European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Committee: 8th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 19th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, we support that. It is particularly important for the new SIs that will deal with functions hitherto carried out by EU bodies and which therefore will not be part of the normal, ongoing scrutiny that may have happened for many years. It is particularly important that these should be by only the affirmative procedure, as the word “modification” can only mean an increase.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

In order to indicate cross-party support, I will say that I support this amendment.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, I am just wondering whether the noble Lord who moved this amendment is thinking that the House of Lords should not reject an SI outright once it has been confirmed by the House of Commons but should ask that it be reconsidered, and whether that should be the only option apart from approving it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wigley]

My Lords, I am delighted to support Amendment 247 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, to which my name is attached. This is a pragmatic amendment, intended to make the provisions of the Bill more workable. As such, it should be acceptable to noble Lords on both sides of the Brexit argument, and perhaps even to the Government. Given that so much legislation is moving over to being enacted by statutory instrument, the case for looking into the ways of making instruments amendable now becomes an urgent challenge and will become increasingly so as the Bill goes forward.

As the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, spelled out the detail of the amendment, including very helpfully the precedents, perhaps I could just give an example of where the power to amend SIs would be useful. Take, for example, Clause 7(6)(b), which enables Ministers to establish new public bodies to undertake functions now carried out by the EU. The provision of such a power by order would require the relevant SI to specify precise details for the workings of the new body, such as its objectives, duties, powers, members, resources and accountability. Parliament might be happy for such a new body to be established but might want to change some of those details, which it could not do under our current procedures and which could only be triggered by rejecting the SI in its entirety, thereby subjecting the process to potentially long delays—exactly what the Government want to try to avoid. Having a process to allow amendment would be swifter and provide more acceptable legislation.

These powers would be used in exceptional circumstances, and it is not proposed that they should cover other Brexit legislation—although a strong argument could be made along those lines. But given the ominously growing use of unamendable orders to force legislative change through Parliament, there is a case for undertaking a far more rigorous review of the statutory instrument system. Since this facility could save time, which may be of the essence in regard to Brexit legislation, I would have thought that Amendment 247 should appeal to both sides, to Brexiters and remainers alike. I commend it to the Committee.

[Viscount Hailsham]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 248 in my name. Because of the lateness of the hour I will speak briefly, but throughout these debates the Committee has repeatedly expressed concern about the scope and nature of the SI procedure. Time and again, noble Lords in Committee have said, “This is not amendable. We cannot change what is proposed. This is government by fiat and declaration”. The noble Lord, Lord Beith, and I spent many years in the House of Commons, where we lamented the fact that statutory instruments could not be amended. It is a great defect in our constitutional process. Statutory instruments are a form of legislation; in fact, they are a form of legislation by fiat or declaration—and that is an extraordinary thing in a parliamentary democracy.

The amendments that I have tabled have just two objectives: one is to assert the primacy of the House of Commons, which must have primacy in these matters, and the other is to say that legislation should be amendable. As two propositions, they are wholly unobjectionable. What are the objections, if there be any? Actually, they are the objections of the Executive throughout the centuries: it makes life for the Government rather more difficult. As a parliamentarian, I am bound to say that I do not find that a very impressive argument.