our rights.
Visas: Student Visa Policy
Viscount Hanworth Excerpts(11 years, 11 months ago)
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Viscount Hanworth
My Lords, a particularly worrying aspect of the figures that have recently become available is the fall in the numbers of overseas postgraduate students that they record.
A reality of UK universities is that postgraduate courses in all subjects are largely sustained by overseas students. There are very few native British postgraduate students. There is virtually no provision for the support of postgraduate students via grants or bursaries. In order to sustain themselves on their courses, students must vie for posts as teaching assistants. It must be acknowledged that the widespread use of postgraduate students to assist in the teaching of undergraduate courses is having a deleterious effect on the quality of the education. An inevitable consequence of the dearth of native postgraduate students will be evident to anyone who visits a university department. There are declining numbers of native British academics within the departments, and they tend to be the older members who are passing into retirement.
Within many departments, the junior staff, who are predominantly recruited from abroad, are staying for periods of only two or three years before moving on, either to their countries of origin or to other English-speaking nations. Nowadays, many European universities are open to English-speaking academics, whatever their countries of origin may be. In the departments in which I have served, the annual rate of staff turnover has rarely fallen below 20% in recent years, and on occasion a full 30% have left at the end of the year.
What I am asserting is that British universities are in peril. My own perceptions, which have been derived from first-hand experience, contrast markedly with the self-congratulatory tenor of some of the accounts of the university system that I have been listening to. Now, we see a Government who are wilfully kicking away some of the props that support the university system, of which the flow of overseas students is a vital one. To me, at least, the motives of the Government are unfathomable.
Universities: Overseas Students
Viscount Hanworth Excerpts(12 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I am not sure that the right reverend Prelate is correct in his assumptions. I know that the numbers from the Indian subcontinent are indeed down, but graduate-level jobs are available, and students are able to go on to postgraduate studies. We welcome that. I am therefore not sure that the right reverend Prelate’s reading of this is correct.
Viscount Hanworth
My Lords, a recent survey of UK universities has shown that, excluding students from China and Hong Kong, whose numbers continue to increase, the numbers of non-EU students in UK universities decreased in 2011-12 compared with the previous year. Does the Minister have figures in his brief that would illustrate this and, if so, is he prepared to share them with this House? Could he also tell us whether the Government intend to take any measures that might reverse this trend?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
Perhaps I can help the noble Viscount with some figures. Up to the year ending December 2011, overall student immigration was 232,000—the second highest year on record. Of those, 180,000 were non-EU nationals, which is almost 60% of total non-EU inflows.
Protection of Freedoms Bill
Viscount Hanworth Excerpts(12 years, 10 months ago)
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Lord Oxburgh
My Lords, I support the intention, if not the precise wording, of Amendments 55A and 56. I feel that, if the legislation goes forward as is proposed at the moment, a series of what I hope are unintended consequences will ensue, which will be seriously damaging to the research community in this country.
One of the points that has not yet been made or emphasised is that the ability to demand information under the Freedom of Information Act is international, so it may be demanded by any person, anywhere in the world, without any specific purpose whatever. We may say that there is copyright, or that the information is released under certain conditions, but probably the places that we would have most concern about making demands of this kind would not respect these conditions, and we would have no means of enforcement.
A serious point, which was made by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas—although I do not support the purpose with which he made it—is that it is not clear from the legislation, as it now stands, what constitutes a data set. My days at the bench are a little behind me, but if I spend a couple of days carrying out a series of experiments and arrive at a series of data points, are they instantly a data set which may be requested by the competition, in North America or elsewhere, and incorporated, published and what have you? The results may or may not have significant commercial significance, but it would certainly undermine the career of an individual who was making them if they were pre-published by someone else.
I wonder whether we should not think of some reasonable amount of time—this concept has been used by research councils from time to time—during which the results of any particular piece of research should be accessible only to those who have carried it out, after which they could be available subject to the Freedom of Information Act: a year, maybe, or two years, or something like that. Certainly the results should be in the public domain; but equally, the person or group that has put in the time, building the apparatus and making painstaking observations, should be the person or group with first access to them.
Another point worth making is that the costs of redaction of some of the information which would be freed under the legislation at the moment are really significant. As I understand it, they would be able to be passed on to the individual or group requesting the information. However, a good example would be data which were acquired from a health study—perhaps clinical trials, or something of that kind—where all the information that would have made it possible to identify the individuals concerned has to be removed: this is a long and expensive business and it is the kind of cost against which someone requiring the data might seek to complain. Provided all of these things are genuinely covered, it seems to me that this is not a serious point, but it has to be recognised.
Overall, what the Government have to recognise is that the net effect of the legislation going ahead as it is now would be to make the UK a relatively unattractive place to do research. It seems to me that this goes counter to the trend of all other government thinking.
Viscount Hanworth
I shall speak briefly in support of Amendment 56. It is clear that this amendment is seeking to address a substantial problem with the Freedom of Information Act 2000. We have seen some remarkable evidence of how the provisions of the Act can be used maliciously to frustrate research programmes by those who dislike the conclusions that the research is supporting. Is it not the freedom to conduct research without hindrance that we ought to be protecting? It is clear that the existing regulations within the Act that relate to vexatious requests have proved to be inefficient in warding off the nuisance. The amendment seems to fulfil that purpose perfectly.
Baroness Benjamin
My Lords, I have put my name to Amendment 56. In speaking to it I declare an interest as the Chancellor of the University of Exeter. I too thank the Minister for the time that he spent meeting with those of us who have concerns, which was much appreciated.
The Minister argued in Committee that there is little evidence to support the view of the university sector that the Freedom of Information Act is causing difficulties in universities. However, I have spoken to colleagues at the University of Exeter who have given me the clearest possible indications that this is not so, and have told me where the problem lies. I wish to draw the Minister’s attention to the importance of dealing with those problems and concerns effectively.
In particular, the University of Exeter has described the difficulties which the Freedom of Information Act creates when the university negotiates contracts with commercial companies—for example, where the university is working closely with a company to carry out research that might lead to a commercial product and where release of information might prevent a patent or product emerging.
Exeter is not alone. The University of Oxford has described similar difficulties with contract negotiations. For example, Glenn Swafford, the director of research services at the University of Oxford and a man with direct experience of negotiating commercial contracts, has provided examples of exactly these sorts of difficulties. In one case, the university was in negotiations with a large multinational company for a studentship involving £24,000 funding. Significant resources went into the negotiations, with FOI being the major sticking point. The contract was not signed, and although a one-off compromise was secured because the project in question was already under way, Oxford believes that the relationship has been permanently soured. The university has provided other similar examples of long and difficult negotiations.
The point is that large multinational companies have plenty of choices about who they choose to do business with. We want them to do business with UK universities. This Government and the one before them have done much to encourage this kind of research collaboration. But universities across the country believe that this legislation is a barrier to all that. We must take that risk seriously. As Universities UK has pointed out, my noble friend the Minister has argued that there is not enough evidence of harm to justify this amendment. I and others believe that if he examines the material that Universities UK has collected he will see that there is clear evidence of harm.
Secondly, much of what universities have argued has been about the consequences that this legislation may have in terms of people deciding not to invest in UK research. This will be a disaster. Companies do not generally publicise those types of decisions. That is not a reason for ignoring the risk to the UK’s economic interests.
Therefore, I would like to ask my noble friend three questions. Does he acknowledge that universities have commercial interests, for example, competing for students, academics and research grants? Will he undertake to reflect on how far the current exemption for commercial interests extends to universities’ competitive interests? Lastly, can he explain how or whether the exemption for commercial interests might apply where information does not have the quality of a trade secret, because it is not yet commercially exploitable, but nevertheless points towards commercially exploitable information, perhaps subject to further exploration or research?
I believe that we all want to send a clear message that this Government have our universities’ best interests at heart, and wish to protect their standing in the world so that they are recognised internationally as institutions that produce high-quality research with integrity and in confidence. A moral decision has to be made to secure this philosophy. I hope that the Minister will think again and look favourably on this amendment.
Universities: Non-EU Students
Viscount Hanworth Excerpts(12 years, 10 months ago)
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Viscount Hanworth
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the impact of the UK Border Agency’s activities on the ability of non-European Union students to study at United Kingdom universities.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)
My Lords, the latest figures published by UCAS show an increase of 13 per cent in the number of university applications from students resident outside the European Union. Our original impact assessment forecasts no impact on universities.
Viscount Hanworth
I thank the Minister for his reply. Does he not recognise that the measures designed to combat bogus institutions are also having a severe effect on reputable institutions in the higher education sector? Would he not agree that, if the Government wish to reduce the headline figure of net immigration, it is inappropriate to include non-EU students in these figures? Under normal circumstances, without the impediments created by the Government, their numbers would be expected to follow a steeply upward trend, which would be highly profitable for the UK.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I thought that was exactly what I just said in announcing a 13 per cent increase in those applying for universities. That strikes me as a very good thing indeed. It is quite right that we should stamp down on what the noble Viscount refers to as “bogus institutions”—I use his words, but I have previously used them myself. It is not fair on individuals coming to this country to come to an institution that is not providing them with proper education, and is being used merely as a vehicle to get around the immigration rules. What we have done is quite right. We are getting a grip on net migration figures but we are also seeing a growth in the number of genuine students coming to genuine universities.