Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL]

Viscount Hailsham Excerpts

Wednesday 17th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, the issue which arises on this amendment captures precisely the same constitutional point on which your Lordships expressed your views on Monday. It is therefore disappointing that the Minister has not been able to acknowledge the view that vesting wide-ranging powers in a Minister to create criminal offences by regulation is constitutionally troublesome. Troublesome is a modest word; very troublesome is not much stronger; but understatement perhaps has something to do with my disappointment, because there is a further disappointment. During the course of the debate on Monday, the Minister made clear before the vote that he knew and, to use his words, “totally accepted” the concern of the House about the creation of criminal offences using secondary legislation.

There is a further reason for my disappointment. At least on the sanctions part of the Bill, the Minister was able to advance an arguable point—not a strongly arguable point, but an arguable point—that it was necessary to have the legislation in the form proposed because, after our departure from the EU, there would be a gap and sanctions would be needed which could not be provided for. In other words, there had to be an element of continuity. As I said, it was a colourable argument, but it was an argument.

No such argument is present in relation to this amendment. This is not a provision for continuity; it is not a provision for saving anything; it is a distinct part of a long Bill which is entirely creative and in no sense preservational. We have this very long Bill, and the legislation on money laundering which we are concerned with today is a very short part of it. There is no primary legislation in it at all; it is all regulation-making powers. It is backed up with an endless further supporting group of regulation-making powers in Schedule 2: on and on they go. I shall come to look at one or two of them in a moment.

Where criminal offences exist, and they do here, and if ever you were to be deterred from committing offences, there is also ample protection. The regulations which will support the regulations include: the power to have a supervisory body; directions for investigation; enabling those with the powers to do so to come into your home to search; liability to civil penalties; the fact that you can be caught if you are doing this abroad; and so on and so forth. There are ample powers, therefore, to provide the evidence which would be necessary to prove one of the many offences in the Terrorism Act, the Counter-Terrorism Act, the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act, the Proceeds of Crime Act—the litany is endless, and I shall not weary your Lordships with it.

Perhaps we may consider for a moment some of the offences which you can commit which exist and will exist whether we stay in Europe or come out of Europe—whatever we do until Parliament repeals them. There is the offence of entering into money laundering: precisely what this is about. There is the offence of concealing the proceeds of crime: precisely what this part of the Bill is about. There are endless offences currently in existence of which you will be guilty if the regulations come into force but which we do not need the regulations to base the prosecution on. The statute book is full of offences.

In none of our debates so far has a single possible gap been identified in the criminal law as requiring closure. I would have a recommendation to make if one had been identified—come back to Parliament—but there is none. As with the previous part of the Bill, we are invited to hand over power to a Minister which, save in the most exceptional circumstances, should remain within the power of Parliament to give or refuse on proper scrutiny.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

Would the noble and learned Lord also agree that, if these powers were to be given, they should be exercised only in an emergency situation and that, heretofore, the Minister has not been able to identify any likely emergency not covered by existing legislation?

[Lord Judge]

I agree—and I do not propose to add anything to that, with no discourtesy to the noble Viscount. That is the reality. These powers are not to be given, save in the most exceptional circumstances—and I would not define them, but I would invite some suggestion of what is exceptional here.

So here we have it. There is no self-evident necessity for this. The criminal law covers what is proposed to be covered in the regulations that are proposed to be allowed to be created. Without this amendment, which I am advancing, we would once again be allowing an alarming accretion of power to the Executive. We should not do it; we did not do it on Monday; let us not do it today. I beg to move.

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[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, my name is also attached to this amendment. The case has been so clearly and emphatically made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, that I cannot see that there is anything that I have to say that could strengthen that argument. There are other arguments in favour of Amendment 71A, but they are frankly of second order. It is the constitutional issue, right at the heart of our constitution, that is the fundamental one that we have to consider today. I hope that the Minister takes that on board and responds accordingly.

I want to use this opportunity, because this amendment is part of a much larger group, to pay tribute to the Minister and the Bill team. On quite a number of the other amendments in this group—and my noble friend Lady Bowles may speak for a moment or two to them—the Minister and the Bill team have recognised that the issues in contention are those that concern all of us and there was a great deal of common ground. The Minister and the Bill team have listened—in fact, the Bill team have come many times and listened—and they have responded. I expect that by the end of the Minister’s comments on this grouping, we will feel that, with one exception, it is going to be possible to withdraw the amendments, because the response has been satisfactory and respectful on both sides. I attribute a lot of that to the real skill in the Bill team in understanding the core issues and finding ways in which to respond to them that meet the Government’s requirements, as well as the requirements of those scrutinising the issues. I thank noble Lords for this opportunity and hope very much that this House recognises the importance of Amendment 71A.

[Viscount Hailsham]

My Lords, I rise briefly to say that I found the observations of the noble and learned Lord extraordinarily persuasive. I have had a look at the regulations set out in Schedule 2 and, in particular, paragraphs 15 and 18 of that schedule, which make the point that the regulations create criminal offences and deal, too, with the defences that can be advanced as well as the evidentiary requirements. Furthermore, paragraph 18 makes the point that the regulations can impose custodial sentences of not in excess of two years. If we accept what the Government are asking us to accept, we would create powers that are very intrusive in criminal processes and impose custodial sentences—and we are being asked to do so by regulations, which are not amendable. I regard that as the chief vice of this process, because the resolution procedure is simply not amendable.

If we were being asked to contemplate an emergency situation, I might find these exceptional powers acceptable, but I do not think—for the reasons advanced by the noble and learned Lord—that we are dealing with emergency situations, because no such situations, or the likelihood of the same, have been identified. There is a raft of existing legislation that covers the kind of issues that are likely to arise.

I am personally always against giving delegated powers to Ministers whenever I can avoid doing so. There is a fundamental rule in politics that I have observed over nearly 40 years in Parliament, which is that, if you give powers to Ministers or officials, on occasion they will be abused. That is a fundamental rule of politics. Consequently, you give powers to Ministers and officials only where you must and, when you do, you ensure that there are as many safeguards as possible. I find the observations of the noble and learned Lord wholly persuasive. If he seeks the view of this House, he will have my support.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan (CB)]

My Lords, I do not have anything to add to give force to the argument that has been put so forcefully by my noble and learned friend and the noble Viscount. All I will do, if I may, is add an anecdotal note. In 1936, I believe, a former Attorney-General and former Lord Chief Justice, Lord Hewart, wrote a book called The New Despotism. He was worried about the very powers that we are talking about today being delegated in a dictatorial way to Ministers. If it was a new despotism then, what is it now?

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[The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon) (Con)]

My Lords, the opening line here says “I wish to thank noble Lords for putting forward this amendment”. I am not sure whether that best reflects the sentiments of the House. However, as I have said before, I deeply appreciate that this is a matter of great interest and concern to many in your Lordships’ House. In proceeding, I hope that in part I can reassure noble Lords that the powers in the Bill are taken with the utmost regard to your Lordships’ concerns. In the wider context, I also thank noble Lords for the practical, helpful and constructive engagement we have had. As a government Minister, I always approach legislation with the view that there will be times when we will disagree, but equally, we disagree with great respect to the House and to the incredible experience and wisdom in it. Where we are unable to agree, that does not mean that we have not listened. The Government’s position is a listening one, as the noble Lord, Lord Collins, said, and as we have demonstrably shown on both parts of the Bill. I also thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Bowles, for the constructive engagement we have had on the anti-money laundering aspects, and I am grateful for the key co-ordination role—I hope she will not hold this against me—that the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, played on this. I also very much appreciated the expertise that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, in particular, brought to this group.

Amendment 71A seeks to prevent regulations from making provisions that create new criminal offences. It is not unusual for requirements to be set in delegated legislation which can be enforced using criminal penalties, both in financial services legislation and other regimes such as health and safety. As I am sure all noble Lords are aware, in accordance with standard practice when implementing EU directives, criminal offences in this area have already been created in delegated legislation, in the Money Laundering Regulations 2017, made under the powers given by the European Communities Act 1972. This was also the case in their precursor, the Money Laundering Regulations 2007, which were brought into force—notwithstanding the contribution made by the noble Lord, Lord Collins—by the then Labour Government. The Bill therefore makes no changes to the current position in this sense and reflects the Government’s firm intention to continue imposing criminal penalties for breaches of anti-money laundering requirements.

These detailed provisions, setting standards and procedures for regulated businesses, should also be seen in the context of a separate penalty regime for the key substantive money laundering offences. Such offences are established under Part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, which provides for more punitive prison sentences of up to 14 years—for example, for those guilty of directly laundering the proceeds of crime.

The Government’s view is that removing their power to create criminal offences under secondary legislation would seriously weaken the enforceability of new regulations and therefore lower the effectiveness of the UK’s anti-money laundering regime.

[Viscount Hailsham]

Will my noble friend explain to the House why he is impliedly asserting that he cannot use primary legislation for this purpose?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

As I have indicated, this is not a departure from what already exists. I have already quoted previous Acts and talked about the ways in which Governments of different political colours have used secondary legislation in the past for this purpose.

More generally, noble Lords may recall that it is not unusual for requirements, which can be enforced using criminal penalties, to be set in delegated legislation. In response to my noble friend, in the area of financial services, for example, the Regulated Activities Order under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 specifies which activities are or are not regulated. Carrying on such activities without permission from the regulator is a criminal offence.

I assure noble Lords that I am sympathetic to the arguments on the constitutional position, and I say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, that I have listened very carefully to his contributions—we have had positive engagement on various parts of the Bill. However, as I have indicated, it remains the Government’s position that it is neither unusual nor improper for Parliament to confer powers of this type on Ministers, as we have done previously and has been accepted. I shall turn to the appropriate safeguards relating to these powers in a moment.

I would like to set out why the ability to create criminal offences specifically for the UK’s anti-money laundering regime is necessary. When the Government consulted on whether to remove the specific criminal offence provisions in previous money laundering regulations, the British Bankers’ Association stated that removing such provisions would be at odds with the objective of driving an effective anti-money laundering regime. Furthermore, the Crown Prosecution Service argued that provisions for creating criminal offences in the money laundering regulations different from those in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 serve a separate and useful function in tackling money laundering. In some instances, prosecuting according to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 could jeopardise ongoing investigations. It said:

“In such cases, the ability to prosecute for a regulatory offence relating to defective”,


anti-money laundering or counterterrorist financing,

“systems can be an important tool”.

Finally, in response to the same consultation, HMRC noted that abolishing criminal sanctions for breaches of regulations “carries significant risk” to its ability to tackle money laundering. In lieu of such sanctions, if the UK wishes to maintain a functioning anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing regime post our departure from the European Union, it is vital that the Government continue to have the power to create criminal offences for those regimes.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, pointed out, there are other amendments in this group. Amendments 90 and 92 envisage the same effect as that of Amendment 71A. Amendment 90 aims to prevent future regulations containing provisions to create new criminal offences, while Amendment 92 deals with provisions relating to penalties for such offences. As I set out to noble Lords previously, removing the Government’s ability to create criminal offences would seriously weaken the enforceability of new regulations, thereby, we believe, lowering the effectiveness of the UK’s anti-money laundering regime.

Amendment 72 proposes to restrict the scope of anti-money laundering regulations in several ways. First, it aims to prevent the making of regulations that are detrimental to the UK’s anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing regime. Secondly, it aims to ensure that future regulations prescribe measures which are duly proportionate. Thirdly, it seeks to ensure that regulations cannot create new criminal offences, and, fourthly, it makes provision restricting the ways in which powers in the Bill can be used to update the definition of “terrorist financing”.

I have stressed from the Dispatch Box many times that the Government are listening to concerns expressed by noble Lords about the aims of these regimes, the need for a proportionate approach and the best way to keep definitions up to date. I am pleased to be able to confirm to the House that, having engaged directly with noble Lords on this matter, we will be tabling new amendments for Third Reading which aim to address the concerns contained within limbs (a) and (b) of Amendment 72. I have set out my position on criminal offences in relation to limb (c), and so do not propose to repeat that. I can further confirm that the Government will seek in the other place to restrict the ability to add to the definition of “terrorist financing” in Clause 41. This was also something that we discussed very constructively. I assure noble Lords that it will be limited to cases where any relevant regulations under Clause 1 are for the purposes of compliance with UN or other international obligations or to further the prevention of terrorism, or both. I hope that this is sufficient reassurance to enable the noble and learned Lord not to press this amendment so that we can table amendments and engage constructively with those issues again at Third Reading.

Amendment 74 proposes to create a corporate criminal offence of failure to prevent money laundering. The effect of this amendment would be to provide that a company or partnership is guilty of a criminal offence in cases where the company’s employee, agent or other service provider commits one of the substantive money laundering offences contained in Part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The relevant company would have a defence if it could prove that it had adequate procedures in place to prevent its employees and agents from committing such an offence.

I would like first to note that, as noble Lords may be aware, in 2017 the Ministry of Justice carried out a call for evidence on corporate criminal liability for economic crime, such as money laundering, fraud and false accounting, to establish whether further reform of the law was necessary. Noble Lords will accept that this is a complex and controversial area of the law, attracting views from across a broad spectrum. Responses were received from a wide variety of stakeholders and expressed diverse and often conflicting views, as well as raising several important issues that need careful consideration. As I have told the House when dealing previously with this Bill, the Government’s response is being finalised and will be published in due course. I hope we can agree that it would make no sense to muddy the waters by introducing a further failure to prevent offence before there has been a proper review of the evidence.

I emphasise and assure noble Lords that there is no gap in the regulatory regime for financial services that would be addressed by the introduction of a failure to prevent offence for money laundering, which was a concern expressed. The senior managers regime requires that relevant financial services firms, such as banks and building societies, allocate a senior management function for overseeing the firm’s efforts to counter financial crime, including money laundering, to a specific senior person.

The requirement to maintain this role is in addition to the requirement for a money laundering reporting officer, or MLRO, who is directly responsible for ensuring that measures to combat money laundering are effective. Noble Lords may wish to note that the MLRO has a personal responsibility for the oversight of the firm’s compliance with Financial Conduct Authority rules on anti-money laundering systems and controls.

The senior managers regime is robust in the additional requirements it places on senior managers responsible for overseeing firms’ defences against financial crime. Such senior managers are required to obtain pre-approval as fit and proper from the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. If there is a contravention of the money laundering reporting requirements by a firm, the Financial Conduct Authority can take action against the responsible senior manager, if they can prove that they did not take such steps as a person in their position could reasonably have been expected to take to avoid the contravention occurring. This enforcement action includes fines and disbarment from undertaking regulated activities.

The senior managers regime currently applies to banks, building societies, credit unions, Prudential Regulation Authority-designated investment firms and UK branches of foreign banks.

The Government have legislated for it to apply across all financial services firms, and this will be implemented in due course—the regulators have been consulting on the final design of this extension of the regime. The introduction of the senior managers regime has significantly enhanced the ability to hold individuals responsible for failures of the systems and controls of relevant firms. Its expansion across the financial services sector will do more in this regard.

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[Lord Judge]

My Lords, my concern with this clause is that it is a Henry VIII provision. A number of your Lordships have listened to me on the subject of Henry VIII clauses and I do not want to repeat myself but it remains a matter of puzzlement to me that Governments of all different hues and compositions rely on them. To rely on such a clause is not to rely on a badge of honour—Henry VIII was a monstrous tyrant. There are many things about him that I would like to say but anybody who thinks that Henry VIII is less than a badge of shame should just look at the story. Ignore the hypocrisy of sleeping with Anne Boleyn and not Catherine of Aragon because his brother had slept with Catherine, when he himself had earlier slept with Mary, Anne’s sister. How do you square that for honesty and integrity? Much more seriously, how do you claim to have clauses in the name of a man who gave his solemn oath as the anointed monarch to Robert Aske at the Pilgrimage of Grace that he would reform, and then sent his troops out under the Duke of Norfolk to exercise and wreak vengeance and havoc so as to deter anybody from ever rebelling against him again?

Noble Lords will not want to hear any more from me on Henry VIII, but he was a monster and these are monstrous clauses. Take this one—with Clause 44, there is no primary legislation at all. As I have said in the course of the debates on other aspects of the Bill, one cannot find anything in it to bite on. It just says, “Let’s give the Minister regulation-making powers for this, that and the other”. I am not suggesting this about our Minister tonight, but it is, “Come in and buy one: take anything you like—it’s regulations”. Can we bear that in mind, given that we are now to have a regulation which can be supplemental, incidental, consequential, transitional or saving, and which may amend, repeal or revoke enactments whenever passed or made—possibly even in the future?

This is all being done on the basis of an unknown law, because the Minister has not yet brought the regulations into existence. In advance of the law being made by regulation, we are giving the Minister power to amend the regulations and to do away with statute. This is in a world where, as we discussed earlier, we already have the Terrorism Act, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, the Terrorism Asset-Freezing etc Act and the Proceeds of Crime Act—goodness knows how many—all of which bear on this Act, and all of which will be susceptible to amendment repeal at the Minister’s behest.

The lesser will override the greater; the secondary will override the primary; and the Minister is, in effect, going to replace Parliament. I hope that when the Minister comes to deal with this part of the debate, he is able to reflect on the vote earlier this afternoon on allowing the Minister to create criminal offences by regulation. That vote, which I urged on the House, reflected a constitutional concern about too much power being vested in any Minister. Today, the vote against giving Ministers these extraordinary powers was clear and unequivocal. It is a sign that Ministers need to be cautious; that maybe times will come when Ministers will not be given Henry VIII powers just because they ask for them, and will have to reflect carefully before they allow such a clause to be included in any Bill. For the time being, I beg to move, and I invite the Minister to address the consequences of this afternoon’s vote.

[Viscount Hailsham]

My Lords, I support what the noble and learned Lord has said. My own view is that the power in the Bill gives far too great a power to Ministers. The fact that this specific power is subject to the affirmative resolution procedure is not a sufficient safeguard, not least because—a point I have made time and again—the procedure does not provide a power of amendment.

Let us consider for a moment what this power enables the Government to do. It could be used in amending, revoking or repealing existing legislation or to extend classes of offence to which the amended legislation applied. It could be used to increase penalties. It could be used to remove statutory defences. It could be used to amend the definition of criminal intent. Indeed, it could make absolute offences that presently require proof of a specific intent. Because it is an amending power, it could be used to give further powers to the investigating officials or to increase the penalties imposed by the courts.

One can get a very good guide as to what could be done from the clause of the Bill on enforcement, Clause 16, where one can find among other things that the regulations could impose a sentence of imprisonment of up to 10 years. That could be done by regulation—without the power to amend. There is a further objection if one actually considers, just for a moment, the purpose that can be used to justify the regulations. Clause 1(2) states:

“A purpose is within this subsection if the appropriate Minister making the regulations considers that carrying out that purpose would—


(a) further the prevention of terrorism, in the United Kingdom or elsewhere,

(b) be in the interests of national security,

(c) be in the interests of international peace and security, or

(d) further a foreign policy objective of the government of the United Kingdom”.

Paragraph (a) is all right, but paragraph (b) is becoming pretty broad and paragraph (c) is even broader, and paragraph (d) refers to an objective that might never previously have been discussed by Parliament or even disclosed to an admiring public. We are enabling a Minister, by fiat, to introduce regulations of that kind.

There are well-intentioned Ministers on the Front Bench such as the noble Lord, Lord Young. We have known each other for almost 60 years. I would no doubt be very content to let him have those powers. But then I ask myself whether I would want to give those powers to Mr McDonnell or Jeremy Corbyn. I suspect that nobody in your Lordships’ House tonight would wish to do that—certainly not the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, very sensible fellow that he is. I suspect that we would be paving the way to the elective dictatorship of which my father wrote and spoke.

If we are to do these things we do them by primary legislation, surely not by secondary legislation over which we have precious little control and when I know that the Whips will be very active with noble Lords who have never read the legislation. I do not know whether the noble and learned Lord will press his amendment, but, if he does, he will have my support.

[Lord McNally (LD)]

My Lords, John Major once gave some wise advice to the Conservative Party after it had been in office for nearly 18 years. He said, “Always remember that one day we will have to take the Conservative Party into opposition”. I always think it is rather reckless of a Government to legislate with the assumption that they will always be in power and that the powers they are giving themselves will always be used in the benign way that they intend.

I am pleased to follow the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. When I first came into this House, his father used to sit in the same seat. One of his more unnerving habits was to keep up a running commentary on speakers in a not so sotto voice. But the noble Viscount is quite right: 40 years ago in the Dimbleby lecture, his father warned precisely against an elective dictatorship—a Government with a majority in the Commons who could force through various Acts that would not be suitable in a parliamentary democracy.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has done a great service to Parliament by challenging the Henry VIII clauses that are coming like a great flotilla down the channel towards us in the legislation that the Government have in mind.

I make only one plea, and not just to the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad; I am pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Young, is on the Front Bench as well. He is somebody with the parliamentary experience to tell No. 10 that it must think of a different way of dealing with this kind of legislation. Up with this the House will not put—I think I put that in the Churchillian way. Anyway, it will not. The Government must think again and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and others have offered to help them.