Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL]

Lord McNally Excerpts

Wednesday 17th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham]

My Lords, I support what the noble and learned Lord has said. My own view is that the power in the Bill gives far too great a power to Ministers. The fact that this specific power is subject to the affirmative resolution procedure is not a sufficient safeguard, not least because—a point I have made time and again—the procedure does not provide a power of amendment.

Let us consider for a moment what this power enables the Government to do. It could be used in amending, revoking or repealing existing legislation or to extend classes of offence to which the amended legislation applied. It could be used to increase penalties. It could be used to remove statutory defences. It could be used to amend the definition of criminal intent. Indeed, it could make absolute offences that presently require proof of a specific intent. Because it is an amending power, it could be used to give further powers to the investigating officials or to increase the penalties imposed by the courts.

One can get a very good guide as to what could be done from the clause of the Bill on enforcement, Clause 16, where one can find among other things that the regulations could impose a sentence of imprisonment of up to 10 years. That could be done by regulation—without the power to amend. There is a further objection if one actually considers, just for a moment, the purpose that can be used to justify the regulations. Clause 1(2) states:

“A purpose is within this subsection if the appropriate Minister making the regulations considers that carrying out that purpose would—


(a) further the prevention of terrorism, in the United Kingdom or elsewhere,

(b) be in the interests of national security,

(c) be in the interests of international peace and security, or

(d) further a foreign policy objective of the government of the United Kingdom”.

Paragraph (a) is all right, but paragraph (b) is becoming pretty broad and paragraph (c) is even broader, and paragraph (d) refers to an objective that might never previously have been discussed by Parliament or even disclosed to an admiring public. We are enabling a Minister, by fiat, to introduce regulations of that kind.

There are well-intentioned Ministers on the Front Bench such as the noble Lord, Lord Young. We have known each other for almost 60 years. I would no doubt be very content to let him have those powers. But then I ask myself whether I would want to give those powers to Mr McDonnell or Jeremy Corbyn. I suspect that nobody in your Lordships’ House tonight would wish to do that—certainly not the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, very sensible fellow that he is. I suspect that we would be paving the way to the elective dictatorship of which my father wrote and spoke.

If we are to do these things we do them by primary legislation, surely not by secondary legislation over which we have precious little control and when I know that the Whips will be very active with noble Lords who have never read the legislation. I do not know whether the noble and learned Lord will press his amendment, but, if he does, he will have my support.

[Lord McNally (LD)]

My Lords, John Major once gave some wise advice to the Conservative Party after it had been in office for nearly 18 years. He said, “Always remember that one day we will have to take the Conservative Party into opposition”. I always think it is rather reckless of a Government to legislate with the assumption that they will always be in power and that the powers they are giving themselves will always be used in the benign way that they intend.

I am pleased to follow the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. When I first came into this House, his father used to sit in the same seat. One of his more unnerving habits was to keep up a running commentary on speakers in a not so sotto voice. But the noble Viscount is quite right: 40 years ago in the Dimbleby lecture, his father warned precisely against an elective dictatorship—a Government with a majority in the Commons who could force through various Acts that would not be suitable in a parliamentary democracy.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has done a great service to Parliament by challenging the Henry VIII clauses that are coming like a great flotilla down the channel towards us in the legislation that the Government have in mind.

I make only one plea, and not just to the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad; I am pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Young, is on the Front Bench as well. He is somebody with the parliamentary experience to tell No. 10 that it must think of a different way of dealing with this kind of legislation. Up with this the House will not put—I think I put that in the Churchillian way. Anyway, it will not. The Government must think again and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and others have offered to help them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. Let me say at the outset that between Committee and Report we have considered many matters raised by noble Lords. I listened very carefully to the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and others, although I felt at one point, after hearing the contributions of my noble friend Lord Hailsham and the noble Lord, Lord McNally, that I should be handing over the Bill file to my noble friend Lord Young. I notice that he has escaped before I could avail myself of that opportunity.

[Lord McNally]

When the Whips desert you, you are in real trouble.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I am sure, though, that the noble Lord will agree that I have a very formidable Whip to my left. I am delighted to be joined by my noble friend Lady Goldie, who I can assure noble Lords is very well equipped in the robust defence of the position and policy. However, I am sure noble Lords will understand that I cannot accept this amendment but I will offer some comments in this regard.

First, the power in the Bill is not unusual. It is worth noting, indeed, that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, in its report on the Bill, made no comment on the inclusion of this delegated power. However, I recognise that the House has concerns, reiterated today, about the breadth of the regulation-making powers conferred by the Bill and I hope I can provide some reassurance that this particular consequential power is both appropriate and necessary. Importantly, the power can be used only to make savings provisions or other provisions that are consequential, supplemental, incidental or transitional to the sanctions or money laundering regulations. I assure noble Lords that it does not confer the power to make any changes to legislation that are independent of the sanctions and money laundering powers. It provides a tool to make changes to ensure that the statute book works but it does not give the Government the ability to change swathes of legislation without regard to that specific purpose.

Specific questions have been raised in this respect and, rather than detain the House, I shall offer those reassurances at this point. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and my noble friend Lord Hailsham both raised the issue of the substance. I believe the phrase, which is not the most legal of terms I have heard from the noble and learned Lord, was “nothing to bite on”. I will look up the constitutional books in that respect, but of course I understand the substance of his point. Let me assure the noble and learned Lord that the regulations in the Bill can be made only for the purpose set out in the Bill and impose sanctions of the type set out in the Bill. This clause permits only amendments consequential on the types of sanctions imposed for these particular purposes.

The noble and learned Lord also made a general point about Henry VIII powers. I assure him that they are there to serve a real purpose: to enable Ministers to make the necessary updates to the statute book that arise solely as a result of the sanctions and money laundering regimes.

My noble friend Lord Hailsham raised the list of uses of this power. I assure him that this can be used only to make amendments that arise as a consequence of the imposition of sanctions or rules against money laundering and not to make free-standing changes; for example, to change rules of evidence in an unrelated case. Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, rightly raised the issue of the courts and scrutiny, and how courts will police the use of these powers. I can say on behalf of the Government that we welcome and respect the scrutiny of the courts: they act, indeed, as a check on Ministers, as a useful safeguard which I hope will also reassure noble Lords. I hope that the assurances I have given have added clarity in the context of the powers in the Bill and shown that they are appropriately limited to what is deemed necessary. On the basis of this explanation I hope that the noble and learned Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.