European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Monday 18th June 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Viscount Hailsham]

Leave out “19C to 19L” and insert “19C to 19E, 19G to 19L and 19P”

19P: Before Clause 9, line 37, at end insert—
“(5A) A Minister of the Crown must make arrangements for—
(a) a motion for the House of Commons to approve the statement mentioned in subsection (4), to be moved in that House by a Minister of the Crown within the period of seven Commons sitting days beginning with the day on which the statement is made, and
(b) a motion for the House of Lords to take note of the statement to be moved in that House by a Minister of the Crown within the period of seven Lords sitting days beginning with the day on which the statement is made.
(5B) Subsection (5C) applies if the Prime Minister makes a statement before the end of 21 January 2019 that no agreement in principle can be reached in negotiations under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union on the substance of—
(a) the arrangements for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU, and
(b) the framework for the future relationship between the EU and the United Kingdom after withdrawal.
(5C) A Minister of the Crown must, within the period of 14 days beginning with the day on which the statement mentioned in subsection (5B) is made—
(a) make a statement setting out how Her Majesty’s Government proposes to proceed, and
(b) make arrangements for—
(i) a motion for the House of Commons to approve the statement mentioned in paragraph (a), to be moved in that House by a Minister of the Crown within the period of seven Commons sitting days beginning with the day on which the statement mentioned in paragraph (a) is made, and
(ii) a motion for the House of Lords to take note of the statement mentioned in paragraph (a) to be moved in that House by a Minister of the Crown within the period of seven Lords sitting days beginning with the day on which the statement mentioned in paragraph (a) is made.
(5D) A statement under subsection (5B) or (5C)(a) must be made in writing and be published in such manner as the Minister making it considers appropriate.
(5E) Subsection (5F) applies if, at the end of 21 January 2019, there is no agreement in principle in negotiations under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union on the substance of—
(a) the arrangements for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU, and
(b) the framework for the future relationship between the EU and the United Kingdom after withdrawal.
(5F) A Minister of the Crown must, within the period of five days beginning with the end of 21 January 2019—
(a) make a statement setting out how Her Majesty’s Government proposes to proceed, and
(b) make arrangements for—
(i) a motion for the House of Commons to approve the statement mentioned in paragraph (a), to be moved in that House by a Minister of the Crown within the period of five Commons sitting days beginning with the end of 21 January 2019, and
(ii) a motion for the House of Lords to take note of the statement mentioned in paragraph (a) to be moved in that House by a Minister of the Crown within the period of five Lords sitting days beginning with the end of 21 January 2019.
(5G) A statement under subsection (5F)(a) must be made in writing and be published in such manner as the Minister making it considers appropriate.
(5H) For the purposes of this section—
(a) a statement made under subsection (4), (5C)(a) or (5F)(a) may be combined with a statement made under another of those provisions,
(b) a motion falling within subsection (5A) (a), (5Q(b)(i) or (5F)(b)(i) may be combined into a single motion with another motion falling within another of those provisions, and
(c) a motion falling within subsection (5A)(b), (5C)(b)(ii) or (5F)(b)(ii) may be combined into a single motion with another motion falling within another of those provisions.”

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I shall formally move Motion F3, which is on the supplementary list. As your Lordships know, it is a manuscript amendment which I tabled this morning. For reasons of convenience, I shall refer to Motion F3 as “Grieve II”. We also have a Grieve I, but I shall come to that. I shall also comment on the Government’s Motion F, which is the Government’s amendment. As your Lordships have just heard, I do not move, and have not moved, Motion F1 which is on the Marshalled List and was tabled on Friday, and which I will refer to as Grieve I.

By way of brief explanation before I come to my substantive comments, I say that Grieve I, which is the Motion that I have not moved, was the amendment tabled by Mr Grieve in the House of Commons. It was before the House of Commons on 12 June: it was discussed but never voted on. Grieve II, the Motion to which I am now speaking and will formally move, reflects the agreement that Mr Grieve believed he had made with the Solicitor-General. Mr Grieve thought that Grieve II was agreed to, but it appears that senior Ministers objected and it has now been repudiated. By moving Grieve II—or Motion F3 on the supplementary list—I am asking your Lordships to make a decision which will enable the House of Commons to vote on what Mr Grieve believes was agreed with the Government. That is the purpose of my amendment.

On 30 April this year, this House passed by a very substantial majority what has been described as the “meaningful vote” amendment. On that occasion I explained at some length my reasons for advocating a truly meaningful vote. I am quite sure that I will be forgiven if I do not repeat myself. I would like, however, if I may, to explain why I am moving Grieve II, indicate briefly what the amendments provide, and say again briefly why I hope that your Lordships’ House will support Grieve II, the Motion I am moving.

The first question is: why am I moving Grieve II? On 12 June, the House of Commons considered the Bill as amended by this House. Mr David Davis, as he was perfectly entitled to do, put down an amendment that substantially altered your Lordships’ meaningful vote amendment. Mr Davis’s amendment was itself the subject of an amendment moved by Mr Dominic Grieve and that amendment is Grieve I, which I have not moved but which gave Members of Parliament the power to prevent the United Kingdom crashing out of the European Union and, in the event of such a risk arising, to instruct the Government on what to do next. I accept, and Mr Grieve accepts, that the words used in subsection (5C) of Grieve I are both directional and mandatory.

It seemed to everybody in the House of Commons that Grieve I was likely to carry, and in order to forestall this the Government, in the person of the Solicitor-General, offered negotiations. What he said, of course, appears in Hansard. Of Mr Grieve he said,

“I think that there is much merit in the approach that he urges the House to adopt in subsection (5A). I need more time to think about the other parts of the amendment … but by indicating my position on a key part of it, I am indicating that the Government are willing to engage positively ahead of the Lords stages”.

He went on to say of Mr Grieve’s comments:

“They will form a clear basis for a formal set of discussions that we can start at the earliest opportunity”.—[Official Report, Commons, 12/6/18; cols. 766-67.]


As a result of the Solicitor-General’s intervention, your Lordships’ meaningful vote amendment was defeated and Grieve I was never put to the vote.

Following the undertaking given by the Solicitor- General, negotiations were commenced. These negotiations included a meeting with the Prime Minister. It is reported by those present at that meeting that the Prime Minister herself gave a personal assurance to those present that their concerns about the risk of a no-deal Brexit would be addressed.

I have known Mr Grieve for very many years. He is a man of the utmost personal and professional integrity. I accept without reservation what he has said about those negotiations. I say in passing that the attacks on Mr Grieve in last week’s press, especially the Daily Mail, were disgraceful and the authors ought to be thoroughly ashamed of themselves.

As reported in the Times on 15 June, Mr Grieve said:

“We had very sensible negotiations and thought we had reached an agreement and then they phoned and said that they had to make the motion unamendable. For the life of me I can’t understand why … It is utterly bizarre”.


On 16 June the Times reported the following conversation: asked if he had been tricked by the Prime Minister, Mr Grieve replied that,

“when it came to the end, she wasn’t—for some reason—in a position to deliver”.

I was in direct contact with Mr Grieve throughout Tuesday. I can confirm from my own knowledge that until the afternoon of that day, he was confident that he could achieve a sensible accommodation. Grieve I, which I have not tabled, is the amendment that was before the House of Commons on 12 June. It would probably have passed but it was never voted on. But Grieve II sets out the agreement which Mr Grieve believes he made with the Solicitor-General, negotiating on behalf of the Government. If your Lordships approve Grieve II, the House of Commons will have an opportunity to consider and approve the agreement negotiated in good faith between the Solicitor-General and Mr Grieve.

[Lord Robathan]

I am grateful to my noble friend. He is indeed a friend. I have always found him both highly intelligent and very entertaining. However, on a point of clarification, can he say whether it remains his position that he wishes at all costs to destroy Brexit?

[Lord Robathan]

Can he say whether he wishes to destroy Brexit—that is not a very parliamentary gesture, if I may say so to the noble Lord opposite—and that this amendment is in fact about sabotaging Brexit? That seems to be the case. On a second point of clarification, can he tell us what discussions he has had with the Opposition Front Bench on this amendment?

[Viscount Hailsham]

Yes, it is perfectly true that I have had negotiations and talks with the Opposition Front Bench, and with the Liberal Democrats and many Cross-Benchers. I make absolutely no apology for that. This is the high court of Parliament and we are not party hacks.

[Noble Lords]

Hear, hear!

[Viscount Hailsham]

My noble friend’s second question was whether I am seeking to frustrate Brexit. I do not believe in Brexit, that is perfectly true. I think it is a national calamity. But I believe above all that the House of Commons should have a decisive say one way or another.

Moving on from that point, which I had the pleasure of making to my noble friend—

[Lord Garel-Jones (Con)]

Is it not the case that the point my noble friend is making about Parliament has already been made with great clarity by the Supreme Court—that Parliament approved the referendum but did not approve the outcome?

[Viscount Hailsham]

My noble friend Lord Garel-Jones was one of the best Deputy Chief Whips I have ever met—better even than my noble friend. Of course, he is right. But the point is that this Government have sought to prevent a meaningful vote in every possible way. I want to ensure, if I can, that Parliament in fact has a meaningful vote. I do not want to see it left to chance.

I need to turn briefly to what the amendments before your Lordships’ House say. I commented on Grieve I, which is not before the House. I have already summarised it and I acknowledge that it was directional and mandatory. That caused serious problems for the Government, which Mr Grieve understood. It was for that reason that Mr Grieve was negotiating with the Solicitor-General. Grieve II—that is the Motion before your Lordships’ House, and here I am referring effectively to subsection (5F)—requires the Government, in the absence of any political agreement having been made by the end of 21 January next year, to make a statement setting out how they propose to proceed and to make arrangements for the House of Commons to approve the statement by way of a Motion.

I have taken the best advice available to me. I believe that the Motion in the House of Commons would be amendable but not justiciable—that is to say, the Motion could not be enforced by legal action. However, the political consequences for a Government who sought to act differently from the Motion, whether amended or not, would be very grave. In that respect, Grieve II gives Parliament and, in particular, the House of Commons a meaningful vote.

[Lord Grocott]

The noble Viscount talks about the political consequences of votes. Given that leaving the European Union has been the central objective of this Government since their election, does he not acknowledge that should they lose a vote enabling them to leave the European Union the inevitable political consequence would be that the Government would fall?

[Viscount Hailsham]

I am simply not going to speculate. The truth is that the world at the moment is extraordinarily unpredictable and all the parties are extremely divided on this issue, so I think it is wise not to speculate about what would happen if the Government lost, save to say that the political consequences would be very great.

However, I want to consider what the Government are offering by way of an alternative—in other words, how the Government are proposing to honour their repeated promise to give Parliament a meaningful vote. What is on offer—and it is only this—is as follows. In the event of no deal—that is to say, when there is every probability of the United Kingdom crashing out of the European Union, an outcome which in the eyes of most would be a calamity—the Government are offering a Statement followed by an unamendable take-note Motion. My noble friend’s amendment—she did not refer to its terms when she first introduced it—is that the take-note Motion should be in neutral terms. What is meant by “neutral terms”? It means that it may not express approval, it may not express disapproval and it will not be subject to amendment. The Government’s amendment not only fails to deliver the promised meaningful vote—that would be an act of omission and bad enough—but is far worse as the Government are seeking to make the promised meaningful vote impossible, and that is an act of commission, contrary to what Ministers have on many occasions promised. It deliberately removes the possibility of a meaningful vote and, moreover, the Government’s amendment is being brought forward at least in part by my noble friend Lord Callanan, who on 14 March in this House, to the amazement of everybody who heard him, said:

“We have never used the term ‘a meaningful vote’”.—[Official Report, 14/3/18; col. 1650.]


That statement was inaccurate as to fact, but deeply revealing as to intention.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (Con)]

My Lords—

[Viscount Hailsham]

I am not going to give way. Much as I admire my noble friend, I am now going to proceed. I come to the last and fundamental question: why should this House support Grieve II? There are essentially three reasons for that. The first is this—if I can find it in my notes.

[Lord Robathan]

Let the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, intervene.

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean]

My Lords—

[Viscount Hailsham]

That is very kind of my noble friend but he has given me an opportunity to find my notes, so while I am grateful to him he is going to have to resume his seat. The first reason is this: the House of Commons has never had an opportunity to vote on the amendment, so it is a matter of procedural propriety. Secondly, the Government have failed to deliver on their promise to provide a meaningful vote. Grieve II represents the agreement negotiated in good faith between the Solicitor-General and Mr Grieve but which others thought fit to reject, so it is a matter of honour.

Thirdly, and by far most importantly, it is in the national interest. I appreciate that the Prime Minister faces great difficulties in the conduct of these matters. There are serious divisions within her Government, divisions reflected within all the parties and indeed within the country itself. However, consider where we are and how we got here. The Article 50 process was triggered without any collective agreement as to the desired outcome—indeed, without any collective agreement as to the negotiating framework. Now, just a few months before the deadlines expire, that remains the situation.

This is not an occasion for anything other than temperate language—the political temperature is already far too high—so I shall content myself with questions. Was it wise, prudent or responsible to start the Article 50 negotiations without a firm collective agreement as to where we wanted to go or how we were to get there? Was it perhaps a serious error of judgment to trigger the Article 50 procedure without there being a clear policy on these matters? Is it right that, in the absence of a deal, Parliament should risk crashing out of the EU on the basis of a take-note Motion cast in neutral terms and as a result of the unconstrained decisions of Ministers—these Ministers?

Your Lordships’ answer to those questions may help you to decide whether, to safeguard our nation’s vital interests in the event that there be no deal on the table, Parliament—and here I mean the House of Commons—should have the authority to intervene. Ministers, the Prime Minister in particular, have promised a meaningful vote. As yet, that promise has not been honoured. My noble friend’s amendment frustrates, and is intended to frustrate, that commitment. If your Lordships want Parliament to have a truly meaningful vote then Parliament must insist, and the Grieve II amendment would enable the House of Commons to do that. I beg to move.

Motion F4 (as an amendment to Motion F3)

Moved by

--- Later in debate ---

Motion F4 (as an amendment to Motion F3) withdrawn.

[Viscount Hailsham]

My Lords, I sense that this House wants to come to a very early conclusion, so I will conclude by saying a word to my noble friend Lord Spicer. He is a very old friend and a very distinguished chairman of the 1922 Committee. I will be very sorry indeed if he ceases to appear in this House, because he has had a very distinguished political career. I know that your Lordships want to come to an early decision; I wish to test the opinion of the House.